THE American POLITICAL SCIENCE Review

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The American Political Science Review, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are $15.00 a year ($6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

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Articles and notes appearing in the Review before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. The *International Index to Periodicals* indexes current issues. Microfilm of the Review, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.
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The American Political Science Review

VOL. LV SEPTEMBER, 1961 NO. 3

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT*

KARL W. DEUTSCH[1]
Yale University

Social mobilization is a name given to an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life. It denotes a concept which brackets together a number of more specific processes of change, such as changes of residence, of occupation, of social setting, of face-to-face associates, of institutions, roles, and ways of acting, of experiences and expectations, and finally of personal memories, habits and needs, including the need for new patterns of group affiliation and new images of personal identity. Singly, and even more in their cumulative impact, these changes tend to influence and sometimes to transform political behavior.

The concept of social mobilization is not merely a short way of referring to the collection of changes just listed, including any extensions of this list. It implies that these processes tend to go together in certain historical situations and stages of economic development; that these situations are identifiable and recurrent, in their essentials, from one country to another; and that they are relevant for politics. Each of these points will be taken up in the course of this paper.

Social mobilization, let us repeat, is something that happens to large numbers of people in areas which undergo modernization, *i.e.*, where advanced, non-traditional practices in culture, technology and economic life are introduced and accepted on a considerable scale. It is not identical, therefore, with this process of modernization as a whole,[2] but it deals with one of its major aspects, or better, with a recurrent cluster among its consequences. These consequences, once they occur on a substantial scale, influence in turn the further process of modernization. Thus, what can be treated for a short time span as a consequence of the modernization process, appears over a longer period as one of its continuing aspects and as a significant cause, in the well known pattern of feedback or circular causation.

Viewed over a longer time perspective, such as several decades, the concept of social mobilization suggests that several of the changes subsumed under it will tend to go together in terms of recurrent association, well above anything to be expected from mere chance. Thus, any one of the forms of social mobilization, such as the entry into market relations and a money economy (and hence away from subsistence farming and barter) should be expected to be accompanied or followed by a significant rise in the frequency of impersonal contacts, or in exposure to mass media of communication, or in changes of residence, or in political or quasi-political participation. The implication of the concept is thus to assert an empirical fact—that of significantly frequent association—and this assertion can be empirically tested.

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* A draft version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Committee on Comparative Politics, of the Social Science Research Council, Gould House, Dobbs Ferry, June 10, 1959. An earlier version of this text is appearing in *Zeitschrift für Politik* (Köln, Germany).

[1] Further work on this paper was supported in part by the Carnegie Corporation, and I am indebted for assistance in statistical applications to Charles L. Taylor and Alex Weilenmann.

[2] For broader discussions of the modernization process, see Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960); Harold D. Lasswell, *The World Revolution of Our Time* (Stanford University Press, 1951); and Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960). *Cf.* also Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, 1958), and Lerner, "Communication Systems and Social Systems: A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2 (October 1957), pp. 266–275; Fred Riggs, "Bureaucracy in Transitional Societies: Politics, Economic Development and Administration," American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, September 1959, multigraphed; Dankwart Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East* (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1956); and Lyle Shannon, "Is Level of Development Related to Capacity for Self-Government?" *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 17 (July 1958), pp. 367–381, and Shannon, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Status," *Social Problems*, Vol. 7 (Fall 1959), pp. 157–169.

This notion of social mobilization was perceived early in intuitive terms, as a historical recollection or a poetic image. It was based on the historical experiences of the French *levée en masse* in 1793 and of the German "total mobilization" of 1914–18, described dramatically in terms of its social and emotional impact by many German writers, including notably Ernst Jünger. A somewhat related image was that of the long-term and world-wide process of "fundamental democratization," discussed in some of the writings of Karl Mannheim.[3] All these images suggest a breaking away from old commitments to traditional ways of living, and a moving into new situations, where new patterns of behavior are relevant and needed, and where new commitments may have to be made.

Social mobilization can be defined, therefore, as the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior. As Edward Shils has rightly pointed out,[4] the original images of "mobilization" and of Mannheim's "fundamental democratization" imply two distinct stages of the process: (1) the stage of uprooting or breaking away from old settings, habits and commitments; and (2) the induction of the mobilized persons into some relatively stable new patterns of group membership, organization and commitment. In this fashion, soldiers are mobilized *from* their homes and families and mobilized *into* the army in which they then serve. Similarly, Mannheim suggests an image of large numbers of people moving away *from* a life of local isolation, traditionalism and political apathy, and moving *into* a different life or broader and deeper involvement in the vast complexities of modern life, including potential and actual involvement in mass politics.

It is a task of political theory to make this image more specific; to bring it into a form in which it can be verified by evidence; and to develop the problem to a point where the question "how?" can be supplemented usefully by the question "how much?" In its intuitive form, the concept of social mobilization already carried with it some images of growing numbers and rising curves. In so far as the constituent processes of social mobilization can be measured and described quantitatively in terms of such curves, it may be interesting to learn how fast the curves rise, whether they show any turning points, or whether they cross any thresholds beyond which the processes they depict have different side effects from those that went before. Notable among these side effects are any that bear on the performance of political systems and upon the stability and capabilities of governments.[5]

I. AN ANALYTICAL FORMULATION

Let M stand for the generalized process of social mobilization, and let us think of it as representing the general propensity or availability of persons for recommitment. In this sense, M could be measured by the average probability that any person, say between fifteen and sixty-five years old, would have undergone, or could be expected to undergo during his lifetime, a substantial change from old ways of living to new ones.

In order to define this change more precisely, it is necessary to make three assumptions: (1) there are different forms of social recommitment relevant for politics; (2) these forms tend to be associated with each other; and (3) these forms tend to reinforce each other in their effects. Two further points may be noted for investigation: (4) each of these forms may have a threshold at which some of its effects may change substantially; and (5) some or all of these thresholds, though not identical in quantitative terms, may be significantly related to each other.

For these constituent processes of social mobilization we may then choose the symbols

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[3] Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York, 1940).

[4] Edward Shils, at the Social Science Research Council Conference on Comparative Politics, above, asterisked note.

[5] For a broader discussion of quantitative indicators, bearing on problems of this kind, see Karl W. Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (March 1960), p. 34.

$m_1, m_2, m_3, \cdots, m_n$. Thus we may call m_1 the exposure to aspects of modern life through demonstrations of machinery, buildings, installations, consumer goods, show windows, rumor, governmental, medical or military practices, as well as through mass media of communication. Then m_2 may stand for a narrower concept, exposure to these mass media alone. And m_3 may stand for change of residence; m_4 for urbanization; m_5 for change from agricultural occupations; m_6 for literacy; m_7 for per capita income; and so on.

Our m_1 could then stand for the percentage of the population that had been exposed in any substantial way to significant aspects of modern life; m_2 for the percentage of those exposed to mass media, *i.e.*, the mass media audience; m_3 for the percentage of the inhabitants who have changed their locality of residence (or their district, province or state); m_4 for the percentage of the total population living in towns; m_5 for the percentage of those in non-agricultural occupations among the total of those gainfully occupied; m_6 for the percentage of literates; m_7 could be measured simply by net national product, or alternatively by gross national product in dollars per capita. At this stage in the compilation of evidence the exact choice of indicators and definitions must be considerably influenced by the availability of statistical data. In many cases it may be most satisfactory to use the data and definitions published by the United Nations, in such volumes as the *United Nations Demographic Year Book*, the *United Nations World Social Survey*, the *United Nations Statistical Year Book*, and a host of more specialized UN publications.[6]

In a modern, highly developed and fully mobilized country m_7 should be above \$600 gross national product per capita; m_1, m_2, and m_6 should all be well above 90 per cent; m_4 and m_5 should be above 50 per cent, even in countries producing large agricultural surpluses beyond their domestic consumption; and even m_3, the change of residence, seems to be higher than 50 per cent in such a country as the United States. In an extremely underdeveloped country, such as Ethiopia, m_7 is well below \$100 and the remaining indicators may be near 5 per cent or even lower.

In the course of economic development, as countries are becoming somewhat less like Ethiopia and somewhat more like the United States, all these indicators tend to change in the same direction, even though they do not change at the same rate. They exhibit therefore to some extent a characteristic which Paul Lazarsfeld has termed the "interchangeability of indicators"; if one (or even several) of these indicators should be missing it could be replaced in many cases by the remaining ones, or by other indicators similarly chosen, and the general level and direction of the underlying social process would still remain clear.[7] This characteristic holds, however, only as a first approximation. The lags and discrepancies between the different indicators can reveal much of interest to the student of politics, and some of these discrepancies will be discussed below.

The first and main thing about social mobilization is, however, that it does assume a single underlying process of which particular indicators represent only particular aspects; that these indicators are correlated and to a limited extent interchangeable; and that this complex of processes of social change is significantly correlated with major changes in politics.

The overall index of social mobilization, M, is a second order index; it measures the correlation between the first order indices $m_1 \cdots m_n$. It should express, furthermore, the probability that the $(n+1)$th index will be similarly correlated with its predecessors, regardless of how large a number n might be, provided only that the index itself was appropriately chosen. Differently put, to assert that social mobilization is a "real" process, at certain times and in certain countries, is to assert that there exists for these cases a large and potentially unlimited number of possible measurements and indicators, all correlated with each other and testifying by their number and by the strength of their correlation to the reality of the underlying phenomenon.

In practice, of course, the range of available measurements and indicators is likely to be limited, and ordinarily there should be no need to compile for any particular time and country even all those data that could be found. On the contrary, one's usual aim will be economy: to get the greatest amount of useful information from the smallest body of data. The seven indicators of social mobilization listed above as m_1 to m_7 should quite suffice, in most cases, to give a fairly good first picture of the situation. They were chosen in part on grounds of availability and convenience, but also because they are less closely correlated, and hence less completely interchangeable, than some other indices might be.

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[6] *Cf.* the pamphlets issued by the Statistical Office of the United Nations, Statistical Papers, Series K, No. 1, "Survey of Social Statistics," (Sales No.: 1954. XVII. 8), New York, 1954, and Statistical Papers, Series M, No. 11, Rev. 1, "List of Statistical Series collected by International Organizations," (Sales No.: 1955. XVII. 6), New York, 1955. For somewhat earlier data, see also W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Commerce and Governments: Trends and Outlook* (New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), and *World Population and Production: Trends and Outlook* (New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953).

[7] See Hortense Horwitz and Elias Smith, "The Interchangeability of Socio-Economic Indices," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe, 1955), pp. 73–77.

Each of the seven processes chosen could itself be measured by several different indicators, but in each case these subindicators are apt to be very closely correlated and almost completely interchangeable. Literacy, for instance, can be measured as a percentage of the population above fifteen or above ten, or above seven years of age; it could be defined as the ability to recognize a few words, or to read consecutively, or to write. Each of these particular definitions would yield a different numerical answer, but so long as the same definition was used for each country, or for each period within the same country, each of these yardsticks would reveal much the same state of affairs. If applied to Morocco between 1920 and 1950, *e.g.*, each of these tests would have shown how the number of literate Moroccans began to outgrow the number of literate Frenchmen in that country, with obvious implications for its political future.

Similarly, urbanization could be measured in terms of the population of all localities of more than 2,000 or more than 5,000, or more than 20,000 or 50,000 inhabitants; or it could be measured, less satisfactorily, in terms of the population of all those localities that had a charter or a city form of government. Each of these criteria of measurement would have revealed the same process of large-scale urban growth in Finland between 1870 and 1920, for instance, or in India between 1900 and 1940, which had such far-reaching effects on political life in these countries. A recent unpublished study by Frederick E. Tibbetts 3d suggests once again the close interchangeability of different indicators of urban growth in Canada, as they bear upon the problems of assimilation and differentiation among the French-speaking and English-speaking population of that country. Urbanization, Tibbetts finds, has outstripped in recent decades the learning of English among French-Canadians; he finds among urban residents, and generally in nonagricultural occupations, a growing number of persons who speak no other language but French. The political significance of this development, which was largely concentrated in the province of Quebec, is highlighted by his observation that in 1951 Quebec (omitting Montreal), with 21 per cent of the total population of Canada, had only 4 and 7 per cent, respectively, of the veterans of World Wars I and II.[8]

Among the seven major indicators of social mobilization proposed in this paper, the correlations between economic development and literacy are less complete and the discrepancies more revealing. Ethiopia and Burma both have per capita gross national products of about $50, but Ethiopia has less than 5 per cent literates and is politically stable; Burma reports over 45 per cent literates and is not.[8a] Of the states of India, Kerala, with one of the highest rates of literacy, elected a Communist government in the late 1950s.

It may thus be useful to seek answers to two kinds of questions: (1) how good is the correlation between the seven main indicators and (2) how interesting are the variant cases? As regards the first question, it has already been pointed out that the numerical values of the seven main indicators will not be identical. However if we think of each of these indicators as forming a separate scale, on which each country could rank anywhere from, say, the top fifth to the bottom fifth, then we could measure the extent to which the rankings of a country on each of these indicator scales are correlated. From general impressions of the data, I should surmise that these rank order correlations should have coefficients of correlation of about 0.6 to 0.8, accounting on the average for perhaps one-half of the observed variation. As regards the second question, each of the cases showing substantial discrepancies between some of the main indicators will have to be studied separately, but the examples of Burma and Kerala, just mentioned, suggest that such cases may well repay investigation, and that the comparison of indicators may serve political scientists as a crude but perhaps useful research device.

For a somewhat more refined study the notion of two thresholds may be introduced. The first of these is the threshold of significance, S, that is, the numerical value below which no significant departure from the customary workings of a traditional society can be detected and no significant disturbance appears to be created in its unchanged functioning. For each of the particular indicators, m_1 through m_7, we should expect to find a corresponding particular threshold of significance, s_1 through s_7; and our concept of social mobilization should imply that, once several major indicators move to or beyond this threshold of significance, the remaining indicators should also be at or above their respective levels of significance. The probability that this will be in fact the case should indicate once again what degree of reality, if any, may be inherent in the concept of social mobilization as an overall process.

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[8] Frederick E. Tibbetts 3d, "The Cycles of Canadian Nationalism," Yale University, typescript, 1959, pp. 24, 26–31. For details of the Finnish and Indian cases referred to above, see K. W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953), pp. 102–11, 170–82, 197–204.

[8a] Note, however, the comment on Burmese literacy, in the Appendix to this article, below.

The second threshold would be that of criticality for significant changes in the side effects, actual or apparent, of the process of social mobilization. At what level of each of the indicators we listed above do such changes in social or political side effects appear?

The indicator of literacy may serve as an example. It has often been remarked that even a considerable advance in literacy, say from 10 per cent to 60 per cent of the population above fifteen years of age, does not seem to be correlated with any significant change in the birthrate, if one compares literacy and birthrate levels of a large number of countries in the 1950s. At the level of 80 per cent literacy, however, there appears a conspicuous change: for the same collection of countries, not one with a literacy rate above 80 per cent has a birthrate above 3 per cent a year.[8b] As a provisional hypothesis for further testing, one might conjecture that a literacy rate of more than 80 per cent might indicate such an advanced and thoroughgoing stage of social mobilization and modernization as to influence even those intimate patterns of family life that find their expression in the birthrate of a country. Obviously such a hypothesis would require other evidence for confirmation, but even in its quite tentative stage it may illustrate our point. If it were true, then the 80 per cent level would be a threshold of criticality on the particular scale of literacy as an indicator of social mobilization.

Since we called the indicator of literacy m_6, we might write c_6 for the particular threshold of criticality on that scale and put it as equal to 80 per cent. It would then be a matter for further investigation to find out whether other critical changes also occur near the passing of the 80 per cent literacy level. If so, c_6 might turn out to be the main threshold of criticality for this indicator. If important side effects should show critical changes at different literacy levels, we might have to assume several thresholds of criticality, which we might write c_6', c_6'', and so on.

Other indicators might well have their own thresholds of criticality at other percentage points on their particular scales. It might turn out, for instance, that most of the countries with more than 80 per cent literacy were also more than, say, 40 per cent urban, and that the apparent side effects observable above the 80 per cent literacy mark were also observable above the 40 per cent level on the urbanization scale. If such different but correlated thresholds of criticality could be found for all of our seven indicators, then the concept of social mobilization could be expressed as a probability that, if for some country n different indicators should show values equal to or greater than their respective critical levels, then any relevant $(n+1)$th indicator also would turn out to be at or above its own critical threshold.

Much of what has been said thus far may be summarized in concise notation. If we write P as the conventional symbol for probability, M_S as the symbol for the overall process of social mobilization in regard to the thresholds of significance, and M_C as the symbol for the same process in regard to the thresholds of criticality, then we may write the general concept of social mobilization briefly as follows:

(1) $M_S = P$ (if $m_n \leq s_n$, then $m_{n+1} \leq s_{n+1}$)
or briefly,
(1a) $M_S = P \ (m_n \leq s_n)$
and
(2) $M_C = P$ (if $m_n \leq c_n$, then $m_{n+1} \leq c_{n+1}$)
or briefly,
(2a) $M_C = (m_n \leq c_n)$
and perhaps also
(3) $M = P \ (M_S = M_C)$

None of these shorthand formulas should require further comment here. They merely summarize what has been said at greater length in the preceding pages. Readers who find such formulations uncongenial may skip them, therefore, without loss, so long as they have followed the verbal argument.

II. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT

In whatever country it occurs, social mobilization brings with it an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population. These politically relevant strata are a broader group than the elite: they include all those persons who must be taken into account in politics. Dock workers and trade union members in Ghana, Nigeria, or the United States, for instance, are not necessarily members of the elites of these countries, but they are quite likely to count for something in their political life. In the developing countries of Asia, Africa and parts of Latin America, the political process usually does not include the mass of isolated, subsistence-farming, tradition-bound and politically apathetic villagers, but it does include increasingly the growing numbers of city dwellers, market farmers, users of money, wage earners, radio listeners and literates in town and country. The growth in the numbers of these people produces mounting pressures for the transformation of political practices and institutions; and since this future growth can be estimated at least to some extent on the basis of trends and data from the recent past, some of the expectable growth in political pressures—we may call it the potential level of political tensions—can likewise be estimated.

[8b] Rosemary Klineberg, "Correlation of Literacy Rates with 1956 Birth Rates," Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1959, unpublished.

Social mobilization also brings about a change in the quality of politics, by changing the range of human needs that impinge upon the political process. As people are uprooted from their physical and intellectual isolation in their immediate localities, from their old habits and traditions, and often from their old patterns of occupation and places of residence, they experience drastic changes in their needs. They may now come to need provisions for housing and employment, for social security against illness and old age, for medical care against the health hazards of their crowded new dwellings and places of work and the risk of accidents with unfamiliar machinery. They may need succor against the risks of cyclical or seasonal unemployment, against oppressive charges of rent or interest, and against sharp fluctuations in the prices of the main commodities which they must sell or buy. They need instruction for themselves and education for their children. They need, in short, a wide range and large amounts of new government services.

These needs ordinarily cannot be met by traditional types of government, inherited from a precommercial and preindustrial age. Maharajahs, sultans, sheikhs and chieftains all are quite unlikely to cope with these new problems, and traditional rule by land-owning oligarchies or long established religious bodies most often is apt to prove equally disappointing in the face of the new needs. Most of the attempts to change the characteristics of the traditional ruling families—perhaps by supplying them with foreign advisers or by having their children study in some foreign country—are likely to remain superficial in their effects, overshadowed by mounting pressures for more thoroughgoing changes.

In developing countries of today, however, the increasingly ineffective and unpopular traditional authorities cannot be replaced successfully by their historic successors in the Western world, the classic institutions of 18th and 19th century liberalism and laissez-faire. For the uprooted, impoverished and disoriented masses produced by social mobilization, it is surely untrue that that government is best that governs least. They are far more likely to need a direct transition from traditional government to the essentials of a modern welfare state. The developing countries of Asia, Africa and parts of Latin America may have to accomplish, therefore, within a few decades a process of political change which in the history of Western Europe and North America took at least as many generations; and they may have to accomplish this accelerated change almost in the manner of a jump, omitting as impractical some of the historic stages of transition through a period of near laissez-faire that occurred in the West.

The growing need for new and old government services usually implies persistent political pressures for an increased scope of government and a greater relative size of the government sector in the national economy. In the mid-1950s, the total government budget—national, regional and local—tended to amount to roughly 10 per cent of the gross national product in the very poor and poorly mobilized countries with annual per capita gross national products at or below $100. For highly developed and highly mobilized countries, such as those with per capita gross national products at or above $900, the corresponding proportion of the total government sector was about 30 per cent. If one drew only the crudest and most provisional inference from these figures, one might expect something like a 2.5 per cent shift of national income into the government sector for every $100 gain in per capita gross national product in the course of economic development. It might be more plausible, however, to expect a somewhat more rapid expansion of the government sector during the earlier stages of economic development, but the elucidation of this entire problem—with all its obvious political implications—would require and reward a great deal more research.

The relationship between the total process of social mobilization and the growth of the national income, it should be recalled here, is by no means symmetrical. Sustained income growth is very unlikely without social mobilization, but a good deal of social mobilization may be going on even in the absence of per capita income growth, such as occurs in countries with poor resources or investment policies, and with rapid population growth. In such cases, social mobilization still would generate pressures for an expansion of government services and hence of the government sector, even in a relatively stagnant or conceivably retrograde economy. Stopping or reversing in such cases the expansion of government or the process of social mobilization behind it—even if this could be done—hardly would make matters much better. The more attractive course for such countries might rather be to use the capabilities of their expanding governments so as to bring about improvements in their resources and investment policies, and an eventual resumption of economic growth. To what extent this has been, or could be, brought about in cases of this kind, would make another fascinating topic for study.

The figures just given apply, of course, only to non-Communist countries; the inclusion of Communist states would make the average in each class of government sectors higher. It would be interesting to investigate, however, whether and to what extent the tendency toward the relative expansion of the government sector in the course of social mobilization applies also, *mutatis mutandis,* to the Communist countries.

A greater scope of governmental services and functions requires ordinarily an increase in the capabilities of government. Usually it requires an increase in the numbers and training of governmental personnel, an increase in governmental offices and institutions, and a significant improvement in administrative organization and efficiency. A rapid process of social mobilization thus tends to generate major pressures for political and administrative reform. Such reforms may include notably both a quantitative expansion of the bureaucracy and its qualitative improvement in the direction of a competent civil service—even though these two objectives at times may clash.

Similar to its impact on this specific area of government, social mobilization tends to generate also pressures for a more general transformation of the political elite. It tends to generate pressures for a broadening and partial transformation of elite functions, of elite recruitment, and of elite communications. On all these counts, the old elites of traditional chiefs, village headmen, and local notables are likely to prove ever more inadequate; and political leadership may tend to shift to the new political elite of party or quasi-party organizations, formal or informal, legal or illegal, but always led by the new "marginal men" who have been exposed more or less thoroughly to the impact of modern education and urban life.

Something similar applies to elite communications. The more broadly recruited elites must communicate among themselves, and they must do so more often impersonally and over greater distances. They must resort more often to writing and to paper work. At the same time they must direct a greater part of their communications output at the new political strata; this puts a premium on oratory and journalism, and on skill in the use of all mass media of communication. At the same time rapid social mobilization causes a critical problem in the communications intake of elites. It confronts them with the ever present risk of losing touch with the newly mobilized social strata which until recently still did not count in politics. Prime Minister Nehru's reluctance to take into account the strength and intensity of Mahratti sentiment in the language conflict of Bombay in the 1950s and his general tendency since the mid-1930s to underestimate the strength of communal and linguistic sentiment in India suggest the seriousness of this problem even for major democratic leaders.

The increasing numbers of the mobilized population, and the greater scope and urgency of their needs for political decisions and governmental services, tend to translate themselves, albeit with a time lag, into increased political participation. This may express itself informally through greater numbers of people taking part in crowds and riots, in meetings and demonstrations, in strikes and uprisings, or, less dramatically, as members of a growing audience for political communications, written or by radio, or finally as members of a growing host of organizations. While many of these organizations are ostensibly non-political, such as improvement societies, study circles, singing clubs, gymnastic societies, agricultural and commercial associations, fraternal orders, workmen's benefit societies, and the like, they nevertheless tend to acquire a political tinge, particularly in countries where more open outlets for political activities are not available. But even where there are established political parties and elections, a network of seemingly nonpolitical or marginally political organizations serves an important political function by providing a dependable social setting for the individuals who have been partly or wholly uprooted or alienated from their traditional communities. Such organizations may serve at the same time as marshalling grounds for the entry of these persons into political life.

Where people have the right to vote, the effects of social mobilization are likely to be reflected in the electoral statistics. This process finds its expression both through a tendency towards a higher voting participation of those already enfranchised and through an extension of the franchise itself to additional groups of the population. Often the increase in participation amongst those who already have the right to vote precedes the enfranchisement of new classes of voters, particularly in countries where the broadening of the franchise is occurring gradually. Thus in Norway between 1830 and 1860, voting participation remained near the level of about 10 per cent of the adult male population; in the 1870s and 1880s this participation rose rapidly among the enfranchised voters, followed by extensions of the franchise, until by the year 1900, 40 per cent of the Norwegian men were actually voting. This process was accompanied by a transformation of Norwegian politics, the rise to power of the radical peasant party *Venstre*, and a shift from the earlier acceptance of the existing Swedish-Norwegian Union to rising demands for full Norwegian independence.[9] These political changes had been preceded or accompanied by a rise in several of the usual indicators of social mobilization among the Norwegian people.

Another aspect of the process of social mobilization is the shift of emphasis away from the parochialism and internationalism of many traditional cultures to a preoccupation with the supralocal but far less than worldwide unit of the territorial, and eventually national, state.

An as yet unpublished study of American communications before the American Revolution, which has been carried on by Richard Merritt, shows how during the years 1735–1775 in the colonial newspapers the percentage of American or all-colonial symbols rose from about 10 to about 40 per cent, at the cost, in the main, of a decline in the share of symbols referring to places or events in the world outside the colonies and Britain, while Britain's share in American news attention remained relatively unchanged. Within the group of American symbols, the main increase occurred among those which referred to America or to the colonies as a whole, rather than among those referring to particular colonies or sections.[10]

More recent experiences in some of the "development countries" also suggest a more rapid rise of attention devoted to national topics than of that given to world affairs, on the one hand, and to purely local matters, on the other. This, however, is at present largely an impression. The nature and extent of attention shifts in mass media, as well as in popular attitudes, in the course of social mobilization is a matter for research that should be as promising as it is needed.[11]

Some data on the flow of domestic and foreign mails point in a similar direction. Of five development countries for which data are readily available the ratio of domestic to foreign mail rose substantially in four—Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, and Turkey—from 1913 to 1946–51; the fifth, Indonesia, was an exception but was the scene of internal unrest and protracted warfare against the Dutch during much of the latter period. The trend for Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, and Turkey is confirmed in each case by data for the intermediate period 1928–34, which are also intermediate, in each case, between the low domestic-foreign mail ratio for 1913 and the high ratios for 1946–51. Many additional development countries—including the Gold Coast (now Ghana), the Belgian Congo, Malaya, French Morocco, Kenya-Uganda, Tanganyika, Mozambique, and Malaya—for which data were found only for the 1928–34 to 1946–51 comparison, show upward trends in their ratios of domestic to foreign mail.[12] Here again, a relatively moderate investment in the further collection and study of data might lead to interesting results.

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[9] See Raymond Lindgren, *Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion, Reunion* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959); and K. W. Deutsch, *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton University Press, 1957).

[10] Richard Merritt's monograph, "Symbols of American Nationalism, 1735–1775," which is to cover eventually one or more newspapers from Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, respectively, will be published in due course.

[11] For examples of pioneering contributions of this kind, see the series of Hoover Institute Studies by Harold Lasswell, Ithiel Pool, Daniel Lerner, and others, and particularly Pool, *The Prestige Papers* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1951).

[12] See charts 1, 3, and 4 in Karl W. Deutsch, "Shifts in the Balance of Communication Flows: A Problem of Measurement in International Relations," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 20 (Spring 1956), pp. 152–155, based on data of the Universal Postal Union.

According to some data from another recent study, a further side effect of social mobilization and economic development might possibly be first a substantial expansion, and then a lesser but significant reduction, of the share of the international trade sector in the national economy. Thus, in the course of British development, the proportion of total foreign trade (including trade to British overseas possessions) rose from an average of 20 per cent in 1830–40 to a peak of 60 per cent in 1870–79, remained close to that level until 1913, but declined subsequently and stood at less than 40 per cent in 1959. Similarly, the proportion of foreign trade to national income rose in Germany from about 28 per cent in 1802–1830 to a peak of 45 per cent in 1870–79, declined to 35 per cent in 1900–1909, and by 1957 had recovered, for the much smaller German Federal Republic, to only 42 per cent. In Japan, the early proportion of foreign trade to national income was 15 per cent in 1885–89, rising to peaks of 41 per cent in 1915–19 and 40 per cent in 1925–29; but by 1957 it stood at only 31 per cent. Data for Denmark, Norway, France and Argentina give a similar picture, while the same foreign-trade-to-national-income ratio in the United States fell, with minor fluctuations, from 23 per cent in 1799 to less than 9 per cent in 1958.[13] Here again the evidence is incomplete and partly contradictory, and the tentative interpretation, indicated at the beginning of this paragraph, still stands in need of confirmation and perhaps modification through additional research.

The problem of the ratio of the sector of internationally oriented economic activities relative to total national income—and thus indirectly the problem of the political power potential of internationally exposed or involved interest groups *vis-a-vis* the rest of the community—leads us to the problem of the size of states and of the scale of effective political communities. As we have seen, the process of social mobilization generates strong pressures towards increasing the capabilities of government, by increasing the volume and range of demands made upon the government and administration, and by widening the scope of politics and the membership of the politically relevant strata. The same process increases the frequency and the critical importance of direct communications between government and governed. It thus necessarily increases the importance of the language, the media, and the channels through which these communications are carried on.

Other things assumed equal, the stage of rapid social mobilization may be expected, therefore, to promote the consolidation of states whose peoples already share the same language, culture, and major social institutions; while the same process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life. By the same token, social mobilization may tend to promote the merging of several smaller states, or political units such as cantons, principalities, sultanates or tribal areas, whose populations already share substantially the same language, culture and social system; and it may tend to inhibit, or at least to make more difficult, the merging of states or political units whose populations or ruling personnel differ substantially in regard to any of these matters. Social mobilization may thus assist to some extent in the consolidation of the United Arab Republic, but raise increasing problems for the politics and administration of multilingual India—problems which the federal government of India may have to meet or overcome by a series of creative adjustments.[14]

In the last analysis, however, the problem of the scale of states goes beyond the effects of language, culture, or institutions, important as all these are. In the period of rapid social mobilization, the acceptable scale of a political unit will tend to depend eventually upon its performance. If a government fails to meet the increasing burdens put upon it by the process of social mobilization, a growing proportion of the population is likely to become alienated and disaffected from the state, even if the same language, culture and basic social institutions were shared originally throughout the entire state territory by rulers and ruled alike. The secession of the United States and of Ireland from the British Empire, and of the Netherlands and of Switzerland from the German Empire may serve in part as examples. At bottom, the popular acceptance of a government in a period of social mobilization is most of all a matter of its capabilities and the manner in which they are used—that is, essentially a matter of its responsiveness to the felt needs of its population. If it proves persistently incapable or unresponsive, some or many of its subjects will cease to identify themselves with it psychologically; it will be reduced to ruling by force where it can no longer rule by display, example and persuasion; and if political alternatives to it appear, it will be replaced eventually by other political units, larger or smaller in extent, which at least promise to respond more effectively to the needs and expectations of their peoples.

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[13] See Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890–1957," *World Politics*, Vol. 13 (January 1961) pp. 267–299. See also Simon Kuznets, *Six Lectures on Economic Growth* (Glencoe, 1959), esp. the section on "The Problem of Size" and "Trends in Foreign Trade Ratios," pp. 89–107.

[14] For more detailed arguments, see Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, and Deutsch, *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area;* see also the discussions in Ernst B. Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism and Universal Organization," *World Politics*, Vol. 8, (January 1956), and "The Challenge of Regionalism," *International Organization*, Vol. 12 (1958), pp. 440–458; and in Stanley Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1960), pp. 223–40.

In practice the results of social mobilization often have tended to increase the size of the state, well beyond the old tribal areas, petty principalities, or similar districts of the traditional era, while increasing the direct contact between government and governed far beyond the levels of the sociologically superficial and often half-shadowy empire of the past.

This growth in the size of modern states, capable of coping with the results of social mobilization, is counteracted and eventually inhibited, however, as their size increases, by their tendency to increasing preoccupation with their own internal affairs. There is considerable evidence for this trend toward a self-limitation in the growth of states through a decline in the attention, resources and responsiveness available for coping with the implicit needs and explicit messages of the next marginal unit of population and territory on the verge of being included in the expanding state.[15]

The remarks in this section may have sufficed to illustrate, though by no means to exhaust, the significance of the process of social mobilization in the economic and political development of countries. The main usefulness of the concept, however, should lie in the possibility of quantitative study which it offers. How much social mobilization, as measured by our seven indicators, has been occurring in some country per year or per decade during some period of its history, or during recent times? And what is the meaning of the differences between the rates at which some of the constituent subprocesses of social mobilization may have been going on? Although specific data will have to be found separately for each country, it should be possible to sketch a general quantitative model to show some of the interrelations and their possible significance.

III. A QUANTITATIVE MODEL OF THE SOCIAL MOBILIZATION PROCESS

For a quantitative description, it is convenient to express our first six indicators not in terms of the total percentage of the population which is literate, or exposed to modern life, etc., but in terms only of that average annual percentage of the total population which has been added to, or subtracted from, the total share of the population in that category. If for some country our indicator showed, say, 40 per cent exposed to significant aspects of modern life in 1940, and 60 per cent so exposed in 1950, the average annual percentage shift, dm_1 would be 2 per cent. The seventh indicator, per capita increase, may be broken up into two elements and written as the annual percentage of the total income added, dm_7 and the annual percentage of population growth, p.

Adopting these conventions, we may use in this model, for purposes of illustration, crudely estimated magnitudes from various collections of data. If we add indicators for the increase in voting participation, and in linguistic, cultural or political assimilation, we may write for a case of fairly rapid social mobilization a small table of the sort shown in Table I. The case represented by this table is an imaginary one, but the different rates of subprocesses of social mobilization are not necessarily unrealistic, and neither are the consequences suggested by this model, for the stability of the government in any country to which these or similar assumptions would apply.

Before discussing these consequences more explicitly, it should be made clear that the annual rates of change are likely to be realistic, at most, only for countries during the rapid middle stages of the process of social mobilization and economic development—say, for a range of between 10 and 80 per cent literacy and for analogous ranges of other indicators of economic development. In the earliest stages, the annual percentages of the population shifting into a more mobilized state are apt to be much smaller, and in the late stages of the process something like a "ceiling effect" may be expected to appear—once 80 or 90 per cent of the population have become literate, any further annual gains in the percentage of literates in the population are likely to be small.

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[15] *Cf.* Karl W. Deutsch, "The Propensity to International Transactions," *Political Studies*, Vol. 8 (June 1960), pp. 147–155.

TABLE I. A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY UNDERGOING RAPID SOCIAL MOBILIZATION: RATES OF CHANGE

Symbol of Indicator		Description	Average annual % of total population or income added to category	
			Range	Median
Group I:	dm_1	shift into any substantial exposure to modernity, incl. rumors, demonstrations of machinery or merchandise, etc.	2.0 to 4.0	3.0
	dm_2	shift into mass media audience (radio, movies, posters, press)	1.5 to 4.0	2.75
	dm_8	increase in voting participation	0.2 to 4.0	2.1
	dm_6	increase in literacy	1.0 to 1.4	1.2
	dm_3	change of locality of residence	1.0 to 1.5	1.25
	p	population growth	(1.9 to 3.3)	(2.6)
Group II:	dm_5	occupational shift out of agriculture	0.4 to 1.0	0.7
	dm_4	change from rural to urban residence	0.1 to 1.2	0.5
	a	linguistic, cultural or political assimilation	−0.5 to 1.0	0.25
	dy	income growth	(2.0 to 8.0)	(5.0)
	dm_7	income growth per capita	—	(2.3)

Note: Figures in parentheses refer to percentage increases against the previous year, and thus are not strictly comparable to percentage shifts among sub-categories of the total population. A shift of 1.2 per cent of all adults into the category of literates, for instance, would refer to the total adult population, including the part just added by population aging; etc.

Within the middle stages of development, however, which are appropriate to the assumptions of the model, a cumulative strain on political stability may be expected. All the rates of change in group I tend to make for increased demands or burdens upon the government, and all of them have median values above 1 per cent per year. The rates of change in group II are related to the capabilities of the government for coping with these burdens, but the median values of all these rates, with only one exception, are well below 1 per cent. If it were not for this exception—the assumed 5 per cent annual increase in national income—one would have to predict from the model an annual shift of perhaps 1 per cent or more of the population into the category of at least partly socially mobilized but largely unassimilated and dissatisfied people.

If one assumes, in accordance with this model, an annual entry of 2.75 per cent of the population into the mass media audience and a shift of only 0.6 per cent into non-agricultural employment, then the expectable increase in the numbers of not adequately reemployed new members of the mass media audience might be as high as 2.15 per cent of the population per year, or more than one-fifth of the population within a decade. This might be the proportion of people newly participating in their imagination in the new opportunities and attractions of modern life, while still being denied most or all of these new opportunities in fact—something which should be a fairly effective prescription for accumulating political trouble. The spread of more effective methods of production and perhaps of improved patterns of land tenure, rural credit, and other betterments within the agricultural sector could do something to counteract this tendency; but short of major and sustained efforts at such agricultural improvements the dangerous gap between the fast-growing mass media audience and the slow-growing circle of more adequately employed and equipped persons is likely to remain and to increase.

If linguistic, cultural or political assimilation—that is, the more or less permanent change of stable habits of language, culture, legitimacy and loyalty—is also a relevant problem in the country concerned, then the lag of the slow assimilation rate, put at only 0.25 per cent per year in our model, behind the far more rapid mobilization rates of 0.5 to 3.0 per cent for the various subprocesses in our model, might be even larger for some of them, and potentially more serious.

Table II shows some of the implications of our model for a hypothetical country of 10 million population, $100 per capita income, a principal language spoken by 35 per cent of its inhabitants, and a relatively low degree of social mobilization in 1950. Conditions somewhat similar to these can in fact be found in several countries in Africa and Asia. Table II then shows the expectable state of affairs for our imaginary country in 1960 and 1970, if we assume the rates of change given in our model, as set forth in Table I, and their persistence over twenty years. As can be seen from Table II, the cumulative effects of these changes from 1950 to 1960 will appear still moderate, but by 1970 these effects will have become so great that many of the political institutions and practices of 1950 might be no longer applicable to the new conditions.

As Table II shows, a major transformation of the underlying political and social structure of a country could occur—and could pose a potential threat to the stability of any insufficiently reform-minded government there—even during a period of substantially rising per capita income.

To be sure, many of these political and social difficulties could be assuaged with the help of the benefits potentially available through the 5 per cent increase in total national income, which was assumed for our model. Such a 5 per cent growth rate of total income is not necessarily unrealistic. It is close to the average of 5.3 per cent, found by Paul Studenski in a recent survey of data from a large number of non-Communist countries.[16] Since the rate of population growth, assumed for the model, was 2.6 per cent—which is well above the world average in recent years—the average per capita income might be expected to rise by slightly more than 2 per cent per year.[17] These additional amounts of available income might well go at least some part of the way to meet the new popular needs and expectations aroused by the mobilization process, if the income can be devoted to consumption and price levels remain stable. But any increments of income will also be needed for savings (in addition to loans and grants from abroad) to permit a high rate of investment and an adequate rate of expansion of opportunities for education, employment and consumption for the growing numbers of the mobilized population.

These beneficial consequences could only be expected, however, if we assume that an adequate share of the increase in income would go directly or indirectly to the newly mobilized groups and strata of the population. Unfortu-

TABLE II. A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY UNDERGOING RAPID SOCIAL MOBILIZATION: ASSUMED LEVELS FOR 1950 AND EXPECTABLE LEVELS FOR 1960 AND 1970

Symbol of Indicator		Description	Per Cent of Total Population		
			1950	1960	1970
Group I:	m_1	population exposed to modernity	35	65	95
	m_2	mass media audience	20	47.5	75
	m_8	actual voting participation	20	41	62
	m_6	literates	15	27	39
	m_3	persons who changed locality of residence since birth	10	22.5	35
	P	total population (millions)	(10)	(12.9)	(16.7)
Group II:	m_5	population in non-agricultural occupations	18	25	32
	m_4	urban population	15	20	25
	A	linguistically assimilated population	35	37.5	40
	Y	total income (million $)	(1000)	(1629)	(2653)
	m_7	per capita income ($)	(100)	(126)	(159)

Note: Figures in parentheses refer to absolute numbers, not percentages. Because of rounding, calculations are approximate.

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[16] *Cf.* Paul Studenski, *The Income of Nations* (New York, New York University Press, 1958), p. 249; *cf.* also pp. 244–250.

[17] *Cf.* United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Population Studies No. 28, "The Future Growth of World Population" (New York, 1958), and United Nations, Bureau of Social Affairs, *Report of the World Social Situation* (Sales No.: 1957. IV. 3) (New York, 1957), p. 5.

nately, no assumption of this kind would be realistic for many of the developing countries of Asia and Africa.

It would be far more realistic to assume that in most of these countries the top 10 per cent of income receivers are getting about 50 per cent of the total national income, if not more. If we assume further, as seems not implausible, that in the absence of specific social reforms the increase in income will be distributed among the various strata of the population roughly in proportion to the present share of each group in the total national income, then we may expect that the richest 10 per cent of the people will get about 50 per cent of the additional income produced by income growth. At the same time, since these richest 10 per cent are not likely to be much more fertile than the rest of the population, they are likely to get only 10 per cent of the population increase; and they will, therefore, on the average not only get richer in absolute terms, but they will also retain the full extent of their relative lead over the rest of the population; and so they will increase in absolute terms the gap in income that separates them from the mass of their countrymen. Under the same assumptions, however, we should expect that the poorest nine-tenths of the population will get only one-tenth of the total income gain, but that they will get up to nine-tenths of the entire population growth; and that on the average these poorest 90 per cent of the people will remain in relative terms as far below the level of the rich one-tenth as ever. The fact that the poorer majority will have become slightly richer in absolute terms may then in the main increase their awareness of the wide gap between their living standards and those of their rulers; and it might at the same time increase their ability to take political action.

Differently put, if for the entire country the *average* per capita income was assumed to rise, we must now add that under the assumptions stated, the "social gap"—the gap between the incomes of the poorest 90 per cent and those of the top 10 per cent—may well be expected to increase. Political stability, however, may well be more affected by changes in the income gap than by changes in the average which in this respect might be little more than a statistical abstraction. Our model would lead us to expect, therefore, on the whole the danger of a significant deterioration of political stability in any development country to which its assumptions might apply. Since these assumptions were chosen with an eye to making them parallel, as far as possible, to the more rapid among the actual rates found in countries of this type, the expectations of rising political tensions in countries undergoing rapid social mobilization may not be unrealistic.

To rely upon automatic developments in economic and political life in those countries of the Free World to which the assumptions of our model apply, would be to court mounting instability, the overthrow of existing governments and their replacement by no less unstable successors, or else their eventual absorption into the Communist bloc. Deliberate political and economic intervention into the social mobilization process, on the other hand, might open up some more hopeful perspectives. Such intervention should not aim at retarding economic and social development, in the manner of the policies of the regime of Prince Metternich in Austria during much of the first half of the 19th century. Those policies of slowing down social mobilization and economic development in the main only diminished the capabilities of the government, paved the way to domestic failures and international defeats and were followed over the course of three generations by the persistent backwardness and ultimate destruction of the state. A more promising policy might have to be, on the contrary, one of active intervention in favor of more rapid and more balanced growth; a somewhat more even distribution of income, related more closely to rewards for productive contributions rather than for status and inheritance; the more productive investment of available resources; and a sustained growth in the political and administrative capabilities of government and of ever wider strata of the population.

The crude model outlined above may have some modest usefulness in surveying and presenting in quantitative terms some of the magnitudes and rates of change that would be relevant for understanding the basic problems of such a more constructive policy in developing countries.[18] Somewhat as the economic models of the late Lord Keynes drew attention to the need of keeping the national rates of spending and investment in a country in balance with the national propensity to save, so it may become possible some day for political scientists to suggest in what areas, in what respects, and to what extent the efforts of government will have to be kept abreast of the burdens generated by the processes of social mobilization. The first steps toward this distant goal might be taken through research which would replace the hypothetical figures of the model by actual data from specific countries, so that the model could be tested, revised, and advanced nearer toward application.

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[18] For other highly relevant approaches to these problems, see Almond and Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, esp. the discussion by Almond on pp. 58–64. The problem of rates of change and their acceleration is discussed explicitly by Coleman, *ibid.*, pp. 536–558. While this work presented extensive data on levels of development, it did not take the further step of using explicit quantitative rates of change, which would be needed for the type of dynamic and probabilistic models that seem implicit in the long-range predictions of the authors, as set forth on pp. 58–64, 535–544.

Any cooperation which social scientists and other students of cultural, political, and economic development and change could extend to this effort—by improving the design of the model or by suggesting more precise or refined definitions of some of its categories, or by furnishing specific data—would be very much appreciated.

APPENDIX

A GLANCE AT ACTUAL CASES: PARTIAL DATA FOR 19 COUNTRIES

(with the assistance of Charles L. Taylor
and Alex Weilenmann)

The following data, presented in Tables III–V, have been compiled or computed, respectively, in order to illustrate the possibility, in principle, of the kind of analysis proposed in the main body of this paper, and to demonstrate the availability of enough actual data to get such work at least started.

For certain categories—such as voting participation, immigration and internal migration, linguistic and cultural assimilation, and the inequality of income distribution—not enough data were readily available to permit even the simple type of tabulation presented here. Even for the data that we have collected, the gaps in such countries as Ghana, Nigeria and Congo illustrate the need for more research.

Moreover, the data being presented on the basis of the figures that appear in United Nations publications and similar sources make no attempt to estimate the margins of error to which they may be subject, or the differences in significance which a particular indicator of social mobilization may have in the cultural context of certain countries, in contrast with its significance in others. The high literacy rates reported for Burma and Thailand, *e.g.*, include a substantial proportion of literates trained through traditional monastic institutions. These rates show only a weak correlation to other indicators of modernity for those same countries, while the high literacy rates for Chile by contrast, refer to the effect of a more modern type of school system and are far better correlated to other indicators.

We have tried to take some account of these matters by basing estimates of over-all exposure to modernity not on the highest single indicator but on the average of the two highest indicators for each country, so as to discount to some extent the effects of any single indicator that seems too far out of line with the rest. Despite these precautions, the figures in projection offered here represent at best a crude beginning intended to stimulate far more thorough and critical statistical work, and its critical evaluation by experts on each of the countries and areas concerned.

For discussion of specific data and sources, see the Notes following the tables.

TABLE III-A. SELECTED INDICES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION FOR NINETEEN COUNTRIES: AGGREGATE LEVELS

Country	(1) GNP per capita (1955) US $	(2) GNP (1955) million US $	(3) Population (1953, 1958) 1,000	(4) Radio audience %	(5) Newspaper readers %	(6) Literates %	(7) Work force in non-agric. occupations %	(8) Urban population %
Venezuela	762	4,400	5,440	12.8 ('48)	—	43.5 ('41)	50 ('41)	39 ('41)
			6,320	48.9 ('57)	30.6 ('56)	51.0 ('50)	59 ('50)	50 ('50)
Argentina	374	7,150	18,400	51.2 ('50)	—	64.9 ('14)	75 ('47)	53 ('14)
			20,248	65.0 ('59)	54.0 ('58)	86.7 ('47)	77 ('55)	63 ('47)
Cuba	361	2,180	5,829	42.7 ('49)	—	71.8 ('31)	59 ('43)	50 ('43)
			6,466	59.3 ('59)	38.7 ('56)	76.4 ('53)	58 ('53)	57 ('53)
Colombia	330	4,180	12,111	17.6 ('50)	—	55.8 ('38)	28 ('38)	29 ('38)
			13,522	24.7 ('56)	17.7 ('58)	61.5 ('51)	46 ('51)	36 ('51)
Turkey	276	6,463	22,850	4.8 ('48)	—	20.9 ('35)	18 ('35)	24 ('40)
			25,932	17.6 ('59)	9.6 ('52)	34.3 ('50)	23 ('55)	25 ('50)
Brazil	262	15,315	55,772	19.2 ('50)	—	43.3 ('40)	33 ('40)	31 ('40)
			65,725	25.5 ('58)	18.9 ('57)	48.4 ('50)	42 ('50)	37 ('50)
Philippines	201	4,400	21,211	1.6 ('49)	—	48.8 ('39)	27 ('39)	23 ('39)
			24,010	5.2 ('57)	5.7 ('56)	61.3 ('48)	43 ('58)	24 ('48)
Mexico	187	5,548	28,056	11.4 ('48)	—	48.4 ('40)[a]	35 ('40)	35 ('40)
			32,348	34.6 ('58)	14.4 ('52)	56.8 ('50)[a]	42 ('58)	43 ('50)
Chile	180	1,220	6,437	36.9 ('49)	—	71.8 ('40)	65 ('40)	52 ('40)[b]
			7,298	38.4 ('58)	22.2 ('52)	80.6 ('52)	70 ('52)	60 ('52)[b]
Guatemala	179	580	3,058	2.8 ('50)	—	34.6 ('40)[a]	29 ('40)	27 ('21)
			3,546	4.6 ('54)	6.6 ('58)	29.7 ('50)[a]	32 ('50)	32 ('50)
Honduras	137	228	1,556	5.9 ('48)	—	32.6 ('35)[a]	17 ('50)	29 ('45)
			1,828	7.2 ('57)	7.5 ('57)	35.2 ('50)[a]	16 ('56)	31 ('50)
Ghana	135	624	4,478	0.8 ('48)	—	20–25 ('50)	—	—
			4,836	8.9 ('59)	11.4 ('58)	—	—	—
Egypt	133	3,065	22,003	4.8 ('49)	—	14.8 ('37)	29 ('37)	25 ('37)
			24,781	13.2 ('57)	7.5 ('52)	22.1 ('47)	36 ('47)	30 ('47)
Thailand	100	2,050	19,556	0.5 ('50)	—	52.0 ('47)	11 ('37)	—
			21,474	1.6 ('58)	1.2 ('52)	64.0 ('56)	12 ('54)	10 ('47)
Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)	98	1,639	12,154	0.2 ('48)	—	35–40 ('50)	—	—
			13,559	1.0 ('59)	0.9 ('57)	—	15 ('55)	16 ('47)
India	72	27,400	372,623	0.3 ('48)	—	9.1 ('31)[c]	29 ('51)	11 ('31)[c]
			397,390	1.6 ('59)	2.7 ('58)	15.1 ('41)[c]	30 ('55)	13 ('41)[c]
						19.9 ('51)		17 ('51)
Nigeria	70	2,250	30,104	0.2 ('48)	—	11.5 ('52/3)	26 ('31)	4 ('31)
			33,052	1.0 ('58)	2.4 ('58)	—	—	5 ('52)
Pakistan	56	4,560	80,039	0.3 ('50)	—	9.1 ('31)[c]	24 ('51)	11 ('31)[c]
			85,635	1.2 ('58)	2.7 ('54)	15.1 ('41)[c]	35 ('54/6)	13 ('41)[c]
						13.5 ('51)[a]		11 ('51)
Burma	52	1,012	19,272	0.2 ('48)	—	40.2 ('31)	32 ('31)	10 ('31)
			20,255	0.5 ('56)	2.4 ('52)	57.3 ('54)	30 ('55)	—

[a] Unequal age groups (see Notes below, Column 6).
[b] Variation of definition of "urban" (see Notes below, Column 8).
[c] Applies to pre-partition India, *i.e.*, to India and Pakistan together.

TABLE III-B. SELECTED INDICES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION FOR NINETEEN COUNTRIES: AGGREGATE LEVELS: PROJECTED FOR 1945 AND 1955

Country		(4) Radio audience %	(6) Literates %	(7) Work force in non-agric. occupations %	(8) Urban population %	(9) Exposure to modernity %
Venezuela	'45	1	47	54	44	63
	'55	41	55	64	56	75
Argentina	'45	44	85	74	62	>95
	'55	59	92	77	65	>95
Cuba	'45	36	75	59	51	83
	'55	52	77	58	58	84
Colombia	'45	12	59	38	33	60
	'55	22	63	52	38	72
Turkey	'45	1	30	21	24	34
	'55	13	39	23	26	40
Brazil	'45	15	46	37	34	52
	'55	23	51	46	40	61
Philippines	'45	0	57	32	24	56
	'55	4	71	41	25	70
Mexico	'45	4	52	37	39	57
	'55	28	61	41	37	64
Chile	'45	36	75	67	56	89
	'55	38	83	71	62	>95
Guatemala	'45	1	32	31	31	40
	'55	5	27	34	33	42
Honduras	'45	6	35	18	29	40
	'55	7	36	16	33	43
Ghana	'45	0	—	—	—	—
	'55	6	—	—	—	21[b]
						(1950/58)
Egypt	'45	1	20	35	29	40
	'55	11	28	42	34	47
Thailand	'45	0	49	12	—	38
	'55	1	63	12	—	47
Republic of	'45	0	—	—	—	—
the Congo	'55	1	—	—	—	33[b]
(Leopoldville)						(1947/50)
India	'45	0	18[a]	27	14[a]	28[c]
	'55	1	24[a]	30	16[a]	34[c]
Nigeria	'45	0	—	—	5	—
	'55	1	—	—	5	23[b]
						(1931/53)
Pakistan	'45	0	18[a]	7	14[a]	20[c]
	'55	1	24[a]	35	16[a]	37[c]
Burma	'45	0	50	31	—	50
	'55	0	58	30	—	55

Data in Columns 4, 6, 7, 8, based on corresponding data in Tables III-A and IV-A.

Data in Column 9 are 125% of means of the two highest figures in each of the other columns. (See Notes.)

[a] Pre-partition India.

[b] Based on the two highest data for country in Table III-A.

[c] No distinction made between pre-partition India and India and Pakistan respectively.

TABLE IV-A. SELECTED INDICES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION FOR NINETEEN COUNTRIES: SHIFTS AND RATES OF GROWTH

	Level	Average annual rates of growth			Average annual shifts				
Country	(1) Per capita GNP (1955) US $	(2) Total GDP (1954–58) %	(3) Population (1953–58) %	(4) Per capita GDP (1954–58) %	(5) Radio audience %	(6) Literate population %	(7) Work force in non-agric. occupations %	(8) Urban population %	(9)* Population exposed to modernity %
Venezuela	762	(8.8)	(3.0)	(7.5)	4.0 (1948–57)	0.8 (1941–50)	1.0 (1941–50)	1.2 (1941–50)	1.2 3.2 2.2
Argentina	374	(2.4)	(1.9)	(0.5)	1.5 (1950–59)	0.7 (1914–47)	0.3 (1947–55)	0.3 (1914–47)	0.0 1.4 0.7
Cuba	361	(3)[a] (1957–60)	(1.9)	(1.1)[c] (1957–60)	1.7 (1949–59)	0.2 (1931–53)	−0.1 (1943–53)	0.7 (1943–53)	0.1 1.5 0.8
Colombia	330	(3.1)	(2.2)	(0.8)	1.2 (1950–56)	0.4 (1938–51)	1.4 (1938–51)	0.6 (1938–51)	1.2 1.6 1.4
Turkey	276	(8.1)	(2.7)	(5.2)	1.2 (1948–59)	0.9 (1935–50)	0.3 (1935–55)	0.1 (1945–50)	0.6 1.3 1.0
Brazil	262	(6.4)	(2.4)	(4.0)	0.8 (1950–58)	0.5 (1940–50)	0.8 (1940–50)	0.5 (1940–50)	0.9 1.0 1.0
Philippines	201	(4.8)	(2.5)	(2.2)	0.5 (1949–57)	1.4 (1939–48)	0.8 (1939–58)	0.1 (1939–48)	1.4 1.4 1.4
Mexico	187	(4)[a] (1957–60)	(2.9)	(1.1)[c] (1957–60)	2.3 (1948–58)	0.8[e] (1940–50)	0.4 (1940–58)	0.8 (1940–50)	0.7 1.9 1.3
Chile	180	(2.0)	(2.5)	(−0.6)	0.2 (1949–58)	0.7 (1940–52)	0.4 (1940–52)	0.7[f] (1940–52)	0.6 0.9 0.8
Guatemala	179	(8.3)	(3.0)	(5.2)	0.4 (1950–54)	−0.5[e] (1940–50)	0.3 (1940–50)	0.2 (1921–50)	0.2 0.4 0.3
Honduras	137	(6.6) (1954–57)	(3.3)	(3.2) (1954–57)	0.1 (1948–57)	0.2[e] (1935–50)	−0.2 (1950–56)	0.4 (1945–50)	0.3 0.4 0.4
Ghana	135	(3)[a] (1957–60)	(1.6)	(1.4)[c] (1957–60)	0.7 (1948–59)	—	—	—	— 0.9 —
Egypt	133	(2.1) (1954–56)	(2.4)	(−0.3) (1954–56)	1.0 (1949–57)	0.7 (1937–47)	0.7 (1937–47)	0.5 (1937–47)	0.7 1.0 0.8
Thailand	100	(3.1)[b] (1950–54)	(1.9)	(1.2)[d] (1950–54)	0.1 (1950–58)	1.3 (1947–56)	0.1 (1937–54)	—	0.9 0.9 0.9

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* In each box of Column 9, the first figure is based on the levels in Table III-B, Column 9; the second figure is based on the two largest shifts for country (Columns 5–8, this table), and the third figure is the average of the two preceding figures in the box. (See Notes to Table IV-A, Column 9.)

[a] Growth in GNP.

[b] Growth in national income.

[c] Growth in per capita income.

[e] Based on unequal age groups. (See Notes to Table III-A, Column 6.)

[f] Variation in definition of "urban." (See Notes to Table III-A, Column 8.)

[g] Applies to pre-partition India, *i.e.*, to India and Pakistan together.

[h] No distinction made between pre-partition India and India and Pakistan respectively.

TABLE IV-A.—*(continued)*

Country	Level	Average annual rates of growth			Average annual shifts				
	(1) Per capita GNP (1955) US $	(2) Total GDP (1954–58) %	(3) Population (1953–58) %	(4) Per capita GDP (1954–58) %	(5) Radio audience %	(6) Literate population %	(7) Work force in non-agric. occupations %	(8) Urban population %	(9)* Population exposed to modernity %
Rep. of the Congo (Leopoldville)	98	(1.7)	(2.2)	(−0.8)	0.1 (1948–59)	—	—	—	— 0.1 —
India	72	(3.3)	(1.3)	(1.9)	0.1 (1948–59)	0.6[g] (1931–41)	0.3 (1951–55)	0.2[g] (1931–41)	0.6[h] 0.6[h] 0.6
Nigeria	70	(4)[a] (1957–60)	(1.9)	(2.1)[c] (1957–60)	0.1 (1948–58)	—	—	0.0 (1931–52)	— 0.1 —
Pakistan	56	(1.8)[b] (1950–54)	(1.4)	(0.4)[d] (1950–54)	0.1 (1950–58)	0.6[g] (1931–41)	2.8 (1951–54/6)	0.2[g] (1931–41)	1.7[h] 2.1[h] 1.9
Burma	52	(3.8)	(1.0)	(2.8)	0.0 (1948–56)	0.7 (1931–54)	−0.1 (1931–55)	—	0.5 0.4 0.4

TABLE IV-B. SELECTED INDICES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION FOR NINETEEN COUNTRIES: AVERAGES IN SHIFTS AND RATES OF GROWTH

Range (acc'd. to per capita GNP) US $	Average level	Average annual rates of growth			Average annual shifts				
	(1) Per capita GNP (1955) US $	(2) Total GDP# %	(3) Total population %	(4) GDP per capita %	(5) radio audience %	(6) literate population %	(7) population engaged in non-agricultural occupations %	(8) urban population %	(9)† Population exposed to modernity %
400+ (N=1)	762	(8.8)	(3.0)	(7.5)	4.0	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.2 3.2 2.2
300–399 (N=3)	355	(2.8)	(2.0)	(0.8)	1.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4 1.5 1.0
200–299 (N=3)	246	(6.4)	(2.5)	(3.8)	0.8	0.9	0.6	0.2	1.0 1.2 1.1
100–199 (N=7)	150	(4.1)	(2.5)	(1.6)	0.7	0.5 (N=6)	0.3 (N=6)	0.5 (N=5)	0.6 (N=6) 0.9 0.8
50–99 (N=5)	70	(2.9)	(1.6)	(1.3)	0.1	0.6* (N=2)	1.0 (N=3)	0.1* (N=2)	0.9 (N=3) 0.7 0.8
Total 50–750 (N=19)	209	(4.2)	(2.2)	(2.0)	0.8	0.6* (N=15)	0.6 (N=16)	0.4* (N=14)	0.7 (N=16) 1.1 0.9

These averages are entirely based on data of Table IV-A.

* Data for pre-partition India were used only once in calculating the average.

# GDP = gross domestic product.

† In Column 9, in each box, the first figure is the average of shifts based on highest levels, the second figure is the average of shifts based on largest shifts, and the third figure is the average of the first two. (See Table IV-A and Notes to Table IV-A, Column 9.)

TABLE V. SELECTED INDICES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION FOR NINETEEN COUNTRIES: PROJECTED MINIMUM LEVELS IN 1960, 1970

Country	(1) Radio audience %		(2) Literates %		(3) Percentage of economically active population in non-agricultural occupations %		(4) Urban population %		(5) Exposure to modernity %	
	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970
Venezuela	61	>95	59	67	69	79	62	74	86	95
Argentina	67	82	>95	>95	79	82	67	70	95	95
Cuba	61	78	78	80	57	56	60	65	87	93
Colombia	30	42	65	69	59	73	41	47	79	93
Turkey	19	31	43	52	24	27	26	27	45	55
Brazil	27	35	53	58	50	58	42	47	66	76
Philippines	7	12	78	92	45	53	25	26	77	91
Mexico	39	62	65	73	43	47	51	59	70	83
Chile	39	41	86	93	73	77	66	73	95	95
Guatemala	7	11	25	20	35	38	34	36	44	47
Honduras	8	9	37	39	15	13	35	39	45	49
Ghana	10	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Egypt	16	26	31	38	45	52	37	42	51	59
Thailand	2	3	69	82	13	14	—	—	52	61
Rep. of the Congo (Leopoldville)	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
India	2	3	26*	32*	32	35	17*	19*	37	43
Nigeria	1	2	—	—	—	—	5	6	—	—
Pakistan	1	2	26*	32*	49	77	17*	19*	46	65
Burma	1	1	62	69	30	29	—	—	57	61

* On basis of pre-partition India.

NOTES TO TABLE III-A

Table III-A gives the level of economic and social indices at the beginning and end of a period for each of the 19 countries. Gaps in the available data render it at present impossible to find data for equal periods for all of the indices of any one country. To compensate somewhat for this difficulty, projected levels for the same two years (1945 and 1955) have been computed in Table III-B by applying the average annual shifts of Table IV-A to the levels given in this table.

The present state of comparative international statistics is such that the table contains several weaknesses which are discussed below:

Columns 1 and 2. Per capita gross national products in United States dollars for 1955, and gross national products for 1955 were compiled by the Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, and reported in *Foreign Aid Program*, 85th Congress, 1957, Senate Document 52, pp. 239 f.

Column 3. Mid-year population estimates for 1953 and 1958 were taken from United Nations, Statistical Office and Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Demographic Yearbook, 1959* (New York, 1959), pp. 109 ff.

Column 4. Column 4 gives the percentage of the population exposed to radio broadcasting. The figures were arrived at on the assumption of 4 listeners for each radio receiver. This factor of 4 seems to be justified by the fact that countries which can with good reason be considered to have reached a level of saturation in numbers of radio receivers show approximately 4 persons per radio receiver. The outstanding exception is the United States, with 1.2 persons per radio receiver. Canada has 3.6, Western Germany 4.2, the Netherlands 4.3, Norway 3.8, Sweden 3.0, Switzerland 4.1, and the United Kingdom 3.7 persons per receiver set (these figures, for 1952 to 1955, are based on data given in UNESCO, *World Communications: Press, Radio, Film, Television*, Paris, 1956). The factor of 4 is further substantiated by a sample poll of persons above 18 years of age in the German Federal Republic, in which 92% said they listened to radio (see Noelle, Elisabeth, and Erich Peter Neumann, editors, *Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung, 1947–1955*, 2d rev. ed., Allensbach am Bodensee, Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1956, p. 62), a percentage that corresponds roughly to four times the number of radio receivers per 100.

Sources. The numbers of radio receivers for the years indicated were taken from United Nations, Statistical Office and Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Statistical Yearbook, 1960* (New York, 1960), pp. 608f. The percentages were calculated on the basis of the population figures given for the corresponding years in United Nations, Statistical Office, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, Vol. XIV, no. 12 (New York, December 1960). For Thailand, 1950, the percentage of radio receivers was taken directly from United Nations, Bureau of Social Affairs, *Report on the World Social Situation* (New York, 1957), p. 90; and the 1958 population figure for Nigeria was taken from the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook, 1959.*

Column 5. This column shows the percentage of the population exposed to daily newspapers. The figures are the result of multiplying the number of daily newspaper copies per 100 persons by a factor of 3. This factor seems justified by the fact that the number of daily newspaper copies in well advanced countries is approximately one third of the total population figure (United States 34.5%, Federal Republic of Germany 31.2%, Norway 39.2%, the Netherlands 25.9%, Switzerland 30.8%; figures based on UNESCO, *World Communications*). Professor Wilbur Schramm also uses the factor of 3 in his "Data on Mass Communications in 90 Countries" (Stanford University, 1957, mimeographed).

Column 5. Only the circulation of daily newspapers has been considered, even though various kinds of periodicals, such as illustrated weeklies and monthlies of general interest, may enjoy greater popularity than newspapers in many countries. Also, popular illustrated magazines may reach isolated and hard-to-reach places more readily than daily newspapers are likely to. Total exposure to the press is thus somewhat understated.

It was found feasible to give figures for only one year; this column does not therefore appear in the following tables.

Source. The United Nations *Statistical Yearbook, 1960*, pp. 206f., gives the estimated number of daily newspaper copies per 1000 of population. The *Yearbook* defines a daily newspaper "for the purposes of this table as a publication containing general news and appearing at least four times a week." It points out: "In interpreting the data, it should be borne in mind that in different countries the size of a daily newspaper may range from a single sheet to 50 or even more pages."

Column 6. Comparable international statistics on literacy are still difficult to obtain. In their enumerations, countries differ with respect to the age group of the population to be considered and to the definition of literacy or illiteracy. Not only do countries differ among each other, but a country may change definitions from one census to another. Most sources used for this column endeavor to give literacy (or illiteracy) figures based on defining literates as persons able to read and write. The degree of this ability may again vary from country to country (see UNESCO, *Progress of Literacy in Various Countries*, Paris, 1953). An attempt has been made to find or compute data in such a way that the same age limits apply to both years for each country; exceptions are duly indicated. The data in such exceptional cases are still deemed valid for our purposes. In 15 cases in which corresponding calculations have been made, the difference between the percentages of literates in the population of 10 years of age and over and that in the population of 15 years of age and over averages 0.9% and ranges from 0.1% to 2.6%. For the purposes of this analysis, these magnitudes are negligible, particularly regarding average shifts per year.

Column 6. The high literacy rates reported for such countries as Burma and Thailand include to a large, though diminishing, extent men who have received traditional training in Buddhist monasteries and are not necessarily involved in the process of social mobilization.

Several sources used for this column give percentage of illiterates. To find the percentage of literates, the former was subtracted from 100%. In some cases, this method may count a small percentage of "unknowns" as literate, and thus very slightly overstate the number of literates.

Sources and age groups by countries and years:
(Abbreviations used and summary of sources)

DY 1948—United Nations, Statistical Office and Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Demographic Yearbook, 1948* (New York, 1948), pp. 204 ff., gives numbers of illiterates and of total population in several age groups, by country (*e.g.*, 10 years and over, and 10 to 15 years);

DY 1955—United Nations, Statistical Office and Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Demographic Yearbook, 1955* (New York, 1955), pp. 436ff., lists total population, number of literates and percentage of literates in several age groups, by country;

StY 1957—United Nations, Statistical Office and Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Statistical Yearbook, 1957* (New York, 1957), pp. 599ff., lists percentage of illiterates and total population in several age groups, by country;

UN Report—United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation*, pp. 79ff., lists percentage of literates;

Progress—UNESCO, *Progress of Literacy in Various Countries*, gives percentage of illiterates;

BFF—UNESCO, *Basic Facts and Figures: International Statistics Relating to Education, Culture and Communications, 1959* (Paris, 1960), pp. 27ff., gives percentage of illiterates.)

Venezuela: 1941: *DY 1948*, age group 15 years and over computed from age groups 10 and over and 10–14; 1950: *DY 1955*, age group 15 years and over computed from age groups 7 and over and 7–14.

Argentina: 1914 and 1947: *Progress*, age group 14 years and over.

Cuba: 1931: *Progress*, age group 10 years and over; 1953: *StY 1957*, age group 10 years and over.

Colombia: 1938: *DY 1948*, age group 10 years and over; 1951: *StY 1957*, age group 10 years and over.

Turkey: 1935: *DY 1948*, age group 10 years and over; 1950: *DY 1955*, age group 10 years and over.

Brazil: 1940: *DY 1948*, age group 10 years and over; 1950: *DY 1955*, age group 10 years and over.

Philippines: 1939 and 1948: *Progress*, age group 10 years and over.

Mexico: 1940: *DY 1948*, age group 10 years and over; 1950: *UN Report*, age group 6 years and over.

Chile: 1940: *DY 1948*, age group 10 years and over; 1952: *StY 1957*, age group 10 years and over.

Guatemala: 1940: *DY 1948*, age group 7 years and over; 1950: *DY 1955*, age group 10 years and over.

Honduras: 1935: *Progress*, age group 15 years and over; 1950: *UN Report*, age group 10 years and over.

Ghana: 1950: *UN Report*, estimate, age group 15 years and over.

Egypt: 1937: *DY 1948*, age group 10 years and over; 1947: *DY 1955*, age group 10 years and over.

Thailand: 1947: *DY 1955*, age group 15 years and over computed from age groups 10 years and over and 10–14; 1956: *BFF*, age group 15 years and over.

Congo: 1950: *UN Report*, estimate, age group 15 years and over.

Pre-partition India: 1931: *Progress*, age group 10 years and over; 1941: Davis, Kingsley, *The Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 151, Table 70, quoted in Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, p. 201, age group 10 years and over, based on a sample and correction factor.

India: 1951: *DY 1955*, age group 10 years and over, based on 10% of census returns.

Nigeria: 1952/53: *UN Report*, age group 15 years and over.

Pakistan: 1951: *UN Report*, all ages, including semi-literates (13.5%). Another figure, 18.9%, excluding aliens and the population of the Frontier Regions, is given in *Pakistan—1959–1960* (Karachi, Pakistan Publications, October 1960), p. 89. Both data are reported to be based on the 1951 census.

Burma: 1931 *Progress*, age group 10 years and over; 1954: *StY 1957*, age group 10 years and over.

Column 7. The percentages of economically active population engaged in non-agricultural occupations (*i.e.*, those other than agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting) were taken from Food and Agricultural Organization, *Production Yearbook, 1959* (Rome, 1960), pp. 19ff., except those for Guatemala (1950), Honduras (1950), and Pakistan (1951) which were calculated from International Labour Office, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1960* (Geneva, 1960), pp. 14ff.; Cuba (1943) which was calculated from the 1947/8 edition of the same publication, pp. 10f.; and Argentina (1955), India (1955) and Burma (1955) which were taken from United States Senate, *Foreign Aid Program*, op. cit., p. 243.

Column 8. Urban data were reported in United Nations, Statistical Office and Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Demographic Yearbook, 1952* (New York, 1952), pp. 168ff., and United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1955*, op. cit., pp. 185ff. Those for Nigeria were taken from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Economic Survey of Africa Since 1950* (New York, 1955), p. 14; and for Cuba (1953) from *UN Report, 1957*, p. 172.

Definitions of "urban" vary widely from country to country, but an attempt has been made to see that the definition remained the same for both dates used in calculations for each country. For Chile, this was not possible. In 1940, "urban" included cities and towns of 1000 or more inhabitants and administrative centers of less than 1000 population. In 1952, the definition was population centers which had definite urban characteristics contributed by certain public and municipal services. It would seem, however, that these two definitions are close enough for our purposes.

A higher 1950 urban population (almost 54%) is given for Venezuela in *UN Report, 1957*, p. 172; if we had used it, it would have made the mobilization rates for Venezuela still somewhat higher.

NOTES TO TABLE III-B

To be in a better position to compare the available data all indices of social mobilization (Columns 4 and 5–8) have been adjusted to the same two years (1945 and 1955), by applying the annual average shifts of Table IV-A to the corresponding levels given in Table III-A. It is thereby assumed that shifts did not change significantly over the relevant years. While most of the adjustments involve only a few years, the risk of possible slight distortions had to be taken in cases in which a longer period was involved.

As we have only one level for newspaper readers, Column 5 does not appear in this table.

Column 9. The persons exposed to modernity are those who have in one way or another come into contact with aspects of modern life. Since hardly enough surveys in this respect have been made in the countries under consideration, the percentage of the population exposed to modernity must be estimated indirectly. It is initially assumed for the purpose of this table that (1) exposure to modernity includes any one of our indices (Columns 4–8) in addition to other, more informal exposures such as markets, travel, rumor, etc.; (2) the sector of the population in a smaller percentage index is entirely included in the sector of a higher percentage so that the exposed population groups form concentric circles—*e.g.*, all of the newspaper readers would be exposed to radio, and all of the radio listeners would be literate, but that some literates would not listen to radio, etc., (3) the largest sector is that exposed to any form of modernity, and (4) 20% of the population exposed to modernity are unaccounted for in Columns 4 to 8, because the groups indicated there do not overlap completely, and because of less formal ways of exposure. As has been pointed out in the introduction to this Appendix, however, in order to discount to some extent the effects of any single indicator that seems too far out of line with the rest, the procedure followed to estimate the percentage of the population exposed to modernity has been to increase the average of the two highest of the indices for each country and year by 25 per cent. This method reduces the impact of a single indicator with weak correlation to other indicators to such a degree that the percentage of persons exposed to modernity appears to be smaller than that of some other population sector in cases in which the correlation of single index is extremely weak (*cf.* Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Burma).

In actual fact, we have good reason to suppose that these assumptions understate in general the total extent of exposure. It is quite likely that some of the population sectors overlap only to a lesser degree. This can particularly be expected in countries with balanced low levels of social mobilization.

Calculated percentages exceeding 95% are assumed to behave differently. They are merely listed as being over 95%.

NOTES TO TABLE IV-A

Column 1. See notes to Table III-A, Column 1.

Column 2. Average annual rates of growth in gross domestic product for the years 1954–1958 were reported in United Nations, Statistical Office and Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Yearbook of National Account Statistics, 1960* (New York, 1961), pp. 265ff.

Data for Cuba, Mexico, Ghana and Nigeria are average annual rates of growth in gross national product for 1957–1960, and were taken from P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries" (multilithed, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T., August, 1960), pp. 3ff.

Data for Thailand and Pakistan are average annual rates of growth in national income for 1950–1954, and were taken from Paul Studenski, *The Income of Nations: Theory, Measurement and Analysis: Past and Present* (New York, New York University Press, 1958), pp. 229 f.

According to the sources, all rates are based on constant prices.

Column 3. The rates of population growth are the geometric means of the differences between the mid-year estimates of populations in 1953 and 1958. They were taken from the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook, 1959*, pp. 109ff.

Column 4. Average annual rates of growth in per capita gross domestic product in constant prices for 1954–1958 were taken from United Nations, *Yearbook of National Account Statistics, 1960*, pp. 265ff. Data for Cuba, Mexico, Ghana, Thailand, Nigeria and Pakistan were calculated on the basis of columns 2 and 3 of this table.

Columns 5–8. While Columns 2, 3 and 4 show average percentage rates of growth per year, Columns 5 to 8, and 9, represent average annual percentage shifts, *i.e.*, that average annual percentage of the population which has been added to, or subtracted from, the total share of the population in that particular category. Thus, these percentages were obtained by dividing the difference between the pair of levels in Table III-A by the proper number of years (see explanation of Table I, above). Since the figures in these four columns are entirely based on the data in Columns 4 and 6 to 8 in Table III-A, the notes and the sources for Table III-A and for its respective columns apply also to Columns 5 to 8 of Table IV-A.

Since we have the percentage of newspaper readers for only one year (Column 5, Table III-A), shifts into the exposure to newspapers have had to be omitted.

Column 9. Shifts in the population exposed to modernity were calculated in three different ways.

The first figure in each box is based on the levels of modernity given in Column 9 of Table III-B, and calculated in the same way as the shifts of Columns 5 to 8. For a discussion of the assumptions made, see Notes to that Table, Column 9.

The second figure in each box is based on the average of the two fastest growing indicators, as expressed by the percentage shifts in Columns 5 to 8. The underlying assumptions in this case are similar to those set forth for Column 9 in Table III-B. It is again assumed that the shift into the aggregate of all groups involved in at least one process of social mobilization should grow faster than shifts into any of the particular processes. If two or more sectors of the population did not overlap at all, yet each index was an expression of modernity, the shifts into each of these sectors would have to be added to obtain a basis for the calculation of the shift into modernity, and the fastest shift would constitute a minimum. A conservative estimate of the percentage shift into exposure to modernity, taking into account informal exposures, has been to take the average of the two highest of the percentage shifts in Columns 5 to 8, and increase it by 25%.

The first method here used may perhaps best be applied to countries that already have very high levels of minimal exposure to modernity. The second figure may be more representative of the shift to minimal exposure in low-range countries, and of the shift to more intense mobilization in more advanced ones.

The third figure in each box is the average of the first two figures.

NOTES TO TABLE V

The projections, for 1960 and 1970, are based on the levels of Table III and on the shifts of Table IV-A. For Column 9, the median shifts (third figure in each box of Column 9, Table IV-A) have been used in computing the projections of the exposure to modernity.

It is assumed that the average annual shifts will continue to hold. In actual fact, we have good reason to believe that shifts will grow as the countries develop and that these projections represent minima. Since results of the censuses taken around 1960 will soon be available, the reader will be able to check our projections for that year.

Calculated figures close to 100% are assumed to behave differently and are listed as being over 95% (>95).

MEASUREMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL CHANGE

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Social scientists are finding an increasingly useful and stimulating tool in the application of statistical techniques to their problems. As in the employment of any new tool, both the utility and the limitations of this one must be learned. It seems beyond reasonable doubt, however, that quantification of data in the social sciences will become a more widely used and rewarding procedure as time goes on.

Prudence dictates that stress be laid on its limitations. The enthusiasm with which a new tool—toy, some would say—is adopted should not blind the user to dangers which may be implicit in its overuse. One cannot squeeze more juice from an orange than the orange contains, no matter how modern the squeezer. Care must be exercised, too, lest the bitter essence of the rind become mixed with the nourishing juice of the fruit itself.

I

The present analysis is an attempt, in not too complex a fashion, to make use of such techniques to organize and validate data which might otherwise permit only the broadest sort of generalizations by way of conclusion, conclusions unsatisfactory roughly in proportion to their breadth. The senior author of this article has for more than a decade and a half been interested in the problem of objective measurement of certain aspects of political change in Latin America with particular respect to the sum total of phenomena falling under the rubric of "democracy." On four occasions, 1945, 1950, 1955, and 1960, he conducted a survey among groups of specialists[1] on Latin America to elicit evaluations which then, with the help of such statistical procedures as seemed useful, were summarized and analyzed. In the study of the most recent survey, undertaken on a more comprehensive basis than earlier ones, he was joined in the analysis and presentation of findings by the junior author, whose contribution has been such as to justify coauthorship. Results of these surveys have previously been published,[2] with a degree of response which

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* The authors gratefully acknowledge grants to assist in the research for this paper from the Senate Committee on Research and the Department of Political Science of the University of California, Los Angeles, and advice in connection with procedures from Thomas Ferguson, Joseph A. Gengerelli, and Dwaine Marvick of the University of California, Los Angeles, and Harold Guetzkow of Northwestern University.

[1] In the first two surveys ten persons participated each time; in the third survey, twenty; and in the fourth, forty. The following list identifies by a superscript "all" those taking part in each of the four surveys and by the appropriate numbers those participating in fewer instances: Robert J. Alexander[4] (Rutgers), Marvin Alisky[4] (Arizona State), Samuel F. Bemis[1,2] (Yale), George I. Blanksten[2,3,4] (Northwestern), Spruille Braden[4] (former Assistant Secretary of State), Frank R. Brandenburg[4] (National University of Mexico), James L. Busey[4] (Colorado), Howard Cline[4] (Director, Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress), Harold E. Davis[3,4] (American), Jules Dubois[3,4] (*Chicago Tribune*), Russell H. Fitzgibbon[all] (California, Los Angeles), William Forbis[4] (*Time*), Jesús de Galíndez[3] (Columbia), Federico G. Gil[4] (North Carolina), Rosendo Gomez[4] (Arizona), Stephen S. Goodspeed[3,4] (California, Santa Barbara), Paul E. Hadley[4] (Southern California), Robert M. Hallett[3] (*Christian Science Monitor*), Clarence H. Haring[1] (Harvard), Hubert C. Herring[all] (Claremont Graduate School), Henry F. Holland[4] (former Assistant Secretary of State), Preston E. James[4] (Syracuse), Bertram B. Johansson[4] (*Christian Science Monitor*), Miguel Jorrin[3,4] (New Mexico), Harry Kantor[3,4] (Florida), Merle Kling[4] (Washington, St. Louis), Leo B. Lott[4] (Ohio State), Austin F. Macdonald[all] (California, Berkeley), William Manger[4] (former Assistant Secretary General, Organization of American States), Herbert L. Matthews[4] (*New York Times*), J. Lloyd Mecham[all] (Texas), Edward G. Miller, Jr.[4] (former Assistant Secretary of State), Dana G. Munro[all] (Princeton), Harry B. Murkland[3,4] (*Newsweek*), L. Vincent Padgett[4] (San Diego State), William L. Schurz[3,4] (American Institute of Foreign Trade), Robert E. Scott[3,4] (Illinois), K. H. Silvert[4] (Tulane), James H. Stebbins[4] (Executive Vice President, W. R. Grace and Company), William S. Stokes[all] (Claremont Men's), Graham H. Stuart[1,2] (Stanford), Philip B. Taylor, Jr.[3,4] (Tulane), Martin B. Travis, Jr.[3,4] (Stanford), Arthur P. Whitaker[all] (Pennsylvania), A. Curtis Wilgus[4] (Florida).

[2] By the senior author, "Measurement of Latin-American Political Phenomena; A Statistical Experiment," REVIEW, Vol. 45 (1951), pp. 517–23;

indicates keen and widespread interest in the approach and methods. The present paper embodies an attempt to make a purely statistical analysis of the consensus of judgments by forty specialists; other sorts of analyses are possible and it is hoped can subsequently be made.

The objective of the successive surveys was to determine, with as much certainty as the necessarily subjective approaches by individuals to their respective evaluations would permit, trends of democratic or undemocratic change in the several Latin American states and the correlations and interrelationships among contributory factors. It was premised, as the preceding sentence suggests, on the assumption that democracy is a complex process, shaped and conditioned by many and diverse factors. It cannot be equated simply with, say, free exercise of the ballot. In ultimate analysis, of course, democracy can be said in large degree to be merely a state of mind; but to approach the appraisal on such a basis involves one in a subtle interplay of intellectual, spiritual and other factors which scarcely lend themselves to any sort of precise expression, if indeed, they are wholly identifiable in the first place.

Another problem inherent in this brash undertaking is simply that of definition of terms to begin with. We shall not now attempt that, but rather simply point out that a definition of democracy which might be widely acceptable, perhaps even unconsciously, in, say, Great Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, and the United States might not find such acceptance or even recognition in states of Latin America.[3] It is an oversimplification, but suggestive, to say that much public opinion in the first group of states mentioned above is inclined to regard the problem as one of political democracy, although the approach in much of Latin America is likely instead to emphasize social democracy. We know too little about the whole amorphous and involved problem to propose as more than a highly tentative hypothesis, that a shift to emphasis on the political aspects is a result of longer experience with self-government; the very complexity of the matter immediately suggests caution in making deductions.

II

It seemed necessary first to specify criteria which had an apparent relationship to the sum total of democratic attainment in a given country, with especial reference to states of Latin America. Some of these criteria were social, some economic, some cultural, some political in nature. Fifteen criteria, listed below, finally suggested themselves as having an important relationship, direct or indirect, to the determination of where State X in Latin America stood on a scale of political change relevant to democracy. They were:

1. An educational level sufficient to give the political processes some substance and vitality.
2. A fairly adequate standard of living.
3. A sense of internal unity and national cohesion.
4. Belief by the people in their individual political dignity and maturity.
5. Absence of foreign domination.
6. Freedom of the press, speech, assembly, radio, etc.
7. Free and competitive elections—honestly counted votes.
8. Freedom of party organization; genuine and effective party opposition in the legislature; legislative scrutiny of the executive branch.
9. An independent judiciary—respect for its decisions.
10. Public awareness of accountability for the collection and expenditure of public funds.
11. Intelligent attitude toward social legislation—the vitality of such legislation as applied.
12. Civilian supremacy over the military.
13. Reasonable freedom of political life from the impact of ecclesiastical controls.
14. Attitude toward and development of technical, scientific and honest governmental administration.
15. Intelligent and sympathetic administration of whatever local self-government prevails.

The order of arrangement above is what appeared to be a logically contributory and developing order and not one which indicates

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"How Democratic is Latin America?," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. 9 (Spring, 1956), pp. 65–77; "A Statistical Evaluation of Latin-American Democracy," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 9, (1956), pp. 607–19.

[3] Gabriel A. Almond has warned against the error of applying the norms of mature Western societies to developing nations characterized by pre-industrial societies. The basic methodological danger of this mixture of Western rational systems with traditional routines is that the researcher may find himself treating the underdeveloped societies as pathologies. The present writers have kept this admonition in mind. In instructing the respondents as to judgmental components for evaluating the fifteen basic criteria, a conscious effort was made to apply norms which reasonable men in pre-industrial societies would regard as valid. *Cf.* Gabriel A. Almond "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 391–409, *passim.*

the relative importance of the respective criteria. Obviously such a criterion as freedom of elections is more significant than some of the others in determination of ultimate results. Hence, it seemed desirable to weight the different criteria to indicate that degree of importance. Of those listed above, items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14, and 15 were weighted one; items 6, 8, and 12, one and one-half; item 7 (which appeared the most important of all), two; and item 13 (now partially of historical importance only), one-half. Respondents in the surveys were asked to rank the various states by the letters *A*, *B*, *C*, *D*, and *E*, indicating in general an individual judgment of excellent, good, average, poor, or insignificant (virtually no) democratic achievement, respectively, on the particular criterion. A rating of *A* was evaluated at five points, one of *B* at four points, and so on, to one point for *E*. The variation in ratings given to one country by a single respondent (taking into account the different weightings of the several criteria) could therefore range from 17 to 85 points.

Brief explanatory material regarding the criteria and the method of ranking was sent the respondents and in addition an evaluation form on which each person was asked to express 300 judgments—his evaluation for each of fifteen criteria applied to each of twenty states. In addition, in the 1960 survey, each respondent was asked, in a self-rating, to indicate his degree of familiarity, whether "considerable," "moderate," or "little," with each state and each criterion. The evaluation sheets used were in the form of a fifteen-by-twenty matrix, fifteen components of democratic practice listed to correspond to rows of cells for recording evaluations, and twenty states listed to correspond with the same cells in columns. The evaluation sheet also included an additional row and column of cells for indication of the respondents' "familiarity level" with the states and the criteria, respectively. This aspect of the analysis cannot be considered in detail at this time but it can be summarized by saying that the self-confident evaluations ("considerable familiarity") of the states did not usually differ significantly from the non-self-confident judgments ("little familiarity").

Although no sacrosanct quality is claimed for the phrasing of the criteria used, it seemed desirable to keep them identical in successive surveys in order to assure greater comparability of results. Each respondent was asked to view the scene in each state as of "recent months," though no specific time span was prescribed. It was also suggested that average conditions within a given country should be considered, though the difficulty of doing that for one as large and complex as, say, Brazil is immediately apparent. Given the somewhat exacting conditions laid down, the respondents certainly participated in the survey "above and beyond the call of duty" and the authors are deeply grateful for their collaboration. Replies were received in the early months of 1960; time since then has been spent in various sorts of analyses of the data, in part of which an advanced type of electronic computer was used.

A necessary first step in the analysis was the compilation of original or "raw" scores for the various states, determined simply by totalling the points for evaluations of the several criteria, taking into account their different weighting. "Raw" scores for the various states as shown in the four surveys are given in Table I.

Use of the "raw" scores is open to serious statistical objection, however, because of the natural (and perhaps unconscious) optimism of this respondent and the pessimism of that. That is, one person will be inclined to view the Latin American states through rose-tinted glasses, another through lenses befogged with various smudges of prejudice. Then, too, the ranges of scoring varied widely for the respondents.[4] Inasmuch as the ranges rather neatly straddled 1,000 points it seemed expedient and helpful to adjust or "normalize" the scoring of the various respondents by allotting each of them 1,000 points for all countries and recalculating individual state scores correspondingly. This was done by calculating reciprocals of the total scores given by each respondent to all states on all criteria and then determining the adjusted score to be given each state by multiplying the reciprocal by the "raw" score for each state. This statistical adjustment meant, of course, a change in the total for each state but not a change in relative ranking. Adjusted scores, omitting fractions (which are statistically insignificant) are shown in Table II; a graphic indication of the progressive changes is shown in Figure 1. Later aspects of the analysis are all based on adjusted scores.

Table II, in addition to giving the adjusted point-score for each state in the first column of each year's tabulation, shows in the second column for each year the rank order of the state in that year's survey. Ranks are somewhat delusive, however, in that two states with immediately adjoining rank positions (*i.e.*, fourth and fifth places or seventeenth and

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[4] Minimum and maximum scores given by a single respondent in the four surveys were: 1945, 750 and 1,229½ (a range of 479½); 1950, 798 and 1,184 (a range of 386); 1955, 741½ and 1,186 (a range of 444½); and 1960, 911½ and 1,334½ (a range of 423).

TABLE I. RAW SCORES, BY COUNTRY

	1945		1950		1955		1960	
	Points	Rank	Points	Rank	Points[1]	Rank	Points[2]	Rank
Argentina	628	5	536	8	499½	8	704½	4
Bolivia	308	18	334	17	374½	15	439	16
Brazil	481½	11	605	5	633	5	648½	7
Chile	712½	3	732½	2	713	3	741½	3
Colombia	683½	4	597½	6	507	6	651½	6
Costa Rica	730	2	702½	3	746	2	768	2
Cuba	590½	6	659	4	504	7	452	15
Domin. Rep.	301	19	320½	19	307	19	315	18
Ecuador	379½	14	474	9	487	10	556½	10
El Salvador	411½	13	424	14	461½	11	508½	12
Guatemala	416	12	472½	10	393½	14	483½	13
Haiti	330½	16	329	18	367	17	309½	19
Honduras	328	17	379	15	418½	12	452½	14
Mexico	545½	7	569½	7	639½	4	664	5
Nicaragua	345½	15	354	16	329½	18	370½	17
Panama	528	8	471	11	498	9	519½	11
Paraguay	289	20	293½	20	291½	20	284	20
Peru	494	10	428	13	369½	16	562½	9
Uruguay	772	1	788½	1	820	1	785	1
Venezuela	504	9	451	12	397	13	611½	8

[1] Initial "raw" score divided by two and rounded to next low one-half point if necessary.

[2] Initial "raw" score divided by four and rounded to next low one-half point if necessary.

TABLE II. ADJUSTED SCORES, BY COUNTRY

	1945			1950			1955			1960		
	Points	Rank	Percent	Points	Rank	Percent	Points	Rank	Percent	Points	Rank	Percent
Argentina	634	5	63.9	542	8	53.3	513[1]	7[1]	47.8[1]	652	4	78.0
Bolivia	315	18	19.2	335	17	23.4	384	15	29.5	406	16	39.2
Brazil	495	11	44.4	612	5	63.4	651	5	67.4	600	7	69.2
Chile	745	3	79.4	740	2	81.9	735	3	79.3	688	3	83.7
Colombia	718	4	75.6	602	6	62.0	524	6	49.4	602	6	70.1
Costa Rica	765	2	82.2	713	3	78.0	773	2	84.7	713	2	90.8
Cuba	619	6	61.8	667	4	71.4	513[1]	7[1]	47.8[1]	422	14	41.7
Domin. Rep.	310	19	18.5	318	19	20.9	312	19	19.3	290	18	20.9
Ecuador	387	14	29.3	479	9	44.2	498	10	45.7	514	10	56.2
El Salvador	417	13	33.5	422	14	36.0	469	11	41.6	468	12	49.0
Guatemala	426	12	34.7	478	10	44.1	398	14	31.5	445	13	45.3
Haiti	336	16	22.1	331	18	22.8	375	17	28.2	283	19	19.7
Honduras	331	17	21.4	378	15	29.6	426	12	35.5	414	15	40.4
Mexico	562	7	53.8	570	7	57.4	657	4	68.2	613	5	71.9
Nicaragua	349	15	23.9	351	16	25.7	336	18	22.7	341	17	28.9
Panama	537	8	50.3	468	11	42.6	505	9	46.7	478	11	50.6
Paraguay	304	20	17.6	293	20	17.3	297	20	17.1	261	20	16.3
Peru	505	10	45.8	425	13	36.4	378	16	28.7	518	9	56.9
Uruguay	804	1	87.7	804	1	91.2	850	1	95.6	767	1	96.2
Venezuela	518	9	47.6	448	12	39.7	404	13	32.3	564	8	64.1

Tie.

eighteenth places) may be close together or relatively far apart in terms of points. It is desirable, then, to determine percentage positions and shifts for the several states. It would not be feasible to do this on the basis of a perfect or even an optimum "democratic measurement"; but it can be done by assigning to the lowest possible score a percentage of zero, and to the highest possible a percentage of 100. If "raw" scores were to be used, the variation—in a ten-respondent survey—would be between 170 and 850 points; *i.e.*, if a given state were rated *E* on all criteria by all ten respondents it would receive a total of 170 points, while if another state were rated *A* in similar fashion its total would be 850 points. Using adjusted scores, however, it was necessary similarly to adjust the minima and maxima employed for determining percentages.[5] On this basis percentage achievement in the various years surveyed could be determined, and the results are shown in the third column of each year's tabulations in Table II. Percentage positions are more revealing than rank positions in that they show up what would otherwise be occasionally concealed by "bunching."[6]

Table III gives certain summary information extracted from Table II. The first three columns show percentage changes by states from, respectively, 1945 to 1950, 1950 to 1955, and 1955 to 1960; the fourth column cumulates these and shows the net percentage change from 1945 to 1960. The fifth column indicates the maximum point fluctuation by states over the fifteen-year period, and the last column shows the net point change over that period.

In the broadest terms, a tentative conclusion might be reached that Latin America has gained somewhat in recent years in total democratic achievement. This may be determined by totaling "raw" scores of the four surveys, dividing the totals for 1955 and 1960 by two and four, respectively, because of the larger number of respondents. The resulting totals



FIG. 1. Movement in adjusted scores, by countries, 1945–1960.

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[5] *Adjusted* minima and maxima for the successive surveys were: 1945, 178 and 892; 1950, 173 and 865; 1955, 176 and 881; 1960, 158 and 792.

[6] An apparent anomaly will be noted in the case of six states (Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama) whose rank positions declined between 1955 and 1960 although their percentages improved. This is explained by the considerably higher total scores assigned by respondents in 1960 over those given in 1955. This same apparent contradiction occurred, but less frequently, in the changes between 1945 and 1950 and between 1950 and 1955.

TABLE III. PERCENTAGE AND POINT CHANGES, BY COUNTRY, 1945–1960

	% Change 1945–50	% Change 1950–55	% Change 1955–60	% Change 1945–60	Maximum Point Shift	Net Point Shift 1945–60
Argentina	−10.6	− 5.5	+30.2	+14.1	139	+ 18
Bolivia	+ 4.2	+ 6.1	+ 9.7	+20.0	91	+ 91
Brazil	+19.0	+ 4.0	+ 1.8	+24.8	156	+105
Chile	+ 2.5	− 2.6	+ 4.4	+ 4.3	57	− 57
Colombia	−13.6	−12.6	+20.7	− 5.5	194	−116
Costa Rica	− 4.2	+ 6.7	+ 6.1	+ 8.6	60	− 52
Cuba	+ 9.6	−23.6	− 6.1	−20.1	245	−197
Domin. Rep.	+ 2.4	− 1.6	+ 1.6	+ 2.4	28	− 20
Ecuador	+14.9	+ 1.5	+10.5	+26.9	127	+127
El Salvador	+ 2.5	+ 5.6	+ 7.4	+15.5	52	+ 51
Guatemala	+ 9.4	−12.6	+13.8	+10.6	80	+ 19
Haiti	+ .7	+ 5.4	− 8.5	− 2.4	92	− 53
Honduras	+ 8.2	+ 5.9	+ 4.9	+19.0	95	+ 83
Mexico	+ 3.6	+10.8	+ 3.7	+18.1	95	+ 51
Nicaragua	+ 1.8	− 3.0	+ 6.2	+ 5.0	15	− 8
Panama	− 7.7	+ 4.1	+ 3.9	+ .3	69	− 59
Paraguay	− .3	− .2	− .8	− 1.3	43	− 43
Peru	− 9.4	− 7.7	+28.2	+11.1	140	+ 13
Uruguay	+ 3.5	+ 4.4	+ .6	+ 8.5	83	− 37
Venezuela	− 7.9	− 7.4	+31.8	+16.5	160	+ 46

are: 1945, 9,763½; 1950, 9,943; 1955, 9,760; 1960, 10,827½. The considerable jump in 1960 may well be a reflection of the impression caused by the fall of various Latin American dictatorships in the late 1950s. Greater comparability and hence more validity might be gained by using only the totals of those seven respondents who participated in all four surveys. On this more limited basis the respective totals were: 1945, 6,452½; 1950, 6,995; 1955, 6,338; 1960, 7,132. In the shift from 1955 to 1960, the most marked of any of the three quinquennia available for comparison, the seven "veterans" are an even three percent more liberal than the total of the forty respondents.

The monopoly of certain states on relative positions among the Latin American group in terms of democratic achievement is illustrated in part by Table II. It can be further demonstrated by determining the respective number of ratings of excellent, good, average, poor, and insignificant given the several states in total. Each state in the four surveys received a total of 1,200 ratings (the four were, chronologically, 150, 150, 300, and 600). If State X had received from every respondent in each survey a rating of *A* it then would have had 1,200 *A's* and no other ratings of any kind. The actual distribution of ratings is indicated in Table IV.

Similarly, 1,200 opportunities were offered in the four surveys for complete concentration of evaluations or a partial or complete spread among the respondents. That is, all respondents could evaluate criterion X for State Y as good, for example; or, on the other hand, their evaluations could wholly or partially cover the gamut from *A* to *E*, *i.e.*, excellent to insignificant. Since the number of respondents increased in the third and fourth surveys chance would make it more likely that disagreement or

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS, BY COUNTRY

	Excellent	Good	Average	Poor	Insignificant
Argentina	342	465	214	91	88
Bolivia	29	127	318	452	274
Brazil	213	464	420	86	17
Chile	494	526	162	17	1
Colombia	205	458	417	94	26
Costa Rica	563	511	120	6	0
Cuba	127	336	383	220	134
Domin. Rep.	31	100	234	301	534
Ecuador	55	256	509	303	77
El Salvador	49	216	500	347	88
Guatemala	40	145	476	435	104
Haiti	14	72	226	453	435
Honduras	38	97	427	470	168
Mexico	248	511	339	77	25
Nicaragua	19	75	326	479	301
Panama	76	264	507	284	69
Paraguay	8	45	155	463	529
Peru	64	208	511	306	111
Uruguay	799	360	37	4	0
Venezuela	111	310	480	196	103

spread rather than agreement or concentration would prevail; but curiously, of the seven instances (out of 1,200) when complete agreement was registered five occurred in 1955, with twenty respondents participating. In that year all twenty judged that attainment in freedom of party organization in the Dominican Republic was insignificant and that Uruguay's achievement in freedom of expression, freedom of elections, significance of party organization, and civilian supremacy should be regarded as excellent. In 1950 all ten respondents had agreed that civilian supremacy over the military was good in Cuba and that the Dominican Republic's progress toward free elections was insignificant. No instances of complete agreement occurred among the respondents in 1945 or in 1960.

Among the 1,200 ratings in the four surveys, 133 instances—more than half of them in 1960—showed the respondents evaluating particular criteria for given states all the way from excellent to insignificant; even specialists may disagree. A complete spread in evaluations was commonest with regard to Panama, where in fourteen instances the respondents registered clear across the spectrum from excellent to insignificant, and Cuba, El Salvador, and Honduras, where all gradations of judgment were represented in twelve instances. The degree of spread or concentration of evaluations is shown in Table V. In it Column 1 indicates the instances, by states, in which all respondents agreed on a single evaluation, whatever it was. Column 2 shows the number of times in which all respondents concentrated their judgments on two evaluations, even though these might not be contiguous evaluations, *i.e.*, excellent and good, good and average, etc. Columns 3 and 4 indicate the numbers of cases in which the spread was proportionately greater, and Column 5 shows the number of instances in which the spread was complete, *i.e.*, representing all evaluations from excellent to insignificant.

Among the several criteria, it appeared that the respondents found it easiest to disagree on the status of internal unity and the absence of foreign domination. In the former case there were twenty instances of disagreement "across the board"; in the latter, twenty-one. An extreme illustration of divergence of views was presented by opinions on Cuba's freedom from foreign domination in 1960; for ten respondents its situation in that respect was excellent, for ten it was good, for ten it was average, for six it was poor, and for four its freedom from foreign domination was insignificant. Table VI indicates, by criteria, the concentration or spread of judgments in similar fashion to Table V.

TABLE V. CONCENTRATION AND SPREAD IN EVALUATIONS, BY COUNTRY

	1	2	3	4	5
Argentina		11	21	22	6
Bolivia		6	25	22	7
Brazil		6	30	21	3
Chile		15	35	9	1
Colombia		10	25	20	5
Costa Rica		20	37	3	
Cuba	1	8	19	20	12
Domin. Rep.	2	12	19	17	10
Ecuador		1	23	28	8
El Salvador			11	37	12
Guatemala		3	26	20	11
Haiti		9	27	19	5
Honduras			23	25	12
Mexico		3	24	24	9
Nicaragua		3	25	27	5
Panama			15	31	14
Paraguay		9	37	10	4
Peru		4	24	29	3
Uruguay	4	35	17	4	
Venezuela		1	19	34	6

III

The data are subject to analysis also from the point of view of the criteria used. In such an analysis it may be possible to determine tentatively, for one thing, the nature of the shifts taking place in the various components of democracy in Latin America. Totals of points in each survey for each criterion, the corresponding rank achieved by each, and the point changes for appropriate periods are indicated in Table VII. The same data are shown graphically in Figure 2.

Table VII *indicates the consensus of the*

TABLE VI. CONCENTRATION AND SPREAD IN EVALUATIONS, BY CRITERIA

	1	2	3	4	5
Educational level		19	44	17	
Standard of living		20	42	18	
Internal unity		5	20	34	21
Political maturity		16	27	30	7
Lack of foreign domination		5	23	31	21
Freedom of speech, etc.	1	16	30	25	8
Free elections	2	17	27	27	7
Free party organization	2	9	34	26	9
Judicial independence		6	34	33	7
Government funds		5	24	40	11
Social legislation		8	46	23	3
Civilian supremacy	2	15	28	25	10
Lack of ecclesiastical control		6	29	29	16
Government administration		6	32	37	5
Local government		3	41	28	8

specialists, that conditions affecting all components improved in the last half of the 1950s, sometimes strikingly (*e.g.*, in regard to elections and civilian supremacy), and also registered a gain in each instance (even in freedom from ecclesiastical controls, which had always been considered good) over the whole period of a decade and a half. Changes of this sort are in general agreement, especially as regards the quinquennium 1955–60, with the shifts earlier mentioned in total point scores ("raw") for the half decade (*i.e.*, from 9,760 to 10,827½ between 1955 and 1960).

IV

It seemed desirable also to explore the statistical interrelationships among criteria. Could significant correlations be found, for example, between one respondent's evaluations of Criterion 1 (educational level) and his judgments with respect to Criterion 2 (standard of living) —*i.e.*, how often would Criterion 1 be rated *A* though Criterion 2 was rated *C* for the same states? In the state analysis dealt with earlier, individual states were treated as discrete units; the nature of this aspect of the analysis dictated that criteria ratings for individual states be grouped into totals which no longer emphasized political boundaries but dealt with Latin America as a consolidated whole. Within this whole the components of democracy are similarly treated as mutually exclusive variables although the authors realize that this is an oversimplification.

The concern here was not the collective values assigned by the specialists to any single criterion, as was the case in those aspects focusing on the states. It was, rather, the determination of any correlations between relative achievement in respect to one criterion and that in another. By treating each set of evaluations, in the scale of five alternatives per pair of criteria being compared, as one permutation it was then possible to collect like permutations into their appropriate space in a series of contingency tables. One such table was constructed for each pair of criteria for which comparison was sought, *e.g.*, free elections and free press. Data from each response form were collected into a composite table showing observed cell frequencies and marginal totals.

With the observed cell frequencies established, expected (or *a priori*) cell frequencies were computed by multiplying the totals of the respective coordinates (row and column totals) for each cell and dividing this product by the total size of the sample, N. With forty respondents expressing judgments (in this case, permutations found by comparing judgments expressed for the pairs of variable criteria independently of each other but with reference to specific states) on twenty states, the sample is forty (respondents) times twenty (states), or N equals 800. The observed frequencies were then compared with the computed expected cell frequencies to determine if there was close agreement. This required the hypothetical assumption that in each tabular comparison the compared variables were independent of each other. If this were so, fairly close agreement, given the marginal totals, might have been anticipated between the expected and observed

TABLE VII. CHANGES IN EVALUATIONS, BY CRITERIA, 1945–1960

	1945		1950			1955			1960			
	Points	Rank	Points	Rank	Change in Points 1945–50	Points[1]	Rank	Change in Points 1950–55	Points[2]	Rank	Change in Points 1955–60	Change in Points 1945–60
Educational level	521	15	586	6	+65	562	8	−24	590	13	+28	+69
Standard of living	525	13	563	11	+38	559	9	−4	571	15	+12	+46
Internal unity	623	4	639	3	+16	627	3	−12	666	4	+39	+43
Political maturity	561	8	576	8	+15	582	6	+6	617	10	+35	+56
Lack of foreign domination	659	2	669	2	+10	686	2	+17	724	2	+38	+65
Freedom of speech, etc.	650	3	609	5	−41	605	5	−4	689	3	+84	+39
Free elections	552	9	538	15	−14	541	12	+3	659	5	+118	+107
Free party organization	546	10	548	14	+2	533	14	−15	630	7	+97	+84
Judicial independence	574	5	581	7	+7	547	10	−34	620	9	+73	+46
Government funds	523	14	552	12	+29	544	11	−8	602	12	+58	+79
Social legislation	562	7	622	4	+60	609	4	−13	629	8	+20	+67
Civilian supremacy	567	6	568	10	+1	521	15	−47	632	6	+111	+65
Lack of ecclesiastical control	732	1	717	1	−15	722	1	+5	739	1	+17	+7
Government administration	539	12	569	9	+30	565	7	−4	612	11	+47	+73
Local government	542	11	551	13	+9	540	13	−11	583	14	+43	+41

[1] Initial score divided by two and rounded to next lower whole point if necessary.

[2] Initial score divided by four and rounded to nearest or next lower whole point if necessary.



FIG. 2. Movement in evaluations, by criteria, 1945–1960.

cell frequencies. In most cases, however, appreciable differences were found, indicating that the variables were in some way related.

Realizing the problems and limitations involved in treatment of qualitative variables in quantitative terms, it was decided to test the pilot study contingency tables by the chi-square formula:

$$X^2 = \Sigma \frac{(oij - eij)^2}{eij} .^{7}$$

Inasmuch as large values of chi-square indicate significant discrepancies between observed and expected cell frequencies the relationship between variables in this analysis can be accepted as significant if the sample value of chi-square exceeds a certain critical value, .05 (accepting that as the level of significance). Correspondingly, a small value of chi-square is taken to imply that the discrepancies between two sets of frequencies, in terms of cell content, are to be attributed to chance. It can be argued that extremely small values of chi-square indicate that the whole analysis is null, *i.e.*, that the evaluations probably had not been conducted in an objective manner. As the values in this analysis are generally large, this is not a problem here.

It might also be urged that extremely large values of chi-square imply that variables are being compared which, on the basis of consideration of the substantive area involved, are obviously related. This may be a fair criticism, but the authors of the present study emphasize that its focus is neither the methodology *per se* nor an attempt to quantify the obvious. Rather, it is an endeavor to view the substantive area of Latin American democratic components and their changes, using the methodology that has been described simply to put intuitive assumptions on a more precise and scientific basis.

Use of the chi-square formula tests assumptions as to whether the relationship between two qualitative variables is or is not meaningful. It does not, however, tell which variable is a function of another, *i.e.*, a dependent variable. To develop a more accurate measure of the degree of correlation between variables an additional step was taken. The coefficient of contingency correlation was determined, to help define the measure of mutual dependency displayed by the variables of the contingency tables. The coefficient is defined mathematically by the formula:[8]

$$C = \sqrt{\frac{X^2}{X^2 + n}}$$

The fact that the relationship between criteria (variables) is meaningful was first indicated by the diagonal progressions of observed cell frequencies in contingency tables. That this relationship is statistically significant has been underscored by use of the chi-square formula. The formulation of a coefficient of contingency correlation further verifies intuitive assumptions.

Three of the fifteen criteria were selected as key variables to be statistically compared, with the aid of an electronic computer, with all other criteria. These were items 2, 7, and 12, respectively, the standard of living, freedom of elections, and the degree of civilian supremacy over the military. Results of the comparisons are shown in Table VIII.

Comparing the standard of living with all other criteria variables exhibited a range of chi-square values with limits of 1,116 and 158. At the upper limit was the value produced by comparing the standard of living with the educational level. The lower limit was the result of contrasting the standard of living with ecclesiastical freedom. In both cases, intuitive assumptions about the criteria as analytical categories were confirmed.

When freedom of elections, the second key variable, was compared with all others, chi-square value limits of 1,328 and 224 were obtained. The upper limit indicated a strong relationship between this and freedom of the press, certainly no unexpected finding. The lower limit pointed to a not-so-strong relationship between free elections and freedom from ecclesiastical domination.

Similar results were obtained from comparisons between civilian supremacy and all other variables. The upper limit of 918 was produced by contrasting this variable with freedom of elections and the lower limit, 208, resulted from comparing the third key variable with the standard of living. This latter finding, namely that the standard of living and civilian supremacy were not substantially related variables, may suggest the need for further inquiry into both the substantive area and the methodology itself. Informed judgment might suggest to some that a substantially stronger correlation ought to have appeared here, and its apparent absence points up the need for more intensive inquiry.

These findings notwithstanding, it must be emphasized again that the size of the scores obtained in the chi-square analysis is no absolute basis for judgment. Rather, the scores act as a guide as to further inquiry. The scores

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[7] In the X^2 formula oij represents the observed cell frequencies of the various contingency tables and eij the expected or theoretic cell frequencies.

[8] N represents the total number of cases, *i.e.*, 800.

TABLE VIII. CORRELATIONS AMONG EVALUATIONS OF SELECTED CRITERIA

	Standard of Living		Free Elections		Civilian Supremacy	
	X^2	C	X^2	C	X^2	C
Educational level	1116.563	.76327	486.792	.61506	354.207	.55397
Standard of living			338.692	.54538	208.427	.45463
Internal unity	410.279	.58223	369.361	.56202	341.652	.54705
Political maturity	585.817	.65017	747.083	.69491	609.329	.65754
Freedom from foreign domination	231.177	.47348	315.884	.53205	239.337	.47987
Freedom of press, etc.	326.933	.53862	1328.490	.79003	804.038	.70800
Free elections	338.692	.54538			918.761	.73113
Party organization	328.278	.53940	1234.761	.77900	778.881	.70236
Judiciary	351.861	.55269	1055.157	.75417	713.785	.68668
Government funds	382.503	.56874	762.526	.69858	588.450	.65101
Social legislation	530.661	.63150	537.295	.63386	506.552	.62266
Civilian supremacy	208.427	.45463	918.761	.73113		
Ecclesiastical freedom	158.578	.40673	224.431	.46806	313.417	.53056
Government administration	481.821	.61310	621.626	.66126	510.669	.62420
Local government	357.406	.55594	618.745	.66063	484.212	.61428

themselves are not nearly so important as the reason for their occurrence. If intuitive "hunches" about the analytical categories can be confirmed statistically, there is every reason to suggest their continued use. If the statistical procedures tend to contradict well based intuition then an additional analysis into latent structures and operative sub-variables may remove the contradiction or reveal errors in method.

Before considering deductions or findings it may be well to acknowledge certain potential methodological problems. It might be argued that a basic blunder has been committed by treatment of the criteria as discrete, cardinally defined variables, when clearly, in actuality, they are not such, or at least not entirely such. Yet, in an effort to expand the statistical utility of such an analysis, they have been so treated and, in fact, instructions to the respondents prescribed that the criteria be rated in accordance with certain factors of relevance which implied a mutually exclusive and cardinal definition. But the statistical refinements were used merely to lend confirmation to intuitive assumptions based on intensive and long continued field study and observation. Many analyses which involve quantitative treatments of qualitative variables are apt to be suspected of a primitive reduction of human events to numbers. The present analysis is only in part an attempt to subject democratic components and trends to statistical testing and measurement. The tabular score composites of the panel of specialists may in themselves be claimed to be an adequate measurement of democratic conditions. A major value in the use of the chi-square formula is its test of the adequacy of the criteria used as conceptual categories of analysis.

Additionally, the method employed here would seem to invite further and expanded use of the panel analysis technique. Panel analyses have usually been devices for focusing attention upon population segments with a view to inquiry into the social processes in which the given segments (panels) were involved, *e.g.*, studies of change and processes of opinion and attitude formation. Such studies have sought to examine socio-political subprocesses by intensive inquiries addressed to participants. The present effort has involved instead a panel of spectators of, not participants in, a process—spectators who, by virtue of their continued observation may be thought to be knowledgeable interpreters of the process of political change that is taking place in the complex world of Latin America. Statistical manipulations apart, the fact that the panel of specialists is in pronounced agreement as to the evolution of democratic trends in Latin America is noteworthy.

V

What sorts of substantive—not procedural—conclusions does the series of surveys seem to justify? These, it must be emphasized, are, and will doubtless continue to be, tentative. But, on the basis of the statistical analyses conducted, they have an impressive weight of consensus about the evidence behind them, a weight reenforced by the individual and collective expertise of the respondents.

Three of the states, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Chile, regularly have occupied the first three rank positions for the past fifteen years—Uruguay uniformly in first place. A significant percentage gap has usually prevailed between the lowest of the three and the next highest ranked state. These three states may justifiably be segregated, then, as a top group which thus far has monopolized a premium position in terms of democratic achievement. That such a monopoly may not be permanent is perhaps indicated by the fact that the adjusted point score obtained by Colombia in 1945 exceeded that of the third-ranked state in 1950 and those of the second- and third-ranked states in 1960.

Turning to the bottom of the ladder, five states, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, have regularly occupied rank positions among the lowest six in the four surveys, with Paraguay consistently holding lowest rank. Bolivia's continued place in this unenviable low group seems uncertain in view of its consistent and relatively striking gain over a period of fifteen years both in terms of point and percentage ranking. In three of the four surveys Honduras occupied the other position among the lowest six. It, too, however, like Bolivia, has shown a considerable improvement in respect both to points and percentages.

It is among a middle dozen, excluding a top three and a bottom five states, that the greatest and most interesting changes occur. These twelve are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Changes in them are, of course (as with all the states, for that matter), to be set against the backdrop of specific political change in the respective states during the decade and a half covered by the surveys. Substantial net percentage gains during the fifteen years were recorded by Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, and Mexico; and a striking net loss by Cuba because of the combined impact of Batista and Castro. Average maximum point fluctuations (see Table III) were substantially larger for this group than for either the top three or the bottom five; in the case of Cuba the pendulum swung through the fantastically wide arc of 245 points. The greatest net gainers (Brazil and Ecuador) and the greatest net losers (Colombia and Cuba) are also in this group. It is in this intermediate group, then, that the greatest flux appears; it is there that in the foreseeable future we may probably expect the most change, either upward or downward.

Turning to conclusions to be drawn from scrutinizing the data involving the criteria, the consensus is striking that conditions with regard to all criteria improved during the quinquennium 1955–60 and also during the total period covered by the four surveys. The impact on democratic attainment registered by the relative absence of ecclesiastical controls continued uniformly to be regarded as the most positive (or least negative) factor conditioning democratic achievement; by the same token, it reflected the lowest net gain during the decade and a half. It can similarly be concluded that foreign political domination of Latin American states—the controversial Cuban case apart—is not now significant: uniformly during the four surveys that criterion was given the second most favorable rating. Conditions surrounding free expression and internal unity have also been regarded favorably.

On the other hand, the educational level, the handling of governmental funds, the status of governmental administration, and conditions of local government have regularly been considered as leaving much to be desired. The toppling in the late 1950s of dictatorial regimes, so often supported by military props (beginning with that of Perón in 1955, *after* the 1955 survey was made) is reflected by the spectacular change in the consensus regarding civilian supremacy over the military: that criterion was *put in last place in 1955 but in sixth in 1960*, for a gain of 111 points. A roughly parallel improvement, for obviously related reasons, was shown in the consensus on freedom of elections: a gain of seven rank places and 118 points.

Freedom of elections, in the context described in the directive distributed to the respondents at the beginning of the surveys, is doubtless the most directly contributory of the fifteen criteria devised for the mensuration. Its close relationship to the other criteria is strikingly confirmed by the tabular material obtained from use of the chi-square and the coefficient of contingency correlation formulas. This is also true of the two other criteria thus tested: one, an essentially economic component of democracy (the standard of living) and the other a political or quasi-political component (civilian-military balance).

Democracy and political change in Latin America (or anywhere else, for that matter) are far more fluid and subtle phenomena than can be described and delimited simply by statistical data and techniques. But, the authors believe, the use of such tools gives a means of refining and confirming subjective and intuitive conclusions which must otherwise by their very subjectivity and intuitiveness remain partially unsatisfactory. The political scientist can probably, with profit, make more use of such tools.

BIG BUSINESS LOBBYING IN JAPAN: THE CASE OF CENTRAL BANK REFORM

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The political activities of the business community in Japan have not received the scholarly attention they deserve. Because of the paucity of information and the lack of serious studies, the nature of the political power of Japanese business is poorly understood. The popular notion that big business is influential in politics is quite correct, but just how the influence is exercised, or how much influence can be brought to bear in a particular field of policy, or what conditions limit or augment business influence are far from clear.

This paper seeks to single out some of the important conditions affecting the impact of business influence in Japanese government and politics. The case approach is used, and the case is the abortive effort toward central bank reform. Even though this episode concerns only a small portion of the government machinery and the single field of monetary policy, it nevertheless demonstrates the methods commonly employed by business to reach decisions within its own group, the competition with others encountered in persuading the government to act, and the strength of bureaucratic forces resisting change. The simplicity of this case is an advantage in depicting the conflicting groups and the influence they were able to exert. Later studies may reveal more of the pattern of business action on other economic problems and in other areas of government and politics. The bank case showed the great influence of group and personal loyalties as well as the power of one of the government ministries. Where the party leaders cannot easily bring their power to bear, cultural and bureaucratic influences such as these may be determining. Perhaps the most important lesson is that the ascendancy of business power should not be taken for granted even in the present period when it is at its apogee.

I

Central banks in countries with market economies, through their influence on the supply of money and credit, on interest rates, and on the financing of government debt, exercise potent powers for economic development and welfare. Historically central banks, however they came into being, have characteristically been sensitive, if not invariably responsive, to the policy views of the banking communities of their respective countries. Typically, they have been so constituted as to enjoy a considerable measure of autonomy from the governments of the day in policy matters. But monetary and credit policy is inextricably intertwined with fiscal policy, for which those governments are traditionally responsible. A central bank move may reinforce or may offset the economic impact of a tax, an expenditure or a public debt transaction. And the influential constituencies of governments are not necessarily the same as those of central banks. So tension between the central bank and the finance ministry, and with it agitation for a changed relation between them—for a greater or lesser degree of independence for the one or control for the other—is a recurrent phenomenon, particularly at times of major reorientation in economic policy. The nationalization of the Bank of England by the postwar Labour government, the "Accord" between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve in the

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* The material presented here was collected during a trip to Japan in 1960 made possible by grants-in-aid from the Canada Council, the President's Committee on Research and the Institute of Social and Economic Research, both of the University of British Columbia. Much of it is based on interviews with high-ranking officials and businessmen, who were readily accessible but generally reluctant to reveal much, and with middle-ranking personages, who were usually more willing to speak freely and sometimes able to give very useful information. Even high-ranking leaders, however, in their need to persuade others, often find it advantageous to take favored reporters into their confidence, with the result that much valuable information finds its way into news stories. Government and business reports and privately printed business organizations' histories, on the other hand [see Keizai Dantai Rengokai (Federation of Economic Organizations), *Shashi, Keizai Dantai Shi Mokuroku* (Catalogue of Histories of Companies and Business Associations) (Tokyo, May 1961)], are almost devoid of practical details concerning policy advocacy. Future studies need to be supplemented by the personal records and accounts of leaders, if they can be obtained. Otherwise, the investigator is dependent on news accounts, formal reports, interviews, and detective work.

United States in 1951, and the recent move to oust the Governor of the Bank of Canada, are varying manifestations of this tension.

In Japan, such an issue arose in the wake of the unprecedented prosperity and rapid economic growth of the mid-1950s, which got an additional stimulus from the Korean War. The status of the Bank of Japan is based largely on a law of 1942—left undisturbed in this respect by the Occupation interlude—which placed the Bank under the supervision of the finance ministry, in furtherance of wartime financial measures. With prosperity and the relaxation of restrictions after the end of the Occupation, strict government control of Bank policy, and consequently of monetary policy, seemed increasingly anomalous to powerful groups in financial quarters. Bank officials grew restive, feeling the government controls to be unnecessarily stringent. Japanese big business, both in banking and industry, has never relished strong official controls in any form: even during the war, business resistance was tenacious and some private initiative was jealously maintained. So the idea of greater independence for the central bank attracted sympathetic business support. Fears of inflationary policies by the government furnished another ground of arguments for Bank independence. For this reason even Socialist Party opinion favors "relative neutrality" for the Bank as against the finance ministry.[1]

A government investigation committee was established in 1956 to study central banking and recommend changes in the Bank of Japan Law to the minister of finance.[2] Meanwhile the effects of retrenchments in American military procurement, rising domestic consumption and other factors were being felt. A balance of payments crisis arose in 1957. This slowed down the work of the committee, for the ministry was not prepared to advance plans to weaken its authority just when it thought careful guidance urgently needed. At first, the ministry did not permit bank action to counter the adverse balance of payments; then it authorized a sharply deflationary policy. This manner of handling the problem was criticized by a number of economists on the committee.

The committee first debated whether the Bank's primary goal should be to stabilize the currency's value—*i.e.*, price levels—or to insure economic growth. The bankers favored making stability of the currency the basis of Bank policy, to halt government policy which they thought would result in inflation to stimulate growth. The committee was not destined to resolve this conflict to the extent of a clear view one way or the other. But by February 1958 it was ready to consider recommendations to the government, and to develop them it divided into a number of working committees.[3]

The central problem was the basic question: how independent of the ministry should the Bank be? The ministry officials gradually came to accept the position that the functions of a modern central bank required a greater degree of freedom than the Bank presently had. The Bank officials never went so far as to desire that they be cut off from government financial policy. They expected that in the long run the Bank and the government would have to act in harmony. But the view of the ministry was more grudging toward bank independence, as can be seen by statements of their officials who were experts on the government committee.

For example Shimomura Osamu, then a ministry official, asserted that the responsibility for the value of the currency rested with the government.[4] Matsumoto Shigeo, a Bank of

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[1] Nihon Shakaito Seisaku Shingikai Zaisei Kinyu Bukai (Public and Private Finance Section of the Socialist Party Policy Board), "Nichigin Seido ni Kan Suru Taido (Attitude Toward the Bank of Japan System)," April 20, 1960, mimeographed statement; Ouchi Hyoe, "Nihon Ginko wa Dare no Mono ka (Just Who Does the Bank of Japan Belong to?)," *Asahi Janaru* (Morning Sun Journal), Vol. 1 (November 8, 1959), pp. 8–15.

[2] The *Kinyu Seido Chosakai* (Committee of Financial System Research) was set up on June 3, 1956 with forty-five members, comprising bankers, journalists and professors mainly. It also had a committee of experts, thirteen officials from the finance ministry, Bank of Japan, and several other banks.

For some background, see David J. Ott, "The Financial Development of Japan, 1878–1958," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 69 (April 1961), pp. 122–141; Economic Research Department, Bank of Japan, *Outline of the Financial System in Japan*, 3d ed. (Tokyo, April 1959); Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan's Postwar Economy* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1958).

[3] The Standing Committee for Planning (*Joji Kikaku Iinkai*) of six was to prepare basic materials for discussion by the Special Committee on the Central Banking System (*Chuo Ginko Seido Tokubetsu Iinkai*) of eighteen which included the six members of the other committee.

[4] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Japan Economic News), "Nichiginho Kaisei Mondai o Raigetsu kara Honkaku Shingi (Full Discussion of the Bank of Japan Law Revision Problem to Start Next Month)," May 31, 1958, p. 1. (All newspaper

Japan official, argued for a check-and-balance system between the Bank and the government whereby the Bank could exercise an independent judgment.[5]

The first substantial proposal from the government committee was drafted by its Standing Committee for Planning.[6] It recommended that the Bank should have freedom in determining monetary policy, but that the ministry could request a delay or reconsideration of a Bank decision. This draft expressed the attitude of the Bank officials, but seemed to contemplate a substantial surrender of the ministry's controlling power.

II

Now that the government committee was approaching the stage of concrete proposals, the business federations intervened. The Federation of Economic Organizations[7] formed a special committee[8] to insure that the views of private business were pressed before the government body. The chairman of the government committee and its chief secretary both attended the first meeting of the Federation body on September 2, 1958 and the vice-governor of the Bank of Japan attended the second meeting on October 3.

The Federation committee set up a subcommittee to draft detailed proposals on October 17, and after ten meetings these were presented to the full committee, which approved them on March 30, 1959. They were then approved by the Federation's board of directors on April 2 and sent to the government committee. The weight of these recommendations can be appreciated if the character of the Federation is considered. It is broadly representative of most of the big business firms in Japan.[9] It is frankly intended to urge its members' views on the government as one of its major aims.[10] In the Federation the government faces the most prominent spokesmen for business.

The Federation's views gain added weight because it provides the largest single source of business funds for party politics. This is arranged through the separate political party fund-raising council[11] under the leadership of Uemura Kogoro, leading vice-president of the Federation. This group collects funds from individual firms for lump sum presentation to the political parties, the Socialist (Nihon Shakaito) as well as the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyu Minshuto).[12] The im-

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citations are to the morning editions.) Shimomura was then a fiscal research officer of the finance minister's secretariat and at this writing is an economic advisor to Prime Minister Ikeda. He is the architect of the government policy of maintaining a very high rate of economic growth to increase employment and personal income.

[5] *Ibid.* Matsumoto was then chief of the economic research department.

[6] Shionoya Tsukumo, "Chuo Ginko Seido no Kihon Mondai ni Kan Suru Oboegaki An (Draft Memorandum Concerning the Basic Problems of the Central Banking System)," October 23, 1958, in Okurasho Ginkokyoku (Finance Ministry Banking Bureau), *Chuo Ginko Seido* (Central Banking System) (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 1–3.

[7] *Keizai Dantai Rengokai* or *Keidanren.* This might also be translated as "federation of business associations." See Keizai Dantai Rengokai, *Keidanren No Junen* (Ten Years of the Federation of Economic Organizations) (Tokyo, 1956), pp. 2–3.

[8] The Special Committee on the Financial System (*Kinyu Seido Tokubetsu Iinkai*). See Keizai Dantai Rengokai, "Keidanren Jigyo Hokoku, Showa Sanjusan Nendo, Dai Juhachi Go (Federation of Economic Organizations Report of Activities, 1958, No. 18)" May 1959, p. 47.

[9] On March 31, 1960 the Federation contained 718 corporations and 101 associations representing many thousands of individual firms. Keizai Dantai Rengokai, "Keidanren Jigyo Hokoku, Showa Sanjuyo Nendo Dai Juku Go (Federation of Economic Organizations Report of Activities, 1959, No. 19)" May, 1960, p. 103. "Keizai Dantai no Genjo Ichiran (The Conditions of the Economic Organizations in Outline)" (Tokyo, 1960), 183 pp., lists the member associations.

[10] "The federation shall engage in the following activities . . . the presentation of proposals and recommendations to the National Diet, the Government and other agencies concerned in regard to adjustment, coordination and revision of economic policies, economic administration and legislation; and the rendering of cooperative services for satisfactory implementation of said proposals and recommendations," the Federation of Economic Organizations, "Constitution" pamphlet (Tokyo, 1954), p. 1; Japanese text in *Keidanren No Junen*, p. 247. See also "Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren)" pamphlet (Tokyo, 1958–1959), p. 1.

[11] *Keizai Saiken Kondankai* (Economic Reconstruction Council).

[12] On the party fund council see *Mainichi* (The Daily News), "Seito to Toshikin (Political Parties and Party Funds)" November 30, 1955, p. 2; *Asahi Janaru*, "Seikai ni Tsunagaru Zaikai no Kane (The Business World's Money Ties with the Political World) Vol. 2 (October 30, 1960), pp. 78–79; *Asahi Shimbun* (Morning Sun News), "Towaku Suru Jiminto, Keizai Saiken Kondankai

portance attached to the Federation at the cabinet level can be seen in the frequent attendance at the yearly convention of the Federation by the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, and other major government figures whose positions depend upon their leadership in the political parties. Their scheduled presence at the meeting on May 19, 1960 was only prevented at the last minute by the political crisis over ratification of the Security Treaty with the United States. In August the customary banquet given by the big business federations for a new cabinet was used to reaffirm business support for the conservatives in the coming election and afforded an opportunity for Ikeda, the new Prime Minister, to appeal for generous financial support.[13] In the government committee, however, the close cooperation of politicians and the business federation was less evident. The bureaucrats and those government bankers who had to be persuaded to support a neutral central bank were not dependent upon party or business favor.

Especially important is the unified business view articulated by the Federation's committee system. By presenting a single stand to the government, business can give its view more weight. The Federation committee consisted of influential figures in the various lines of business represented within the Federation as a whole as well as finance. (See Table I.) These include such well known figures as Kobayashi Ataru, Nagano Shigeo and Sakurada Takeshi in addition to the president, leading vice-president, and secretary general of the Federation as *ex officio* members. Besides being prominent heads of large firms, some of the members were also presidents of important business associations within the federation. Among them were men who began their careers in government ministries or banks before going into business; a fact which facilitated their relations with government. This is notably true of the top officers of the Federation itself. The former giant combines and their successor firms appear frequently as their firms, including such names as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Yasuda. The major firms were well represented on the committee.

This committee was too large for detailed work and all its members could not be expected to be familiar with problems of central banking. Consequently, junior management and expertness were given a place on a subcommittee which drafted the detailed proposals for the main committee. It contained executive directors of some of the companies whose presidents sat on the full committee, three from banks and five from industries particularly concerned, which preserved a division along the lines of the chief membership groups concerned.

The traditional Japanese preference for avoiding public expression of disagreement is characteristic of the Federation. Although the modern parliamentary procedure is often followed, as in voting for officers and resolutions at the general meeting, the proceedings are rather cut and dried, following decisions already reached informally. No dramatic confrontation of opposing groups occurs at large or small meetings. In the committees, when differences develop they are referred to a sub-committee for negotiation and compromise. This does not signify an absence of conflicts of interest in the Federation, but rather discretion in handling them.

Members sometimes complain that the resulting Federation decisions are too weak. The leadership is not prepared to strain the loose bonds of membership, so the organization only acts upon the maximum agreement which can gain the support of the members concerned. By relying upon persuasion and compromise the organization can be kept together. The leaders prefer a large and representative organization which can speak with an authoritative voice,[14] however thin the substance it utters.

III

The bankers and industrialists who made up

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no Kaisanron (The Perplexed Liberal Democratic Party, the Advocacy of the Abolition of the Economic Reconstruction Council)," January 29, 1961, p. 1.

[13] Dinner on August 31, 1960 given by the Federation of Economic Organizations, Federation of Employers' Organizations (*Nihon Keieisha Dantai Remmei* or *Nikkeiren*), and the Japan Management Association (*Keizai Doyukai*). See Yaguchi Yuichiro, "Yottsu no Keieisha Dantai (The Four Employers' Organizations)," *Chuo Koron* (Central Review), October, 1960, p. 157.

[14] Ishizaka Taizo, president of the Tokyo Shibaura Electric Company and president of the Federation, said at the twenty-first general meeting, May 19, 1960, "The federation has reached the greatest common measure of agreement possible when it announces an opinion as that of its organization, but there is the feeling that it is lukewarm since the firms which are related to it are divergent in their interests. It would not do for the president to arbitrarily try to push matters forward, but, as a basic position, I think we should pull together under the slogan of a free economy."

TABLE I. REPRESENTATION OF BUSINESS: FEDERATION OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (APRIL 1960) (KINYU SEIDO TOKUBETSU IINKAI)

Business	Member	Principal Present Position	First Organization Entered
Banking	Sakai Kyonosuke	Pres. Daiichi Bank	Same
	Nakatani Kazuo	Pres. Mitsubishi Bank	Same
	Yanagi Masuo	Pres. Mitsui Bank	Same
	Hori Takeyoshi	Pres. Japan Hypothec Bank Pres. Fed. Bankers' Assoc. of Japan	Same
	Horie Shigeo	Pres. Bank of Tokyo	Yokohama Specie Bank
	Kawakita Teiichi	Pres. Industrial Bank of Japan	Bank of Japan
	Saito Toshitada	Pres. Yasuda Trust Bank Pres. Trust Companies Assoc.	Same
	Hirano Shigetaro	Pres. Shizuoka Bank Pres. Local Banking Assoc.	Saien Bank
Insurance	Yano Ichiro	Pres. Daiichi Life	Mitsubishi Bank
	Yamane Harue	Pres. Taisho Marine Insur. Co. Pres. Japan Marine Fire Insur. Assoc.	Same
	Tanaka Tokujiro	Pres. Tokyo Marine Insur. Co.	Mitsubishi & Co.
Securities	Horikoshi Teizo (ex officio)	Exec. Dir. Japan Securities and Fin. Co. Sec. Gen. Federation of Econ. Organs.	Bank of Japan
	Koike Konosuke	Pres. Yamaichi Security Co.	Koike Bank
Shipping	Kobayashi Ataru	Man. Dir. Japan Mail Steamship Co. (NYK)	Ishiwa Bank
	Ichii Yasuzo	Pres. Mitsui Shipping Co. Pres. Japan Shipowners Association	Mitsui Trading Co.
	Yamagata Katsumi	Chair. New Japan Steamship Co.	Tatsuma Marine Insur. Co.
Shipbuild.	Nomura Yoshikado	Vice Pres. Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co.	Mitsubishi Bank
Power	Otagaki Shiro	Pres. Kansai Elec. Power Co.	Hankyu Elec. Ry. Co.
	Aoki Kinichi	Pres. Tokyo Elec. Power Co.	Tokyo Woolen Co.
	Matsune Soichi	Man. Dir. Japan Atomic Power Co.	Industrial Bank
Machinery	Kawai Yoshinari	Pres. Komatsu Mfg. Co.	Agr. and Commerce Ministry
	Ishizaka Taizo (ex officio)	Chair. Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co. Pres. Fed. of Econ. Organ.	Communications Ministry
	Kanari Masuhiko	Pres. Fuji Elec. Mfg. Co.	Same
	Kurata Chikara	Pres. Hitachi Ltd. Pres. Japan Machinery Assoc.	Kuhara Mining Co.
	Uemura Kogoro (ex officio)	Pres. Japan Jet Engine Co. Vice Pres. Fed. Econ. Organizations	Agric. and Commerce Ministry
Metals	Kawada Shigeru	Pres. Japan Steel Tube Co.	Same
	Nagano Shigeo	Pres. Fuji Steel Co.	Asano Trading Co.
	Yamaguchi Sadakazu	Man. Dir. Yahata Steel Co.	Daiichi Bank
	Kusano Giichi	Pres. Japan Light Metals Co.	Furukawa Elec. Indus.
Chemicals	Hara Yasusaburo	Pres. Japan Explosives Co.	Gold Mining
	Anzai Masao	Pres. Showa Denko K. K.	Kanegafuchi Spinning Co.

TABLE I.—(*continued*)

Business	Member	Principal Present Position	First Organization Entered
	Ninomiya Yoshimoto	Pres. Oriental Soda Indus.	Industrial Bank
	Owada Teiji	Pres. Japan Soda Co.	Postal Ministry
	Doi Masaharu	Pres. Sumitomo Chemical Indus.	Same
Textiles	Ohara Soichiro	Pres. Kurashiki Rayon Co.	Same
	Kashu Ekizo	Pres. Mitsubishi Rayon Co.	Shinko Rayon
	Tsukada Kota	Pres. Kurashiki Spinning Co.	Mitsui Trading Co.
	Sakurada Takeshi	Pres. Nisshin Spinning Co.	Same
	Shimada Eichi	Pres. Nitto Spinning Co.	Industrial Bank
Pulp Paper	Kaneko Saichiro	Pres. Jujo Paper Co.	Oji Paper Co.
	Kanai Shigenao	Pres. Kokoku Rayon Pulp Co.	Toyo Life Insur.
	Sasayama Tadao	Pres. Alaska Pulp Co.	Bank of Japan
Broadcasting	Sasabe Kureo	Pres. Central Japan Broadcasting Co.	Bank of Japan
Trading	Nizeki Yasutaro	Pres. Mitsui & Co. Ltd.	Same
	Tanibayashi Masatoshi	Man. Dir. Japan Trading Co.	Mitsubishi Trading Co.
	Fujita Kametaro	Pres. Esho Co.	Same
Warehouse	Takeda Masayasu	Pres. Mitsui Warehouse Co. Chair. Nat. Warehouse Assoc.	Same
Gov. Enter.	Matsukuma Hideo	Pres. Japan Monopoly Corp.	Finance Ministry

the Federation's committee for the central bank problem were this time in agreement. They urged greater independence for the Bank of Japan in such matters as the control of interest rates, open market operations and reserve requirements. At present the open market operations are so limited and the reserve requirements so low that they have little effect on credit conditions. The committee suggested that the minister concerned be able only to delay or ask for reconsideration of the Bank's decisions.[15] It also proposed that the aim of the bank be to stabilize the value of the currency as the best means of contributing to steady economic growth.[16]

This may seem surprising, for the bankers and industrialists of the Federation are often in disagreement over such matters as industrial credit. The industrialists ordinarily prefer some flexibility for credit expansion when necessary to encourage industry, and this was included in their recommendations, which nevertheless gave primacy to stability of the currency. But they are not prepared, for example, to see it manipulated for the sake of full employment.

One key to the apparent harmony of business and finance in this instance is to be found in the fact that the Federation is not fully representative of business, because it is dominated by the large firms. It contains some small businesses among the constituents of its member associations, and even a National Union of Small Business Associations (Zenkoku Chusho Kigyo Dantai Chuokai).[17] Nevertheless, the voice of small business is very weak within the Federation. Because of strong differences in viewpoint, small business is usually represented outside the Federation when it is organized.[18] The relative absence of small business is an advantage to the others because it removes a divisive element from the Federation, an element, moreover, which is not at present politically powerful.

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[15] Keizai Dantai Rengokai, "Nihon Ginkoho Kaisei ni Kan Suru Yobo Iken (Recommendations Concerning the Revision of the Bank of Japan Law)," March 30, 1959 in *Chuo Ginko Seido*, p. 315.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 314.

[17] The more important Medium and Small Enterprise Federation (*Nihon Chusho Kigyo Dantai Remmei*) and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (*Nihon Shoko Kaigisho*) left the Federation in 1952 because of feelings of discrimination against them by big business. See Nagata Masatomi, *Keizai Dantai Hattatsushi* (History of the Development of Economic Organizations) (Tokyo, 1956), p. 209.

[18] The conflict between small and large ship operators in the member association, the Japan Shipowners' Association (*Nihon Senshu Kyokai*), almost resulted in the disintegration of that association recently. The small owners felt that most of the benefits of government aid were going to the big owners. The small owners put more reliance on their contributions made directly to party politicians than on the association.

The Federation's decisions have utilitarian functions which also give it influence with the government. Its recommendations are informative both because of the Federation's knowledge of the practical nature of business problems and because they show what business is prepared to support. Where business cooperation is needed to carry out a government policy, government officials are eager to have business recommendations as a guide or source of support. The right of business to be fully consulted is thus recognized.

IV

The Federation of Bankers' Associations of Japan (Zenkoku Ginko Kyokai Rengokai) is the business federation most directly concerned with Bank of Japan policy, for the Bank is the bankers' bank. Industry has until recently relied heavily upon bank loans for capital funds. The private banks in turn have gone to the Bank of Japan for loans to obtain the money needed to permit loans to industry.[19] The bankers' federation is a member association of the predominantly industrial Federation of Economic Organizations and took a leading part in the drafting of the recommendations noted above. In addition it drafted its own recommendations and urged them separately upon the government committee.

The most noteworthy point is that the bankers' federation on a smaller scale resembled the economic Federation in its structure and manner of handling the banking problem, but encountered less difficulty in reaching a clear position. It has five working committees, one of which took up the reform question.[20] This contained twenty-one members chosen from the directors and auditors and two chosen for expert knowledge. A sub-committee was appointed, comprising ten research section heads of banks, or heads of Tokyo branches, or heads of the banks themselves.[21] The proposals drafted by the sub-committee were approved by the full committee and then by the board of directors, on April 3, 1959, before being sent to the government committee. The matter was handled at about the same time it was taken up by the economic Federation.

The bankers' memorandum was similar in nature to the economic Federation's proposals, but put more stress upon stability of the value of the currency,[22] as might have been expected.

The private bankers' views were useful for their practical knowledge and cooperation in carrying out government policy; after all, they dealt directly with the central bank. On the other hand they did not represent such a large cross section of business as did the economic federation and so perhaps carried less political weight. Within the sphere of banking, however, the bankers' federation contained the leading private banking associations, was representative of banking as a whole, and on this issue, unlike the big Federation, was unhampered by divergent interests and opinions.

Other business groups were interested in the Bank of Japan problem. The Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Osaka Shoko Kaigisho) and the Kansai Economic Federation (Kansai Keizai Rengokai) submitted memoranda to the government committee.[23] But these groups did not take as active a part in the proceedings as the two federations above.

Horikoshi Teizo, secretary-general of the economic Federation, appeared before the government committee's special committee on April 2, 1959 to explain the Federation's views in person. A former career official in the Bank of Japan, now he was accused here of representing only the bankers and not the industrialists in his organization. This may have been a shrewd attempt to exploit business differences. The Federation countered by calling a round-table conference of both industrialists and bankers, and here the industrialists present reaffirmed their support for the Federation's stand for the Bank's independence of the ministry of finance.[24]

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[19] Funds available to the commercial banks have been insufficient to meet the demand for loans by industry; the commercial banks have regularly borrowed large sums from the central bank to expand their loans.

[20] The Financial Problems Investigation Committee (*Kinyu Mondai Chosa Iinkai*).

[21] Zenkoku Ginko Kyokai Rengokai, Tokyo Ginko Kyokai (Federation of Bankers' Associations of Japan and the Tokyo Bankers' Association), "Kyokai no Shiori (Guide to the Associations)," pamphlet (Tokyo, September, 1959).

[22] Zenkoku Ginko Kyokai Rengokai, "Chuo Ginko Seido ni Kan Suru Iken (Views on the Central Banking System)," April 2, 1959, in *Chuo Ginko Seido*, pp. 317–318.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 331–334.

[24] *Keidanren Geppo* (Federation of Economic Organizations Monthly), "Nihon Ginkoho Kaisei no Mondaiten: Zadankai (Round Table on Bank of Japan Law Revision Issues)," July, 1959, p. 21.

V

Views supporting strong ministry supervision of the bank now began to appear before the government special committee, in testimony from April 22 to 24. Kushida Mitsuo, former president of the People's Finance Corporation; Arai Shinji, a consultant of the ministry of international trade and industry; Hirata Keiichiro, vice-governor of the Japan Development Bank; and Takahashi Kamekichi, an economic writer, opposed Bank independence.[25] Two of these men were former career officials in the finance ministry and all were members of an economic study group led by Shimomura Osamu[26] who favored ministry control of the banks. With this indication of the way top-level political winds were blowing, the trend of opinion within the government committee seemed to move away from the preference for Bank independence.

The government committee became increasingly divided between the ministry view and the Bank of Japan view. The ministry favored retention of final decision on major Bank policies. The Bank of Japan favored a large measure of independence even if the ministry was in disagreement. Beneath the apparent power dispute between the two was a difference of economic theory. The Bank preferred a more orthodox approach to monetary policy, while the ministry appeared likely to embark on policies to encourage high economic growth which could be inflationary or disquieting from a conservative financial point of view. Business, but more especially banking, espoused the Bank's viewpoint: the economic Federation, at least, preferred a conservative economic policy.

The ministry viewpoint was loyally stated by Tanimura Hiroshi, an expert of the ministry on the government committee:

> It is all right to entrust the three aspects of financial policy (lending policy, open market operations, and reserve deposit requirements) to the Bank of Japan, but it is best to retain final directive power in the government.[27]

The government committee in June 1959 appointed a subcommittee under Funayama Shokichi to draft a preliminary version of the recommendations to go to the Minister of Finance. Funayama was a former career official of the finance ministry, had been a member of the policy board of the Bank of Japan, and was by now the vice-president of the government-sponsored Export-Import Bank of Japan. Because of his background he could be counted on to understand the ministry and bank viewpoints. His subcommittee held meetings at the end of June, and after four days he undertook to consolidate the views expressed. Two further meetings were held in August to consider the results. On August 24, 1959 the Funayama subcommittee made public "The Preliminary Draft of Principles for the Bank of Japan System."[28]

The preliminary draft made the headlines next day. It recommended a final directive power in the ministry of finance over decisions of the Bank of Japan—a victory for the ministry and a setback for the Bank. The Bank of Japan officials, in turn, were now quite upset by the trend of events; they held meetings on September 1 and 2 to consider the Funayama draft, which they found unacceptable.

Coming out of this caucus, Taniguchi Tsutomu, vice-governor of the Bank, appeared before the government special committee on September 3 to present the Bank's objections.[29] He foresaw no sharp disagreement between the Bank and ministry, but insisted that the Bank should have the power to act when the economy expanded or contracted too suddenly. The government's power to appoint the members of the Bank policy board and the presence of ministry officials on the board should be sufficient to insure a voice in policy to the ministry. Final control in the ministry, however, could threaten the initiative of the Bank and could be used to compel the Bank to accept the ministry's view, as at present. The long experience of ministry dominance would make independence for the Bank difficult enough in any event, without specifying in the law the power of the ministry to overrule it.[30]

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[25] *Toyo Keizai Shimpo* (Oriental Economic News), "Churitsusei de ketsudan o semarareru Nichiginho Kaisei (Neutral Stand Pressed as Basis for Decision in Bank of Japan Law Revision)," No. 2906 (September 12, 1959), p. 50.

[26] See above, note 4.

[27] Same as reference in footnote 25.

[28] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, "Shijiken o Zosho ni (Directive Power to the Ministry of Finance)," August 25, 1959, p. 1. For text of the draft see p. 3.

[29] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, "Nichigin, Shoiinkai ni Tsuyoku Hantai (Bank of Japan Strongly Opposes Sub-Committee Draft)," September 3, 1959 p. 3.

[30] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, "Shijiken, Churitsusei o Habamu, Taniguchi Fukusosai no Hatsugen Naiyo (Directive Power Will Obstruct Neutrality, the Contents of Vice-Governor Taniguchi's Statement)," September 4, 1959, p. 3.

The business federations were also disappointed by the success of the ministry view and took steps to counter it. On August 29 the chairman, chief secretary, and Funayama himself of the government committee were invited to explain the draft to the economic Federation's special committee.[31] On September 10 both the leading vice-president of the economic Federation, Uemura Kogoro, and the president of the bankers' federation, Hori Takeyoshi, appeared before the government special committee to argue against the Funayama draft.[32]

The economic Federation spokesman, Uemura, was an *ex-officio* member of the Federation's special committee, and had attended its meetings so as to familiarize himself with the topic. He cautioned the government committee against leaving the directive power in the ministry, and urged reconsideration. Hori of the bankers' federation reiterated that it was disturbing that the ministry should have power over the Bank's decisions; he asked that the Bank's purpose be clearly stated to be stabilization of the currency; he thought it undesirable to set no limits to the amount of note issue by the Bank. The conservative fears of the bankers were evident.

The government committee was split roughly half-and-half for and against the final power of decision over Bank policy in the ministry. Shibusawa Keizo, the chairman, preferred to reach a decision with general support if possible. It would be very awkward to present a committee report without substantial agreement on the most crucial matter before it. The government was likely to act only on a unified report. Shibusawa was therefore opposed to taking a simple vote which could only make the division in the committee sharper. He and Funayama consequently spent several weeks in individual discussion with the members in search of some common ground. At the October 30 meeting there was still no agreement. During the ensuing five months, while the subcommittee drew up its final draft. the chief issues were taken up again by the chairman and vice-chairman with individual members but without achieving any substantial change in their positions.

In the end the committee failed to reach a compromise. Therefore on March, 31, 1960 the final Draft of Principles containing both viewpoints was presented to the special committee, which approved it; and this was approved by the full committee on April 21.[33] The final draft simply put the two views as alternatives for government action. Plan A provided that the minister of finance would have the final decision. Plan B provided that the minister could only ask reconsideration or delay.

In April the president of the economic Federation, who was also the member of the government committee intended to represent the Federation, spoke at a full committee meeting in favor of giving the minister only the right to ask reconsideration or delay: he urged that only Plan B be recommended in the draft. But this hope of moving the committee at the last moment proved unavailing. After a long delay, the final draft was submitted with an explanatory statement to the finance minister on September 20, 1960.[34]

VI

The group taken as a reference by each member was important in reaching his decision; only the most active members on the special committee will be considered here, though all are listed in Table II. The officials of the Bank of Japan supported the Bank view. The ministry officials as well as those who had formerly been career officials of the ministry proved loyal to the ministry view. Even those of them who had earlier been connected with the Bank still retained their ministry outlook. A ministry career carries great prestige, especially one in the finance ministry which enjoys the highest reputation and attracts the best talent from among Tokyo University graduates. In addition, the traditional ties of personal and group loyalties have persisted in Japan in associations formed among work groups, even among the most progressive elements of Japanese society today. The highest value is set upon loyalty to one who had helped you in your career or is dependent upon you for his. Former officials still identify themselves naturally with their career ministry. This may help explain the strong influence of the finance ministry over those

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[31] "Keidanren Jigyo Hokoku Showa Sanjuyo Nendo. Dai Juku Go," pp. 60–61.

[32] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, "Shijiken ni wa Tsuyoku Hantai, Hori Zenginkyo Kaicho Ra (Strong Opposition to Directive Power, President Hori of the Federation of Bankers' Associations of Japan and Others)," September 11, 1959, p. 3.

[33] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, "Churitsusei ni Ryoron Heiki (Both Versions on Neutrality Put Side by Side)," April 1, 1960, p. 1, Text on p. 5.

[34] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, "Nichigin Seido Kaisei de Toshin (Report on Revision of the Bank of Japan System)," September 21, 1960, p. 1. See p. 3 for text of explanatory statement accompanying the report.

TABLE II. MEMBERSHIP AND AFFILIATION, GOVERNMENT SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE CENTRAL BANKING SYSTEM
(CHUO GINKO SEIDO TOKUBETSU IINKAI)

Business	Member	Positions
Private Banking	Sakai Kyonosuke	Pres. Daiichi Bank Chm. Econ. Fed. Special Committee 1959– Pres. Fed. Bankers' Assoc. 1957–58
Government Banking	Funayama Shokichi	Vice Pres. Export-Import Bank Ex-Permanent Vice-Min. Finance Ex-Member, Bank of Japan Policy Bd.
	Inouye Toshio	Vice-Governor, Bank of Japan to 1959
	Taniguchi Tsutomu	Vice-Governor, Bank of Japan 1959–
	Murase Naokai	Chm. Central Bank for Commercial and Industrial Cooperatives Ex-Permanent Vice-Min. Internatl. Trade and Ind.
Industry	Shibusawa Keizo, Chm.	Pres. Bunka Broadcasting Co. Ex-Vice-Pres. Daiichi Bank Ex-Minister of Finance Ex-Governor, Bank of Japan
	Oshima Kenzo	Dir. Keihanshin Elec. Ry. Ex-Man. Dir. Sumitomo Bank
	Kishi Kijio	Chm. Fuji Heavy Industry Co. Ex-Ministry of Finance official Chm. Econ Fed. Special Committee 1958–1959 Ex-Bank of Japan Policy Bd. Member
Government Ministry	Yukawa Mototake	Dir. Cent. Depository Ministry Agric. Forestry
Journalism	Enjoji Jiro	Exec. Dir. Nihon Keizai News
	Tsuchiya Kiyoshi	Editor Asahi News
Academic	Inaba Hidezo, Secretary	Chm. People's Economic Research Inst. Prof. Kanto Gakuin Univ.
	Shionoya Tsukumo	Prof. Nagoya Univ.
	Shinjo Hiroshi	Prof. Kobe Univ.
	Takada Yasuma	Prof. Osaka Munic. Univ.
	Takahashi Taizo	Prof. Hitotsubashi Univ.
	Suzuki Takeo	Prof. Tokyo Univ.
Law	Tanaka Jiro	Prof. Tokyo Univ.

COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE
(SEMMON IIN)

Government Ministry	Shimomura Osamu	Finance Ministry official
	Otsuki Takashi	Finance Ministry official
	Tanimura Hiroshi	Finance Ministry official
	Murakami Takataro	Finance Ministry official
	Nakao Hiroyuki	Finance Ministry official
	Sumita Satoshi	Finance Ministry official
	Kojima Yotaro	Finance Ministry official
Government Banking	Oda Sadanobu	Bank of Japan official
	Sekine Taro	Bank of Japan official
	Matsumoto Shigeo	Bank of Japan official
	Yoshino Toshihiko	Bank of Japan official
Private Banking	Onoda Kiyoshi	Industrial Bank official
	Shioda Masashi	Daiichi Bank official

agencies to which its capable higher officers have moved.

There were exceptions. Kishi Kijio, a former ministry career official, was one. A former president of the government-sponsored Industrial Bank and member of the Bank of Japan policy board, he had entered private business and become chairman of the board of the Fuji Heavy Industry Company. Because of this combined background he had been made chairman of the economic Federation's special committee in late 1958. His position, favoring the Bank, was appropriate to his later role as spokesman for business groups.

Contrariwise, one private businessman favored the ministry view. Oshima Kenzo had been an executive director of the Sumitomo Bank, but was also a writer on economic problems. He favored a degree of Bank independence, but to keep responsibility for monetary policy in government hands he preferred final directive power in the minister. The other private banker, Sakai Kyonosuke, went down the line for the independence of the Bank. He was president of the Daiichi Bank and in 1957–1958 president of the bankers' federation; he took Kishi's place as head of the economic Federation's special committee when Kishi died unexpectedly in January 1959.

The chairman of the government committee, Shibusawa Keizo, was the son of one of Japan's greatest industrialists and a banker and businessman. He had been governor of the Bank of Japan; he had also been finance minister. As chairman he did not support the bankers' position; he confined himself to the thankless task of getting some basic agreement upon which legislation could be based. He did his best to use the traditional methods to minimize differences of opinion or of interest and bring everyone's views together (*Iken o Matomeru*). He proceeded with patience on this time-consuming task. His method was to permit the stronger view to prevail by the force of numbers, prestige, or character of the holders, but in such a way as not to embarrass the losers—a time-honored way of reaching group unanimity (*Zenkai Ittchi Giketsu Hoshiki*) which is not purely Japanese.[35] Shibusawa rejected the last-minute plea of the economic Federation for a vote on Plan B although the regulations permitted use of such a method to decide.

The economics professors and journalists who made up half the special committee also did not identify themselves closely with the ministry, the Bank, or business. One journalist supported the ministry for the practical reason that this seemed necessary to obtain action; if more had been so inclined, a traditional type of consensus might have been possible. The economists favored greater freedom for the Bank, perhaps from academic dislike of bureaucratic power, perhaps as a specific criticism of the way the ministry had handled recent monetary problems, or perhaps from a generally conservative economic orientation.

The dispute over the relationship between the ministry and Bank, was indeed neither purely a struggle for power, nor a contest between bureaucrats and those who disliked them. It was partly an ideological dispute over the proper role of monetary policy as well as of proper role of the government, as embodied in the ministry. On one side of this dispute was a group, centered in the finance ministry, that believed the government must be prepared to take dynamic steps to lead the economy, using monetary policy as one of several means.

Shimomura Osamu, as already noted, was the leader of this group, and a finance ministry expert on the government committee. He is a Keynesian economist in his acceptance of positive leadership of the economy through government action. Under the patronage of Ikeda Hayato, then minister of international trade and industry, Shimomura headed a personal advisory group for economic policy.[36] It included Inaba Hidezo, Chairman of the People's Economic Research Association and a prominent member of the government advisory committees. It also contained Takahashi Kamekichi, Hirata Keiichiro, and Kushida Mitsuo, all of whom appeared in April 1959 before the government committee to defend the ministry's control. Their advice had a strong influence upon the committee, judging from the preliminary draft proposals for the central Bank. Now as close confidant of Prime Minister Ikeda, Shimomura's ideas are very influential in the present government policy of high growth to eliminate Japan's double system of efficient relatively well paid labor and inefficient badly paid labor.

The bankers and industrialists as well as the Bank of Japan officials are cool toward such economic theory. They want stabilization of the currency guaranteed, to curb some of the excesses of the government economists. They would like the currency issue to have fairly fixed, albeit flexible, limits and to be tied to foreign exchange. They favor greater stability and a more conservative approach to monetary and economic policy. Representative of this opinion on the committee were Sakai Kyonosuke, president of the Daiichi Bank, and Yoshino Toshihiko, deputy chief of the economic research department of the Bank of Japan.[37]

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[35] Doa, R. P. (R. P. Dore), "Surogan no Hanran Suru Kuni (The Country Where Slogans Abound)," *Chuo Koron,* January, 1961, especially p. 240.

[36] The *Keizai Kenkyukai. Shukan Asahi* (Weekly Morning Sun), "Zaikai no Ikeda, Seichoritsu 9% no Bureentachi (Ikeda of the Financial World . . . The Brains behind the 9% Growth Rate)," October 30, 1960, pp. 8–9. See note 4, above.

VII

The issue of central bank reorganization has not been resolved. The government committee recommendations embodied two opposing policies on the central question, the relation of the finance ministry to the Bank of Japan. Sato Eisaku, the finance minister, said in April 5, 1960 that he could not introduce legislation with two conflicting recommendations; he preferred to leave the directive power in the ministry. Since he is one of the three leading faction leaders in the Conservative party and dependent on business contributions, it may seem odd that he should feel compelled to support the finance ministry officials: he was a career official in the former railway and transportation ministries, not finance. This illustrates, however, that even an outsider cannot ignore the thinking of ministry officials when he becomes finance minister. Prime Minister Ikeda, who did begin his career in the finance ministry and now heads the dominant faction of the Conservative party with powerful business backing, can more surely bend the ministry officials to his point of view, but he is also closely associated with the ministry group interested in using central bank measures as a means of regulating and stimulating the economy, so he may be inclined to favor the ministry over business. His prime support among the industrialists and stock brokers may be less committed to such a conservative approach as the private bankers prefer for the Bank of Japan.[38] It will be instructive if both Sato and Ikeda ignore business sentiment on the matter of central bank reform.

The previous Kishi Cabinet to which Sato belonged collapsed in July, 1960 under pressure of the crisis over the ratification of the security treaty with the United States. The final central banking committee report in September, therefore, went to the minister in the new Ikeda cabinet, which must decide whether to take steps on introducing new bank legislation. Action may be delayed for some time.

The current policy of relaxing trade and foreign exchange controls—made necessary by free-world currency convertibility and Japan's membership in GATT—has made the finance ministry officials reluctant to see the central bank system radically liberalized for the time being. The easing of trade controls will subject Japanese domestic business to the rigors of international competition. The government is unwilling to risk surrendering any more of its influence over finance until a new trade equilibrium has been reached on such a difficult problem. A more liberal economy will in the long run probably favor more independence for the Bank. But it is only realistic to recognise that an industrialized island nation, with the highest density of population in the world per acre of arable land, yet a nation notably lacking in industrial raw materials, and facing a great and menacing mainland power, is inevitably dependent on foreign commerce for its sustenance and strength. Such a nation, whatever the inclinations of its people, cannot lightly afford to decentralize its powers of decision over monetary and credit policies that are vital to its continued safety and prosperity.

The case of central bank reform, then, has not been a story of successful business influence, even at a time when business seems to be at the height of its power in the postwar period. Some conditions limiting business influence have been pointed out. Despite these, business lavished its efforts to influence the outcome. It appealed to the dislike of bureaucratic control and it used conservative economic arguments, but it could not win out against personal and group loyalties and the basic logic of Japan's economic and international situation.

The power of business, potentially very great, is exercised in conventional and institutionalized ways within the context of competing groups, competing ideas, and competing policies. All of these affect the influence it can exert. In the case of central bank reform, business, especially banking, was fully consulted and able to take an active part in the formation of policy. It was not able to prevail. On monetary policy at least, even with finance, industry, and the central bank in agreement, business and its allies could not overcome the position of a powerful ministry.

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[37] Sakai Kyonosuke, "Nihon Ginkoho Kaisei Rongi o Kaerimite (Looking Back Over the Discussion on the Revision of the Bank of Japan Law)," *Keidanren Geppo*, November 1959, pp. 7–9; Yoshino Toshihiko, "Excessive Dependence of Commercial Banks on Central Bank Loans in Japanese Economic Development," mimeographed, note pages 29 ff.

[38] For Sato's position see *Nihon Kogyo Shimbun* (Japan Industrial News), "Seifu no Nichigin Shijiken (The Government's Bank of Japan)," April 12, 1960, p. 1.

THE ELECTED AND THE ANOINTED: TWO AMERICAN ELITES

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In all advanced societies there is a distinct tendency for political and economic power to be held and exercised by different kinds of individuals. Even in modern totalitarian states it has been possible to observe quite distinguishable groups playing the leading roles in political and economic life. The aptitudes that go to make a successful political leader and those that produce an effective economic manager are analytically separable. And if the men who comprise the political and economic elites in a single society are markedly different in character and social background, then certain tensions are bound to arise in the areas where their power and authority interact. These tensions may develop even if the two sets of people profess to sharing a common ideology and even if they are ostensibly committed to working toward common objectives. For the kinds of men who enter political and economic vocations are prone to view social reality from different vantage points, and consequently they will interpret their shared ideology in the light of different experience. What will follow, then, is a comparative study of two elite groups in contemporary American society. The purpose of this study, quite simply, is to ascertain what the members of these elites have in common and what they do not.

Once this knowledge is in hand it will then be possible to speculate on the connection between the disparate backgrounds of the political and economic elites and the perceptions of political and economic reality held by the members of the two groups. If it is granted that a legislator's or an executive's view of society is shaped by a wide variety of forces, it will also be acknowledged that the true weight of only a few of these factors can be evaluated in a systematic way. To infer that selected aspects of a man's environment determine his perceptions of the world around him is bound to be a risky affair. Only if these admonitions are kept in mind can the generalizations ventured at the close of this paper be read in a proper light. As conclusions they will perforce be both limited and tentative. For the sake of clarity of presentation, however, some emphases will be highlighted and certain contrasts will be underlined. While appearances may occasionally be to the contrary, the writer has not been carried away by the simplicity of his theme. And neither will the well-advised reader be so stampeded.

The 200 men (in fact, 199 men and Mrs. Margaret Chase Smith) to be considered here constitute the totality of the two elites in question: 100 United States senators and the presidents of America's 100 largest industrial corporations. But the study is, in another sense, based on a sample. The 100 senators are those who happened to be the incumbents in mid-October, 1959. The 100 corporations are those which happened to be tops in sales during 1958, and their presidents are the men who happened to be the incumbents in mid-October, 1959. At this time the Senate was rather heavily weighted on the Democratic side. Prior to the 1958 election there were 49 Democrats and 47 Republicans in the Senate; after that election there were 65 Democrats and 35 Republicans. But this line-up was not changed appreciably by the 1960 election.

As for the corporations, in the five years from 1955 through 1959 a total of 119 companies have been listed among the top 100 at one time or another. In other words, during the five years ending with 1959, nineteen companies fell below the top 100 and nineteen new ones came in to take their places. It should be pointed out, however, that of the nineteen which took this fall, thirteen were still in 1959 among the top 120. Only six really lost significant ground in the half-decade.

While the Senate in 1959 was overweighted with newcomers, the median tenure of office was still approximately seven years. The median tenure of the presidents was somewhat over four years. On the whole it is true that the corporation executives do not stay in office as long as their legislative counterparts. Indeed, one of the noteworthy features of the modern corporation is the fairly rapid rotation of top personnel. At all events a necessary limitation of this study was its being based on a single point in time. Information on the senators and presidents was obtained from standard reference works and additional data were secured by means of personal correspondence.[1]

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[1] The one hundred corporations were taken from "The *Fortune* Directory" of the 500 largest industrial corporations; the "Directory" was published in August 1959 and covers the 1958 calendar year. Information on the senators and presidents was secured from 1959 editions of *Who's Who in America, Who's Who in Commerce and Industry*, and the *Congressional Directory*. The re-

Much of our folklore, academic and otherwise, manages to convey stereotyped images of the men who fill our legislative and corporate offices. James M. Burns, for example, prefaces his *Congress on Trial* with a vignette entitled "The Congressman and His World." This portrait (of a representative, but clearly intended by Burns to apply to the senators as well) is meant to be characteristic of the men who make our nation's laws. Burns writes:

> Above all else the Congressman believes in Boone Center and the rest of the Ninth District. An unashamed booster of the district, he is an expert on its products, its history, and its importance to the nation. . . . The Congressman's world, then, is largely confined within the boundaries of the Ninth District and is shaped by the business spirit and way of life of Boone Center. It is a world where old ideas and myths still survive, blurring the alignments that economic and political forces inevitably produce. As the champion of his world, the Congressman defends it against its real and imaginary adversaries outside. As the product of his world, he puts its imprint on Congressional action.[2]

If the congressman is commonly seen as the product of provincial America, the corporation executive is most usually invested with what may be called a metropolitan background. The really important group in C. Wright Mills' trinitarian power elite consists of the top business leaders, and he refers largely to these when he describes America's men of power:

> They derive in substantial proportions from the upper classes, both new and old, of local society and the metropolitan 400. . . . Their fathers were at least of the professional and business strata, and very frequently higher than that. They are native-born Americans of native parents, primarily from urban areas, and . . . overwhelmingly from the East. They are mainly Protestants, especially Episcopalians or Presbyterians. In general, the higher the position the greater the proportion of men within it who have derived from and who maintain connections with the upper classes. The generally similar origins of the members of the power elite are underlined and carried further by the fact of their increasingly common educational routine. Overwhelmingly college graduates, substantial proportions have attended Ivy League colleges.[3]

It is easy enough to point out that both Burns' and Mills' portraits are caricatures, and there is every reason to think that both authors know that this is so. But—if these are caricatures—it remains to ask just where the reality lies. How far is it possible to generalize about the men who make up America's legislative and industrial leadership? There are important elements of truth in both the provincial and metropolitan stereotypes. But they can also be misleading insofar as they obscure some interesting and subtle differences which are important features of the composite elite picture.

Early Environment. Seventy-eight of the senators were raised in the states they currently represent. This means that, in geographic terms at least, the legislators constitute a fairly representative cross-section of the country. What is more surprising is that the executives are similarly diversified. Table I gives the regional breakdown of the two elite groups, based on the towns where they went to high school. Quite clearly the South is over-

TABLE I. EARLY ENVIRONMENT: SECTION OF COUNTRY

	Senators ($N=97$) %	Presidents ($N=95$) %
East	30	36
Midwest	27	35
South	27	13
West	16	15

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mainder of the data were obtained by personal letters sent out to the 200 presidents and senators by the students in my undergraduate course in "Political Behavior." Their hours of toil over their typewriters and their uncomplaining—and unreimbursed—expenditures on postage stamps have my heartfelt appreciation.

[2] James M. Burns, *Congress on Trial* (New York, 1949), pp. 5, 17. For more systematic analysis of Senatorial backgrounds, see the cumulative studies of Donald R. Matthews: "United States Senators and the Class Structure," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 18 (1954), pp. 5–22; *The Social Backgrounds of Political Decision-Makers* (New York, 1954); *United States Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill, 1960).

[3] C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956), p. 279. There are four full-length studies of business executives: Mabel Newcomer, *The Big Business Executive* (New York, 1955); W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, *Big Business Leaders in America* (New York, 1955); Warner and Abegglen, *Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry* (Minneapolis, 1955); The Editors of *Fortune*, *The Executive Life* (New York, 1956).

represented in the Senate, and the corporations draw slightly more heavily on the East and the Midwest. However it is important to note that almost as many executives hail from the Midwest as do from the East. In this respect what Mills has to say falls rather wide of the mark: the corporate elite may once have been an Eastern preserve but the current generation has been recruited from all sections of the country. Both Mills and Burns are largely correct, however, when the character of the hometowns of the two elites is examined. Table II shows the kind of city in which the legislators and executives received their secondary education. It should be pointed out that the three categories were construed very liberally: a "metropolitan center" is any city with a population of over 100,000 and includes the suburban fringe; a "medium-sized city" ranges from 25,000 to 100,000. From these figures it is plain that the senators are preponderantly provincial in origin. While, again, the number of small-town executives is surprisingly large—not a few hail from such hamlets as Red Lodge, Montana, Crystal, North Dakota, or Sour Lake, Texas—the far larger group were raised in cities like New York or Chicago or their immediate suburbs. An individual's hometown is generally selected for him by his parents, and his real choice of environment (if he gets any) comes after he completes his higher education. Nevertheless, to the extent that the milieu of one's early upbringing instils in a person a certain social outlook, it may be said that the legislators begin life with an exposure to its provincial manner whereas the executives tend to start in a metropolitan environment. And as an individual's decision to make a break with his hometown surroundings is an important fact in his biography, this information on early environment can be regarded as a point of departure for further analysis.

TABLE II. EARLY ENVIRONMENT: HOMETOWN

	Senators (N = 100) %	Presidents (N = 95) %
Metropolitan center	19	52
Medium-sized city	17	17
Rural or small town	64	29

Education. In the United States, as in most other countries, a man's education tells us a good deal about his overall social background. The two elites show a basic similarity in that the overwhelming majority in both groups attended college. But significant variations appear when we look into the type of school they attended prior to college and the kind of college in which they enrolled. Table III breaks down their schools and colleges into the conventional categories. Such a classification in no way presupposes the educational superiority of one type of institution as compared with another. It can be said, however, that at the time the members of the elite groups were receiving their education, attendance at a private school or an Ivy League college was evidence of coming from a fairly well-to-do family. About twice as many executives had private school and Ivy League educations as legislators. For the senators, the roughly equal apportionment between non-Ivy private colleges and public universities probably reflects the middle to upper-middle class backgrounds of these men. More than half of the senators who did go to private schools did not attend the fashionable Eastern seaboard preparatory schools but rather went to local institutions in or relatively close to their hometowns.

TABLE III. EDUCATION: SECONDARY SCHOOL AND COLLEGE

School	Senators (N = 94) %	Presidents (N = 90) %
Private school	15	28
Public school	85	72
College*	(N = 100)	(N = 95)
Ivy League college	15	29
Other private college	36	27
State university	40	31
No college	9	13

* By "Ivy League" colleges are meant Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, Dartmouth, Brown, Pennsylvania, Cornell, and also Amherst and Williams. Included with "State universities" are the U. S. Naval Academy and the City College of New York.

The corporate elite, on the other hand, departs markedly from the stereotype. Over two-thirds of them went to public high schools and the same proportion attended non-Ivy private colleges or state universities. And of the minority of executives who did go to Ivy League colleges, by no means all of them preceded this with private school training. Of the 28 such corporation presidents, eighteen were prep school graduates and ten were not. In other words, only 20 per cent of the corporate elite had the educational background usually associated with privilege in this country.[4] The remaining 80 per cent of the executives diverge from this pattern in important particulars, and Table IV shows that one of the most significant of these is an engineering training. While the engineers do not constitute a majority of the corporate elite—but neither, for that matter, do the liberal arts graduates—they are nevertheless a large enough group to command attention. What emerges is that the executives, once more contrary to Mills' analysis, do not form a homogeneous group. There are, to be sure, those from privileged backgrounds and with training in the useless arts. But they are easily outnumbered by those with humbler beginnings and educations geared to the practical. The Ivy League executives, it ought to be said, seem to possess certain advantages. The members of this group ascended to their presidencies at a median age of 47 years, whereas the non-Ivy presidents had to wait until they were 52 or 53, on the average, for this promotion. It would appear, furthermore, that engineers "waste" several years while working on the technical side, and transfer over to management slightly later in their careers. But once such a shift is made they seem to stand an equal chance of getting to the top.

TABLE IV. EDUCATION: FIELD OF STUDY (PRESIDENTS)

	Ivy League ($N=28$) %	Private ($N=23$) %	State ($N=23$) %
Liberal arts	78	15	30
Engineering	11	70	40
Other	11	15	30

National Origins and Religion. As the years move on it is increasingly difficult to analyze social backgrounds and basic attitudes in terms of national origins. Of course it is still true that a second-generation American of southern or eastern European parentage is going to begin life with a lower social status and greater career handicaps. On the other hand third-generation Americans of northern European stock are less and less frequently regarded as other than full-fledged citizens. This is certainly the case with Germans and Scandinavians, and it is increasingly so for Irish-Americans. The outlook is bound to change for Italians, Poles, and Jews as the second generation makes way for the third. At the same time America is filled with tens of millions of "poor whites" of venerable Anglo-Saxon stock. For the offspring of these less successful Mayflower families, the road to career advancement can be virtually as difficult as that for a third-generation American of Polish background. So long as caveats such as these are kept in mind it is possible to proceed with an examination of the national origins of the two elites.

Table V gives the birthplaces of the grandparents of the legislators and executives. A grandparent of one of these men would have been born at about 1840, and if he was born in the United States this would be sufficiently early to be termed "old American" stock. However, for purposes of this study only those with four native-born grandparents were put in the "old American" class. Those with three, two, one, or none who were born in the United States were classified as coming from immigrant backgrounds. In the vast majority of cases, it should be said, either all grandparents were born in this country or all were born elsewhere. While only a total of 128 members of the two elites supplied information in this area, the pattern for them, at least, is quite straightforward. There is a basic similarity between the two elites, and both are largely the preserve of grandsons of "old American" families. While it is conventional to suppose that political

TABLE V. NATIONAL ORIGINS: GRANDPARENTS' NATIVITY

	Senators ($N=69$) %	Presidents ($N=59$) %
Old American	70	60
Northern Europe	21	34
Southern or eastern Europe	9	6

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[4] Two thoughts occur here: The corporate elite might have displayed a more priviledged background had the heads of large banks, investment houses, and insurance companies been included in the study. Industrial corporations may be less concerned about a man's origins than financial institutions seem to be. At the same time, had the ten (or fifty) men in each company immediately below the president been studied, a greater prep school and Ivy League proportion might have been noted. When the final promotion to the summit is made it may well be that questions of background are given less stress than they are for subordinate executive positions in the company.

careers are one of the first roads of advancement opened to recent immigrant groups, this rule has as yet to be applied in the Senate. It should be noted, moreover, that in the case of both elites the grandparents who are designated as coming from "Northern Europe" tend to hail from England and Scotland rather than Germany or Ireland. Ours is probably the last generation in this country's history in which an analysis of national origins will be of much value. For in thirty years' time an inquiry into the nativity of an individual's grandparents will shed very little light on his own character or social opportunities. By the year 1990 virtually all white Americans will be thoroughly assimilated, and national antecedents will be little more than interesting curiosities.

Religion, like education, has been traditionally employed as a social index. The religious affiliations of the senators are a matter of record, and a high proportion of the presidents were willing to give this information. It has never been easy to classify the various denominations. But most members of the two elites are Protestants, and the "high-status"-"low-status" breakdown is a fairly useful one. In this classification, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Unitarians are termed "high-status" and Baptists, Methodists, Lutherans, and others "low-status."[5] Table VI gives the church memberships of the two elites. Any such attempt at general analysis is bound to be plagued by regional variations. In the state of Utah, for example, a large part of the population belongs to the Church of Latter Day Saints. And in the South membership in Baptist and Methodist churches can be every bit as "high-status" as Episcopal or Congregationalist membership elsewhere. Indeed, of the twenty-two Southern senators, only five belong to what in national terms might be called "high-status" churches and seventeen are "low status" affiliates. If the Southerners are left out of consideration, the "high-status"-"low-status" ratio among the non-Southern legislators is 54 to 46 per cent—compared with 75 to 25 per cent among the executives. In other words, while the majority of non-Southern Protestant senators belong to "high status" churches, the proportion is appreciably greater among the presidents. One further point can only be raised as a matter of speculation. The church memberships reported here are the current ones attested to by the men in the two elite groups. It would be of some interest to know how many of the legislators and executives have continued with the religious affiliations in which they were originally raised. There is a suspicion, raised by correlating current church membership with data on the early environment, that at least some of the presidents now professing "high status" religions affiliated with these churches later in adult life. Hardly any similar evidence exists for the senators. If this is in any way so, then the implication is that the legislators are content to retain the religious identification of the provincial middle-class into which they were born, whereas the executives prefer to associate themselves with the churches of the metropolitan upper-middle class.

TABLE VI. CHURCH AFFILIATION

	Senators ($N = 100$) %	Presidents ($N = 72$) %
"High-Status" Protestant	36	60
"Low-Status" Protestant	45	20
Unspecified Protestant	4	8
Roman Catholic	12	9
Jewish	3	3

The Next Generation. If the last observation is only a matter of speculation, it may be strengthened by examining the aspirations of the members of the two elites for their children. Contrary to the popular literature, not all Americans are embroiled in the game of status-seeking—although some are more than others. It may be presumed that the goals which an individual sets for his children reflect in some way his own sense of values. Table VII shows the colleges to which the senators and presidents sent their sons or daughters.[6] Out of the 200, some 142 replied to this question; but of

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[5] This classification of religions according to status is employed by Matthews in his *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers*, *op. cit.*, p. 26. It was devised by Wesley and Beverly Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (1948), pp. 377–89. The church memberships of the senators are given in *The Congressional Quarterly*, January 8, 1961, p. 61.

[6] By "Ivy League" colleges are meant the ten cited in the note accompanying Table III, plus Smith, Vassar, Wellesley, Bryn Mawr, Radcliffe, Barnard, and Mount Holyoke. If a senator or president had sent more than one child to college, and if different children went to different types of institutions, then "Ivy League" was recorded in preference to Non-Ivy, and private colleges were recorded in preference to public institutions.

TABLE VII. COLLEGE OF CHILDREN

	Senators (N=44) %	Presidents (N=53) %
Ivy League college	27	70
Other private college	34	17
State university	39	14

this number, 45 had either no children or children who were too young for college. It is no surprise to learn that the presidents tend to send their children to Ivy league colleges even if most of them did not attend such institutions themselves. The typical executive would not yet have been the president of his corporation when his offspring started college; however, he was clearly close to the top by that time and well exposed to the metropolitan life. The information on the senators is more revealing. Our legislators are not so poorly paid or without outside sources of income that the expense of an Ivy League education is beyond their means. And it is plain that an Ivy League college would be as happy to have a senator's child on its rolls as it would a president's. The thought arises in consequence that most senators simply do not have metropolitan aspirations for their sons and daughters any more than they do for themselves. They prefer, on the whole, to have their offspring identify with more familiar surroundings and they elect to send their sons and daughters to non-Ivy private colleges and state universities closer to home. Indeed, it is the very definition of what constitutes one's "home" that comes closest to differentiating the two elite groups.

Geographic Mobility. It has already been noted that senators tend to begin life in provincial surroundings while presidents are more apt to have metropolitan boyhoods. The first opportunity for a break with the home environment usually comes with the decision of where to go to college. Table VIII indicates the distances travelled by the members of the two elites from their hometowns to college. If it is asked whether it was the youthful legislators or executives who were more venturesome in this sphere, the answer is ambiguous. On the one hand, the median distance travelled by the college-bound future senators is higher; on the other, twice as many presidents-to-be went over 500 miles in order to attend college. It is clear, however, that the future executives did not hitch-hike across the country to get their educations. Only a quarter of them travelled a great distance, and it is doubtful if they had to journey by means of upraised thumb. Furthermore almost half of the legislators went to colleges over 100 miles from home. These figures—especially if 100 miles is taken as the dividing point—are strikingly similar.

TABLE VIII. MOBILITY: HOMETOWN TO COLLEGE

	Senators (N=84) %	Presidents (N=79) %
Same town	15	18
Under 100 miles	38	30
100 to 500 miles	34	27
Over 500 miles	13	25
Median distance	101 miles	90 miles

The current location of the two elites is quite another matter. Table IX shows the distance between the hometown and the current residence for the senators and the presidents. Here the typical executive will be seen to have travelled over fifteen times as far in pursuit of his career. If 100 miles is again taken as the dividing point, approximately 70 per cent of the legislators now live within 100 miles of their hometown whereas 70 per cent of the executives have set up residence over 100 miles from where they started. It is well known that the corporate life is a nomadic one and that the road to advancement in large companies is paved with a series of transfers throughout the country.[7] The presidents, of course, are now residing in or near the cities where the company headquarters are located. These centers are not, in point of fact, as "metropolitan" as might first be thought. Only thirty-seven of the corporations are based in New York; nine are in Chicago, and six each are in Detroit and Pitts-

TABLE IX. MOBILITY: HOMETOWN TO CURRENT RESIDENCE

	Senators (N=92) %	Presidents (N=91) %
Same town	41	12
Under 100 miles	30	18
100 to 500 miles	11	34
Over 500 miles	18	36
Median distance	22 miles	342 miles

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[7] See Robert Sheehan, "We've Been Transferred," *Fortune*, July, 1957, pp. 116–118, 198–200.

burgh.[8] After that the spread is wide, including such towns as Moline, Greensboro, and Bartlesville. What is important, however, is that all of these corporations are national in their operations. Their presidents spend a great deal of time travelling throughout the country, and their constituency—for so it may be called—consists of suppliers and customers and employees and shareholders from coast to coast. It is truly nationwide in its proportions. This metropolitan world was entered at the moment the executives decided they would not return to the hometowns in which they were raised. And, for most of them, this was the first decision they made upon leaving college and embarking upon their corporate careers.

If what distinguishes the senators is their decision to return to their hometowns, there is good evidence that they ventured beyond familiar territory during their formative years. A simple way to measure such mobility is to set up four "compass points." These are: (1) the town in which a senator or a president was raised (in most cases this is the town where he went to high school). (2) The town where he went to college (if he did). (3) The town where he went to graduate school (if he did). (4) The town where he currently resides. By plotting a "map" for each senator and president, four general patterns of mobility begin to emerge. They are: (1) the "non-leavers," whose hometown, college and graduate school (if attended), and current residence are all within the same state; (2) the "temporary leavers," whose hometown and current residence are within the same state, but who travelled to another state for college or graduate school; (3) the "late leavers," who went to college or graduate school in their home state, but whose current residence is in a different state; and (4) the "early leavers," whose hometown, college and graduate school (if attended), and current residence are all in different states. Table X applies these four patterns, based on the four "compass points," to the senators and presidents. Those with the first two patterns are called "returners"; those displaying the second two are called "non-returners." What is perhaps most interesting is that while most of the legislators return to their home state, so large a proportion of them leave temporarily for purposes of furthering their education. Significantly, also, this movement on the part of the senators was more typically for graduate school than for undergraduate studies. Of the 65 legislators who attended graduate school (and this was usually law school), as many as 41 took their advanced work in another state. The general pattern, then, was to go to college in one's home state, to attend graduate school in a different state, and then to return home with a law degree. The senators may be characterized, in sum, by their early decision to follow their careers in the surroundings in which they were raised. The majority of the presidents made a quite different choice: on completing their education they decided to make the nationwide business community their new home.

TABLE X. MOBILITY: DURATION OF ABSENCE

	Senators ($N=100$) %	Presidents ($N=97$) %
Returners		
Non-leavers	21	5
Temporary leavers	57	24
	78	29
Non-Returners		
Late leavers	14	39
Early leavers	8	32
	22	71

In summary it may be said that the members of the two elites are similar in several important respects. In terms of regional origins, of level of education, of national origins, and of pre-career mobility the pictures are pretty much the same. The respects in which they differ are, on the whole, more significant. These have to do with the size of the hometown, the character of education, current religion, education of children, and career mobility. On this basis it may be said that the provincial characterization of the legislative elite is not an inaccurate assessment. Even though the senators travelled away from home for their education, their early decision to return suggests their choice to identify with the section of the country in which they grew up. That such an identification continues to persist is suggested by the findings on their children's education. There are, to be sure, exceptions to these generalizations. But the major patterns hold. On the other hand, the metropolitan attributes of the executives are as much acquired as they are the product of early environment. Almost half of the presidents, it will be recalled, were raised in medium-sized cities or small towns or rural surroundings. There are, furthermore, two quite distinct groups among the executives: the "Ivy League-liberal arts" contingent on the one side, and the "State University-engineers" on the other. The latter group, in terms of origins and education, has much in common with the senators. But the law students who were to become legislators returned home, whereas the engineers who were to become executives did not.

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[8] For those who like to keep in touch with the world of affairs, the following intelligence may be of interest: of the 37 corporations with head offices in the New York area, eleven are located around Wall Street, eight are in Rockefeller Center, and seventeen are on the Upper East Side—chiefly Park Avenue. (One is in suburban White Plains.) Tourists to the Soviet Union who wish to set straight the dialecticians of Red Square may point out that "Wall Street" is a thing of the past and "Park Avenue" is the new center of industrial capitalism.

Furthermore, of the executives who studied liberal arts subjects and who attended Ivy League colleges, only a part came from the higher strata of society. Indeed, having attended a private school is in most of their cases evidence of an upper-middle class rather than an upper-class background. Of the 37 presidents who currently live in or around New York City, only four are listed in the *New York Social Register*.[9] Most of them clearly lack the family connections which entitle an individual to membership in the established citadel of metropolitan society—or, more properly, Society. Yet these are men of real power and not inconsiderable wealth, and those who had provincial backgrounds have long since put these behind them. The chief reason why the corporate elite does not gain entry into the world of the *Social Register* is that they hold their positions as top executives for too short a time to establish themselves as individual personalities. Nor does it follow that their children will enter this world. For a corporation president may give his sons and daughters a good education and a modest inheritance, but there is small likelihood that he can pass on to the sons top jobs in the company.[10] At this point we do not know what careers are followed by the children of the executives, nor is it clear how large are the fortunes which are left to them. But it must not be thought that most of the presidents end up as more than modest millionaires, if that; the amount of money which will descend to the second generation is not going to be particularly impressive.

The corporate elite, then, is a group whose membership is always in the process of circulation. The men who comprise it at any given time have not been at the top for long, and for this reason they have not been able to acquire substantial wealth or traditional social connections. It is an elite based on talent rather than on birth, and its overlap with the upper class of the *Social Register* is negligible. If it is metropolitan, therefore, it is because it lives in and exercises power over a nationwide economy. And it is this experience of life in a national constituency which gives it its image of American society.

It ought not to be necessary to allude to the structural differences in the organization of the political and economic elites. The senators meet regularly and they make their legislative decisions jointly. While they are ever mindful of the interests of their constituencies, the actions they ultimately take concern the formation of national policy. The presidents belong to no common organization and their interactions with each other are irregular and informal.[11] And most of their decisions concern the operations of their companies rather than the business community as a whole. Nor is either group the exclusive elite in its province. The senators share power with the representatives, the President, and the Administration.

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[9] *Social Register New York 1959* (New York, 1960). The idea of examining the overlap between "elite" and "upper class" in a metropolitan area comes from E. Digby Baltzell, *Philadelphia Gentlemen* (Glencoe, 1958).

[10] The facts of limited tenure of office and corporate bureaucracy raise important questions which can only be broached here. John Kenneth Galbraith, for example, minimizes the role of individual executives: "Organization replaces individual authority; no individual is powerful enough to do much damage. Were it otherwise, the stock market would pay close attention to retirements, deaths, and replacements in the executive ranks of large corporations. In fact, it ignores such details in tacit recognition that the organization is independent of any individual." *The Affluent Society* (Boston, 1958), p. 102.

[11] This process is discussed by Floyd Hunter, *Top Leadership U.S.A.* (Chapel Hill, 1959). Even more illuminating is Hobart Rowen's brief discussion of the Business Advisory Council. *Harpers*, September 1960, pp. 79–84. The sixty members of this group, almost all of them corporation leaders, meet periodically for several days to discuss national policies. Despite its recent dissociation from the Department of Commerce the B.A.C. has made clear its intention to continue meeting as a corporate entity. Another gathering point is the National Industrial Conference Board, which assumes importance because the National Association of Manufacturers' membership rolls are dominated by smaller businesses.

The presidents, within their own corporations, share power with the directors, the chairmen of the boards, and frequently the large lending and underwriting institutions. All of these facts are quite obvious, and if analogies are being suggested between the two elites these must not be strained. It is clear, however, that both senators and presidents are men of substantial power. As an individual, each legislator and executive has a substantial jurisdiction in which he can act on his own discretion; and as collectivities, each elite group constitutes a major force in American society. The senators, for example, participate in presiding over a governmental establishment with approximately 2.5 million employees and they enact a budget which disposes of over $80 billion in taxes. The presidents, for their part, head companies with over five million employees and they produce goods which bring in almost $120 billion in sales. In our time power lies with major political and economic institutions more than ever before, and one is frequently tempted to conclude that these organizations dictate the conduct of the men who work in and for them. Yet it is also true that the behavior of institutions, of legislatures and corporations, will reflect the character of the men who staff them.

The hypothesis to be advanced here is that serious tensions exist between our major political and economic institutions. And this state of affairs stems in no small measure from the fact that different kinds of individuals fill the legislative and executive roles in American society. There is, at base, a real lack of understanding and a failure of communication between the two elites. This hiatus, and the consequent tensions, stem largely from the disparate images of society held by the respective groups. And the void is most especially pronounced in the areas where politics and economics come into contact with one another.[12]

This hypothesis is, of course, tentative. No one has conducted a systematic survey of the attitudes and outlooks of senators and presidents; and while there are good studies of both groups, they overlap neither in method nor in substance. At this juncture, therefore, the suggestion that there is a mutual misperception of needs and goals must be regarded as a starting point rather than as a conclusion. If this initial impression has been gained from rudimentary observation of the two elites, it is subject to correction and revision. I have not undertaken to match individual views and individual backgrounds against group misperceptions. There are, furthermore, dangers in generalizing about a legislative elite, for in such bodies not all members are equally powerful. Nevertheless, in the case of the Senate there is ground for believing that the more powerful members are also more heavily provincial in background. At the same time there is the anomaly that the more metropolitan senators may, in spite of the characteristics they share with the businessmen, be those most feared by the economic elite. Thus Prep School-Ivy League Democrats like Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania and William Proxmire of Wisconsin are regarded by corporation managers with no small hostility. (But it should also be noted that Prep School-Ivy League presidents such as Thomas Watson, Jr. of I.B.M. and Henry Ford II of Ford are surprisingly liberal in their politics and not nearly so worried as their colleagues about welfare legislation or high government expenditures.) But the real problem under consideration has to do not with the handful of vocal anti-business senators, many of whom are admittedly metropolitan in background. Rather it centers on the broad legislative majority: the large group of lawmakers from provincial environments who harbor no overt antagonism to the business community.[13]

Most of the legislators are sympathetic to the needs of business and they sincerely desire to maintain our economic system—as they understand it. Problems arise, however, because the legislative image of the business world is cast largely in provincial terms. Most of the senators have had little direct experience of metropolitan institutions and almost none have worked with the national corporations. At most, they are familiar with branch plants which may happen to be in their constituencies; but they have little appreciation of the national outlook of the large firms. The world of business they have been exposed to is the realm of small, locally owned enterprise. And it is their ignorance of the metropolitan economy which leads to some of the most pronounced ambiguities in legislative behavior. On the one hand, legislators seek to protect and encourage small and local businesses, for to their minds these are the rightful foundations of the economy. Consequently there is much rhetoric about "aid to small business" and perennial calls for "vigorous anti-trust action" directed against the large corporations. On the other hand, they are faced with the very real fact that our nationwide firms must be given access and listened to with respectful attention. Corporation lobbyists are never denied entry in our capitols, and their power is such that more often than not they secure the legislation they want. Indeed, a provincial assembly of lawmakers seems again and again willing to accommodate itself to the wishes of these metropolitan institutions. The problem is that the legislators are faced with a power they do not really understand and with demands about whose legitimacy they are uneasy. If they acquiesce, it is frequently with no small qualm of conscience. At the very same time, they are unable to protect the small, local enterprises to which they are ideologically committed. Small business loans and anti-trust legislation are ineffective instruments, yet these are the major weapons in a paper arsenal. While the lawmakers believe strongly in the institution of private property, their image of the economy is such that they are incapable of seeing the real conflicts between small and large businesses. Contracts which go to the one cannot be available to the other; tax laws which benefit the one will work hardships on the other. And the rise in market and distribution power of the nationwide corporations tends, if not to drive small firms out of business, to deprive their owners of prestige and independence by reducing suppliers and retailers to a state of vassalage. Yet because legislators have been brought up to view the business world as a seamless web, they are unable to face up to these problems in a serious way. They never launch a serious attack on the activities of large corporations, even though their hearts are with the welfare of small enterprise. Indeed, it is hard for them to be "anti-business" in even the most selective of ways.

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[12] It might be mentioned as a gratuitous note that this study was largely impelled by two personal experiences of the author. In August of 1959 he was asked to testify before the McClellan Committee on the political activities of corporations. He was unable to persuade the legislators that a national corporation was something more than an expanded version of a locally owned and managed enterprise. "Investigation of Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field," 86th Congress, 1st sess., Part 57, pp. 19900–19908. In November of the same year he was asked to speak at a meeting of the National Industrial Conference Board on corporation activities in politics. He was unable to persuade the executives that the Congress was something more than a Washington Branch office which was not up with the times. "Executives Eager to Get in Politics," *New York Herald Tribune*, November 25, 1959. But then this may be only a commentary on the persuasive powers of the author.

[13] I am grateful to Robert E. Lane for helping me to think through some of the problems raised in this paragraph.

A further consequence is that even though the Congress will oftentimes make sincere efforts to accommodate the desires of large corporations, the result is that the economic elite remains dissatisfied with their handiwork. Thus we saw the ironic spectacle of an essentially conservative Congress enacting a labor law which placed further restrictions on unions, and for this act it got not thanks but renewed criticism. The program sponsored by large corporations to "get businessmen into politics" arose in 1958 while a Republican was in the White House and the Congress was controlled by a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats.[14] That very Congress was seen by executives as dominated by labor unions and bent on destroying the foundations of a free economy. While the "businessmen in politics" movement ended up with more talk than action, it was also deeply symptomatic of the economic elite's dissatisfaction with the overall record and outlook of our lawmakers.

It may be argued, and with some justice, that corporation executives are lacking in political sophistication and they will never really be happy until taxes cease to exist and regulatory agencies padlock their doors.[15] Yet the very fact that the economic elite does not feel that its needs are understood by the men who make the nation's laws is a fact having broad ramifications. In American society the level of employment, the rate of industrial growth, and the success of our involvement with other nations—all of these and more depend on the prosperity of our large corporations. At the heart of the executive plaint is the feeling that our legislators cannot bring themselves to acknowledge that corporations are here to stay and that they are national in character. It is wrong, they would argue, to treat a major corporation as simply another "pressure group" bent on getting a larger share of the spoils. There is, in the corporate world, no small anxiety about the politics of democracy as they are expressed in legislation. This is not because the politics are democratic, but rather because they are focussed through a provincial lens rather than a metropolitan compass.

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[14] The literature exhorting businessmen to get into politics is voluminous. The author has in his files well over one hundred speeches by executives and statements by companies on this subject. A typical call to action is Horace E. Sheldon's "Businessmen Must Get Into Politics," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 37 (1959), pp. 37–47.

[15] Very little is known about the political attitudes of executives. For a sampling, see the "Report from 75 Presidents" published by Elmo Roper and Associates in their *The Public Pulse*, September, 1958, pp. 2–3.

These tensions would not arise in such graphic form if the men who comprise the nation's political and economic elites were more similar in background and experience. While in no society can there be real homogeneity between these two groups, in a country like Great Britain political and economic leaders are far more similar in character. For this reason, legislation affecting the British economy can secure political ends with a high degree of effectiveness and at the same time gain the approval of the corporate institutions which are directly affected.[16] The American pattern, because it is more democratic, has been far less smooth in its operations. The provincial outlook which is represented in the Congress will, in the final analysis, have to bow to the power which inheres in our metropolitan institutions. Again and again, the lawmakers have been forced to admit—although not necessarily to understand—that there is nothing they can do to prevent the rise of corporations or to preserve in any meaningful way the provincial life. The debate will, of course, be conducted in muted tones; but the conflict is real. The elected elite will vainly try to devise ways and means of meeting the challenge of the men anointed with corporate power. As matters now stand they are incapable of licking them and unwilling to join them. If the legislators are to make any headway at all they will have to recast their image of economic reality from local to national terms. If they are unable to make such a revision they will be increasingly plagued with the sensations of frustration and bewilderment.

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[16] See Arnold A. Rogow, *The Labor Government and British Industry* (Ithaca, 1955). For a study of the relations between the business community and the nationalized industries in Great Britain, see Clive Jenkins, *Power at the Top* (London, 1959).

THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND THE STUDY OF POLITICAL THINGS: THE CASE OF CHRISTIAN BAY'S *THE STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM**

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One result of the advent of the behavioral sciences in political science is that political things are now being studied, to an ever increasing extent, by men with little or no training in political science. Of the 27 authors of essays in the Burdick and Brodbeck volume, *American Voting Behavior*, for example, only six are political scientists, the others being mainly sociologists, social psychiatrists, and, to a surprising extent, psychiatrists; so that if people were once thought to vote for political reasons, and if a decade ago they were said to vote for sociological reasons, we are now told that in fact votes are expressions of "individual needs to secure gratification of repressed wishes for a certain type of parental image. . . ."[1] I use the example of voting studies because it is in this area that the approach and the research techniques of modern behavioral science are said to have had the greatest impact.[2]

There would be no disposition to resist this development—certainly it would be indefensible for political science to cut itself off from the insights provided by other social sciences—were it not for the tendency in such works for the political to be reduced to the sub-political and the danger that in this process the political will disappear altogether, so that we will have a political science that refuses to address itself to political questions. This is not a remote possibility. The basic premise of modern social science is the so-called distinction between facts and values. It is said to be "vital for the healthy growth of [our] discipline" that we "separate political science from political philosophy so that factual research [will] not continue to be the stepchild of normative reflections. . . ."[3] But the truth of this proposition is by no means self-evident. The substitution of "causal theory" for the outlawed "normative reflections" may avoid "hyperfactualism," but causal theory cannot rescue the political from the oblivion into which it is cast by the fact-value premise. For the political can better be seen by minds that do not draw this distinction too sharply. As Professor Jaffa has said, "[P]olitical objects, by and large, exist only in the realm of human opinion."[4] The sensitivity that is the condition of their visibility exists more in the mind than in the eye. The political, generally speaking, is not visible to any of our senses, or even a combination of them. Racial segregation in the United States is seen by the observer because he can see the injustice of the practice; racial segregation in South Africa is seen by the same observer because of an understanding of justice and injustice that is not confined by a parochial "value system." Through the "eye of the mind" we are enabled to see the injustice and hence the political; with the eye alone we would see only men of dark skin sitting in the balconies of theatres, drinking from fountains marked "Colored," or *not* sitting at Woolworth lunch counters. Out of the millions of so-called "factual" events that pass within the range of our vision, we could not single out these events except as they are seen by the eye of our minds, and more precisely, as they are seen by the eye of a mind that is not blinded by prejudice or a fallacious theoretical commitment. It is this commitment that accounts for political science books devoid of political content.

Professor Bay leaves his readers in no doubt as to where he stands on this fundamental question. He asserts at the very outset of his undertaking that the "choice of goal values," which includes the choice of freedom, "is ultimately a matter of personal faith."[5]

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* A paper delivered at the Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September, 1960.

[1] C. W. Wahl, "The Relation Between Primary and Secondary Identifications: Psychiatry and the Group Sciences," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1959), pp. 263–4.

[2] David B. Truman, "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences," *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government* (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1955), p. 213.

[3] Stanley Hoffman, in a review of *Introduction à la Science Politique*, this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (December, 1959), p. 1120.

[4] Harry V. Jaffa, "The Case Against Political Theory," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (May, 1960), p. 259.

[5] Christian Bay, *The Structure of Freedom* (Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 4.

> The social scientist who strictly limits himself to the role of an observer of human behavior can only report what it appears that men actually do want, or in fact believe they ought to want. Statements about what men ought to want would amount to a projection of the observer's own values, so that they become standards by which he evaluates other people's behavior.[6]

The freedom he seeks to foster, the "goal value" he seeks for himself and everyone else on earth,[7] has no status in science, no "objective validity,"[8] which means that the desire to make men free is no more defensible before the bar of reason than the desire to enslave them. His desire to make men free, as *he* understands freedom, will be praised only by those who, because of historical accident, share his particular "faith."

But he intends *The Structure of Freedom* to be a political study, and the book won a Woodrow Wilson award, the highest official award offered by our profession. A serious consideration of what is surely one of the most important, and today most urgent, political problems, human freedom and dignity, it abounds in political judgments. In the words of the author, it is concerned with the problem of how "increased insights into human behavior [can] be employed in the service of sheltering the growth of individuality and freedom in the modern society."[9] To foster the growth of freedom, not merely in one country but throughout the world, requires a knowledge of the conditions of freedom or of those factors that facilitate its growth, and it is therefore altogether proper that the major part of Bay's book should be given over to the attempt to ascertain, in his words, the determinants of freedom. This might be called the causal theory section of the book. But knowledge of causes or conditions is impossible without knowledge of the thing caused, in this case, freedom. Bay must know what freedom is, and he therefore devotes considerable attention to defining the freedom and individuality whose growth he seeks to foster, although, as we have seen, he does not claim objective validity for his definitions. A moment's reflection on his enterprise shows us that the task he has set for himself is no less than the one that has engaged political philosophers since Socrates: the discovery of the political arrangement most conducive to human freedom in its most exalted sense. The grandeur of this subject is one measure of the importance of the book. To this traditional subject, however, Bay brings a new approach and a new method, which promise a rigor that was formerly unobtainable, because it is only in our own time that political science has become interested "in determining how laws actually operate and in assessing their psychological and social effects."[10] His enterprise as a whole must be seen as an attempt to be political and behavioral at the same time, and the extent to which he succeeds is the subject of this paper.

I

My task is made simpler by elements of agreement between us. Not only do we share an opinion of the importance of human freedom, but we both know that the essence of freedom cannot be captured in a definition restricted to the absence of legal or customary restraints, and that a man free from such restraints is not by that fact alone a free man. This knowledge leads Bay to speak of freedom in three senses, psychological and potential as well as social freedom, a definition to which I shall return.[11]

We also agree that there are limits to self-expression and, if I am not mistaken in my reading of his book, that these limits are part of the essence of freedom, which means that the man who is truly free does not express himself—because he has no wish to express himself—in some of the ways that are open to other men. Bay's statement of these limits is contained in his first chapter, where he says that he believes "in the fullest development of all human potentialities and faculties, in so far as they are nondestructive and not mutually incompatible."[12] "As a general rule," he goes on, "this development is furthered by a maximal freedom of expression for all individuals." The development of man's potentialities and faculties is fostered by freedom of expression, but only the nondestructive potentialities and faculties ought to be developed. It is necessary at this point to raise the question of the character of that which ought not be destroyed. By nondestructive, Bay could be referring to the rights of others, to the self itself, or to both of these, and to judge by the questions he discusses throughout the book, he means nondestructive of both. Let us consider the rights of others first, a subject that Bay discusses in one form or another in more than one place.

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 375–77.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[11] See below, p. 555.

[12] Bay, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

In order to determine whether the self-expression of one man destroys the rights of others, we have to know the character of these rights. Bay adopts what he calls the "human rights approach,"[13] and is therefore concerned that no man be permitted to destroy the human rights possessed by another. Unfortunately, however, men seem to differ as to what constitutes a human right, and the occasions are many when so-called human rights come into conflict. In this situation, he asks, "how is it possible to lay down priority criteria that are potentially acceptable to all?"[14] "I cannot solve this problem," he answers, "but I suggest that the most promising avenue toward a never fully attainable solution is opened up by the political and legal instrumentality of human rights." "Once it has has been decided which rights are more basic, it becomes an empirical question, though perhaps a complex one, to decide . . . what less basic rights have to be curbed in order to extend the more basic rights to all. . . ."[15] Unfortunately, we never reach the empirical question, because in another place he asks: "Who determines what human rights are more basic than others? [and answers immediately] We all do."[16]

One man's definition of his rights is as good as—or perhaps we should say, as objectively meaningless as—another's. "An increase in A's freedom," he says in the same chapter, "may well mean a decrease in B's, depending on what types of behavior or what kinds of expressions are involved,"[17] which means, or at least seems here to mean, that a man is free only in relation to others. The freedom of the sheep to graze in peace is no more defensible, however, than the freedom of the wolf to devour the sheep. Their goals are incompatible and, even in theory, irreconcilable. The world, and any of its political sub-divisions, consists only in sheep and wolves, yet it is the duty of the politician, who is himself either a sheep or a wolf, somehow to keep the peace among them. (One consequence of this is the frightening proposition that civil society is based on a myth, a lie.) He cannot, of course, avoid favoring one or the other.

But what, in this kind of world, is the duty of the political scientist whose announced purpose is to foster freedom? Since one man's freedom is another man's slavery, since freedom has, as he says, no "objective validity," there can be, in reality, no such thing as freedom. Bay's is a book about the structure of something that does not exist. In the world ruled by the behavioral sciences, freedom, like justice, is a myth; it can exist only as opinions in the minds of sheep and wolves. Whose freedom, then, does the political scientist seek to foster throughout the world? The answer depends, in this case, on whether Christian Bay is a sheep, with a sheep's values, or a wolf, with a wolf's values; he does not, because he cannot, recognize the existence of the third figure in Lincoln's parable, the shepherd. Instead of the liberator he pretends to be, Bay can be accused of wanting to embark on a campaign of imperialism that lacks the justification even of that carried on in the name of "white man's burden," since he *knows* that what he has to offer to the rest of the world is in no way superior to what the rest of the world already has.

If anything may be learned, not from the substance but from the spirit of this book, it is that Christian Bay would be one of the last men actually to embark on such a campaign. Good will and an active concern for the welfare of his fellow men pervade its pages from beginning to end, and the human rights he refers to, as well as the freedom he seeks to promote, are real to his spirit however unreal they are in the substance of his arguments. So far from wishing to impose his opinions on anyone, he speaks again and again of the desirability of being able to form one's own opinions, and he explicitly condemns the use of coercion; but the very words in which he does this reflect the tension between his good will and his intellectual commitments, his politics and his science. "Coercive acts against individuals, according to *my scheme of values*," he writes, "can be justified only on the concrete show of evidence that each type of coercive act serves to protect or extend some *considerably more important* freedoms than it destroys. . . ."[18] It is difficult to see how some freedoms can be "considerably more important" than others when in the same sentence he implies, with his reference to his own scheme of values, that in reality no scale of importance is possible. This means that each man may decide for himself whether by coercing others, or by expressing himself, or by developing one of his potentialities, he is protecting a freedom or a human right more important than the one he is destroying. Bay's problem is not solved by repeating at intervals that the "most basic human rights . . . should have priority,"[19] when we are told that each man is free to decide for himself what rights are most basic.

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[13] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 372.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 103. Italics supplied.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

Bay struggles with this problem throughout the book. In one place he suggests that "every person's basic motives are humanistically inclined,"[20] and that anti-humanistic behavior is merely the result of ego deficiency and a scarcity of material goods. If true, it is conceivable that the overcoming of scarcity by modern technology and the nourishing of egos by modern psychotherapy might eradicate not only all anti-humanistic behavior, but all differences of opinion with respect to such matters as the nature of human rights. This would solve Bay's problem, but, alas, he only "assumes" and later hopes that everyone at heart is humanistically inclined. On one of the last pages of the book he says that "[g]eneral priorities between freedoms must ultimately be decided by majorities . . . since these are questions of value."[21] If the sheep outnumber the wolves, they have a right to graze in peace—provided they have the power to defend themselves; if the wolves outnumber the sheep, they have a right to devour them. Being "optimistic [in his] assumptions,"[22] however, Bay hopes they won't want to. Still, wolves might remain wolfish, so two pages later he says: "The point I wish to make here is that the majority should not, even in a much improved society, be the sovereign judge of whether a minority got hurt or not. The minority . . . can give a more valid answer. . . ."[23] But instead of demonstrating the basis for the greater validity of the minority's answer, he finishes the sentence by saying, "not, of course, an impartial one." Then in the next paragraph he says that it is "for the legal and political experts to decide whether the minority that hollers is justified in hollering," and they should make this decision by determining whether human rights have been denied. Unfortunately, we know by this time that one man's understanding of his human rights is as objectively meaningless as another's.

On page 126 he begins a ten-page section entitled, "Conflicting Freedom Demands," in the course of which he suggests three approaches toward the "laying down [of] general priority rules for maximizing freedom of expression for all."[24] Two of them are found, quite reasonably, to be wholly unsatisfactory, and of the third he says in conclusion: "It must be admitted that this approach does not lead us very far toward determining priorities between specific freedoms of expression, because people differ widely in their conceptions of freedom and of a free society."[25] We remain all sheep and wolves, each with his own view of which rights are basic and ought, therefore, to be preferred.

Our subject is the question when the self-expression of one man destroys the human rights of others, and the investigation of this subject has led us to those various places where Bay has attempted to define a human right or to distinguish a more basic from a less basic human right or to find the criteria according to which this perplexing question can be solved. None of these attempts has succeeded, but there are others still to be considered. For example, he devotes 16 pages to the defense of the proposition that freedom of political speech is "a crucial freedom," in the sense that other freedoms depend on it for "protection" and "vindication"; but he knows there must be limits on even this freedom. "Under certain circumstances," he says, "it may be legitimate to punish incitements to unlawful acts, malicious provocation of panics, and libels against persons or groups, even in the context of political speech."[26] Once again, however, his specification of the circumstances leaves the problem unsolved. Incitement to obstruct enforcement of the laws may be punished, he says, provided the law in question does not abolish or reduce a "previously vindicated right."[27] But this means that the speech that legitimately may be punished varies from place to place depending on the rights that have been "constitutionally sanctioned"[28] in that place. Whether men should enjoy equal political rights, then, depends on where they live, for example, in the United States or in the Union of South Africa. One might have supposed that this is the situation already prevailing. Yet precisely this seems to be his final word on the subject, for in his last chapter, where he says that the "problem of determining priorities between human rights is perhaps the thorniest of all the problems raised by my approach toward a theory of the free society,"[29] he speaks on behalf of constitutional government because, among other reasons, constitutions "offer a set of enduring criteria for the making of decisions when powerful groups are in conflict."[30] A constitution, provided it permits groups the freedom to organize, but otherwise simply by virtue of being a constitution, provides the criteria that Bay himself is unable to provide.

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[20] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 379.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 381.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 130.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 135.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 373.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 374.

These examples are meant to illustrate two things. In the first place, Bay is aware that his entire enterprise stands or falls on his ability to discover the nature of freedom, a discovery that would permit him to establish a hierarchy of ends and provide a set of principles to guide the settlement of conflicts. Until he knows what are truly human rights, instead of merely men's opinions of human rights, he cannot know when the self-expression of one man is destructive of the human rights of another. Secondly, these examples illustrate that he cannot admit the possibility that freedom has a discoverable nature, or that there is such a thing as an objectively valid human right. He knows what is required of him to talk sense about freedom, but his scientific principles stand in the way of its discovery.

Nevertheless, in the last chapter he makes one more try. He says: "I assume that there are certain principles of justice that are potentially acceptable to all mankind."[31] Even if true, there is no guarantee, of course, that these principles will be the ones he happens to favor; that is to say, he does not consider the possibility that the triumphant principles will be similar to those that men of another age would have called principles for a city of pigs. The principles he has in mind will be based on human needs, and he is hopeful that eventually human rights will acquire the status, if not the specific character, of traditional natural rights. This is a possibility, he says, "to the extent that the behavioral sciences can demonstrate that each right corresponds to a universal human need—a need actually or potentially rooted in all human beings everywhere."[32] But it is difficult to see how a scientist "who strictly limits himself to the role of an observer of human behavior [and who] can only report what it appears that men actually do want," can ever determine what men actually or potentially need. "Need" is a slippery word. Need in order to do or be what? And with this question we return to the question with which we began this section.

II

Bay, as already noted, states his belief "in the fullest development of all human potentialities and faculties, in so far as they are nondestructive and not mutually incompatible." We have considered the term nondestructive with reference to the rights of others; it is now time to consider the term with reference to the self. What is the self that Bay does not want destroyed? In his answer to this question we find the same ambiguity that we found in the other, and for the same reason.

The question of the self, or of being, or, in modern terms, of personality, has a long history, but Bay ignores the history to be guided by the form of the answer provided by modern psychiatry, if not by its answer as such. He accepts the authority of Erich Fromm, for instance, even though he is justly critical of the ambiguity in Fromm's concept of the "integrated personality"—which is one of the modern euphemisms for what used to be called the well-ordered soul. "The task of making empirical sense out of the concept of 'fundamental personality integration' is still ahead," he says, "and it is no simple task."[33] It is not only not simple, it is impossible with the methods of investigation he has adopted or advocated. He says that he wants a world in which "men can develop into what they have it *in themselves* to become,"[34] and the emphasis is his. How do we know or learn what men have it in themselves to become? If we attempt to discover this empirically through direct observation, we find that men can—because they have—become any one of a number of things; but only the observer who has not blinded the eye of his mind can go on to observe that what a man can become ranges from "the best of all animals when perfected [to] the worst of all when sundered from law and justice." What a man can become is invisible to the empirical eye. Being, even defined as the integrated personality, cannot be discovered by the senses alone—as I shall try to prove shortly.

Bay defines the "fundamentally integrated personality" as one "in which a successful solution has been found in the conflict between biological drive and social conscience, so that a minimum of self-deception by repression or other defense mechanisms has been necessary."[35] I think it a simple matter to show the empty formalism of this definition. If we must speak of these things in these vulgar terms, could we not say that a man might solve the conflict between biological drives and a social conscience based on or derived from the grossest of superstitions? Could we not say that a man living on the lowest level of savagery might readily achieve a balance between biological drives and his savage-tribal conscience? Could we not say that a flaccid nonentity might possess a fundamentally integrated personality, that, in fact, he might more readily achieve a state of serenity unsullied by repressions or other defense mechanisms than a man of great passions who, by virtue of this, is capable of great things? Can we not conclude, then, that a definition that does not distinguish between the solution achieved by a savage or a well-adjusted nonentity and by a man of noble character is of no use to our attempt to understand freedom?

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[31] *Ibid.*, p. 371.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 372.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 95–6.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

The formal, substantively empty, definition is not the exception in this book, but the rule, and it occurs at each decisive point such as in his three-fold definition of freedom, to which we referred earlier. It is now appropriate to examine this definition. Bay speaks of freedom in three senses, psychological, social and potential, defined respectively as a "harmony between basic motives and overt behavior," "the relative absence of perceived external restraints on individual behavior," and "the relative absence of unperceived external restraints on individual behavior."[36] Freedom, in short, he says, means "*self-expression, or the individual's capacity, opportunity, and incentive to express whatever he is or can be motivated to express.*"[37]

According to this definition, Socrates would have been a free man in every sense of the word for most of his life, and he would have remained psychologically and potentially free even in prison. According to this definition, however, Hitler would have been a free man too. There is no reason to doubt the harmony between his motives and his behavior; he was therefore psychologically free. He destroyed completely whatever external restraints he perceived; he was therefore socially free. The considerable number of unperceived restraints on individual behavior in the Third Reich were imposed on others by him and his closest associate, Josef Goebbels; none was imposed on him. He was potentially free. I suggest that this definition does not capture the essence of freedom, for, once again, we require a definition of freedom that enables us to distinguish between a Socrates and a Hitler, so that we may say that one was a free man and the other was not.

What is common to these various deficiencies should be plain. His statement with respect to the fullest possible development of all human potentialities and faculties insofar as they are nondestructive, for instance, is clearly dependent on a conception of man when fully grown. It can have no other meaning. Bay must rest his belief on some knowledge of man in his perfection, because without this knowledge he cannot speak, and the psychiatrist cannot speak, of destruction and nondestruction, of health and disease, of a healthy personality and an unhealthy personality. Such knowledge is not available to the behavioral scientist. It will not do to try to avoid this issue by speaking in terms of integrated personalities, because all kinds of personalities can be integrated and, furthermore, the kind of personality that can be integrated in one place is not the kind that can be integrated in another place. Only with knowledge of a healthy, integrated personality in the best conceivable place can we speak of those things that are right for man, that are *naturally* (*i.e.*, not customarily or conventionally) right for him, and it is that which Bay must but cannot know. Only by knowing what man ought (*i.e.*, *owes* it to himself) to be, can he know the potentialities that ought to be developed freely and wholly, and, on the other hand, those that ought not be developed because they are destructive. He must, in short, have knowledge of man's nature, in the ancient sense of that word. To deny nature in the sense of a perfected end is to make it impossible to define freedom, because freedom, like justice, is inextricably tied up with a conception of human excellence, of man in his perfection.

III

Bay not only denies the possibility of acquiring knowledge of human excellence, he also denies, and denies explicitly, the very possibility of human freedom, and he does this for reasons that are derived quite obviously from his understanding of behavioral science. Deprived of the ability to make political judgments, the new behavioral political science turns to causal theory, in part in order to avoid "hyperfactualism." It seeks the laws of events by relating dependent to independent variable, with the ultimate goal of a theory or science of human behavior. But it would appear to be a solecism to speak of freedom in such a context, and if there is no such thing as freedom there is no such thing as excellence. Bay addresses himself forthrightly to this problem.

"For purposes of political theory," he writes in the first chapter,

> even when the task is to discuss "freedom" [here

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[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 88, 95.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

> not unreasonably placed within inverted commas to indicate that the word has no place in a scientific vocabulary], it is unnecessary to take a stand on the free-will issue. What matters in politics is not to discover whether man is or is not free in an ultimate sense. . . . For purposes of political analysis a freedom concept with clear behavioral implications is needed, a concept of *empirical* rather than *transcendental* freedom.
>
> [Nevertheless, he continues, in one sense it does] appear proper for a social scientist to have a bias in favor of a determinist position on the free-will problem. As a basic working hypothesis in psychological and social inquiry, it is expedient to assume that human behavior is explicable in terms of cause-effect relationships or at least in terms of probabilities of predictable relationships between events. The opposite assumption would, in effect, block further inquiry.[38]

The opposite assumption would indeed block the kind of inquiry he has in mind as a behavioral scientist, but *his* assumption renders his concern with the growth of human freedom absurd. For if a man's will is not free, if he is not free "in an ultimate sense," it is difficult to understand how he can be free in a penultimate or any other sense. That is, if man's behavior can be reduced to a set of laws, if it is *determined* by social or psychological or biological forces or "drives," what possible meaning can be attached to the word freedom? A social, psychic or biological apparatus cannot be free, cannot be held responsible for its acts, and cannot be praised or blamed for doing what it cannot help doing.

One understands why Bay assumes man's behavior is determined, and why other behavioral scientists take obvious pleasure in evidence they find of slavish, dehumanized behavior. They want to develop a causal theory, a set of laws of human behavior, and the free man is a threat to their enterprise. What is more difficult to understand is Bay's denial of freedom at the beginning of a book entitled, *The Structure of Freedom*, or to state it differently, why he wanted to write, and believed he could write, a political study about freedom on his behavioral premise. To do so, not only would he have "to take a stand on the free-will issue," but he would have to take the stand opposite to the one he says he will take by way of his assumption. His commitment to behavioral science notwithstanding, he should have reflected on his own activity before saying he would adopt the determinist position, for, despite what he says, and paradoxically, because of what he says, he makes out a strong case for man's freedom in the very process of denying it. He does this merely by raising the question of whether man is free "in an ultimate sense." An apparatus whose behavior is determined has no power to make assumptions. As a truly distinguished psychiatrist said in response to the argument of two distinguished determinists, an apparatus

> cannot be so cynical as to treat someone as free while knowing that he is not. . . . [because] in an apparatus determined by causative factors all events are of the same kind. . . . [occurring] not hypothetically nor probably but actually.[39]

It is no argument to say that a machine might be "programmed" so as to be able to do this; even if true a machine so programmed would merely reflect the freedom of the programmer. In a world consisting wholly of machines, however, there can be no programmers and, therefore, no assumptions. A machine cannot even conceive of such a thing as freedom. If it is merely the "accidental distribution of circumstances [that] determines in [Professor Bay] the appearance of one set of ideas, and in [me] the appearance of another set," neither of us is wrong, neither of us is right, and discussion between us here of our differences concerning the structure of freedom, would be "utterly senseless."[40] I hope that despite his "bias in favor of [the] determinist position," Bay will reply to me, if he cares to reply at all, with arguments addressed to my presumed ability to exercise reason, and if he does, he is to that extent a free man.

I am aware that I have exaggerated the position of most behavioralists on the question of determinism. Not many of them (although I know one personally) are willing to assert that man's opinions and acts are determined by his toilet training, for example, and that he is in no respect free. I have devoted this time to a consideration of what Bay says about freedom and determinism because while his discussion is most inadequate, it has the virtue of directing our attention to the indispensable condition of human freedom, namely, human reason. As one of freedom's greatest spokesmen, John Milton, said in the last book of *Paradise Lost:* ". . . true liberty/. . . which always with right Reason dwells/Twinned, and from her hath no divisible being." Or, to anticipate the manner of speaking I shall shortly adopt, Bay's discussion enables us to investigate the truth in spoken words.

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[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 22–3.

[39] Erwin W. Straus, "On the Form and Structure of Man's Inner Freedom," *Kentucky Law Journal*, Vol. 45 (Winter, 1956–57), pp. 260–61.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

IV

Its detachment from the earth is the condition of the animal's physical freedom to seek the means of preservation; unlike the plant, it is not necessarily doomed to wither and die in a drought or be destroyed in a deluge.[41] Man's ability to detach himself in another sense is the condition of his freedom fully understood. Not rooted to a place, man is nevertheless attached to the world he knows through his senses, primarily to the world he can see around him and feel beneath his feet. But the world he can touch with his senses is deceptive; it appears flat, for instance; it appears stationary in a universe of movement; it appears to be the whole when it is only a part. The exercise of his physical freedom, so advantageous to his survival, does not enable him to touch more than a part of the whole, or at most, a sequence of parts. Even the astronauts now being trained to circle the earth, to grow wings, so to speak, will not, by virtue of this flight, succeed in detaching themselves from the world of their senses; they will not see the earth as a whole, no matter how many times they orbit it. At any given moment of time they will see only a part, and the eye by which they see the part, like the eye of the seagull (or spacegull) sitting in the rigging, is incapable of adding image of part to image of part—to say nothing of being able to construct the whole. This task is not the work of our senses; on the contrary, before we can begin it we must question the evidence of our senses—more precisely, we must first *be able* to question the evidence of our senses. We must be potentially free in a sense that other animals, with whom we share the freedom of movement, are not free. The faculty that frees us is the faculty we do not share with other animals, our speech.

Unlike the animals that are governed instinctively, man possesses speech, and with his speech he can form the opinions that guide his life. But he can do more than this. With his speech he translates the language of the things perceived by his senses, and their order, into his own language. With his speech he imitates the language of nature; he apprehends things as they are, not by means of his senses but in and through speech. In Socrates' account of his own experience, this is expressed as follows:

> It seemed to me, then, after I had failed in the exploration of that which is, that I should take good care lest the same happen to me which happens to those who look at and investigate an eclipse of the sun; some of them, indeed, suffer their eyes to be destroyed if they do not watch the sun's image in water or similar medium. I thought of something like that, and was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at things by means of my eyes and tried to touch them by means of each of my senses. Rather, it seemed to me necessary to take refuge in speaking and to investigate the truth of existing things in spoken words.[42]

That which is, which is imitated in our speech, is visible only to the "eye of the soul."

Only with the "eye of the soul" can we question opinion by "investigating the truth of existing things in spoken words," and if we do not question opinion—and it is much more difficult to see with the "eye of the soul" than it is to rely on our sense of hearing and accept without question the imitation of nature that is contained in the speech of our place—we are no more free than the animals whose life is regulated by sensory perceptions and instincts. We hear opinions, and opinions originate in a meaning conveyed to us by other senses. We hear the opinion that the earth is flat and stationary, that the sun is a golden carriage driven across the sky by a god, that an eclipse of the sun is evidence of divine wrath, that the study of politics must proceed on the basis of a separation of facts and values. In the world ruled by opinion, where behavior is guided wholly by opinion, there is no problem of freedom because man has not yet freed himself. The problem arises when someone questions opinion, and especially when someone "investigates the truth of existing things" in the words spoken in Athens or New York or Timbuktu about these things; and his ability to do this depends not on his senses, however acute, but on the "eye of his soul," or as we would say, his reason. Our speech, or reason, sets us free, from the deceptive world perceived by our senses and from the opinions in which this world is imitated directly. The freedom of speech *is* essential, because of the possibility that through speech we can discover nature.

But just as we are not free in the decisive sense because of our animal ability to move from place to place, so we are not free by virtue of the mere absence of legal restraints on freedom of speech or thought. If men are compelled to say and hear the same opinions and only the same opinions, they can never know whether those or any other opinions are true. But the fact that no one *forbids* them to contradict the opinions they hear does not by itself make them free. One man may know only one opinion because he is withheld from all other opinions by other men; another may know only one opinion because nothing has ever disturbed or shocked him from it. Intrinsically there is no difference between these two men. Must we not recognize this in our vocabulary? Freedom cannot be won merely by changes in the law or by changes in the government. Milton, who speaks for so many of us on the subject of freedom, warned his countrymen of this:

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[41] This, and part of the discussion that follows, is adopted from Dr. Erwin Straus.

[42] Plato, *Phaedo*, 99 D4-E6.

> Unless your liberty be of that kind, which can neither be gotten, nor taken away by arms; and that alone is such, which, springing . . . from real virtue, shall take deep and intimate root in your minds; you may be assured, there will not be wanting one, who, even without arms, will speedily deprive you of what it is your boast to have gained by force of arms.[43]

Freedom is an indication of a man's qualities. The words of Socrates quoted a moment ago were spoken by a prisoner under sentence of death, but by a free man nevertheless, because even in prison he could not be prevented from searching for the nature of things, from exercising the faculty—his reason—that defines a man, from, in short, behaving as a man. He might be chained to the cave of his world, but the mind of a free man cannot be chained. His reason is what makes man what he is: a being capable of freeing himself from the evidence of his senses and specifically from the tyranny of opinion; it is his reason that makes man a being capable of freedom.

There seems, then, to be a necessary connection between freedom and human excellence, or virtue, or manliness, so that if political science were to insist on separating itself from political philosophy, in order that "factual research [might] not continue to be the stepchild of normative reflections," it cannot address itself to what is surely one of the urgent political problems of our time.[44] It is the absence of any clear conception of these things that accounts for the essential emptiness of Bay's book. He shares the behavioral scientist's interest in what is called factual research and in the widespread search for the sub-political causes of behavior, which is part of the behavioral scientist's denial of man's rationality, and of man's nature, and therefore, I have argued, of man's freedom.

V

I do not have to make the argument that the behavioral political scientists are not equipped by their science to discover the nature of man, or to understand the character of human excellence, because they do not even pretend or attempt to understand this. Scientific knowledge of this is, they assert time and again, impossible, and the subject, therefore, lies outside the range of their interests as scientists. Bay got involved in this perplexing problem only because of his wish to write a political book, and it is certainly possible, even for members of our association, to write other kinds of books. We have seen it done. Only because he was somewhat aware of the requirements of his subject did he become involved in his struggle to find a morally neutral substitute for human excellence that would permit him to state the activities that man should be free to engage in and the "faculties" or "potentialities" that should be developed. I have tried to show in various ways how and why he does not succeed. Only because he wanted to understand freedom did he enter this area, but his commitments to a behavioral science prevented him from finding his way. I hope to persuade him that, with his announced intention of discovering how "increased insights into human behavior [can] be employed in the service of sheltering the growth of individuality and freedom," he is actually engaged in the noble enterprise initiated by

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[43] *Second Defense of the People of England*, in *The Works of John Milton*, Vol. 8 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1932), pp. 239–41.

[44] See Howard B. White, "Comment on Morgenthau's 'Dilemmas of Freedom,' " this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (September, 1957), pp. 724–33, and especially this sentence on page 731: "That a variety of forces in modern society, ranging from Communist brain-washers with ruthless aims and coercive powers, to public relations experts, advertising copywriters, psychiatrists, and psychological warriors, with their milder aims and their more moderate powers, are bound and determined that the minds of as many as they can get hold of, are not going to be free, Almighty God to the contrary notwithstanding, is a clear and simple fact, of primary importance, in its own way perhaps as important as the presence of periodic elections."

Socrates. In fact, he is attempting to discover the political arrangement best suited to human freedom and excellence, but his enterprise makes demands that cannot be met by behavioral science.

I have argued in this paper that if we cannot speak of man as he ought to be, we cannot speak of free men. *If we are contemptuous of* the effort to understand the nature of man, we must also be contemptuous of the effort to understand freedom. If we insist on the so-called separation of facts and values, we must also insist on the separation of the behavioral sciences and the study of political things, because the study of political things rests on the question, How should men live? It is possible to turn our back on this question—we have seen it done—but to do so is to imprison ourselves in a world built on opinions we accept as "given" while *knowing that they are not true.* To do so constitutes a deliberate refusal to try to be free.

It would be ironic if the science that once made man free, were now to become the instrument of his enslavement.

THE NECESSITY OF HISTORICISM

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American students of society and politics for the most part view "historicism"—the ascription to history of an overall direction and goal—with attitudes ranging from skepticism to overt hostility. In the general view, no valid propositions can be framed concerning matters so shrouded in darkness as the course and the end of history. Indeed it may well be asked, when we use such terms, whether we are referring to realities or merely to inventions of the imagination. Historicist theories are also said to tend to undermine concern for the individual; the needs of the present, living person are likely to shrink into apparent insignificance before the imagined events of a future age. On the part of those who in recent years have seen the bloody trails left by pretended ministers of historical missions, such misgivings are understandable.

Are social scientists and political thinkers at liberty, however, dogmatically to reject historicism? It is the purpose of this article to argue that they are not. For if history is without meaning, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that social and political affairs, which make up a large part of what we treat as history, are also without meaning. Why then should one study, or take part in, these affairs? What is at stake, in the last analysis, is our right—or duty—to regard the world we inhabit, not merely as alien material to be used or ignored as we please, but as a realm of being with which we are fundamentally united and in which, consequently, we are properly participants. It may be, of course, that the inscrutability of the world and the legitimacy of withdrawal are principles which twentieth century men are entitled, or even compelled, in the light of their experiences, to accept. But these are not principles to be adopted casually or thoughtlessly.

Nor is this merely an "academic question." It is necessarily of particular concern to professional students, but it presents itself in one way or another, and with varying degrees of force, to almost everyone. The question of historicism is closely connected with the general spiritual unsettlement which is being experienced in Western society.

By the end of the nineteenth century, it is hardly too much to say, Western thought was basically historicist in form. At least since the time of Augustine there had been a large element of historicism in occidental attitudes and thinking. The importance of this element varied with periods and thinkers, and during the Middle Ages it was relatively subordinate. After the Renaissance, however, it became increasingly dominant. Finally, in the eighteenth century, in the form of the idea of progress, it began to take on the characteristics of a popular faith. Philosophies of history often seem esoteric in the extreme, yet countless persons who have never seriously pondered the meaning of history, have nevertheless viewed the world and have shaped their lives from the historicist perspective provided by the doctrine of progress. Thus Reinhold Niebuhr can remark that the "dominant note in modern culture is . . . faith in history. . . . "[1] And it may be that in a different form it is one of the major appeals of communism.

Faith in progress, however, is a faith which—among Western peoples—is now subdued if not quenched. This is undoubtedly due above all to the fact that the events of the past few decades have rendered it highly implausible. The wreckage and the graves are too far-flung and too new for belief in the inevitability, or even in the likelihood, of continuing human betterment to be at all natural or easy. The prospect of a nuclear cataclysm is perhaps as vivid as that of further improvement in the human state. One cannot read very much in the literature of the Edwardian and the late Victorian eras without feeling how greatly the mood has changed since 1914. Even the more sober writers of these earlier periods could look forward without the sense of dread which haunts contemporary literature. At present, a thinker like Reinhold Niebuhr, who denounces the idea of progress and reaffirms the doctrine of original sin, only gives a particular theological form to the disillusionment of a civilization.[2]

The result is a crisis of meaning. If nothing stable and enduring is to be achieved, why should one study, or become engaged in, the affairs of the world? The vigor and humanity of the American imagination have been intimately connected with a vague but powerful confidence in the future, and the evaporation of this confidence cannot be counterbalanced merely by an extra measure of determination. Men will inevitably fall to wondering, not only what will happen to them or their children in the future, but, looking to the past, whether the actions and attainments often glorified by the nation are after all of any lasting significance. They will wonder, if only obscurely, whether anything on earth is truly meaningful.

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[1] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Faith and History* (New York, 1951), p. 3.

[2] See Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, Rudolf Bultmann, *The Presence of Eternity* (New York, 1957), and Nicolas Berdyaev, *The Meaning of History*, translated by George Reavey (New York, 1936). All of these include theological attacks on the idea of progress.

The problem of meaning needs to be more systematically examined, however, if the argument for the necessity of historicism is to be clearly set forth. If I oversimplify, I hope at least to have raised the right questions.

I

Is it unconditionally necessary that the world be seen as meaningful? Apparently it is not. A number of intelligent men have lived while regarding reality as alien and meaningless. Certain periods of history, when the world seemed suddenly deprived of meaning, have been rich in the wisdom of living tolerably in the face of emptiness. The third and fourth centuries B.C. constituted such a period; and in retrospect it may be seen that the present century does also.[3]

At the very least, pleasure and pain remain. Epicurus' life and thought seem to show that it is possible to restrict one's moral commitments to these and still to live decently and perhaps even nobly. For Epicurus, of course, hedonism issued in an ideal of political withdrawal; this, however, was not a necessary inference. A pleasure-pain philosophy may likewise be made the basis of an ethic of action and engagement. Those who seek pleasure through power and fame are sometimes dangerous to the world; but they are not always so, as their actions often are productive of order. And in any case, there is meaning in their individual lives. For purposes of symbolic representation, rather than precise historical description, one might along these lines distinguish the "Epicurean" and the "Machiavellian" responses to a meaningless view of the cosmos.

According to other viewpoints, moral law also remains. Personal rectitude is one of the oldest fortresses amid the futility and uncertainty of the world. Socrates observed that "to a good man, nothing is evil." Much of the appeal of Stoicism derived from the fact that, in the spirit of this maxim, it offered Romans a refuge from the reign of brutality and chance under which many of them felt themselves to be living.[4] It is to be added that the moralist, like the hedonist, may follow the way either of withdrawal or of action. To cultivate purity of motive, heedless of practical results, represents a form of withdrawal. The pacifism which is based simply on the proposition that it is wrong in all circumstances whatever to use violence is an example of this approach. On the other hand, the moralist may strive to force the incongruities of the world into a mold fashioned after transcendent norms, all the while being convinced that no enduring results can be achieved. Plato, with his near-despair of the empirical world, may be taken as representative of this viewpoint.

Finally, religion, like pleasure and morality, offers ways both of withdrawing from and of acting upon, a world without meaning. Gnosticism, in at least some of its manifestations, represented that kind of religious inspiration which leads men to condemn the realm of phenomena and to seek escape from it in mystical illumination.[5] The contrasting religious way of living where meaning is lacking—that of action and reform—is common in the West. Christians have more often than not looked upon this as a world which is fallen and is doomed to end in destruction; at the same time they have traditionally rejected the Gnostic doctrine of world-escape and have led intensely active lives.[6]

Each of these general viewpoints—the hedonistic, the moralistic, and the religious—suggests ways of living meaningfully in a meaningless world, whether in withdrawal or in action. But each promises at best a beleaguered, if not despairing, existence. The hedonist has perhaps the greatest security because he asks very little: merely to gain a degree of contentment, while he lives, and then to enter upon the peace of total extinction. The moralist, however, beholds the scandal of a world which is not merely on occasion immoral but in which it is doubtful that pure morality is even feasible. One of religious faith, finally, is in the least comfortable situation. A moralist, like Plato, may regard the transcendent norms as uncompromised by the human frailties he sees in the world; the person who believes in a divine Creator, however, confronts the problem of theodicy. If the world is meaningless, the conception of God as an all-powerful source of reality necessarily crumbles.

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[3] The spiritual similarity between the present period of history and the Hellenistic Age is brought out in José Ferrater Mora, *Man at the Crossroads*, translated by Willard R. Trask (Boston, 1957).

[4] For an exposition of the central role of Fortune in the minds of Romans see Michael Grant, *The World of Rome* (Cleveland and New York, 1960).

[5] See Virginia Corwin, "The Gnostics Speak Again: the *Gospel of Truth*," *The Massachusetts Review*, Vol. I (February, 1960), pp. 218–228.

[6] For example, in spite of all that is said in *The City of God* concerning the significance of temporal affairs, it is not easy to determine what meaning the world and history have for St. Augustine; it is nevertheless clear that he stands emphatically for the importance of action within the world.

Therefore, while it is not indispensable to life that one find meaning in the world, it is, to state it moderately, exceedingly desirable that one should be able to do so. The question is whether there is an ultimate correspondence between reality and human aspiration. It is no light thing to have to say that there is not; in that case, we are born for defeat. It may be possible, regardless, to live with integrity and, if one is fortunate, even with pleasure; but the integrity must be based on despair and the pleasure encircled with fear. Further—and it is this which most concerns the student of society and politics—participation in the world is either placed at the service of the will-to-power, reduced to a gesture, or else totally rejected.

II

If meaning is to be attributed to the world, however, must it be through historicism of some kind? Broadly stated, the history of civilization in the West reveals two principal ways in which significance has been ascribed to reality. One is historicism: the existence of present evil is admitted, but the argument affirms that the future holds in store some kind of final harmony, in which all incongruities are resolved and all evil defeated. In short, reality is accepted, not for what it is, but for what it will be. This version of meaning is mainly Hebraic in origin. The Greeks had another sense of the meaning of things; it may be designated "cosmic," as distinguished from "historicist." Greek writers show little of that historical expectancy which is perhaps the most prominent characteristic of the attitude expressed in Old Testament literature. For the Greeks, order was not in the future but in the present; the world was seen as meaningful in that—as they thought the proper use of reason would reveal—it was in reality a great realm of order. The Greek interpretation of morality consequently centered upon the task of understanding and respecting cosmic order. These remarks describe, very generally, the outlook of Plato and Aristotle, as well as that of the Stoics.[7]

The question presents itself whether modern man, whose historicist vision, in the form of the idea of progress, now is fading, may rediscover meaning through cosmic vision. With the dissolution of the Hebraic conception of world-meaning, can the Hellenic conception be called upon to take its place? It is easy to contemplate such a change. The minds of modern peoples have been profoundly affected by the spectacular revelations of cosmic order which have come from the physical scientists. For this reason there exists, in the modern consciousness, a certain predisposition towards Hellenism.[8] A complete reversion to the ancient Greek sense of the cosmos, as a great natural city with laws for men and for all else within it, is not inconceivable.

A reversion of this kind, however, would hardly solve the problem of meaning because of the fact that a deeper understanding of man has been gained since the decline of the ancient city-state civilization which gave the notion of the cosmos philosophical form and authority. Man is now viewed as something more than an aspect of cosmic order. One is conscious now, as Greeks of the Periclean Age were not, that he transcends all order. The person is subjective; order is objective. The person is free, though cosmic law may be invariable. Awareness of these truths is the result of a long process of philosophical and religious development, beginning at least as early as Socrates and culminating in Christianity.[9] This sense of personal transcendence is the ultimate basis of the principle (which at most attained only rudimentary development in Greece and Rome) of "the dignity of the individual." In consequence, man can no longer seek fulfillment in submission to the inflexible statutes of the cosmos. He feels his dignity to be evinced only in creativity.

The conception of human transcendence carries another implication relevant to the present argument. If man is truly free, how can any such reality exist as that to which the term "cosmos" is generally intended to refer? There cannot be an all-embracing order, though there are unquestionably realms of order. If man is a trans-cosmic being, the particular realms of order found in nature must be limited in range and conditional upon human choice; and these realms must become increasingly limited and conditional as technological power expands. It is necessary to think of reality in terms, not of a given order, but of novelty and even of chaos.[10]

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[7] An illuminating discussion of the contrast between the Hebraic and Greek views of reality may be found in Rudolf Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity*, translated by R. H. Fuller (New York, 1957).

[8] Even the sense of history on which the modern idea of progress is based has often been on the point of being reduced to cosmic order. In Condorcet, for example, the historical process is treated as an expression of scientific laws and as in principle predictable. Thus "all is given."

[9] For a discussion of the development of the concept of the soul see A. E. Taylor, *Socrates* (New York, 1953).

The foregoing argument may be summarized by saying that man is an historical, and not a cosmic, being; and the world as a whole, while comprising realms of order, must be envisioned as history. If history is meaningless, the world as a whole is meaningless. If history is absurd, man is a stranger in the universe, and the ideal of political participation—which is both presupposed and recommended in much contemporary social science and theory—is thrown into question, at least, if it is not altogether upset. The Judaic-Christian outlook is distinguished from most other religious visions both by the respect for the individual and by the historicist tendency which it embraces. One may surmise that these two distinctive attitudes are not unrelated and that historicism thus cannot be casually dropped. The individual spirit seeks meaning in history because history is reality as shaped by spirit, and elsewhere meaning could not possibly be found.

The meaninglessness of mere cosmic order can be clearly experienced in relation to the concept of history which the idea of cosmic order implies and which was characteristic of Hellenic philosophy. The cosmos is manifest in recurrence: of days, of seasons, and of generations. Thus when the Greeks concerned themselves with the overall historical process—which they did only briefly and incidentally—they envisaged it as cyclical; history was assimilated to natural order.[11] This is the view which most readily derives from cosmic vision. But while it was natural to the Greeks, modern man is appalled by the notion of the everlasting repetition of events, without any lasting accomplishments or final conclusion. Thus Nietzsche propounded the eternal recurrence of all things as a doctrine for "paralyzing and breaking the world-weary."[12] Something enduring must be achieved, history must "lead somewhere," or the pall of absurdity falls over the world.

But how can we possibly say where history leads or even that it leads to any end whatever? We cannot look ahead, with any certainty, even a few years. It is surely impossible to say anything at all concerning the final result of history. " . . . To ask earnestly the question of the ultimate meaning of history," as Karl Löwith remarks, "takes one's breath away; it transports us into a vacuum which only hope and faith can fill. . . . "[13] It is far beyond the scope of this article even to suggest what meaning might be attributed to history. It is a necessary part of the argument being presented, however, to consider whether a philosophy of history can possibly have any claims to validity which are presentable in the court of reason.

III

It is certainly true, as asserted by the critics of historicism, that a rationally demonstrable theory of history is impossible. Man is inextricably involved in history, and so it is not an object available for the kind of analysis employed in the sciences. This is particularly manifest in the fact that history is unfinished; men confront the future as a responsibility and not as an object of knowledge. But this—which might be called "the principle of historical subjectivity"—applies to the past as well. We know, objectively and certainly, many particular things concerning the past. But we cannot survey the human record as a whole and state apodictically what has occurred. Every effort to do so eventuates at best in one of a number of possible interpretations.

Consequently, the final basis of any particular philosophy of history must be faith. Among men as deeply committed to the authority of reason and the dictates of empirical evidence as most professional students of society and politics are today, this will serve as no recommendation for historicism. But if it is important not to try to answer by faith problems soluble by reason, it is not less important to be open to faith where reason is inadequate. Whatever cannot be treated purely as an object cannot be altogether grasped intellectually; relationship with it can only be established through an act of will. It is misleading that faith should so commonly be associated with religion. No one can avoid resorting to faith because no one is exempt from the necessity of deciding, at least tacitly, how to live—that is, how to relate himself to reality as a whole.[14] Since we live in history, and can neither escape it nor rationally comprehend it, we are obliged to found our conception of it on faith. Historicism consequently cannot be discredited by its dependence on faith. Anti-historicism is no less dependent in this way.

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[10] Bergson is of course a classical source for one who desires to study the idea of novelty as opposed to the Hellenic conception that "all is given." *Cf.* my "Encounter With Chaos," *The Yale Review*, Vol. 50 (Spring, 1961), pp. 357–369.

[11] For extended comment on this aspect of Greek thought see J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (New York, 1932), and Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History* (University of Chicago Press, 1949 (1)).

[12] For a discussion of Nietzsche's rejection of the idea of progress, and his restatement of classical cyclicism, see Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York, 1956).

[13] Löwith, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

The proposition that interpretations of the meaning of history rest ultimately on faith, however, does not imply that these interpretations are necessarily arbitrary and without intellectual value. Reason sets at least three standards which a theory of history is obliged to meet. The most obvious is that of logical coherence. An interpretation of history cannot of course be validated merely on the basis of internal consistency; but on that basis alone it may be overturned. Secondly, and in like fashion, while the historical data in our possession do not dictate any one theory of history, they exclude any number of conceivable theories. A philosophy of history must correspond with known facts even though it cannot be derived from them. Finally, through psychology and anthropology, through literature and introspection, we know a good deal about men. No valid philosophy of history can be constructed except on the basis of this knowledge. As examples of the application of these criteria, it may be asserted that the theory of history as inaugurated by a benevolent and omnipotent God with the intention that it end in fire and horror cannot be true because it is self-contradictory; the notion that history is an uninterrupted movement towards truth and justice may be rejected as contrary to the facts; and Condorcet's idea that progress is ensured by the accumulation of knowledge may be discarded in view of the reservoirs of unreason disclosed by modern psychology.

In short, an historicist vision is—or should be—an intellectual construction. It is a proper object of intellectual labor and belongs within the sphere of problems with which thinkers and scholars, as such, are properly concerned.

Obviously historicism is not within the sphere of rigorous social science. This is implied by the principle that a philosophy of history is not objectively demonstrable. Consequently, to affirm the importance of historicism is implicitly to deny that all of social reality is comprised within a finally given system which is open to scientific apprehension. It would be profoundly unfortunate, however, if it came to be assumed by philosophers of history and by social scientists that they are necessarily in conflict with one another. On the one side, the philosopher of history has no legitimate interest in excluding the social scientist from an important role in the study of politics and history. There are regularities in human behavior which the most dedicated opponent of determinism and behaviorism could not overlook.[15] To comprehend these regularities with the greatest possible economy and certainty is the purpose of social science. But this also is the demand of historical existence (and consequently of the historicist) because transcendence, and historical creativity, are realized only through knowledge; it is comprehension of the past which opens the way into the future.

On the other side, arguments already stated imply that the social scientist has no justification for refusing to recognize as a rightful participant in social inquiry the philosopher of history. If the totality of social and political reality cannot be scientifically comprehended, then the social scientist is dependent on disciplines of another kind to supply a framework of meaning. Lacking this framework, his investigations are not consciously related to life as a whole; they must be in their origins without ultimate purpose and in their results, except by chance, without utility. The burden of the argument presented in this article is that only the philosopher of history can supply this framework of meaning.[16]

IV

That historicism is dangerous, tempting its authors into baseless and anti-personal prophecies, is not merely to be admitted but is to be insisted upon. It might well be taken as an inflexible rule that one should not enter the perilous territory of historicism unless armed with Occam's razor. The problem is to envision history as a meaningful process; to meet this problem it is not necessary that events be forced into a preordained pattern, after the fashion of thinkers like Hegel. Nor is it necessary to formulate an exact delineation of the end of history such as one finds, for example, in *The City of God.* Interpretations of historical meaning are compatible with greater economy of construction than is often supposed. To insist on such economy would be to exclude some of the grandiose generalizations which offend those who rightfully feel that it is the office of reason more to restrain the imagination than to provide it with rhetorical wings. The use of Occam's razor also might help to preserve awareness of the concrete individual, whose existence is often forgotten amid dreams of future splendor but whose drive to overcome his estrangement from the world constitutes the historicist's principal claim to legitimacy.

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[14] See Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith* (New York, 1957).

[15] Bergson is a good case in point. No philosopher could be more intolerant of social theories in which reality is envisioned as final and systematic. But Bergson does not in the least eschew historical generalization nor does he deny the regularities on which such generalizations must rest. See *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, translated by R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton (New York, 1954).

[16] It may be noted that originally social science and historicism were intimately joined. The names of Condorcet, of Saint-Simon, and of Comte, to mention no others, symbolize this union.

Because of this drive, however, the danger of asking as to the meaning of history is counterbalanced by the danger of not so asking. Students of society and politics cannot restrict themselves to questions in which they just happen to be interested. Questions occur which everyone might prefer to avoid but which, as inhabitants of a world we did not make, we are compelled to consider. Our age as a whole, immersed in catastrophe, is involved in the question whether history is meaningful; this is particularly so in America, where responsibility for man's future rests very heavily and where faith in that future is becoming dim and uncertain. If academic social scientists and theorists refuse to concern themselves in a serious way with this question, then, though they be moved by the methodologically admirable resolution to believe nothing which cannot be shown to be strictly true, they will deserve the charge of ivory tower detachment which is often brought against them. Furthermore, they will thereby leave a vital field of inquiry to be monopolized by the fanatical and irresponsible. The conclusion which may be drawn from the fact that baseless historicist faiths have contributed substantially to the tumult and bloodshed of our times is that the questions which have provoked these faiths had better be dealt with by men who are sober, informed, and charitable.

THE OUTSIDER IN THE SENATE: AN ALTERNATIVE ROLE

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The growing concern of students of politics with the social structure of official bodies and the behavior expected of their members promises to make the Senate of the United States a prime target of research. Two recent books make notable contributions and suggest the trend. One is William S. White's *Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate,*[1] an "insider's" impressions based on years of close observation; and the other is Donald R. Mathews' *U.S. Senators and Their World,*[2] the work of a political scientist. One (though not the only) concern of both books is the system of norms for behavior of members of the Senate.[3] Although reached through different routes (White's largely inferred from observed behavior, Matthews' principally from interviews) their statements of Senate norms and the way they work have much in common. The norms (or "folkways," as Matthews calls them) are viewed as cultural "oughts" upon which there is a high degree of consensus. The members who conform most closely to the norms are, generally speaking, the most influential and effective members. This general view is almost certainly correct, as it would be for any stable human group; in this the Senate is not unique (as White sometimes seems to suggest it is) but typical.[4]

But what about the senator who does not conform? What is his place in the Senate and what happens to him there? This study will explore these questions through a case study of such a senator. But first it may be useful to try to restate the relevant parts of the analysis of White and Matthews (without holding them in any way responsible for the restatement) in terms of role theory, which will provide the conceptual framework for the analysis of the senator's experience.[5] In this the senators will be seen as actors in a political sub-system called the Senate, vested with an official position (or status) called "senator." The analyst's problem then is to describe the "senator" role—the dynamic, behavioral aspect of the official position. The new senator, with different motivations, faces much the same problem: he must learn or be taught the norms which define the rights and obligations of his position in order to take the actions which will validate, poorly or well, his occupancy of the position. White and Matthews, in effect, describe the senator role by stating the norms which prescribe how persons who occupy the senator position are expected to behave. Needless to say, it is essential to identify *whose* expectations are meant—who, that is, prescribes the appropriate behavior. For White the expectations apparently emanate from a powerful elite he calls the "Inner Club" whose members, appropriately referred to as the "Senate type," most nearly fulfill the requirements of the role, and who wield the internal sanctions. Matthews suggests that the expectations are widely shared by the membership as a whole.

What is the "senator" role (White's "Senate type" or "Senate man," Matthews' effective senator) which emerges from these two books? It is one of a prudent man, who serves a long apprenticeship before trying to assert himself, and talks infrequently even then. He is courteous to a fault in his relations with his colleagues, not allowing political disagreements to affect his personal feelings. He is always ready to help another senator when he can, and he expects to be repaid in kind. More than anything else, he is a Senate man, proud of the institution and ready to defend its traditions and perquisites against all outsiders. He is a legislative workhorse who specializes in one or two policy areas, says Matthews. He has a deep respect for the rights of others, says White, making his institution the last citadel of individualism. In this composite, the senator as an ideal type is a man of accommodation who knows that "you have to go along to get along"; he is a conservative, institutional man, slow to change what he has mastered at the expense of so much time and patience.

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* The author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin for invaluable assistance in the preparation of this paper, and to the Rockefeller Foundation for a grant which made possible the theoretical work on it. The author is, of course, solely responsible for all statements of fact and judgment.

[1] New York, 1956.

[2] Chapel Hill, 1960.

[3] See especially White, chs. 5–10, and Matthews, ch. 5.

[4] George Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950), pp. 147, 169–170, 426–28.

[5] "Role" and related concepts are defined in a great variety of ways by social scientists, depending upon the discipline of the definer and the special problems which engage his interest. For an excellent clarification of the definitional problem see Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role* (New York, 1958), ch. 2. Because the purpose of the present study is not to refine role theory but to employ it rather crudely to gain some insights into the behavior of senators, concepts are stated with as little elaboration as possible. For the theoretical formulation principally relied on see Theodore Sarbin, "Role Theory," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), Vol. I, pp. 223–58.

But what of the man who does not play by the rules? What sanctions, if any, does the system impose? White suggests small inconveniences: the formal rules, for instance, may be closely applied to him.[6] But the Senate is disinclined to proceed against *any* senator; the "great ones" do about as they please and the others, except for a few who are not acceptable at all, can get away with almost anything so long as it is not directed against a member of the Inner Club.[7] The whole thrust of his book nevertheless suggests that the non-Senate type who does not make the Inner Club never amounts to much in the Senate. This is essentially Matthews' point, too, which he arrives at through some ingenious measurements showing on their face, that the senator who violates the folkways is less effective in getting his bills passed.[8] Neither is bothered much by the cases of spectacularly successful senators who do not altogether fit the type—the talkative Humphrey, whom White firmly locates in the Inner Club; the domineering Taft and Johnson, who leapt immediately to leadership. White explains them simply as "authentic geniuses among Senate types,"[9] which indeed is consistent with his emphasis on sentiment and feeling rather than overt behavior. In Matthews' collective profile they cause hardly a wrinkle.

This study is a participant-observer analysis of a single case of presumptively deviant senatorial behavior, that of William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin, in his first year in the Senate. The observer was legislative assistant to Senator Proxmire that year. The observer's assumption was that one way to gain insights into the structure and working rules of a social system is to learn what the neophyte has to learn during his "initiation" period. Senator Proxmire was an ideal subject. He went to the Senate keenly aware of the importance of learning its norms and constructing with care the role he should play there. His interest was theoretical as well as practical; as a person trained in the social sciences he was self-conscious about his learning experiences and determined to rationalize them in order to develop a consistent view of the Senate and his place in it.[10] More than that, he was willing to share his experiences and discuss them regularly with the observer.

Because this is a study of an individual in his relations with an institution, an attempt will be made first to suggest some of the relevant personality factors. Then Proxmire's choice of role will be recounted. After that some inferences will be drawn and hypotheses suggested about the role systems of the Senate.

I

A complex human being like William Proxmire cannot be psychologically categorized by a layman. Nevertheless, analysis begins with simplification; from the whole man must be abstracted some elements which shape him as a political personality, which identify him as a political type. In Proxmire's case, the first would seem to be a driving ambition to succeed, to which almost everything else in his life is subordinated, coupled with a puritan's belief in the sanctity of unremittent work.

Only a man with Proxmire's bottomless ambition and faith in the efficacy of effort would have believed he had any prospects at all in Wisconsin politics. His disabilities were perhaps best summed up in an apocryphal story given wide currency in the state in 1952, when he first ran for governor. It relates a conversation between his opponent, Governor Walter Kohler, and, say, Driscoll of New Jersey, at the governors' conference that year.

"Have you an opponent, Walter?" asks Driscoll.

"Yes," replies Kohler. "He's the son of an Illinois Republican. He graduated from Yale and Harvard, worked for J. P. Morgan and married a Rockefeller, and just moved into Wisconsin three years ago."

"My God, Walter," explodes Driscoll. "Did you pick him yourself?"

The presumed liabilities bear closer inspection.[11] The Illinois Republican father was a physician who worked long hours seven days a week until his death at 79, who taught his son that it is morally wrong as well as inefficient to be awake and not at work. At Yale Proxmire learned the rewards of perseverance: too light for football, he nevertheless made every practice, spring and fall, for four years and finally got his letter by participating in one play in a "letter" game. His experience at the Harvard graduate school confirmed what Proxmire had suspected while working for Morgan, that the financiers no longer made the decisions that mattered; the politicians did. The public life therefore offered the largest opportunities for a man who would make his mark. There also his political values crystallized. ("I didn't raise my son to be a Democrat," said Dr. Proxmire. "Harvard did it to Bill.")[12] To decide to be governor of his newly adopted state did not seem preposterous to Proxmire; experience had taught him that he could reach his goals because he wanted to more than most people and would pay a higher price.

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[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 122, 126.

[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 114–17. More will be said about this later.

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

[10] Proxmire has a B.A. degree from Yale, an M.B.A. from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, and he carried his doctoral program in government at Harvard to the dissertation-writing stage.

[11] See the sketch of Proxmire's life and personality by Godfrey Sperling, Jr., in *The Chris-*

Another lesson of experience, reenforced by temperament, was that he did better alone. The second personality trait—and I think the decisive one—which affected Proxmire's choice of role in the Senate is his compulsive independence. No group can contain him long; he does not trust it to take care of him nor make his decisions, and he cannot abide the restrictions on his actions which would go with truly belonging. Claims upon him which would limit his freedom of action, even those of friends and supporters, are onerous. His position in the Democratic Party of Wisconsin is a case in point.

The value of Proxmire's winning a Senate seat in 1957 to a party which had won only one other statewide race in 25 years can hardly be overstated.[13] Nevertheless, before the election an astute political reporter said in his syndicated column that it was no secret that there were "some pretty substantial Democrats who would not mind Proxmire's defeat in the senatorial election, considering their personal feelings alone and not the welfare of the party to which they owe their allegiance."[14] Some understanding of this estrangement is crucial to an explanation of Proxmire's political personality.

After World War II a group of Wisconsin Democrats, many of them Madison intellectuals, undertook the seemingly impossible task of rejuvenating their moribund and reactionary party. Their success, after a decade of effort, was spectacular; in 1958 the Democrats captured the state Assembly, all statewide offices but one, and half the congressional seats. These organization people naturally would like a dominant voice in party affairs, and at the minimum they expect to be consulted. Proxmire has not done much consulting, the plain fact being that if he had he almost surely would never have gone to the Senate. He had barely qualified to vote in the state when he won his first office—from a Democratic assemblyman who had lived all his 65 years in one Wisconsin county. After that Proxmire ran as he pleased (three times for governor before going to the Senate) without heeding pointed suggestions that he had "had his chance."

His indefatigable campaigning undoubtedly did much to rebuild the party, but as usual he made his own calculations along the way. He discovered very early that time spent hunting up a county chairman is, on the average, enough to shake two hundred hands downtown. Whether the chairman would get him any votes was problematical; not so with the handshaking. With Democratic politicians at that time virtually ignored by communication media in large areas of this Republican state, direct personal contact through continuous campaigning seemed the one sure way to make himself known. This piece of practical wisdom, acted upon, did not endear him to the organization but it made him unbeatable in a primary.

More important, a strong hold on the electorate, which can control him only in the most general sense, enables him to resist any group (including his staunch supporters) which might seek to exercise specific influence. Two incidents will illustrate. The morning after his first election to the Senate Proxmire stood with his wife before daybreak in the rain at a plant gate in Milwaukee, thanking the workers for their help. A couple of weeks later, when a labor leader dared to suggest that he was the union's man, Proxmire chose a state CIO convention as the place to declare his independence of labor. One act was as significant as the other and they were not unrelated.

II

Throughout the spring of 1958, for roughly half his first session in the Senate, Proxmire strove earnestly to be a model freshman senator. He worked hard on his committees and took care of his constituents. He accepted cheerfully a mammoth portion of the burden of fresh-

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tian Science Monitor, August 31, 1957; or the Chicago *Sun-Times*, August 25, 1957.

[12] Chicago *Daily News*, August 8, 1957, p. 22.

[13] Proxmire was elected in August, 1957 to the unexpired term of Senator McCarthy, and to his first full term in 1958.

[14] John Wyngaard, August 17, 1957.

men of the majority party, presiding over the Senate. He did much more than his share; an unofficial tabulation midway in the session showed that he had sat in the chair longer than anyone else and about sixteen times as long as Vice President Nixon. The club apparently approved of him. No senator can ask his colleagues how he is doing, but his staff members can and do check with *their* peers. The reports at first were always the same: He's doing fine; he hasn't made a single mistake.

But Proxmire had not satisfactorily answered the question that mattered most to him: How much could he talk on the floor? Ordinary prudence, as well as Senate practice, counsel a neophyte to bide his time before exercising very freely his undoubted right to speak at any time. But to a man like Proxmire the life of the Senate is the debate on the floor. Not to be there and participate is to deny himself equal membership in the Senate. Proxmire said of a freshman colleague who seldom spoke: "He might as well not be a senator!"

Nevertheless he forbore, trying to find socially acceptable ways to take some part. The "morning hour," that period at the beginning of each day when senators introduce bills and insert material in the *Congressional Record,* seemed safe enough so he quickly became a regular contributor to the *Record.* He entered colloquies on the floor only when specifically invited to do so by senior members. He cautiously scheduled his first major speech for the day before the Easter recess when most members would be gone, having been assured that this was an appropriate time for a freshman to talk. Only two members heard him through, the presiding officer and Senator Douglas (who canceled an appointment in order to give Proxmire an audience).[15]

But almost as if he could not help himself, Proxmire became steadily more active in debate until he was one of the busiest men on the floor. Then came the first warnings that he was "talking too much." The warnings were characteristic of the operations of the Senate. None of them was direct. They came in friendly tips: someone heard an unnamed person say it; the report was passed on to a Proxmire staff man for what it was worth. Or a very senior senator in the chair would pointedly overlook Proxmire standing at his desk, to recognize other members ahead of him out of turn.

Proxmire retired, brooding, to his office. He was puzzled and frustrated. He believed that he *had* exercised great restraint. He had kept his speeches short, except when asked by a party floor man to help kill time. So he sat mute. Not even a debate on unemployment compensation, in which he was deeply interested, could make him speak.

Then the dam broke. In the first week of June Proxmire offered six amendments to the Mutual Security Act and pressed them to a vote.[16] Inasmuch as Proxmire was not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and four of his amendments were first introduced on the floor so the committee had no chance to consider them, the performance was hardly a demonstration of modesty and withdrawal. Criticism was sharp and immediate (though indirect, as always), and it spurred Proxmire to a decision: he would "be a senator like Wayne [Morse] and Paul [Douglas]"; he would talk when he pleased on whatever he chose and would not worry about his influence in the Senate. He had found his role.

The Senate soon learned what that meant. In mid-July, for instance, Proxmire served notice that "I intend to rise every day, from now on until social security improvement is adopted, to plead for it,"[17] which he did, on 27 consecutive occasions. But if the club was unused to being lectured by a freshman member, it must have been wholly unprepared for his threat to hold them beyond adjournment by the very antithesis of freshmanlike behavior, a filibuster.

The provocation was a bill to allow the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Chicago to increase the amount of water it may withdraw from Lake Michigan by a thousand cubic feet per second for a three-year test period.[18] Similar bills had been passed by both houses twice before (by the Senate in the closing hours of a session with scant debate) only to be vetoed by the President because of objections raised by Canada. Once more it appeared that the bill would come up in the flood of last-minute legislation, and with committee and leadership support it seemed sure to slide through the tired Senate. Moreover, because the Canadian position was now ambiguous the President might sign the bill.

But the pressure for adjournment which was the greatest factor in favor of the bill's passage could also be its doom—if its opponents had sufficient nerve. Their hope was to stall consideration as long as possible, then make it clear that the cost of passage was extended debate. It was a simple, time-proven strategy, but not one designed to make friends.

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[15] *Congressional Record,* Vol. 104 (April 3, 1958), pp. 6200–14.

[16] *Ibid.* (May 26, 1958), pp. 9424–25; (May 28, p. 9655; (June 4–5), pp. 9868–69, 10157–63, 10260–62, 10266–70.

[17] *Ibid.* (July 18), p. 14187.

[18] H.R. 2, 85th Cong. See S. Rept. 2482, *Congressional Record,* Vol. 104 (August 20, 1958), p. 18606.

Proxmire was by no means the only man fighting the bill—there was a militant bipartisan coalition on each side—but he was probably the most determined and certainly the most conspicuous. It was he who blocked unanimous consent to allow any deviation from the rules in handling the bill. Thus he objected to a meeting of the Public Works committee while the Senate sat, and to the bill's being reported to the Senate after the expiration of the morning hour—tactics which brought sharp rebukes from two senior members but delayed the bill a day.[19] And it was he who held the floor from nine till midnight the last night of the session, until the water-diversion bill was put aside for other business;[20] and he who sat through the early morning hours, armed with a score of amendments and great piles of materials, ready to resume the debate. When the session ended at 4:11 A.M. the unfinished business of the Senate was a Proxmire amendment to the bill. It is not likely that anyone on the floor that night doubted that Proxmire was ready to talk on through Sunday if need be, but probably few present realized how eager he was to do just that.

III

What may be suggested about the "senator" role from this summary statement of the first stage of Proxmire's socialization in the Senate?

First, at a certain point in his first session, Proxmire selected the role he would play. He did not play badly the role associated with the member of the Inner Club; he rejected it. He did not fail in an effort to make himself acceptable to the Inner Club; he decided he did not want to try to be one of them. The role he chose was one suited to his personality and temperament, one he had played before.[21] In his opinion it offered him the best opportunities to attain his goals in the Senate. Conformity with the folkways would not have allowed him, for instance, to associate himself so persistently with expansion of social security nor to make his Horatio-like stand against the water-diversion bill. Moreover, the independent role clearly was congenial to his constituency—Proxmire's seat had been held successively by "Old Bob" LaFollette and his son and by Joe McCarthy—and Proxmire was up for reelection. But it is important that his performance was not simply a bid for votes; it was rather a deliberately adopted legislative style which he has followed consistently since reelection.[22]

Second, he had a model to go by. He mentioned two senators and could have named others. The norms for his behavior were furnished by a small group within the Senate, just as the norms of the "Senate type" are likewise furnished by another, perhaps much larger, group within the Senate. The model, moreover, is rooted in Senate history. There have always been members of the Senate labelled variously as "independents," "mavericks," and the like. They have come from all sections of the country, although the midwest seems to have produced more than its share. It is not necessary to try to establish a roster of such senators; a voluminous popular literature and common knowledge support the contention that the "loner," the man who conspicuously walks his own way, is a familiar figure in the Senate.[23]

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[19] *Ibid.* (August 19), p. 18457.

[20] *Ibid.* (August 23), pp. 19464–66, 19469–78, 19522–39, 19554–55.

[21] In his first press conference after winnning the special election in 1957, Proxmire shunned labels such as "liberal" and "Douglas Democrat," but mentioned approvingly that some labor leaders had described him as a "maverick." Chicago *Daily News*, August 29, 1957.

[22] Representative actions are not hard to find. In 1959 Proxmire made three speeches criticizing the Democratic party leadership in the Senate, with support from four other senators. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 105 (February 23), pp. 2814–20, (March 9), pp. 3559–78, (April 15), pp. 5956–59. In 1960 he opposed the judicial nomination of a Wisconsin man who had massive support from within and outside the state, with no one else from Wisconsin in opposition. (Proxmire said: "I have had more visits and phone calls in connection with this nomination than with any other matter I have dealt with since I came to the Senate.") Hearings, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, 86th Cong., 2d sess., *Nomination of James R. Durfee; Congressional Record*, Vol. 106 (January 25), pp. 1027–1033, (April 19), pp. 7577–78, (April 20), p. 7750. In 1961 he was the first to make a fight against a Kennedy nominee. *Ibid.* (daily edition, January 23, 1961), pp. 1086–1100.

[23] "Borah and Johnson, Disturbers of the Senatorial Peace," *The Literary Digest* (August 23, 1919), pp. 52, 55; Austin Haines, "Smith W. Brookhart, Dissenter," *Nation* (November 1, 1922), pp. 465–7; Richard Barry, "A Radical in Power: A Study of La Follette," *Outlook* (November 29, 1922), pp. 564–7; Chester H. Rowell,

What is more important is to try to sharpen the description of the role and to distinguish it from its opposite, the "Senate type" which makes up the membership of the Inner Club.

Because the most significant characteristic of the role is its conscious rejection of the behavior associated with belonging to the Inner Club, we might tentatively label it the "Outsider." The term is not meant, however, to apply indiscriminately to all members of what White calls the Outer Club (*i.e.*, all senators not in the Inner Club), who may simply have failed somehow to be taken into the inner communion, but to the man who does not *want* to be in.

If the "Senate type" who belongs to the Inner Club is distinguished by his sensitiveness to Senate moods, his regard for Senate traditions and norms, and his spirit of accommodation, the Outsider is notable for his determination to speak out whenever he pleases on whatever subject he chooses without regard to whether he can get any vote but his own. And if the "Senate type" cares more for the esteem of like-minded colleagues than any other kind of approval, the Outsider typically looks elsewhere—to his constituents and to his ideological allies across the nation, perhaps more than to those other members of the Senate whose norms he shares.

The difference between the Outsider and the Senate type is not so much in ideology or issue orientation (although the Outsider is more likely to be liberal, as his opposite number is apt to be conservative) as in legislative style. The popular literature of forty years has drawn a sharp picture of that style. The Outsider feels impelled to stand for principle absolutely, preferring defeat on those terms to half-a-loaf. He likes to tell people what they should and frequently do not want to hear. He is never so confident of the soundness of his opinions as when he holds them alone. He is as comfortable alone against the crowd as the Senate type is in the bosom of the club; indeed he is probably happiest when he stands by himself against powerful and wrong-headed foes. As a consequence few people, in the body or outside, are lukewarm toward him; they tend to like or dislike him strongly. He is like the "sons of the wild jackasses" who came out of the midwest thirty years ago, of whom it was said that "theirs is not a compromising spirit, and this lack of the give-and-take philosophy may, with their want of a sense of humor, be their greatest weakness but it has often proved to be their strength."[24]

The characterization is not really adequate. For one thing, it is undoubtedly too harsh. Many who helped shape it were deeply unsympathetic with the goals and tactics of the men they described, among whom there were, then and now, attractive as well as powerful personalities. Nevertheless there is more than a suggestion that unpopularity was not unknown to them and they were not dismayed by it. Even if it were wholly fair, the description obviously would not apply in all its details to any individual. What we have sketched here is an "ideal type"; real people are only more or less like it.[25] Its relevance is that it suggests what I shall argue here, that the Outsider is not a deviant at all but a person playing a recognizable and recognized role, a legitimate alternative to some others which he might select.

Deviant behavior has been defined as "behavior which violates institutionalized expectations—that is, expectations which are shared and recognized as legitimate in a social sys-

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"LaFollette, Shipstead, and the Embattled Farmers," *World's Work* (August, 1923), pp. 408–20; F. E. Haynes, "LaFollette and LaFollettism," *Atlantic Monthly* (October, 1924), 536–44; Bruce Bliven, "Robert M. LaFollette's Place in Our History," *Current History* (August, 1925), pp. 716–22; Charles Merz, "Androcles and the Lion: The Silent President and the Roaring Borah," *Century* (April, 1926), pp. 698–703; Richard Washburn Child, "He Rides Alone," *Saturday Evening Post* (May 21, 1927), pp. 6–7, 187, 189; Dixon Merritt, "Four Senators," *Outlook* (December 28, 1927), pp. 531, 534; Ray T. Tucker, "Those Sons of Wild Jackasses," *North American Review* (February, 1930), pp. 225–33; Frederick R. Barkley, "The Voice of the Corn Belt: Senator Norris—Square Peg in the G.O.P.," *Outlook* (January 14, 1931), pp. 52–4, 74–5; Louis H. Cook, "Brookhart, Insurgent," *North American Review* (February, 1931), pp. 178–84; Oswald Garrison Villard, "Borah Goes on the War Path," *Nation* (July 25, 1934), p. 91; "Borah: Political History-Maker," *Literary Digest* (February 1, 1936), p. 9; Richard L. Neuberger, "Wayne Morse: Republican Gadfly," *American Mercury* (July, 1947), pp. 16–24; Robert L. Riggs, "Wayne Morse: The Peril of Independence," *The New Republic* (March 2, 1953), pp. 10–12; Robert L. Riggs, "That Maverick Morse," *Nation* (May 5, 1956), pp. 380–2.

[24] Tucker, *op. cit.*, pp. 226–27.

[25] This should be emphasized. No classification of individuals is intended. Where individuals are mentioned it is only to illustrate a characteristic in the construction of a type.

tem."[26] My argument is that the Outsider role has been accepted and esteemed by a considerable part, at least, of the general public and by the specialized publics of close students of the Senate and that within the Senate itself it is recognized as legitimate whether it is popular with a majority or not. Most theories of deviant behavior postulate an effort (even if ineffective) by the social system to eliminate or at least control the offending behavior. The Senate has proved that it can and will take telling measures against what it considers deviant behavior, but the kind of behavior associated with the Outsider role is remarkably free of institutional inhibitions.

One piece of evidence supporting the assertion of widespread public acceptance of the role is the long tenure in office usually enjoyed by the established maverick. Approval by the special publics is suggested by the frequency with which close observers rank men noted for their independence at or close to the top of lists of outstanding senators. Thus a group of political scientists who specialized in legislation (presumed to be able to make informed judgments largely free from provincial, partisan or emotional bias) were asked in 1950 to "grade" all members of the Senate; they consistently put Douglas first, and the next three in order were Kefauver, Morse and Lehman.[27] The same year *Time* included Douglas among the "Senate's most valuable ten," calling him, among other things, a "maverick liberal."[28] *Collier's* congressional award for 1946 went to Robert LaFollette, Jr., "as notable an independent as the Senate has known since his fiery father, Wisconsin's famous Old Bob . . ." who always "has been free to do his stuff as he thought it should be done."[29] One of two awards made by the American Political Science Association in 1959 to outstanding members of the Senate went to John J. Williams of Delaware, who is noted for his lone-wolf assaults on wasteful spending, subsidies, and tax privileges.[30]

More than that, the Senate itself has in a sense put its *imprimatur* on the role. In 1955 the Senate set about selecting "five outstanding persons, but not a living person, who have served as members of the Senate" whose portraits would be painted in oval spaces left blank for that purpose when the Reception Room was decorated a century earlier.[31] A committee of five senators chaired by John F. Kennedy considered nominations for two years with advice from many people.[32] The senators finally selected were Webster, Calhoun, Clay, Taft, and the senior LaFollette. The names fall almost automatically into slots—the nationalist, the sectionalist, the compromiser, the arch Republican, the maverick liberal.[33] Was the committee—perhaps consciously—filling historic roles? The choice of LaFollette is striking.

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[26] Albert K. Cohen, "The Study of Social Disorganization and Deviant Behavior," in Robert K. Merton et al. (eds.), *Sociology Today* (New York, 1959), pp. 461–84, 462. Robert A. Dentler and Kai T. Erickson argue that deviants are functional to the group, testing and tracing its boundaries, as opposed to the notion of deviance as a dysfunctional aspect of group or society; but they accept Cohen's definition and it is clear that they are talking about behavior which is regarded as illegitimate by the group. "The Function of Deviance in Groups," *Social Problems*, Vol. 7 (Fall, 1960), pp. 98–107.

[27] Byron L. Johnson and W. E. Butt, "Rating the Senators," *New Republic* (March 3, 1952), pp. 10–11.

[28] "Senate's Most Valuable Ten," *Time* (April 3, 1950), p. 20.

[29] James C. Derieux, "For Distinguished Congressional Service," *Collier's* (April 26, 1947), pp. 78–79. The awards, made each year for four years to one member of each house, consisted of a $10,000 cash prize and a gold medal presented by the President of the United States. Other senators chosen were Arthur H. Vandenberg (1945), Alben W. Barkley (1947), and Vandenberg again (1948). Young Bob's style in the Senate was not his father's; indeed, by the time the *Collier's* award was made he probably was a valued member of the Inner Club. But the point is that his independence was stressed in the article announcing the award.

[30] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 105 (September 11, 1959), pp. 19085–86. See also William Benton, "For Distinguished Service in Congress," *New York Times Magazine* (July 24, 1955), pp. 14 ff.

[31] New York *Times*, May 5, 1957, IV, p. 2.

[32] The original committee was made up of Lyndon B. Johnson, chairman; Richard B. Russell, Styles Bridges, Mike Mansfield, and Eugene D. Millikin. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 101 (August 2, 1955), p. 12967. Johnson later was replaced by Kennedy and Millikin by John W. Bricker. For a description of the selection process, see John F. Kennedy, "Search for the Five Greatest Senators, "*New York Times Magazine* (April 14, 1957), pp. 14–18.

[33] See S. Rept. No. 279, 85th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record*, Vol. 103 (May 1, 1957), pp. 6206–08.

It is doubtful that any man ever aroused more bitter antagonisms in the Senate or was ever more reviled by his colleagues than he.[34] That LaFollette was selected as a prototype seems more likely from the fact that his closest competitor was George W. Norris, a man not like any of the other "outstanding persons" but the most like LaFollette.[35]

What happens inside the Senate to the Outsider? Not much; as White observed, the Senate is not a body disposed to impose sanctions on any behavior but the most outrageous. The point is important. A group may be expected to punish deviant behavior, and the Senate has proved that it can and will do so with dreadful finality.[36] Calculated and continued flouting of the dignity and good order of the Senate, easier to recognize than define, is deviance which compels sanctions. It will be punished finally, as Huey Long and Joe McCarthy learned, by a spiritual banishment more conclusive than formal censure and more galling, in its daily erosion of ego, than physical expulsion. But the Senate is of all official bodies (again, as White remarked) perhaps the most tolerant of individualistic, even eccentric, behavior.

Institutional arrangements, both formal and informal, encourage tolerance. An external system determines who shall be members and confers upon them an equal official status, and the seniority system softens the contest for status and preference internally. The Senate is a relatively large group (though its smallness has always been emphasized); it *does* have a hundred members, and the staff people who share intimately in the work of the body multiply that number several times. Differences in style, temperament and goals therefore may be softened by simple avoidance if not by the sharing of committee tasks, or by the temporary alliances of mutual interest which account for much legislation. And because the Senate agenda is managed largely by unanimous consent a majority judiciously refrains from employing against irksome behavior the small sanctions which serve merely to irritate the offending member. The imposition of censure or ostracism is a rare and traumatic action reserved for really deviant behavior usually borne a long time.

The evidence is strong that the Senate accepts as legitimate a wide range of behavior. Its members advance without hindrance to the perquisites of seniority, and some of the most powerful committees have had rather odd chairmen. Relations among subgroups appear to be easy; an Outsider who fights with only a handful of friends on one issue may, because of personal expertness on the subject, be chosen by the leadership to lead the party on a crucial measure the next week. Proxmire has said that no sanctions have been imposed on him; on the contrary, the leadership gave him substantial help in 1960 in the passage of a dairy price support bill which was helpful to his constituents.[37] Proxmire, like other Outsiders, readily joins subgroups in support of common interests and frequently votes with the majority. The behavior associated with the Outsider role seems to fall well within the bounds of what most members of the Senate regard as tolerable.

If this analysis is correct, an assumption of role consensus in the Senate is incorrect; there is variability not only in the behavior of occupants of the senator position but in the expectations—the "ideal patterns"—of behavior to which members may conform.[38] The Outsider therefore is not a deviant but an alternative role. It would be a mistake also to assume, without empirical justification, a bimodal distribution of acceptable behaviors—the Inner Club member and the Outsider. What is more probable is the existence of several legitimate "senator" roles. One thinks, for instance, of the persistence of the pure service type, the "Errand Boy," who eschews controversy and distinguishes himself neither in committee nor on the floor, but renders himself unbeatable by causing his beneficence to fall like gentle rain on all his constituents, Democrats and Republicans alike. The identification and conceptualization of alternative roles will in turn provide important clues to strains and conflicts, or to the existence of subsystems, within the body.[39]

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[34] This was frankly acknowledged in the committee report, *ibid.*, p. 6205, which says of LaFollette, in part: "Ceaseless battler for the underprivileged in an age of special privilege, courageous independent in an age of partisan conformity, he fought memorably against tremendous odds and stifling inertia for social and economic reforms which ultimately proved essential to American progress in the 20th century. . . . The bitter antagonisms stirred by his unyielding opposition to international commitments and conflict were ultimately submerged by widespread admiration for his dedicated life-long fight against political corruption and corporate greed." An editorial criticism of the selections characterizes LaFollette as "the champion of lost causes." "What Makes These Senators Great?" *Christian Century* (May 15, 1957), p. 612.

[35] *Congressional Record*, *ibid.*, pp. 6212–13.

[36] White, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–35.

[37] S. 2917, S. Rept. 1592, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.; P.L. 86–799. See *Congressional Record* (daily edition, August 19, 1960), pp. 15594–600.

[38] See the discussion of "the postulate of role consensus" in Neal, et al., *op. cit.*, ch. 2.

It should be emphasized, however, that the successful performance of this task would by no means exhaust the sets of role orientations in the Senate which are worth analysis.[40] What we are dealing with here—the way the senator relates himself generally to his colleagues and the obligations of his office, or better, the *style* of his performance in chamber, committee room and office—is concerned with only one set, albeit an important one. Externally it is the image of himself as senator which he projects to his publics. Within the Senate it is the cluster of attitudes and modes of behavior toward other members which identify him to them and stimulate and shape their attitudes and behavior toward him. The choice of this role among available alternatives is therefore crucial to the successful performance of his other roles and to his self-esteem, and its importance is heightened by the fact that, once adopted, it is not easy to change.

IV

The disability usually supposed to be associated with the Outsider role is that the senator who chooses it is thereby doomed to be less effective in the Senate. White puts it indirectly: the Inner Club runs the Senate;[41] the Outsider would be then, by definition, not of much consequence. Matthews goes further, attempting to test the proposition that the more effective member abides by the folkways. He constructs an index of "Legislative Effectiveness" by calculating the proportion of all public bills and resolutions introduced by each senator in two successive congresses that were passed by the Senate, arguing that "to the extent that the concept as used on Capitol Hill has any distinct meaning, 'effectiveness' seems to mean the ability to get one's bills passed." He then plots the effectiveness index against indexes measuring conformity with two Senate folkways and concludes: "The less a senator talks on the Senate floor, and the narrower a senator's area of legislative interest and activity, the greater is his 'effectiveness.' "[42]

It should be said at once that Matthews is as modest in his claims for his statistical test as he is resourceful in constructing it. Nevertheless the effectiveness index raises questions too important to ignore. To the individual senator, to whom being a senator is part of a professional career, the ability to get reelected might be considered a fair test of effectiveness and any behavior judicious which helps him pass the test. From the point of view of society, the conception of the Senate as a bill-and-resolution factory where the individual members are paid on a piece-work basis seems both too narrow and contrary to fact. To take the last point first, the passage of a bill is a collective process in which the introducer may have played a very small part, if indeed his bill was not changed beyond recognition.[43] Conversely, bill introduction may be no more than a form of advocacy, or a way to state a personal platform, or simply a bid for publicity. Or again, a senator may persistently sponsor legislation he knows can pass only well in the future, if at all, as George Norris did the TVA.[44] But more important, the enactment of legislation is but one and perhaps not the most important function of either house of Congress, let alone of all members individually. An adequate assessment of the effectiveness of alternative Senate roles or individual role-takers must await an analysis of the political functions performed by the Senate.[45]

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[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26.

[40] The most perceptive and elaborate statement of the interrelated sets of roles within a legislative sub-system is found in the comparative study of four state legislatures by Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, LeRoy C. Ferguson and William Buchanan, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," this Review, Vol. 53 (September, 1959), pp. 742–56; "The Legislator as Specialist," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13 (September, 1960), pp. 636–51; and especially their mimeographed working paper, "The Role Concept in the Comparative Study of State Legislatures," pp. 3–17. See also my "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study," this Review, Vol. 48 (June, 1954), pp. 340–365.

[41] *Op. cit.*, pp. 86–87.

[42] *Op cit.*, pp. 114–17.

[43] In determining standards for the selection of the five outstanding senators, Kennedy rejected the notion of choosing those whose names are prominently associated with legislation. He pointed out that the senator whose name a bill bears may not be for the bill and may not even have read it, while a senator whose legislative efforts fail may find that later on someone else will take up his bill and succeed. John F. Kennedy, *op. cit.*

[44] Stephen K. Bailey and Howard D. Samuel, *Congress at Work* (New York, 1952), ch. 8; Henry C. Hart, "Legislative Abdication in Regional Development," *The Journal of Politics*. Vol. 13 (1951), pp. 393–417.

Suppose, for instance, that one function of the legislature should prove to be "the institutionalization, crystallization and resolution of conflicts."[46] Might not then the Outsider's outspoken championship of minority, perhaps unpopular, views contribute to the process? The analysis would have to take account of the latent functions—the unintended and unrecognized consequences—as well as the manifest functions.[47] A latent function of the legislature might be to provide catharsis for fringe views which never will prevail.[48] If so, what better agent than the lone fighter against hopeless odds (regardless of his motivations or what he fights for) who, as he afflicts the mighty, may serve as the psychological representative of all the Outsiders in the great society?[49] To turn the questions around, is it likely that certain modes of legislative behavior should persist over long periods of time *without* having relevance for the political functions the legislature is called upon to perform?

It may be that Senate role and Senate function are directly linked and either may be approached through the other. The "ideal pattern" of behavior which we have called "role" may embrace one or more basic functions of the Senate, performed in greater or less degree by all the members, writ large and personified in the "ideal" role-taker. Thus the Errand Boy, if we may assume there is such a role, simply is performing to the virtual exclusion of everything else a function which by all accounts has always consumed a great deal of energy and time of senators and (especially since the Legislative Reorganization Act) their staff. In any event, what is important is that a functional analysis be made, and that it take into account what the legislators actually do and not just putative functions ascribed to them. Not until such an analysis has been satisfactorily performed can anyone say what senatorial role is "effective" and what is not.

Any sophisticated assessment of Senate roles, moreover, must recognize that any role, or even a single item of behavior, may have "diverse consequences, functional and dysfunctional, for individuals, for sub-groups, and for the more inclusive social structure and culture."[50] Thus the behavior of the Senate type who is in the Inner Club may be functional for groups which benefit from preserving the status quo, dysfunctional for those seeking change; functional for the preservation of harmony within the body, dysfunctional for conflict resolution in the larger society. The behavior associated with the Outsider may be functional for protest groups seeking a spokesman, dysfunctional for groups needing leverage inside the legislative body. It may even be functional for the leadership, to the degree that it makes more persuasive the middle position usually taken by the leaders. A given role may be functional in some respects for the role-taker, dysfunctional in others. Proxmire, for example, unquestionably has paid a price for choosing the Outsider role (as he would if he had chosen another) which he believes to be justified by the increased freedom of action it gives him. The important thing would seem to be not what role is chosen but what the role-taker uses it for, what goals are served by it. The Inner Club member may get little more than the personal satisfaction of belonging, the Outsider no more than personal publicity. Either may, on the other hand, choose his role self-consciously with the probable consequences clearly in mind, in order to maximize the advantages to be gained toward legislative goals he has set himself.

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[45] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), pp. 19–84.

[46] In their forthcoming comparative study of four state legislatures, Eulau, Wahlke, Ferguson and Buchanan use this phrase to define the legislative process.

[47] *Op. cit.*, pp. 60–84. Merton makes "the distinction between manifest functions and latent functions; the first referring to those objective consequences for a specified unit (person, subgroup, social or cultural system) which contribute to its adjustment or adaptation and were so intended; the second referring to unintended and unrecognized consequences of the same order."

[48] David B. Truman suggests this as one of the functions of the public hearing of the congressional committee. *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1953), pp. 372–77.

[49] This is suggested by Proxmire's mail from all over the country when, for instance, he criticized his party's leadership in the Senate.

[50] Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

TVA AND POWER POLITICS

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The passage of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Revenue Bond Act in 1959 ended a quarter of a century during which the Authority was dependent upon Congressional appropriations to supply the capital investment for its growing electric power facilities.[1] This development marked the first appearance of consensus in the long conflict over the role of TVA in the national economy. The consensus emerged from an impasse between TVA's lack of support in Congress—the result of its narrow geographical limits, its identification with a single political party, and the growing industrialization of states on its borders—and the inability or unwillingness of its opponents to have TVA sold to private investors—the result of intensive support for the Authority among an active few in Congress, the unified nature of the TVA power system, and the huge amounts of power which TVA supplied to defense installations. The resolution of this impasse by authorizing TVA to sell revenue bonds on the public market suggests that in an open political arena like the Congress a stable consensus on policy may arise despite the most ardent efforts of the main contenders to achieve other solutions. Indeed, conflict among independent political forces may well achieve solutions meeting a far wider range of preferences than would be the case if the decision were made by any single official. Since maintenance of adequate Congressional support is a perennial problem for federal agencies, it will be instructive to review the shifting basis of support for TVA in Congress and draw from this experience the appropriate lessons.[2]

TVA has gone through a cycle which illustrates the operation of democratic politics under American conditions. After years of agitation, TVA was born in a burst of reform. Its early days as an agency were filled with struggle and blessed with success as the forces which gave birth to it maintained their original support and vitality. As it grew more successful, TVA increasingly came under attack; new opposition elements arose and old supporters departed. Faced with mortal threats, unable to expand Congressional support for its power program, TVA was compelled to abandon its dependence on the appropriations process and turn to financing through revenue bonds in order to establish a wider basis of consent under which it could continue to operate.

Yet the life-history of the TVA power program differs from that of many other issues. "In their course across the political stage," Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee assert, "viable issues seem to 'move' through various phases—from near-unanimous rejection at first through sharp partisan disagreement to near-unanimous acceptance at the end, perhaps a generation later. . . ."[3] TVA electric power appropriations never passed the stage of sharp partisan disagreement. In seeking to account for this behavior we shall be concerned with three major questions. First, where and why did TVA's original support decline? Second, why was TVA unable to expand its base of support? And, third, through what process were the decisions made which enabled TVA to survive through the issuance of revenue bonds?[4]

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[1] In the years since it was founded in 1933, TVA became primarily a producer and distributor of electric power. Although one heard a great deal about TVA's flood control, navigation, resource development, and regional planning functions, by far the greatest part of the Authority's expenditures was devoted to its power operations. In 1959, for example, the total operating expense of the power program was approximately $186.7 million compared to $28.7 million for all non-power functions combined. From the inception of TVA until June 30, 1957, net power income was $413.4 million and net expense of non-power operations was $175.8 million; *Annual Report of the Tennessee Valley Authority*, 1957, pp. A12–A15; 1959, pp. A2–A3.

[2] Despite the overwhelming importance of TVA's power program, the vast outpouring of literature on the Authority does not contain a single piece which attempts to identify and analyze the sources of support and opposition which it encountered in Congress. Phillip Selznick's excellent book, *TVA and the Grass Roots, A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949), deals with the Authority's accommodations with the interests in its area of operations.

[3] Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), p. 207. Even if this pattern is less typical than these authors contend, it is certainly a prominent one and serves the useful analytic function of providing a basis of comparison to the TVA experience. For an excellent study of the movement toward consensus on the issue of government regulation see Robert E. Lane, *The Regulation of Businessmen* (New Haven, 1954).

I. SAVED BY THE WAR: FROM 1933 TO WORLD WAR II

An enduring symbol of the New Deal, TVA was created in May, 1933, by a coalition of Republicans, led by the zealous and indefatigable Senator George W. Norris, and a victorious Democratic Congress. The TVA Act was approved by overwhelming majorities in both houses.[5] As Table I shows, only three scattered Senate Democrats voted against the bill and thirteen Republicans from the Mid-West, West and Northwest supported it. Of the few Democrats in the House voting against TVA, a significant number—13 out of 28—originated in Illinois; these Congressmen feared the competition of TVA water power with the hard-pressed coal industry in their state.[6] Among the 11 Republican votes for TVA, 3 came from Progressive Wisconsin, 2 from power-conscious North Dakota where rural electric cooperatives were influential, and 2 from Tennessee, where TVA was located.[7]

The inevitably slow start of a new agency in the electric power field and the resounding Democratic majorities in Congress worked against any serious challenge to TVA appropriations during the first five years of its existence.[8] The year 1938, however, brought the first decline of New Deal strength. Men like the Republican Robert A. Taft of Ohio entered the Senate, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt failed in his attempt to "purge" a number of conservative Democrats. Although this decline did not show up in absolute numbers in the Senate, where there were 69 Democrats to 23 Republicans and four from other parties, the Democratic margin in the House was reduced to 261 against 169.

The first serious congressional challenge to TVA occurred on February 8, 1939, when the House voted 159 to 122 in Committee of the Whole to approve an amendment cutting the Authority's power appropriation request. This would have eliminated funds for completing a hydroelectric station at Gilbertsville and would have prevented a new start on a dam at Watts Bar.[9] On February 21, the Senate voted 49 to 31 in favor of the TVA request.[10]

While no roll-call was taken in the House, a formal division did take place in the Senate. From Table I it is clear that the number of

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[4] The method to be followed here is a simple one. Since the votes in Congress divide closely along party lines, it will not be essential to show the detailed vote from every state. It should be sufficient to present the total vote by party and to pay special attention to the Republicans who voted for TVA's appropriation desires and the Democrats who voted against them. Analysis of the geographic areas in which these party deviants predominate will enable us to pinpoint the sections in which changes in voting patterns occurred. Since the Congressional votes cannot be interpreted apart from some understanding of the issues involved, brief reference will be made to the arguments for and against TVA power appropriations, technological changes in the TVA power system which carry with them important political implications, the consequences of war on power production, and internal developments within the Authority. The voting records are, therefore, supplemented by interviews, newspaper accounts, Congressional hearings and a variety of other documentary sources.

This paper is an extension of material originally developed as part of a book, *Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics*, to be published by Yale Press as part of the Yale Political Science Series. In the course of this research, I interviewed over one hundred participants, friends and foes of TVA, many of whom contributed information on TVA's Congressional fortunes. I wish to thank Allan Sindler, Nelson Polsby, Theodore Lowi, and James Barber for their comments at various stages of this analysis.

[5] In the Senate, the Democrats enjoyed a 60 to 35 majority over the Republicans and there was one Farmer-Laborite. The Act was approved by a vote of 63 to 20 with 12 not voting. *Congressional Record,* Vol. 77, pp. 2808–2809, May 3, 1933. There were 310 Democrats in the House to 117 Republicans and 5 Farmer-Laborites. TVA was supported by 258 Representatives, 112 were opposed and 60 did not vote. *Ibid.*, p. 3600, May 17, 1933.

[6] *Ibid., passim.*

[7] The seven TVA states include Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.

[8] For an account of TVA appropriations in the early years see C. Herman Pritchett, *The Tennessee Valley Authority* (Chapel Hill, 1943), pp. 230–241. As is usual with defeated parties in legislative battles in the United States, the opposition to TVA tried to defeat it in the courts before it could get started. The *Ashwander* case left the opposition without any effective means of redress through the courts. *Ibid.*, pp. 56–64. The next forum for attack was an extended congressional investigation.

[9] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 84, p. 1250.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 1673. The number of Senators not voting was 16.

TABLE I. KEY CONGRESSIONAL VOTES ON TVA, 1933 AND 1939

States by section		Republicans for TVA			Democrats Against TVA		
		1933 House TVA Act	1933 Senate TVA Act	1939 Senate Appro-priations	1933 House TVA Act	1933 Senate TVA Act	1939 Senate Appro-priations
New England	Connecticut				1		1
	Maine				1		
	Massachusetts				1	1	1
	New Hampshire						
	Rhode Island						1
	Vermont						
Mid-Atlantic	Delaware						
	New Jersey				1		
	New York				1		
	Pennsylvania	1					
Border	Kentucky						
	Maryland					1	2
	Missouri						
	Tennessee	2					
	West Virginia						1
South	Alabama						
	Florida						
	Georgia						
	Mississippi						1
	North Carolina				1		1
	South Carolina				1		1
	Virginia						2
South-west	Arkansas						1
	Louisiana				1		
	Oklahoma					1	
	Texas				3		
Midwest	Illinois				13		
	Indiana		1		2		1
	Iowa	1	1				
	Kansas		1	1	1		
	Michigan		1				1
	Minnesota	1		2^a			
	Nebraska		1	1*	1		1
	Ohio						
	Wisconsin	3	1	1#			
West	Arizona						
	California	1	1				
	Colorado						2
	Nevada						
	New Mexico		1				
	Utah						

^{a} = Farmer Labor
^{a}, #, *, are counted in the Republican Column.

# = Progressive.
* = Independent.

TABLE I.—(*continued*)

States by section		Republicans for TVA			Democrats Against TVA		
		1933 House TVA Act	1933 Senate TVA Act	1939 Senate Appropriations	1933 House TVA Act	1933 Senate TVA Act	1939 Senate Appropriations
Northwest	Idaho		1				1
	Montana						
	North Dakota	2	1	1			
	Oregon		2	1			
	South Dakota		1				1
	Washington						
	Wyoming						
Total		11	13	7	28	3	19

Senate Democrats voting against TVA increased sharply throughout the nation, from 3 in 1933 to 19 in 1939, with the South contributing the greatest share. The number of Republicans supporting TVA decreased from 13 in 1933 to 7 in 1939. Nevertheless, the Democratic majority was sufficiently large, particularly when some Republican support was added, to provide a comfortable margin of victory for TVA.

The beginning of the Second World War intervened to halt temporarily any further decline in TVA's support; it was an unexpected and ironical vindication of the *Ashwander* decision which had grounded the constitutionality of TVA on the war power. In 1940 and 1941 Congress voted supplemental appropriations for TVA on the advice of the Office of Production Management and the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense.[11] Although TVA did not have an easy time of it during the next few years,[12] the need of the Oak Ridge atomic energy and other defense installations for power which could not be supplied elsewhere led to a rapid growth of the Authority's power facilities, both hydro and steam; even the vehement opposition of Chairman McKellar of the Senate Appropriations Committee to the building of Douglas Dam was overridden.

II. THE TVA STEAM PLANT PROBLEM

In 1939 TVA produced virtually all of its power in hydroelectric plants;[13] by 1956 it produced 70 per cent in coal-burning steam plants.[14] During the War TVA had developed most of the remaining good hydroelectric sites and had also found it advantageous to build a few steam plants in order to provide firm (continuously available) power during low-water periods. Despite the end of the war, the demand for power in the Tennessee Valley increased after 1945. Huge atomic energy and military installations requiring enormous amounts of power were located in the Valley. And at the same time industrial and consumer demand, fed by increased use of electric appliances, was growing rapidly in the TVA service area.[15]

As the demand for power increased, TVA rapidly exhausted its available additional water power and began to exhaust the useful potential for firming up this supply through related steam plants. It either had to build new, independent steam plants or lose its potential markets to private suppliers. The TVA Board chose to seek Congressional appropriations for a vastly expanded program of steam plant construction. This course was the more attractive because advances in technology had greatly reduced the cost of steam power. But while the dam sites where hydroelectric power was produced were fixed, and TVA could not expand its service area from these beyond an economic transmission distance from its sources of supply, this was not true of steam plants which utilized coal. The number and deployment of steam plants that TVA might build was limited only by its own desires and the amount of capital which Congress decided to appropriate. The pre-war conflict between public and private power advocates therefore broke out afresh.

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[11] Pritchett, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

[12] See Ellen St. Sure, "The TVA Ammonia Plant," in Harold Stein, ed., *Public Administration and Policy Development* (New York, 1952), pp. 391–444.

[13] Pritchett, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

[14] *Annual Report of the Tennessee Valley Authority*, 1956.

[15] *Ibid.*, 1945–1951.

The conflict occurred over the first giant steam plant which TVA proposed to erect at New Johnsonville, Tennessee, in 1948. A victory in the 1946 election had put the House Republicans in control of Congress.[16] When the vote was taken on an amendment to include funds which the Truman Administration had requested for New Johnsonville, the House voted 192 to 152 against the proposal, with 87 not voting. Although TVA received 16 Republican votes, largely from the West and Northwest as Table II shows, the large Republican majority was sufficient to defeat the Authority.[17]

The Senate debate was influenced by a letter from the AEC declaring that it might well need more power from TVA for defense purposes in the coming years.[18] The New Johnsonville appropriation was thereupon approved in the Senate by a vote of 45 to 37 with 14 not voting. Republican support centered in the Northwest, together with strong Democratic support, enabled TVA to carry the day.[19] But when the TVA appropriation went to the Conference Committee the managers from the House refused even to talk about including funds for New Johnsonville and so it was defeated in the Republican 80th Congress.[20]

TVA made a strong comeback after President Truman's surprise victory in 1948. Putting ever greater emphasis upon the AEC's need for power, TVA Chairman Gordon Clapp went to see President Truman and enlisted his support for the New Johnsonville steam plant as an essential defense measure.[21] "The electric industry," *Newsweek* reported, "was shouting 'Stop thief,' 'Unconstitutional' and 'Creeping socialism' with high power intensity."[22] But as one utility executive told a *New York Times* reporter, "Most Congressmen will not want to vote against appropriations for a defense project regardless of whether this (the New Johnsonville project) actually is one or not."[23]

The Democrats commanded a Congressional majority in 1949.[24] The key vote came when the House rejected by a vote of 192 to 105 an amendment to cut out an appropriation for the New Johnsonville steam plant.[25] Although the "yeas and nays" were not taken, the *Times* reported that the division took place "almost entirely along party lines."[26] The Senate also voted 55 to 30 to reject an amendment which would have denied TVA funds for New Johnsonville. Nine Democratic votes or pairs against TVA were more than offset by 14 favorable ones from Republicans in the Northwest and other sections.[27]

TVA's support for steam plant appropriations in 1948 and 1949 came largely from two major sources: the Democratic Party, which was generally favorable to public power and which was committed to TVA as a leading symbol of the New Deal; and Republicans from Northwestern and Western states favorable to public power. The opposition to TVA came from Republican private-power advocates and a few Southern and Border State Democrats. It should be noted from Table II that TVA lost no votes from New England Democrats and gained a few from New Eng-

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[16] The Republicans enjoyed a 254 to 185 lead in the House and a small 51 to 45 margin in the Senate.

[17] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 94, pp. 5623–5624. The vote took place on May 11, 1948. There was a second vote on June 19 in which another bid to provide funds for New Johnsonville was defeated 201 to 186 with 42 not voting, two seats vacant, and one person answering present. The only notable difference between the two votes was that there were fewer non-voters the second time. The latter vote is recorded in a valuable compilation by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, *Voting Records on Rural Electrification and Related Wholesale Power and Rural Telephone Issues* (September, 1954). Hereafter cited as *NRECA Voting Records.*

Beginning with 1948, all votes have been double-checked with the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, which contains a category of voting showing those who were paired for or against or who made known their position. This category is symbolized in the tables by a check (✓). It has been used in order to tabulate all available indications of support or opposition to TVA.

[18] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 94, pp. 8280–8282.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 8282–8283. This vote took place on June 15, 1948. A motion to reverse the previous Senate action was defeated on June 19 by 47 to 37 with 12 not voting. *NRECA Voting Records.*

[20] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 94, p. 9018.

[21] *New York Times*, April 4, 1948, part III, p. 1.

[22] *Newsweek*, March 28, 1949, p. 66.

[23] *New York Times*, April 4, 1948, part III, p. 1.

[24] In the House the Democrats led by 263 to 171; and in the Senate by 54 to 42.

[25] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, p. 1260.

[26] *New York Times*, February 17, 1949, p. 13.

[27] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, p. 4482, April 13, 1949; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 5, 1949, p. 258.

TABLE II. KEY CONGRESSIONAL VOTES ON TVA POWER APPROPRIATIONS, 1948–1952

States by section		Republicans for TVA					Democrats Against TVA				
		1948 House	1948 Senate	1949 Senate	1952 House	1952 Senate	1948 House	1948 Senate	1949 Senate	1952 House	1952 Senate
New England	Connecticut										
	Maine			2							
	Massachusetts									1	
	New Hampshire					1					
	Rhode Island										
	Vermont		2	1		1					
Mid Atlantic	Delaware								1 √		
	New Jersey										
	New York	1			1					1	
	Pennsylvania						1		1	3	
Border	Kentucky		1		1						
	Maryland								2	2	
	Missouri			1							
	Tennessee	2			2						
	West Virginia							1 √	2		
South	Alabama										
	Florida									3	2
	Georgia									1	
	Mississippi										
	North Carolina									8	2
	South Carolina									2	
	Virginia							1+1 √	2	6+1 √	1+1 √
Southwest	Arkansas						2			1	
	Louisiana						1			5	
	Oklahoma										
	Texas							1		9	
Midwest	Illinois				3						
	Indiana										
	Iowa										
	Kansas										
	Michigan				1						
	Minnesota	1+1 √	1	1	1						
	Nebraska		1	2	1	1					
	Ohio									2	
	Wisconsin				2						
West	Arizona									1 √	
	California	1	1	1	1		1				
	Colorado	3							1 √		
	Nevada										
	New Mexico										
	Utah			1							
Northwest	Idaho										
	Montana										
	North Dakota		2	2		1					
	Oregon	4	2	1+1 √	1	2					
	South Dakota					1					
	Washington	3		1	3	1					
	Wyoming										
Total		16	10	14	17	8	5	4	9	46	6

√ =pair or announced position.

land Republicans. The tense international situation in the years between 1949 and 1952 no doubt helped TVA, as World War II had, for it led to ever greater demands for power for the AEC and other defense agencies. TVA began to build six giant steam plants in these years and by 1954 had a total of 4.45 million kilowatts of power capacity under construction.[28]

The TVA steam plant issue was debated in Congress again in 1952, with the Democrats in control. The House voted 199–159 to reduce TVA's appropriation for steam plants by $14 million. Among the 46 Democrats who voted or were paired against TVA were 36 from Southern and Southwestern states.[29] The Senate voted 39 to 30 to put back the funds which the House had deleted. The Democratic Senators from Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia voted or were paired against the TVA appropriation.[30] The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version.[31]

The 1952 votes on TVA appropriations reveal a definite tendency, more manifest in the House than the Senate although present in both, for the Southern and Southwestern states outside the heart of the Tennessee Valley to refuse funds for steam plants. If this tendency were to spread to the Senate, TVA might have a difficult time securing additional appropriations.

III. THE TVA FULTON STEAM PLANT PROBLEM

Although TVA's power production was constantly growing, the fact that the greatest part was allocated to defense projects led the agency to fear that it might become unable to meet the needs of its domestic customers. The most critical situation, according to TVA estimates, existed in the Memphis area. The Authority decided to build a new power plant and chose an advantageous site at Fulton, Tennessee, some 30 miles above Memphis on the Mississippi River. Its first request for funds with which to begin this plant, however, was rejected by the Truman Administration and failed to be included in the fiscal 1952 budget.[32]

The private utility interests vigorously opposed it from the start. Chief among them was Middle South Utilities, a holding company with subsidiaries lining the western border of the TVA system.[33] Middle South and its President, Edgar H. Dixon, feared that TVA might cross the Mississippi and use the Fulton plant as an entering wedge for a thrust into private utility territory.[34] Moreover, the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952 meant that for the first time TVA would have to deal with a Republican President who was hostile toward its power program. Nevertheless, TVA Chairman Gordon Clapp, a zealous advocate of public power, suggested that the incoming Republican Administration provide funds for a one-billion dollar TVA expansion program over the next five years.[35]

In his budget message of January 9, 1953, the departing President Truman included $30 million for TVA to begin work on the Fulton plant.[36] The Eisenhower Administration, of course, refused to be bound by the Truman budget and postponed action on the TVA request. The President later revealed that business leaders from states outside the Tennessee Valley had come to him complaining, "You are taking our taxes and building up cheap power some place and taking our industries out."[37]

The information and advice which the President was receiving at that time have been outlined by Robert J. Donovan:

> In a conference with the President on May 11 [Joseph] Dodge [the Director of the Budget] outlined his own objections to the way things were shaping up in the T.V.A. . . . T.V.A. had been established to develop water resources. The resulting cheap power eliminated private competition. Hence the T.V.A. had taken to operating steam plants in areas formerly served by private utili-

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[28] *Annual Report of the Tennessee Valley Authority*, 1954, p. 12.

[29] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 98, pp. 2699–2700, March 21, 1952; *NRECA Voting Records; Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 8 (1952), p. 128. Democrats in 1952 outnumbered Republicans 234 to 199 in the House and 49 to 47 in the Senate.

[30] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 98, p. 6473. The Senate earlier rejected an amendment to cut TVA's appropriation by some $46 million, by a vote of 36 to 31. *Ibid.*, p. 6471.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 9247, June 3, 1952; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 8 (1952), p. 134.

[32] *New York Times*, January 16, 1951, p. 21.

[33] The Middle South system includes the Arkansas Power & Light Company, the Mississippi Power & Light Company, the Louisiana Power and Light Company, and New Orleans Public Service, Inc.

[34] See Daniel James and Brian Forrow, *Memorandum of Middle South Utilities, Inc., Regarding Legal Aspects of the Federal Government in the Electric Power Business*, October 27, 1954, pp. 50–51.

[35] *New York Times*, December 5, 1952, p. 18.

[36] *Ibid.*, January 10, 1953.

[37] *Ibid.*, July 1, 1954, p. 10. Press Conference.

ties. The cheap power attracted . . . industry which . . . would require more power.

It was these ripples going out from the pebble that Eisenhower objected to and wanted to check.[38]

Two days later, on May 13, 1953, President Eisenhower announced drastic cuts in TVA's budget that completely eliminated funds for the Fulton plant.

At the same time, however, President Eisenhower emphatically rejected the extreme alternative of breaking up TVA and selling it to private investors. He commented at a press conference that TVA was a historical fact, it served many people, and selling it to private industry might wreck the whole system. "After all, the Government used a great portion of the power developed down there . . . he had no comment on such a thing, because that would be a pretty drastic step wouldn't it?"[39]

On June 17, 1953, the House voted 154 to 83 to reject an amendment to add to the TVA appropriation funds for the Fulton plant.[40] Since Republicans outnumbered Democrats, though by only 11 votes—221 to 210—TVA obviously lost a great many of the Democratic votes it had received in previous years. While individual votes were not taken, sentiment in the House was indicated by Charles Bartlett, a pro-TVA reporter for the *Chattanooga Times*, who wrote of "the wide range of people, TVA friends and foes, who were impelled to express . . . their belief that the Authority must somehow be cut loose from its dependence on Congress."[41] The notion that TVA would continue indefinitely to expand its power facilities through use of public funds was repugnant to many congressmen.[42] The Senate, then composed of 48 Republicans, 47 Democrats, and one independent, also defeated an amendment to supply funds for the Fulton power plant.[43] Charles Bartlett reported that Valley senators had been content with a voice vote because "the poor showing that was likely would hurt chances of obtaining approval of the steam plant in the next session of Congress."[44]

IV. THE PROBLEM OF SUPPORT

TVA's leaders were not unaware of the erosion in their support but they were unable to do much about it. If TVA had been able to expand its operations into neighboring states, it might eventually have been able to count on support from congressmen of both parties in those constituencies which benefited from its activities. But TVA disclaimed any intention of going beyond its existing boundaries and, in any case, could not have mustered support for such a move. Had there been a Missouri Valley Authority, congressmen from the TVA area might have established mutually supportive relationships with their colleagues from that part of the country. But this fight had been lost, and all the TVA arguments about how much its purchases and yardstick helped other sections involved intangibles that did not have the impact which large sums for government power plants in these localities might have had.

TVA did have the most intensive support from congressmen in Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, and Mississippi. They would raise a great commotion if attempts were made to cripple the Authority; they would use the defensive advantages which the American system provides to block harmful actions; but they could not guarantee that TVA would continue to receive the appropriations upon which the growth of its power program depended.

V. THE DIXON-YATES CASE

Faced with a hostile Administration and Congress, TVA might have proposed to raise its own capital by using revenue bonds, thus undercutting the argument that the nation was being taxed to provide cheap power facilities for just a few states. But Chairman Gordon Clapp denounced this plan as a creation of TVA's enemies.[45] Leading TVA officials believed or at least hoped that, given a favorable recommendation by President Eisenhower, they they could get funds for the Fulton plant through Congress.[46]

Clapp then came up with a new tactic: he suggested to the Budget Bureau that the AEC find a private supplier for some power then being furnished to AEC by TVA and release an equivalent amount back to the Authority.[47] He undoubtedly suspected that the private utilities would be unwilling to supply additional power at satisfactory rates directly to AEC in the area of Paducah, Kentucky and Joppa, Illinois, where the Commission's facilities were located. The private utilities already had an enormous concentration of power in that area and would be hard put to dispose of it if AEC requirements ever materially lessened. By recommending a course which would be extremely difficult to realize to the mutual satisfaction of the utilities and the AEC, Clapp probably hoped that the Administration would be left with no alternative but to give TVA what it wanted.[48]

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[38] *Eisenhower, The Inside Story* (New York, 1956), pp. 335–36.

[39] *New York Times*, October 22, 1953, p. 20.

[40] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 99, p. 6714. An amendment to decrease TVA appropriations further was defeated 153 to 69.

[41] Quoted from *Charles Bartlett's Files*, story dated June 20, 1953. The files contain original copies of stories.

[42] See the *Congressional Record*, Vol. 99, pp. 6651–6652 ff.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 8472, July 10, 1953.

[44] *Bartlett's Files*, July 10, 1953.

[45] *New York Times*, August 20, 1953, p. 36.

[46] Interviews with TVA officials.

[47] Official Report of Proceedings Before the United States Court of Claims, *Docket No. 479-55, Mississippi Valley Generating Company et al., Plaintiff, the United States of America, Defendant*, 1957, p. 116. Testimony by Carl H. Schwartz, Jr.

The Administration adopted Clapp's suggestion but soon discovered that the private utilities were not willing to supply the power where the AEC needed it. Contrary to Clapp's expectation, however, the Administration was determined to find power for Memphis and still avoid the bitter defeat of recommending funds for the TVA Fulton plant. The Administration instead developed a complex contractual arrangement whereby Middle South Utilities (headed by Edgar Dixon) and the Southern Company (headed by Eugene Yates) would contract with the AEC to supply power to the TVA service area near Memphis. The power which Dixon-Yates supplied to Memphis would then be considered as a replacement of power which TVA would continue to supply to AEC 150 miles away in the Paducah-Joppa area.

TVA and its friends considered the Dixon-Yates project a blatant attempt by private utilities to invade the Authority's service area under the guise of a contract with the AEC. A severe conflict over the Dixon-Yates project took place in Congress during the summer of 1954. No description of these events will be attempted here, however, beyond a few essential points directly bearing on TVA's prospects for support in Congress.

Representative Charles Raper Jonas of North Carolina, one of the seven states in the TVA region, declared that the Authority was no longer a babe in the woods but a giant which ought to take care of itself. "I do not say this in any spirit of animosity toward TVA," Jonas said, "but rather in the spirit of an indulgent parent that [sic] asks himself when his son reaches voting age, has a family, a booming business and a heavy bank account, but still comes to ask for a handout: 'Won't that boy ever make his way by himself?" Although two TVA plants were located in North Carolina almost all of the power was exported to the Tennessee Valley. Jonas would never agree to taxing North Carolina for the exclusive benefit of its neighboring states.[49] Many other statements could be cited to show that TVA was losing support from states just outside the center of the Authority's operations.[50]

Before turning to the vote on Dixon-Yates, an earlier Senate roll-call (on an amendment to restore some $12 million in transmission-line appropriations for TVA) will be of use in appraising sentiment toward the Authority. The Republicans controlled the Senate by a slim 48 to 47 margin with Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon characterizing himself as an Independent. On May 19, 1954, the pro-TVA amendment was defeated by a 56 to 23 majority with 16 not voting. The 8 Republican and one Independent votes for TVA, which might have proved sufficient to carry the day in previous years, were overwhelmed by the 23 Democratic votes against the Authority.[51] Although the large Democratic vote against TVA was national in scope (see Table III), most of it was centered in the South and Southwest. Then, on July 21, by a vote of 55 to 36 with 5 not voting, the Senate rejected an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act which would have prohibited the Dixon-Yates contract. Only 3 Republicans and 1 Independent took the TVA side, while a sizable contingent of 12 Democrats, again largely from the South, supported Dixon-Yates.[52]

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of the Budget Bureau. Hereafter cited as *Dixon-Yates Trial, 1957.*

[48] This and the following two paragraphs are summaries of events covered in detail in Wildavsky, *op. cit.*, chs. 2 to 6.

[49] *Congressional Record,* Vol. 100, p. 10432.

[50] Senator John McClellan, a Democrat from Arkansas where the Dixon-Yates power plant was scheduled to be built, posed the basic policy issue as he saw it: "Are we to continue to pour out millions and millions of dollars in this [TVA] area to build it up beyond its natural potentials while the rest of the country suffers and waits?" The American way, McClellan concluded, was to let some other state get the benefits flowing from the construction and operation of a large powerplant. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Hearings . . . to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,* part II, 83d Cong., 2d sess., June, 1954, pp. 1009–1010. Henceforth cited as *JCAE Hearings,* June, 1954.

[51] *NRECA Voting Records; Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* Vol. 10, 1954, p. 186.

[52] *Congressional Record,* Vol. 100, p. 11221; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* Vol. 10, 1954, p. 563. The two Democratic Senators from Rhode Island and Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts, constituting the total number of New England

TABLE III. KEY CONGRESSIONAL VOTES ON TVA POWER APPROPRIATIONS, 1954

States by section		(Senate) Republicans for TVA			(Senate) Democrats Against TVA		
		1954 May Trans-mission Line	1954 July Anti-Dixon-Yates	1954 July Public Power	1954 May Trans-mission Line	1954 July Anti-Dixon-Yates	1954 July Public Power
New England	Connecticut						
	Maine						
	Massachusetts				1		1
	New Hampshire						
	Rhode Island				1		
	Vermont	1					
Mid Atlantic	Delaware				1	1	1
	New Jersey						
	New York						
	Pennsylvania						
Border	Kentucky	1	1	1			
	Maryland						
	Missouri				1		
	Tennessee						
	West Virginia						
South	Alabama						
	Florida				2	2	2
	Georgia				2		
	Mississippi						
	North Carolina					2	1
	South Carolina				1		
	Virginia				1	2	
Southwest	Arkansas				2	1+1√	
	Louisiana				2	2	
	Oklahoma						
	Texas				2		
Midwest	Illinois				1		
	Indiana						
	Iowa				1		
	Kansas						
	Michigan						
	Minnesota						
	Nebraska	1					
	Ohio				1		1
	Wisconsin	2					
West	Arizona				1		
	California						
	Colorado				1		
	Nevada	1				1	
	New Mexico				1		
	Utah	1					

TABLE III.—*(continued)*

States by section		(Senate) Republicans for TVA			(Senate) Democrats Against TVA		
		1954 May Trans-mission Line	1954 July Anti-Dixon-Yates	1954 July Public Power	1954 May Trans-mission Line	1954 July Anti-Dixon-Yates	1954 July Public Power
Northwest	Idaho			1			
	Montana						
	North Dakota	1	1+1√	2			
	Oregon	1*	1*	1*			
	South Dakota			2			
	Washington						
	Wyoming				1		
Total		9	4	7	23	12	6

√ = pair or announced position.

It is by no means certain that all of those voting against Dixon-Yates were in favor of additional power appropriations for TVA. Some Senators opposed Dixon-Yates because of what they considered the unfortunate use of the AEC as a power broker in the Memphis area, a policy which they believed would lead to endless political disputes that were bound to impair the Commission's defense activities.[53]

In similar fashion the House on July 23 rejected an attempt to void the Dixon-Yates contract by a vote of 172 to 115. There was no roll-call.[54]

Intertwined with the Dixon-Yates conflict was another issue involving an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act (authorizing the AEC to produce electric power with atomic reactors) which was sought by public power interests. The Senate approved this amendment on July 22 by a vote of 45 to 41 with 10 not voting.[55] The favorable vote on this amendment may serve to differentiate roughly the general public power vote from the anti-Dixon-Yates vote.[56] The public power forces were able to muster Democratic votes from Southern and Southwestern states bordering on TVA, and additional Republican support from the Northwest, which provided a margin of victory. There was, then, a narrower base of support for TVA than for general public power interests.

The battle over Dixon-Yates and the TVA Fulton plant proceeded at full force in the Spring of 1955. Considerable emphasis in the House debate was placed on the argument that it was neither right nor equitable for all the people to pay taxes for the special benefit of the TVA region.[57] To all this, Representative Joe Evins of Tennessee replied with a long list of power projects being carried on in other states.[58] Perhaps the most interesting discussion emerged when Republican Kenneth Keating of New York charged that "In city after city . . . we have seen families uprooted and separated, . . . the corner grocery store closed,

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Democrats, voted against Dixon-Yates. Immediately thereafter, by a virtually identical vote of 56 to 35, the Senate approved another amendment specifically authorizing contractual arrangements of the Dixon-Yates kind.

[53] See, *e. g.*, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 100, pp. 10142–11307, *inter-alia*.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 11745; *New York Times*, July 24, 1954, p. 1.

[55] *NRECA Voting Records*; *New York Times*, July 23, 1954, p. 1; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 10, 1954, p. 563.

[56] On the Democratic side, the following pro-Dixon-Yates senators supported the public power amendment: Fulbright of Arkansas, Lennon of North Carolina, Long of Louisiana, Byrd and Robertson of Virginia, and McCarran of Nevada. The following Republican senators favorable to Dixon-Yates voted for the public power amendment: Dworshak of Idaho, and Mundt and Case of South Dakota. Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts was the only opponent of Dixon-Yates who also voted against the public power amendment.

[57] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 101, p. 8470 ff.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 8491.

men and women thrown out of work, virtual ghost . . . towns created when industries have moved down into this Government subsidized power area." This tearful scene proved so upsetting to Representative Evins that he sought at once to allay the fears of his friends from the North by referring to a Department of Commerce report showing that textile plants had been located in South and North Carolina, not the area primarily served by TVA.[59] Finally, on June 16 the House of Representatives, now a Democratic majority of 232 to 203, approved by a vote of 198 to 169 an amendment cutting out the TVA Fulton plant. There was no roll-call.[60]

The death-knell of the Fulton plant was sounded by Democratic Senator Carl Hayden, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, when he wired Memphis officials that it would be "impossible" to obtain Senate approval of that TVA proposal.[61] Faced with the choice of doing without much needed power or accepting power from the hated Dixon-Yates combine, the Memphis City Commission voted on June 23, 1955, to build its own power plant.[62] With one stroke, this action undercut the Dixon-Yates project by depriving it of a market for power, and made the proposed Fulton plant unnecessary, since it was designed to serve the Memphis area.

The simultaneous demise of the Dixon-Yates project and the Fulton plant, and their replacement by a municipal power plant, met with virtually unanimous approval. For the Dixon-Yates interests, Memphis' action had the advantage of removing fear of the Fulton plant and striking a blow at TVA expansion. For the Administration and anti-TVA congressmen, municipal construction meant an end to demands on the Federal budget and an acceptable ideological outcome in the form of local initiative. For anti-Dixon-Yates congressmen and TVA, it put an end to private utility invasion of the Memphis area and the unwise involvement of the AEC. Construction of a power plant by Memphis was by no means an optimum solution for all; but supporters and opponents of TVA agreed on one thing: they regarded this final outcome as preferable to victory by the other side.

The remarkably widespread acceptance of the Memphis steam plant was not a product of agreement on goals within the Congress and the Eisenhower Administration. On the contrary, this approval represented agreement on the desirability of a specific policy—the decision to build a steam plant in Memphis—despite the fact that the opposing sides had not budged at all in their views on the desirability of support for Dixon-Yates and for TVA power appropriations.[63] Yet TVA still faced the problem of how to meet the increasing demands for power from its other customers in the absence of congressional, not to say Administration, support for appropriations with which to construct new steam plants.

VI. INTERNAL CONFLICT

TVA's traditional position of insisting upon Congressional appropriations to build steam plants was undermined from still another direction by the Eisenhower Administration's appointment of men to the Authority's Board of Directors who were by no means wholly committed to this view. When Gordon Clapp's term expired in the Spring of 1955, President Eisenhower appointed in his place General Herbert D. Vogel, formerly of the Corps of Engineers, an agency noted for its hostility to the Authority's power program. While Clapp was Chairman—indeed ever since Arthur Morgan's removal early in TVA's history—internal harmony had reigned because the three Directors and the staff shared common views about the power program. Vogel's championing of the Administration's position now led to severe internal conflict with Directors Harry Curtis and Raymond Paty and many staff members.[64] A measure of harmony was restored by the simple expedient of appointing new men to the Board when Curtis' term expired in 1957 and Paty died.

VII. THE REVENUE BOND ACT

The lengthy negotiations, hard bargains, and numerous conflicts which resulted in the TVA Revenue Bond Act deserve a separate study which is beyond the scope of this paper.[65]

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[59] *Ibid.*

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 8494–8495.

[61] Excerpt from *Minutes of Meeting of Board of Light, Gas & Water Commissioners of City of Memphis.*

[62] *Ibid.*, Resolution of Board of Commissioners of City of Memphis.

[63] See Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 19 (Spring, 1959), pp. 79–88.

[64] See House Appropriations Committee Hearings, *Public Works Appropriations for 1956, . . . Tennessee Valley Authority*, 84th Congress, 1st sess., pp. 176–179, 331.

[65] For an outline of these events see "TVA Revenue Bonds," *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 15 (1959), pp. 261–265. As TVA's congressional fortunes worsened in the early 1950s,

Enough has been said, however, to indicate the considerations which led to the Act. TVA had lost so much support in Congress that it received no new power appropriations after 1953. Even with normal Democratic majorities it was no longer possible to secure appropriations. President Eisenhower had ruled out selling TVA to private interests. What, then, was to happen to the TVA power program?

Not many alternatives were left. The Authority did use operating revenues to finance additional generating units for existing power plants. But this was obviously a stop-gap measure and could not begin to meet the Tennessee Valley's need for additional capital. So long as the Government decided to keep TVA in public hands, there was only one feasible way out: the Authority must be permitted to raise its own funds in the public market. This would cut TVA loose from the appropriations process, enable it to meet the Valley's need for power, and receive broad political support. The conditions under which the revenue bonds were to be issued, the precise amount, the area TVA was to serve, the degree of control to be exercized by Congress and the President might remain within the realm of controversy. But there could be no doubt that if TVA were to be maintained it would have to raise its own capital.[66]

VIII. WHERE AND WHY TVA LOST SUPPORT

The usual explanation for the decline of Congressional support for TVA appropriations in the post-World War II period has been that New England interests feared competition from industries using cheap power provided by TVA and urged their congressmen to vote against it. This is true in part, but New England has regularly sent to Congress Republicans who generally voted against TVA anyway, so that any decline in the number of pro-TVA votes from that region was too small to affect the Authority's fortunes drastically. Democrats from the New England states rarely voted against TVA.

Although the number of roll-call votes available for study is not large, the distribution of legislators suggests that support for TVA power appropriations from 1948 to 1955 came from most Democrats and a small contingent of Republicans, largely from the public power states of the Northwest. Toward the end of this period a tendency emerged for Democrats from the Southern and Southwestern states bordering TVA to vote against steam plant appropriations. When many of these same Democrats voted in 1954 for public power amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, the legislation passed.

A more likely hypothesis to explain the decline of TVA support, therefore, is that industrial interests and congressmen from the Southern and Southwestern states closest to the center of the TVA area came to feel that further development of cheap power in the Tennessee Valley had to be stopped. A secular change—the growing industrialization of the South—had led to a split in the old public power ranks and created a new and victorious coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats on this issue. It is ironical that TVA had contributed so much to the process of industrialization.

"Accepted policies"—those government activities whose continuance is accepted by everyone—emerge in several ways. Mass ap-

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the idea of resorting to revenue bonds was "in the air" among supporters of the Authority who saw no hope for it in continued reliance on appropriations. The Port of New York Authority and many state toll road authorities provided conspicuous and apparently successful models. Meanwhile, the rise in interest rates paid by the Treasury, together with the Authority's ample and growing operating revenues, made the prospect of raising TVA funds in the open market a less unattractive alternative. Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, a Republican supporter of both TVA and President Eisenhower, suggested self-financing 1954 and was in the forefront of the battle for its adoption. In 1955, President Eisenhower requested the TVA Board to recommend ways of financing power operations other than through appropriations. The Board recommended financing through bonds secured by revenues from power. There followed a complex series of interagency negotiations in 1956 and 1957. Congress wrestled with the problem from 1957 to 1959 when the Revenue Bond Act was passed. It contained a series of provisions limiting the geographical area served by TVA, granting the Secretary of the Treasury limited control over the timing and interest of the bonds, putting a $750 million ceiling on TVA's borrowing capacity, and arranging the terms for the repayment by the Authority of the Government's previous investment in its power facilities.

[66] There appeared to be little support for turning TVA down altogether. When a motion was made to recommit the revenue bond bill to committee, the Senate voted 73 to 17 against it. The Democrats gave an overwhelming 56 to 2 vote and the Republicans split 17 to 15 against the motion. No comparable situation arose in the House where all the votes involved the conditions rather than the fact of issuing revenue bonds. *Ibid.*

proval may occasionally be so striking and so intense, as in the case of social security, that no one in a responsible position questions it. Or, an interest group may secure sufficient national influence so as to put beyond the range of debate the core of its gains, like the right to bargain collectively. Or, concessions on policy may be made to opposing interests or support may be traded, in the traditional manner of log-rolling. But TVA was unable to secure any of these solutions to the problem of expanding its support.

Comparing the major issues of American politics according to the degree of agreement shared by the two major parties, Julius Turner discovered that those issues he labelled "Government Action," including votes on TVA, had the third lowest Index of Likeness (measuring inter-party harmony), higher only than tariff and matters of patronage.[67] There can be little doubt that the TVA public power issue polarized the parties more than most other issues, and this provides a clue to TVA's difficulties.

Perhaps one lesson to be learned from TVA's experience is that a Government agency which requires large appropriations cannot expect to continue its programs, if they are controversial, unless substantial support from both parties is present. Dependence on a single party is dangerous. It is unreasonable to expect that a major party will maintain virtually complete cohesion on many issues over a long span of time, and the affected agency may therefore find itself defeated by defections from its supporting party. The swing of the political pendulum may be expected to bring the other party into power in Congress or in the Presidency for years at a time and few agencies can withstand an appropriations drought for so long a period. The very factors which originally secured such remarkable Democratic party solidarity for TVA—identification with the New Deal and the public power issue—led to similar Republican cohesion against it. The long term interests of an agency highly dependent upon appropriations are not served by identification with partisan and ideological issues. These divide the parties and give the party opposed to the agency a strong incentive to cut it down at every opportunity. The conditions which invite government agencies and their supporting interests to form bi-party coalitions are compelling.

TVA, of course, would have liked nothing better than to expand its support among Republicans, but it was unable to do so. Confined to one small region, it did not have sufficient votes or other inducements to give Republicans reason to desert their private power supporters. Even within its nominal seven-state area, TVA met with hostility in Virginia and considerable opposition in North Carolina. And in Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia, not all congressmen manifested an equally passionate interest in the TVA power program.[68] The failure of the proposed Missouri Valley Authority ended one hope of additional support. Yet some still thought it possible for TVA to convince people in states outside its area that its power operations brought benefits to them. Here lies the political significance of the concept of TVA as a "yardstick" by which to measure the fairness of private utility rates. But TVA's publicists were unable to make effective use of this point, partly because of the troublesome problem of demonstrating the comparability of rates, but largely, it seems, because it was aimed at consumers who were unlikely to do much about it even if they believed the Authority's claims. The intensity with which private utilities organize to pursue interests which are direct and obvious to them cannot be compared to the lesser and more diffused interest taken by consumers for whom an electric bill is rarely a source of major concern.[69]

When an agency finds that it cannot obtain essential support in any other way it may seek accommodations with opposing interests in order to retain the major part of its program. But the very nature of TVA's power operations prevented any such move on its part. This is not merely a matter of public power ideology, of devotion to the yardstick approach, or of indoctrination in the original aims of the agency, although all of these considerations are important. Rather, the point is that power plants and distribution systems are monopolies—only one can serve a given locality. TVA could hardly agree to turn itself over to the private utilities. The utilities might conceivably have lessened their opposition if TVA confined itself solely to generating power and enabled the private interests to purchase its transmission lines and to acquire lucrative distribution facilities. The owners of these facilities, however, were municipalities and cooperatives who provided the backbone of TVA's support in its own area. The only way for TVA to concede something which the private utilities wanted would have entailed the loss of much of its existing support.

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[67] Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, 1951), pp. 38–39. The Index of Likeness for the tariff was 21.4, for patronage 26.9, and for Government Action 36.1. More recent confirmation is found in Herbert McCloskey, Paul Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, Vol 54 (June, 1960), p. 411. Taking a sample of party leaders at national conventions, the authors find that Republicans and Democrats are furthest apart on domestic issue preferences in regard to public ownership of natural resources.

[68] Nothing that is said here is meant to belittle the considerable defensive advantages possessed by a small group of intensely committed Congressmen; but this is not the same as the ability to secure a majority for TVA appropriations against opponents who are also intensely committed.

[69] A Gallup Poll on the Dixon-Yates affair showed that only a third of the nation's voters had any idea of what was going on, and a majority of them had not decided whether it was good or bad. *Public Opinion News Service,* December 4, 1954.

Indeed, the absence of widespread national support for TVA might well have become evident much earlier if the requirements of war had not twice intervened when the Authority was encountering difficulties in Congress. Most of TVA's phenomenal growth in electric power production took place during World War II and the Korean War periods when considerations of national defense were overriding. More than is commonly realized, the growth of TVA has been a product of war. TVA's most signal success has been its ability to seize upon the turn of world events and achieve its own growth while contributing to the nation's defense effort. This accomplishment has protected TVA from more extreme attacks, for few responsible officials would consider selling or breaking up an agency in which so much had been invested and which sold so much power directly to the Government.

IX. THE PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT THE REVENUE BOND DECISION

When the smoke had cleared from the long battle over the power program, it was evident that TVA required a new national consensus on the terms of its continuance as the nation's largest electric utility. This was accomplished by the Revenue Bond Act, which reconciled the widespread sentiment that TVA was here to stay with the insistence that it had to raise its own capital. Yet it is important to understand that broad acceptance of this solution was not the product of some mastermind, some official who worked out a plan for accommodating the diverse interests. On the contrary, the Revenue Bond Act was the result of a quarter of a century of conflict between the contending parties, under democratic rules, in which successive tests of strength revealed to the participants the best they could hope to get.

It may appear that 25 years of conflict was excessive. Perhaps there could have been an earlier (though not necessarily a happier) end to the TVA power problem had some official like the President been empowered to impose a solution in accordance with the "public interest." But what would have been the likely consequences of such a decision? If TVA had continued to depend upon appropriations, in accordance with the programs of Roosevelt and Truman, its power operations would have slowed to a halt during Eisenhower's term, with dubious prospects of much greater support in Congress during the succeeding Democratic Administration. The consumers of power in the Tennessee Valley would have been hurt badly and their representatives in Congress would have been exhausting their energies every year in a losing battle to keep pace with TVA's capital requirements. The Revenue Bond Act avoided all that conflict, and the probability of failure, without hampering TVA in a significant way. It was surely a better solution than the available policy alternatives.

It is often said, and still more often assumed, that the task of a hierarchical authority like the President should be to take a comprehensive view of all the interests implicated in a decision and to reconcile them by reference to his conception of what their welfare and the national welfare demands. Aside from the fact that the contending parties here had differing conceptions of what the common good required, this procedure would have imposed a tremendous burden of calculation upon any official. To postulate goals for others, to discover what they will give and take at the margins of their preferred policies, to determine the intensity with which others will pursue their interests, to predict the consequences of the available alternatives, is a complex task. Yet all these calculations were made by the affected parties as they pursued their interests and subjected their desires to the acid test of what others would accept. (It is one thing for an official to tell the interests involved that their cherished policies are unlikely to receive sufficient support; it is another for the interests themselves to discover through conflict, bargaining, and negotiation, the realistic limits upon their aspirations.) The absence of a single, visible guiding hand makes it easy to underestimate the creative role of conflict among independent political forces, and to neglect entirely the feats of calculation performed through the interplay of interests within the American political system. The TVA experience suggests that if the desired goal is the determination of policy outcomes most satisfactory to the widest range of interested parties, then the clash of interests (within agreed on political rules) may be a more efficient process for achieving this end than calculation by any single hierarchy.

JOSEPH DE MAISTRE AND THE REACTION AGAINST THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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It is a commonplace observation of French politics of the past century that men who started out as radicals turned conservative as they grew older, and that party groups launched with radical names and programs, though they kept the names, swung to the Right with the passage of time. In both cases we explain the transformation, in part at least, as evidence of an increasing satisfaction with the *status quo*, as the political system made room for the newcomer. In Joseph de Maistre we have an example from a somewhat earlier age of a less common phenomenon, the conservative turned reactionary, and impelled, moreover, to develop a systematic justification of his new position. Evidently, no parallel explanation will serve to account for this change, for Maistre, though he found a place for himself in the public life of his time, grew increasingly dissatisfied with the trend of events around him. It will not do, either, to dismiss him—in the manner of the orthodox tradition in the history of political thought[1]—as an authoritarian ogre,[2] or an irrationalist,[3] or simply as a confused man, a split personality with humanitarian impulses and reactionary ideas.[4] There was no inconsistency in this combination. Rather the explanation must be sought in the political situation of his day as he saw it, and in his concern for the perennial problem of political obligation. The positions that concern led him to take, his rationalizations of them, and the difficulties they landed him in, are the subject of this article. For whatever the merit of treating Maistre as the first of a century of romantics, or royalist writers,[5] or of Christian pessimists,[6] the more significant fact is that he saw himself at the end of the eighteenth century and as its critic. No French Revolution, no Maistre.

I. FROM CONSERVATIVE TO REACTIONARY

If a Revolution was necessary to induce Maistre to re-act, Maistre before the Revolution should have been merely conservative, not reactionary. And so he was. It was easy for a magistrate to be a conservative in a Savoy whose *ancien régime* was more enlightened than France's. During the fifty years before the Revolution reforms were extensive and feudal rights were gradually extinguished.[7] Even in this enlightened country, Maistre would seem to have been more enlightened than most. One of his biographers,[8] after studying Maistre's decisions as a magistrate, concluded that they showed a marked propensity to resolve doubtful cases dealing with seignorial privilege on the side of liberty.

But one should not conclude hastily from Maistre's patrician enlightenment that Masonry and illuminism exerted a great influence on him in his earlier days or that these were the source of a supposed mysticism that is the key to his later writings. Descostes says that Maistre never did more than "trifle" with

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[1] Popularized by G. Brandes, *Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature* (6 vols., N. Y., 1906), Vol. III, pp. 75, 87–112.

[2] His letters show that Maistre was a humane person who found the Russian punishment by the knout *épouvantable* (letter [1806], *Oeuvres complètes de Joseph de Maistre* [14 vols., Lyon, 1884], Vol. X, pp. 268–269); from St. Petersburg he reminded his Sovereign, after discovering the arbitrary treatment dealt out to several wretches, that "crime against the State . . . like any others . . . must be proved" (letter of 28 Aug. 1805, *Oeuvres*, Vol. IX, p. 462). The use of torture that he presented as a paradox (*Les soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg* [1817] really upset him as a magistrate (F. Descostes, *Joseph de Maistre avant la Révolution* [2 vols., Paris, 1893], Vol. II, p. 18).

[3] I. Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox* (N. Y., 1953). But surely Maistre believed in authority, not "because it was an irrational force," but because he thought it was well-grounded. The alternative was, moreover, anarchy.

[4] It is patronizing, as well as unjust, to Maistre *as a reactionary* not to concede that his patrician humanity is part and parcel of his reactionary theories. The Revolution was a human catastrophe, hence the Eighteenth Century was wrong. Protestantism caused dissension and the bloody Wars of Religion, hence it should never have been tolerated.

[5] S. T. Muret, *French Royalist Doctrines* (N. Y., 1933).

[6] J. N. Shklar, *After Utopia* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 18 ff.

[7] *Cf.* H. Menabrea, *Histoire de Savoie* (Paris, 1933), p. 250.

[8] Descostes, Vol. II, p. 22.

Freemasonry,[9] and the evidence seems to bear him out. As a matter of fact, one of the authors trying to make the most out of such connections has to admit that if Maistre used some of Saint-Martin's notions he did so *sans y tomber* and without approving *Martiniste* undertakings.[10] Maistre's own writings, in this period and later, make it difficult to understand how anyone could exaggerate the influence. There is extant a *mémoire* that Maistre wrote his fellow Mason, the Duke of Brunswick, in 1782 on the state of the lodge. There is no mysticism here. Instead, Maistre typically is concerned with the governance of the lodge, throws out democracy and interestingly suggests Papal government as a model. If it is to work, the realistic magistrate adds, there must be hierarchical order and provision for punishment.[11] His verdict on Masonry thirty-five years later is not inconsistent. He does not deny that there is much in the works of the illuminists that is true, reasonable, and touching, but mixed with it is the false and the dangerous, particularly in their aversion to authority and clerical hierarchy. Saint-Martin, he noted, *le plus instruit, le plus sage et le plus élégant des théosophes modernes,* died without wanting to receive a priest and with clear proof in his writings that he did not believe in the legitimacy of the *sacerdoce chrétien*.[12]

There is, then, little evidence that Maistre derived much of a positive nature from Saint-Martin. Perhaps he learned something from Saint-Martin's opposition to the *philosophes*.[13] But he certainly learned this elsewhere, too. He was taught by the Jesuits in his youth,[14] and he never tired later of praising their respect for authority. He learned from Burke, of course, but the Enlightenment should not be viewed as devoid of *antiphilosophes* from whom he could have learned earlier. In his various works Maistre cites Nicolas Sylvestre Bergier (1715–1790), who wrote a *Réfutation des principaux articles du dictionnaire philosophique* in 1771 and in 1789 a Burkean *Quelle est la source de toute autorité?*—"a wise and profound theologian" who saw that social contract was only a frivolous promise "without the dogma of a divine Legislator."[15] He also cites Bellarmine (on the Papacy, not on the origin of political power in the community); Cardinal Orsi (1692–1721), a Roman ultramontane; Bishop Huet (1630–1721), who wrote a censure of Descartes and a *Traité philosophique de la faiblesse humaine;* Francesco Antonio Zaccaria (1714–1795), a Jesuit who defended the Holy See in his *Antifebronio*. It is hard to see how Maistre deserves the title of "the earliest of the theocrats."[16]

Maistre derives then, in no small degree, from orthodox writers of the eighteenth century, a conservative group before the Revolution who may have been, as Palmer once thought, no more fiercely intolerant or less reasonable than the philosophic zealots of the new faith.[17] The later Maistre utilizes this orthodoxy with the fierceness that distinguishes the reactionary from his earlier conservative self. In germ, some of the later ideas are seen in the earlier period. In the pedantic eulogy of his king in 1775 he not only praises monarchy, but also finds the occasion to display what later was characteristic of his treatment of religion, praise for it as "the most powerful means and the true nerve of the state."[18] It is not merely doctrine, however, but also the mode of its exposition that distinguishes the reactionary from the conservative. As a conservative magistrate before the Revolution, Maistre was in the conservative situation of merely defending an order hardly threatened, and not one of trying to restore an order which had been shattered. It is this simple difference in *situation* which makes his 1784 address to the Savoyard magistracy[19] so uncharacteristic of his later writings. Here he has only the occasion to exhort his hearers to impeccable public behavior as a way of maintaining public respect for the regime. The events of the Revolution changed this conservative complaceny.

Have you seen *l'admirable Burke?*, Maistre wrote to a friend in 1791. *Pour moi j'en ai été ravi, et je ne saurais vous exprimer combien il a renforcé mes idées anti-démocrates et anti-*

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[9] *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 230.

[10] A. Viatte, *Les sources occultes du romantisme* (2 vols., Paris, 1928), Vol. II, pp. 79, 92.

[11] E. Dermenghem (ed.), Joseph de Maistre, *La Francmaçonnerie* (Paris, 1925), p. 112.

[12] "Les soirees," *Oeuvres*, Vol. V, p. 249.

[13] R. R. Palmer, *Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France* (Princeton, 1939), p. 181, n. 6.

[14] G. Cogordan, *Joseph de Maistre* (Paris, 1894), p. 7.

[15] "Essai sur le principe générateur des constitutions politiques" (1809), *Oeuvres*, Vol. I, p. 237.

[16] H. Michel, *L'Idée de l'état* (Paris, 1896), p. 108.

[17] *Op. cit.*, pp. 21–22.

[18] "l'Éloge de Victor-Amédée III." *Cf.* Descostes, Vol. I, pp. 298, 304.

[19] "Le caractère extérieur du magistrat," *Oeuvres*, Vol. VII, pp. 9 ff.

gallicanes.[20] But with the Revolution Maistre's situation is no longer Burke's. The French disease was more contagious in Savoy than in England. In January Maistre's poor Chambéry was already well-infected, and by June[21] he was reporting that a revolt was in the offing. The next year he fled before a French invasion. Thus, all his published writings postdate his emigration, and so from the first, but for one exception, he writes as an emigré, defending what had become the *ancien régime,* and awaiting its restoration.

The exception confirms the rule. Maistre's very first published writing, "Lettres d'un Royaliste Savoisien,"[22] written for his Savoyard compatriots in 1793, not long after his removal to Switzerland, has the confident air of the recent emigré who expects to return promptly to his rightful place. Consequently, its outlook is still rather conservative. It defends the old order as enlightened and tranquil, possessing none of the abuses of the French regime, neither pecuniary privileges for the first two orders, nor ministerial depotism, nor venality of civil or military offices. He pauses to question the glib use of the word *abuse,* but he does not make any effort to defend France, for the Savoyard conservative can better make his defense by contrasting the rule of Sardinia with other kingdoms. He denies that the new republic (of Allobroges), instituted with the aid of French arms possesses the support of the people, or of anybody except the "city scum."[23]

But Maistre's situation does not long allow him confidence in a quick Restoration. Thus his scope of attention is soon broadened to France and to government in general, and he is plunged more deeply than Burke into the abstract questions which, like Burke, he deprecates and would avoid.[24] The difference between Maistre and Burke is perhaps best seen here. Like Burke he rails against abstract reason, but he immediately turns to writing an extended analytical "Étude de la souveraineté"[25] which, in spite of its recurrent attacks on the abstract method of Rousseau, Voltaire,[26] Paine and the *philosophes,* is in character only an inverted *Social Contract* or *Second Treatise on Government.* Maistre cannot simply return to an Eighteenth Century that produced the Revolution. He must return to a purer, better version of the past. The rightful essential past must be stripped of its corrupt accidents if the Revolution is not to recur after military defeat. This given in Maistre's situation is implicit in all of his analyses, although he only gradually became conscious of it and made it explicit.[27]

II. CAPTURING THE PAST

The first strategic object is to establish title to the past. Maistre cannot argue contract in any form, for that has been utilized to legitimize the Revolution. He cannot even argue, as Burke does, a Hobbesian irrevocable contract, for the obvious retort now would be that it has been revoked. On the other hand, he cannot simply argue prescription like Burke. For the new, more recent past has displaced the older prescription. He seizes instead upon the not novel idea[28] of the true and enduring genius of a people and makes it the means of his counterattack for possession of the French past. This is inserted into his treatise on sovereignty, which starts with the well-known refutation of contract. If no man is ever born or ever was born anterior to society, no convention could have set up his society, and hence the origin of society is not the work of men, but of God. All those peoples who have stories of their origin trace it to a divinity. The notion of divine origin is a universal idea; it is more than a fable.[29]

This clears the way for Maistre to introduce sovereignty without risking its becoming the property of the people. Burke managed this by dissipating sovereignty in the English mixed Constitution. Maistre achieves the same end by building sovereignty into the original society. Even the Indian tribes are not without laws and a chief:

> His majesty, the Cacique, is covered with an oily beaver skin instead of a coat lined with Siberian fox; he royally eats his enemy prisoner instead of returning him on his word of honor, as in our degraded Europe. But, in the end, there is among the savages a society, sovereignty, a government of some laws or other.[30]

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[20] Letter of 21 Jan. 1791, *id.,* Vol. IX, p. 11.

[21] *Ibid.;* letter of 26 June 1791, *id.,* Vol. IX, p. 19.

[22] *Id.,* Vol. VII, pp. 35 ff.

[23] *Ibid.,* pp. 114, 200.

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 37.

[25] *Id.,* Vol. I. The work was written during 1793–96, but not finished, and was first published posthumously.

[26] *Ibid.,* pp. 367, 406. Thus Voltaire has destroyed the religious "cement," and Rousseau political authority.

[27] "Mémoire" (1809), *id.,* Vol. XI, p. 352.

[28] It goes back to antiquity, of course. Maistre cites Tacitus as well as Montesquieu.

[29] "Étude," *Oeuvres,* Vol. I, pp. 317, 331–332.

[30] *Ibid.,* p. 322.

And were there not, Maistre adds, a savage is only potentially a man anyway. Sociability is part of human nature. It is thus presented as an original and permanent condition that sovereignty and society are co-existent. It would be just as impossible to imagine it otherwise as to imagine a hive and a swarm of bees without a queen.[31]

A nation, then, has its own God-given social and historical constitution in a rooting even more secure than Burke's legal prescription. Even great legislators have not created this order; they rather gave form to what was already immanent in their people. Nor do they deceive themselves (like the Jacobins) into thinking it is human reason which can build lasting institutions. Institutions last because, created by God, they are both political and religious and accepted as sacred by the people.[32] As in Hobbes, it is stability that counts, and here monarchy shines. It is admitted that in their good days, democracies are brilliant, but they are passing meteors, not capable of counteracting the follies of the people. Athens came to ruin. The Roman Empire was less bloody than the Republic. The English mixed constitution is only a century old and probably will not last.[33] "Republican liberty" usually means the good of a few at the expense of the many and is accompanied by daggers, wars, internal dissension and sedition, whereas the grand monarchies have undertaken great projects, produced the Keplers that led to Newton. If one balances the ups and downs, and averages the reigns of sixty-six French kings, one can see that the most stable rule is clearly paternal hereditary monarchy.[34] One has only to submit to authority.[35]

Maistre, however, still had to remove obvious objections that Louis XIV did not face. Louis XIV could cite the sixty-some kings as the only French past. Writing in 1796–97,[36] Maistre has an additional span of years to explain, a new and alternative past which had the advantage for the moment of being the successful one of the two competitors. Later writers sympathetic to the Revolution would sanctify their past by claiming at least parity for *les deux Frances*.[37] Maistre had to argue that the Revolution was only an interregnum, an aberration, a chastening period of anarchy between two Bourbons; that the Revolution had not produced a durable order, and neither could nor would.

Hence the unflagging argument that the Revolution was ordained by Providence to chasten and regenerate a sinful France. God's ways are mysterious, but one can see that the Terror is swallowing up its own Revolutionary parents. By making a national crime out of the Revolution one might admit and yet reason away its popular sanction. The devil does God's work, an anarchical interregnum serves its purpose in the ordered scheme of things, Jacobinism serves the monarchy unwittingly and Robespierre's infernal genius saves France from dismemberment by the Allies. The clergy is regenerated as a result of its sufferings. All serves a grand plan of restoring peace and royalty which will legitimize France's conquests.[38]

Maistre has been attacked for introducing at this point some gloomy reflections on war and violence,[39] as part of the mysterious and apparently permanent order of human life. The offended critics usually make it sound as if Maistre were the first to say that the wages of sin is death or even that God created a world in which the innocent (by men's standards) suffer. All this is as orthodox as to maintain that secular authority comes from God—although Maistre need not arrogate to himself the application of God's ordinances to human particulars. In any case, he saw a war to the death between Christianity and *philosophisme* and called to the French to take their place at the side of His Most Christian King.[40]

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[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 318, 323.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 329, 347, 352, 354, 361.

[33] Maistre is not in a position to take advantage of the help offered by Burke, who defends the old France by minimizing its difference from England. National representation, alive in England, is dead or dormant in France. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[34] In fairness, it ought not to be forgotten, as it usually is, that Maistre means limited monarchy, in which there is an independent judiciary, room for talent, advisory councils and the liberty indigenous among the European peoples—*i.e.*, the *ancien régime* as it had lately functioned in Savoy and was supposed to function in France. *Ibid.*, pp. 430–437, 440–441, 450–452. Furthermore, the army law excluding the third estate from commissions was *une gaucherie ministerielle* and simply unenforceable. Nor is Maistre sure that venality of offices is good. The old French constitution is not absolutism, but a *mélange de liberté et d'autorité*. "Considerations sur la France," *id.*, Vol. I, pp. 89, 95 n.1, 132.

[35] "Étude," *id.*, Vol. I, pp. 524–525. As with Hobbes, the alternative is anarchy. This applies, of course, to any form of government for both writers, democracy included.

[36] "Considérations sur la France."

[37] *Cf.* R. Soltau, *French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven, 1931), pp. 486 ff.

[38] "Considérations," *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 17–19, 21–22, 24, 130.

[39] *Ibid.*, ch. 3, pp. 28 ff.

If it is necessary for Maistre to deny respectability to the second and newer Revolutionary past, by explaining it away as an episode in the one legitimate French tradition, it is also necessary to adduce evidence that this alternate past cannot take root. Hence a few interesting remarks on the United States, then a symbol to many Europeans. Comte later recalled how in his youth it seemed that the Americans of the revolutionary generation were surrounded by the august aura of republican Rome. Maistre at first disdains even to consider the upstarts:

> America is cited to us; I don't know anything so impatient as the eulogies bestowed on this child in arms. Let it grow up.[41]

Besides, the historic social and institutional characteristics differentiating France from the United States allow him to discount experience in the United States as evidence for the durability of the French Revolution, an argument pursued later by Gentz. For Americans, the king was a distant external power. Almost all the first colonists were republicans who left England during the time of religious and political troubles. The colonists built on these elements and on the English system of three powers; and unlike the French, they did not wipe the slate clean.[42]

In addition to denying the newer Revolutionary past respectability, it is necessary for Maistre to root it out. This means explaining where things went wrong and finding a formula for avoiding the same errors when the old regime is restored. For Maistre, the theories of the Revolution were nothing but the rigorous logical development of the four articles of the unfortunate Gallican declaration of 1682.[43] But he goes further back to find the source of corruption, and equates all its manifestations: Gallicanism, atheism, Protestantism, illuminism, *philosophisme,* Calvinism, Jansen, Rousseau, the *fronde,* together with Bacon, Locke, Helvétius, Kant, and materialism and sensationalism. Everyone not for us is not only against us, but is related in some secret fashion. This is not something I am imputing to Maistre. He believes in "hidden affinities" in the social world, as in the physical world, which, indeed it is the task of science to discover.[44] Such are the negative beginnings of positive social science—in witch-hunting.[45]

The essence of the enemy is variously distilled. Frequently it is labelled the Eighteenth Century or *philosophisme.* But the Eighteenth Century is nearly as often called the daughter of the sixteenth, with Protestantism its symbol. Protestantism is the enemy of every variety of sovereignty as Catholicism is the most ardent friend, conserver and defender of all legitimate governments. Protestantism is *rebelle par essence,* for it substitutes discussion for authority and individual judgment for the infallibility of those in authority. Protestantism is not favorable to *any* government, but is republican under monarchies and anarchist in republics. It is the *sans-culottisme* of religion. It is responsible for the vices of the present. It was the poison in the Gallican Church, which was "Protestant in the XVIth century, *frondeur* and Jansenist in the XVIIth, and finally *philosophe* and republican in the last years." It was the children of this sect who led Louis XVI to the scaffold; not one Protestant writer defended him.[46]

Maistre designates as the philosophic *Urfeind* first Locke, then Bacon. Locke's principles, nurtured in the warm mud of Paris, produced the revolutionary monster which has devoured Europe. "Contempt for Locke is the beginning of wisdom."[47] Because there must be no negotiations about authority, nothing about the social contract can be good, and everything Locke says must be controverted. The individual is not prior to the group, and man's inability to invent language proves it. Because the empiricism of Locke's epistemology also seems interlaced with individualism and social contract, Maistre is willing to go back to innate ideas, even if Aquinas presents an embarrassing degree of empiricism, too.[48] While

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[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 62, 66.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 87. *Cf.* also "Fragments sur la France," *Oeuvres*, Vol. I, p. 218.

[43] "Du Pape," *Oeuvres,* Vol. II, p. 514.

[44] "Reflexions sur la Protestantisme," *id.*, Vol. XIII, p. 86.

[45] *Cf.* H. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution* (2d ed., N. Y., 1954), pp. 328, 344.

[46] "Reflexions," *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 76, 82–84, 90, 93, 97. For a more dispassionate treatment, see B. C. Poland, *French Protestantism and the French Revolution* (Princeton, 1957).

[47] "Soirées," *Oeuvres*, Vol. IV, pp. 372, 380.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 109 ff; "Cinq paradoxes" (1795), *id.*, Vol. VII, p. 328. Bergier so argued before the Revolution. *Cf.* Palmer, *op. cit.*, p. 19. Earlier, Maistre had learned from Hume, as well as from Burke, to pooh-pooh *a priori* notions. "Principe générateur," *Oeuvres*, Vol. I, p. 286, n. 1.

Locke is the official *bête-noir,* Maistre veered toward elevating Bacon to that position when he discovered that Locke is only Bacon's successor. Locke in turn engenders Helvétius, so that "all the enemies of the human race assembled including Cabanis himself, are descended from Bacon."[49] Kant is drawn into the net, too. All Kant's career is contained *in ovo* in his inaugural dissertation at Koenigsberg in 1770 (a work on epistemology), for it presumably led him to republican heresies and to his being utilized by theosophists for unorthodox purposes.[50] The rest of the Eighteenth Century is similarly disposed of—Rousseau,[51] Voltaire, etc. *Illuminisme,* for example, is an amalgam of Calvinism and *philosophisme.* The Jews get only a sentence.[52]

III. THE CHURCH AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

We have already seen that to anchor the monarchical past Maistre locates sovereignty and authority in the divine origin of a people. He never tires of pointing out the conservative force of popular belief in such a history. No institution *of any sort* can last if it is not founded on religion. The religious principle is *créateur et conservateur.* The overthrow of the old order becomes, then, "an insurrection against God," something which never occurred before the eighteenth century.[53] Such a patently instrumental approach to religion has made commentators dubious of Maistre's religious sincerity, commentators who are genuinely distressed or profess to be shocked at Maistre's dating the fourteen centuries of national religion—the basis of French national life—from the Druids![54] Sainte-Beuve patronizingly conceded that Maistre was religious in the practice of religion, but that there was nothing of devotion in his practice.[55] Faguet accuses him of making religion nothing more than a basis for his politics.[56] While this is certainly exaggerated, the practicing Catholic who was shocked at Saint-Martin for dying without last rites and who had a brother who was a Bishop and a sister who was an Ursuline,[57] himself recognizes in the introduction to the 1820 edition of "Du Pape" that his approach to religion had been criticized for being excessively philosophical. He had overly "humanized" the idea of infallibility, the ultramontanes felt, by basing it only on philosophic considerations, over emphasizing analogue to sovereignty in the temporal order. He protests he is not denying revelation,[58] but the fact remains he has nothing much to say in a traditional religious vein, and volumes to say about the Church as a political institution. Lord Acton puts it more dispassionately: Maistre was the foremost of a group of laymen taking the place of the clergy in literature, "all rather inspired by the lessons of recent history than versed in the older details of theological discussion."[59]

Avoiding the presumptuous question of personal devotion, let us only note how Maistre's ecclesiastical program serves his politics. "If I were an atheist and sovereign," he wrote to a Papal Nuncio in 1815,[60] "I would declare the Pope infallible by public edict for the establishment and the security of the peace in my realms." Maistre consciously treats religion instrumentally. Let us treat Christianity as only a political institution, he can say. From this point of view—justification in the sight of God apart—Tellier's persecution of the Jansenists was *française et bonne politiquement.*[61] Irreligion is *canaille.* The patrician is a lay priest; the national religion is his prime and most sacred property, for his privilege falls with it.[62] If it were permitted to establish degrees of importance, Maistre would put hierarchy before dogma, he wrote to a Russian Orthodox friend. Before the decision, the question of the procession of the Holy Ghost mattered little; what was of infinite importance was the obligation of Greek to submit to Roman authority, for otherwise there would be neither faith nor Church.[63] The ultramontane formula he offered to one of Louis XVIII's councillors begins with the political:

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[49] "Examen de la philosophie de Bacon" (published posthumously, manuscript 1815), *id.,* Vol. VI, p. 513.

[50] "Quatre chapitres sur la Russie" (1811), *id.,* Vol. III, pp. 240, 349.

[51] "Examen d'un écrit de J.-J. Rousseau," *id.,* Vol. VII.

[52] "Quatre chapitres," *id.,* Vol. III, pp. 344–345.

[53] "Principe générateur," *id.,* Vol. I, pp. 266, n. 1, 285 ff., 299, 303.

[54] "Considérations," *ibid.,* p. 90.

[55] *Portraits littéraires* (rev. ed., Paris, 1862), Vol. II, p. 437.

[56] *Politiques et moralists du dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris, 1890), Vol. I, p. 43.

[57] Descostes, *op. cit.,* Vol. I, p. 76.

[58] *Oeuvres,* Vol. II, pp. ix-xi.

[59] D. Woodruff (ed.), *Essays on Church and State* (N. Y., 1953), p. 43.

[60] Letter of 1 Dec. 1815, *Oeuvres,* Vol. XIII, p. 185.

[61] "Reflexions," *id.,* Vol. VIII, p. 76, 78.

[62] "Sur la chronologie biblique" (1810), *ibid.,* pp. 114–115.

[63] "Lèttre à une dame russe" (1810), *ibid.,* p. 141.

> Point de morale publique ni de caractère national sans réligion, point de réligion Européenne sans le christianisme, point de véritable christianisme sans le catholisme, point de catholisme sans le pape, point de Pape sans le suprématie qui lui appartient.[64]

The Church is part of the European political fabric, and it too must be accounted for if the old order is to be restored.

But the restored Church must be purified of false Gallican principles. The aristocracy lost all by its alliance with Gallicanism. Its destiny is in its natural alliance with the ecclesiastical order.[65] The old order to be restored has an honorable place for the aristocracy. But for this old order to be safely restored, monarchical authority must be absolutely unchallenged, and absolute obedience is only taught by the Church, notably by the Jesuits. It took less than thirty years for the generation raised after the expulsion of the Jesuits, without their moral education, "to overturn the altar and cut the throat of the king of France."[66] Ignoring Jesuit theorists of the right to resistance, like Suarez and Mariana, Maistre claims that the Church has never employed against a civil authority anything but "*apologies, raisonnements et des miracles.*"[67] Aristocracy and clergy must hence make common cause, not against the monarch as before, when the clergy was Gallican and the nobility infected with *philosophisme,* but to bolster the monarchical principle that is their salvation. If the vigor of the Church itself depends on hierarchy and the principle of sovereignty, then it is necessary to be ultramontane. As Maistre never tired of repeating

> plus de pape, plus de sauverainété; plus de sauverainété, plus d'unité; plus d'unité, plus d'autorité; plus d'autorité, plus de foi.[68]

And faith teaches obedience. Even if the faith itself is persecuted, popular resistance is not justified.[69] So securely is the restored order to be anchored.

While this extreme view tends to make faith a mere instrument for public order, it should be observed in fairness to Maistre that he is more sensitive to the question of the misuse of power than a more thorough-going absolutist like Hobbes. The only restraint upon the ruler Hobbes recognized was "duty."[70] Maistre likewise cannot permit restraint to be exacted as a matter of political right, for that would destroy the principle of authority and mean the dissolution of society.[71] The monarch can be restrained only by a force that is external and non-political. That is to say, spiritual; hence the Papacy. Starting with a sovereign monarch, Maistre is consistent in going on to assert that every liberty won by the Gallican Church from the Holy See meant the enslavement of the French clergy to the temporal power; that the so-called liberties of the Gallican Church were in fact exercised by civil magistrates in a manner reproved by the clergy:[72] that the popes have fought for the legitimate liberties of men;[73] that it is due to the Church that European monarchy is under law, and is not tyranny; that the clergy employed its influence to try to restrain the wickedness of temporal rulers toward South American Indians[74] and extinguished servitude in Europe; and that, indeed, the Popes were *les instituteurs, les tuteurs, les sauveurs et les véritables genies constituants de l'Europe.* If restraint has to come from somewhere, and Maistre would not deny this, it would be exercised logically only by a spiritual and external power, which is most natural and *least dangerous.*[75] The instrumentality of religion is never far from sight.

IV. CONCLUSION

When is a revolutionary change irreversible? The fact is that Maistre could see even before the demise of Napoleon that the Restoration would not be an unimpaired restoration of the old regime, let alone the purification of the past he prescribed, and that he would have to lecture Louis XVIII as much as his Bourbon predecessors for their mistakes. Principle would not override compromise. And this is what in fact happened. Maistre was as out of place in 1819 as he had been in 1789. The restored Sovereign could not make use of Maistre's anti-Gallican principles; nor for the moment, could the clergy.[76] Only a few years earlier the Pope could not even acknowledge Maistre's offer to dedicate "Du Pape" to him.[77] The reprint in 1815[78] of Maistre's "Considérations" made it seem he was not merely against constitutions in general, but *a fortiori* against the Charter of 1814, as he indeed was. It was as liberal a charter as could be hoped for under the circumstance, Louis XVIII having learned a lesson entirely different from Maistre's.

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[64] Letter of 22 May 1814, *id.*, Vol. XII, pp. 427–428.

[65] "Du Pape," *id.*, Vol. II, p. xxiv.

[66] "Cinq Lettres sur l'Éducation Publique en Russie," *id.*, Vol. VIII, p. 165.

[67] "Reflexions," *ibid.*, p. 67.

[68] "Léttre à une Dame Russe;" *ibid.*, p. 154, and elsewhere.

[69] "De l'Église gallicane," *id.*, Vol. III, p. 125; "Du Pape," *id.*, Vol. II, p. 173.

[70] *De Cive,* Part II, ch. 13.

[71] "Du Pape," p. 274.

[72] "De l'Église gallicane," pp. 264–265, 268.

[73] "Du Pape," p. 411.

[74] "Soirées," *Oeuvres,* Vol. IV, p. 83.

[75] "Du Pape," pp. 337, 441, 274–275.

[76] Cogordan, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

Maistre was consistent with what should have been Bourbon principles, but the Bourbon himself was not. The whole problem of settlement had been wrongly defined. Everyone was concerned to find the means of establishing order by touching the revolutionaries and their acts as little as possible. He would propose the opposite, erasing the revolutionaries and their acts as much as possible without endangering the legitimate Sovereigns. Otherwise, the party of sovereignty was lost.[79] Maistre's last letters and conversation showed him bearing bravely the gloomy knowledge that the Revolution had not, by his pure standards, been defeated:

> La révolution est debout, sans doute, et non seulement elle est debout, mais elle marche, elle court, elle rue.[80]

The only difference between this epoch and that of Robespierre is that then heads fell, now faces change. The nobility and the clergy, he wrote to Bonald, have been reduced to the level of the simple bourgeoisie by a government which boasts of legitimacy.[81] Maistre died foreseeing that things would get worse before they got better, that the revolutionary principle would not accept the fall of Decazes, but would react against the monarchy and chase the royal family from France again.[82]

It is Maistre's stubborn principles in times that are out of joint, and not a desire to shock, which leads him to severe judgments. Much earlier, for example, Maistre in 1793 proudly related how during the wars of religion Savoy had suppressed both innovators and inquisition.[83] Before the Revolution it was in no way necessary for a conservative in France or Savoy to defend the Inquisition. But later, in 1815, his reactionary position brought him around to it. For if one can see now that to undo the Revolution it is necessary to root out the Revolutionary principle, it also can be seen that the old leniency was wrong. The Inquisition was proper. Spain was fortunate, for through the Inquisition she alone escaped the blood of the religious wars. Heresy is a dangerous crime. And, finally, had France possessed this institution, the Revolution would have been avoided.[84] Again, Maistre had earlier no reason to defend venality of offices. Later he saw it as an integral part of the monarchical system.[85] Again, Maistre earlier could be proud of the liberty and equality in enlightened Savoy. Later, he would warn against the dangers of liberating the serfs in Russia.[86] Such unrelenting consistency is worthy of a *philosophe.*

And this is our conclusion. Maistre is a *philosophe* in spite of himself, an eighteenth century man. To be sure, we can see in him earlier orthodox views that were never fully displaced by the Enlightenment. But Maistre has to recast these earlier views as a result of his situation, since he has the reactionary task of restoring the old regime, and not merely the conservative task of defending it. To restore the old regime, however, requires that he see it as a system, and it is system-building which sets both Maistre and his enemies off from a Louis XIV or a Louis XVIII. A monarch can be pragmatic, even lenient. A monarch*ist* or a *philosophe* cannot. It is Maistre's change of *situation* that requires the easy-going conservative to become a systematic political philosopher of reaction. By not merely reacting against the French Revolution, but by seeking as well to erase the infamous principles which were both its cause and justification, Maistre is almost driven to a philosophy of order. He is almost, but not quite, a latter-day Hobbes. After all, it was the good society he sought, not mere survival.

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[77] C. Constantine, "Joseph de Maistre," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* (15 vols., 1899–1950).

[78] Bonald, who was acting as Maistre's friend and agent, apparently overlooked Maistre's instructions that the work be printed anonymously like the earlier edition—although it was no great secret who the author was—and was taken to task for allowing Maistre's name to appear. Letter of 13 Feb. 1815, *Oeuvres*, Vol. XIII, p. 42.

[79] Letter of 27 July 1815, *ibid.*, p. 113.

[80] Letter of 3 March 1819, *id.*, Vol. XIV, p. 156.

[81] Letter of 29 May 1819, *ibid.*, p. 168.

[82] Conversation with Ch. de Lavau, printed *ibid.*, p. 285.

[83] "Lèttres d'un royaliste savoisien," *id.*, Vol. VII, p. 65.

[84] "Lèttres sur l'Inquisition espagnole," (1815) *id.*, Vol. III (trans., J. Fletcher [London, 1838]), Letter V.

[85] Earlier, "Considérations," see above; later, "Générateur," *Oeuvres*, Vol. I, p. 284. Maistre came also to defend venality of judicial office as securing the independence of the judiciary.

[86] "Quatre chapitres sur la Russie," *id.*, Vol. VIII, p. 355.

COMMUNICATIONS

STRAUSS ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

To the Editor:

In his review (March 1961 issue, p. 149) of *What is Political Philosophy*? by Leo Strauss, Herbert Deane challenges Strauss on the ground that, "In his interpretation of the history of political thought he holds Machiavelli responsible for effecting the significant break with the classical tradition." According to Deane, "Strauss' thesis leaves unexamined the possibility that the decisive break with classical political philosophy was accomplished, many centuries before Machiavelli, by the Church Fathers, especially by St. Augustine. In the patristic tradition God's grace and its instrument, the Church, replaced the social and political order as the source of true virtue."

Deane appears to use the terms "political thought" and "political philosophy" interchangeably. *What is Political Philosophy*? begins, however, with a careful elaboration of the differences between political philosophy and other species of political thought. "Political philosophy ought to be distinguished from political thought in general. . . . Hence all political philosophy is political thought but not all political thought is political philosophy." (p. 12) Strauss is particularly emphatic that "We are compelled to distinguish political philosophy from political theology. By political theology we understand political teachings which are based on divine revelation." (p. 13) According to this criterion the church fathers were not political philosophers and could not have effected changes in political philosophy, properly so called.

Whether the differences between reason and revelation are such as to justify this distinction between political theology and political philosophy may be questioned, but it can hardly be said that the possibilities involved have gone unexamined by a scholar who has made massive contributions to the understanding of Spinoza, Maimonides, Farabi, Halevi, and other great thinkers for whom this issue is crucial.

Harry V. Jaffa

Ohio State University

ON THE SCALING OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

To the Editor:

In his review of Schubert's *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior* (1960) in the March issue of this Review, Joseph Tanenhaus takes occasion to remark that "scalogram analysis, as Schubert undertakes it is not ordinal scaling at all . . ." and that he (Tanenhaus) is not persuaded that the procedures Schubert describes "are even remotely satisfactory for establishing ordinality." (p. 172) These cryptic comments are not explained and occupy only a few of the thousand or so words devoted to discussion of the Schubert volume. Tanenhaus has also recently remarked that "my earlier enthusiasm for employing cumulative scaling to transform judicial votes into ordinal data has largely evanesced." (Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, pages 509–510)

Since other political scientists and sociologists seem to think that scaling of judicial cases by Guttman techniques is methodologically legitimate as well as useful, a comment does not seem out of order. The point seems to be that the Guttman scale model requires that the items representing the universe of attributes (judicial cases in this instance) be ranked on an ordinal scale. That is, the relationship between any pair of items must be transitive and asymmetrical. Thus, if X is more than Y, and Y is more than Z, then X is more than Z and neither Y nor Z is greater than X.

With this there can be no quarrel. The items in a Guttman scale must have a cumulative property. In social research items may sometimes be found which have this character, for example, the items in the well-known social distance scale. But whether the intrinsic order is obvious is not crucial since the ordering of manifest responses, if sufficiently consistent, will reveal the appropriate structure. So Stouffer, in the standard reference, *Measurement and Prediction* (1950), reports that nine items from a study on fear in combat produced a satisfactory scale when given the following order: (1) urinating in pants, (2) losing control of the bowels, (3) vomiting, (4) feeling of weakness or feeling faint, (5) feeling of stiffness, (6) feeling sick at the stomach, (7) shaking or trembling all over, (8) sinking feeling of the stomach, and (9) violent pounding of the heart.

This particular scale would not have been easy to guess. It is not intuitively ordinal. A panel of experts could not be expected to produce it. The order was derived from the responses of the individual riflemen to the questions asked. In the same way, the judicial cases chosen for the purpose of studying the attitudes of Supreme Court justices toward a subject matter area are ordered by the responses made to the questions raised. So long as the cases are in the universe of content, the actual analysis can be performed blindly. And if "it is uncertain how to rank some categories *a priori* . . . these can be given an arbitrary order, which will then be automatically revised in the course of further steps in the analysis." (*Measurement and Prediction*, page 102)

That an ordered list of cases constitutes an ordinal scale is, of course, part of the hypothetical structure of the Guttman model. If the cases can be arranged to produce a scale, the data are consonant with the hypothesis. Such a hypothesis is subject to refutation, but not by occasional laconic references to ordinality or its lack. Without more, it seems that on the point raised by Tanenhaus, Schubert is in the clear.

S. Sidney Ulmer

Michigan State University

To the Editor:

I regret that the space allotted for my review of Glendon Schubert's excellent and many-faceted book prevented a more elaborate discussion of scalogram analysis. In brief, my position is as follows:

1. Using procedures with a built-in propensity for yielding high coefficients of reproducibility to determine whether a set of cases can be arranged to yield a high coefficient of reproducibility smacks of the self-fulfilling prophecy. Such procedures cannot *per se* establish that the relationship among the cases in a set is ordinal. Before an ordinal relationship can, in my judgment, be said to have been established, two additional steps are necessary.
2. The several cases making up the alleged scale must be differentiated in some articulate fashion, as with the levels of fear in the *American Soldier.*
3. If these differences were hypothesized in advance, then scalogram procedures may be considered a test of the hypothesis. However, if the differences were not postulated in advance, but rather arrived at by exegetical ingenuity (as with the levels of fear in the *American Soldier*), then new sets of cases must be employed to test the hypothesis.

Unless I seriously misread the literature, the scaling of judicial cases has rarely proceeded beyond the first step.

Joseph Tanenhaus

New York University

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON "FOREIGN RELATIONS": 1960

At its fourth annual meeting in Washington on November 4–5, 1960, the Advisory Committee on the publication of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* concluded that the much admired and widely used series of documents is currently faced with a crisis of major proportions.[1] Unless heroic measures are taken immediately by both the executive and the legislative branches of the federal government, the interests of the United States government and the world of scholarship will suffer irreparably.

I. THE CRISIS IN PUBLICATION

This crisis stems from many factors, all of which are intertwined. The most important is the fantastic expansion of materials in the archives of the State Department during the war and post war years, an expansion which reflects the enlarged role of the United States in world affairs.

It is not always understood, even by those who have some knowledge of foreign affairs, that to hope for the publication of "all the materials" is now entirely Utopian. It should be stated categorically that in the circumstances which now exist and will exist in the future, the element of judgment in the selection of documents must inevitably enter in. The materials reported cannot be the total of the documents but those parts which seem most relevant to an understanding of foreign policy. In the past there has sometimes been a disposition on the part of some scholars to criticize the Historical Office for suspected omissions. The Committee emphatically repeats what it has stated in former reports, that it has the utmost confidence in the integrity of the members of the Historical Office, and in the judgment which they bring to their task. Moreover, they are performing a prodigious task with inadequate personnel. The Committee examined with interest the indices of materials available to the Office and the mass of materials in the so-called "lot" and "post" files, and is aware, more than ever before, of the formidable task presented to the Historical Office through the proliferation of materials. It would be useful if those responsible for appropriations to the Office could, by a similar examination, be made aware of the magnitude of the publication problem. The Committee associates itself wholeheartedly with the request of the Office for additional personnel.

II. THE NEED FOR SELECTIVITY

An increase of personnel, however, is not enough. The publication of the annual volumes requires more than additions to the staff. If these volumes are to be meaningful, and if they are to be published within a reasonable period, there must be a far higher degree of selectivity with regard to the documents than has been the case within the past. This selectivity should relate both to subjects and to materials. The Committee is of the opinion that the question of subjects to be treated ought to be most carefully considered with a view to the interests of professional teachers and researchers, government officials, and the public at large. It may well be that this process of selection should be based upon a more deliberate consideration by the staff of the Office. It is certainly true that the process of selection will involve choices not only as to subject but also as to material. Here, again, those documents must be selected which are the most highly relevant and recourse must be had to summaries in the case of less significant materials.

The wide use of this technique would represent a substantial change in the volumes. Nevertheless, the Committee believes that this is feasible, and indeed essential, if the volumes are not constantly to grow in size, and be more and more delayed in publication.

Greater selectivity is all the more necessary since it seems not unlikely, as time goes on, that in certain respects materials will be drawn from more sources than is the case at present. For example, more attention will have to be paid to intelligence operations as revealed in the Department files and indeed as past experience indicates. In some cases it is important to include documents outside the Department to give a well-rounded picture of a given historical problem. None of these things will be easy, but all of them seem to the members of the Committee to be essential.

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[1] Members of the Committee representing the American Historical Association are: Dexter Perkins, Chairman, Professor of History Emeritus Cornell University; Fred H. Harrington, Vice President, University of Wisconsin; and Richard W. Leopold, Professor of History, Northwestern University. Clarence A. Berdahl, Visiting Professor of Government, Southern Illinois University and Leland M. Goodrich, Professor of International Organization, Columbia University, represent the American Political Science Association. Philip W. Thayer, Professor of International Law, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, and Robert R. Wilson, Professor of Political Science, Duke University, represent the American Society of International Law.

III. PROBLEMS OF CLEARANCE

The complex problems alluded to will raise other important questions and will inevitably suggest increased discussion between the State Department and other agencies of the Government. The question will arise, as it has arisen, as to documents originating in other departments but which are in the possession of the State Department. The Committee suggests that an Executive Order be issued by the President of the United States authorizing the Secretary of State to enlist the support of these agencies to this end and to make the final decision on questions so arising. If such a step proves to be unfeasible or inexpedient, it may be desirable to bring this whole problem to the attention of the Secretary, suggesting that at an appropriate time he discuss the question with the other departments or agencies concerned. Other possible action might be a statement by the President on the importance of the "Foreign Relations" series in enlightening the public on the development of our foreign policy, and expressing the view that the satisfactory accomplishment of this publication requires the cooperation of certain other departments and agencies with the Department of State.

The problem of clearance becomes more and more difficult as time goes on. These problems could perhaps be more expeditiously settled if they were referred as soon as possible to the higher officers of the Department. The Secretary of State might outline a plan that would make this possible, and issue a regulation accordingly.

Sometimes there is a disposition in the Department to object to the publication of documents even when they have appeared in print and their contents are already known. While it may be true that publication of given materials by the U. S. government is not the same thing as a publication of such materials by private individuals, the fact that a given statement is already widely known should most certainly operate in favor of official publication. The Committee believes that the Historical Office has pursued the correct technique in this regard by citing references to published material as an argument for permitting clearance. It believes that this technique may be profitably continued.

In this connection a word should be said about the China volumes, none of which has been published since 1956, when the documents dealing with the year 1942 appeared. Although the case for the withholding of future volumes has been several times stated by officers of the Far Eastern Bureau, the Committee continues to believe, in view of the wide public knowledge of the events with which these volumes deal and the fact that many years have elapsed since these events occurred, that the China series should be published as soon as the respective volumes become ready. The China volumes naturally contain materials critical of the China regime. They also contain materials that are laudatory, and of course some that strongly condemn the Communist aims and tactics. Taking into account the favorable and unfavorable aspects of the contents, and the damaging consequences of prolonged concealment of the facts, the Committee has reached the conclusion that it would be better to release the record so that a healthy and informed public opinion could develop as a basis for our relations with Nationalist China. It might well be that the Nationalist Government itself would profit by such a record.

Whatever the decision on the matter, the situation which has arisen with regard to the China volumes suggests the impolicy of deviating from chronological order in publication of the Foreign Relations volumes. The Committee believes that future materials should be published in the annual volumes as routine matter thus reducing to a minimum the chance of distortion or misrepresentation in the interest of some political group.

IV. TIMING OF VOLUMES

The Committee is naturally concerned with the slowness with which the volumes of the series have recently appeared. Two suggestions may be made in this regard. First, the Committee suggests that the Historical Office prepare for the next meeting a tentative plan for the priorities to be established in connection with the volumes 1945 to 1950. Second, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Secretary declare it to be general policy that the series should never fall more than twenty years behind currency and that funds and personnel should be provided to make this possible.

V. OTHER QUESTIONS

A number of other suggestions for the Historical Office occurred to the Committee. A large number of documents which will appear in the future will deal with the activities of the United Nations and international conferences.

Excellent work has been done by the Historical Office in dealing with the Cairo, Teheran and Potsdam conferences. Other special volumes may prove to be necessary with time, as, for example, a volume dealing with the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Committee has considered various suggestions of detail submitted by the Director of the Historical Office. The Committee regards with favor the idea that a Table of Organization of the Department from year to year be included in the first volume of each year's series to outline the set-up of the various echelons from the office of the Secretary through the Bureaus, offices and divisions. It also favors the more frequent inclusion of maps and illustrations.

Finally, the Committee believes it desirable to celebrate the 100th Anniversary of the Foreign Relations series by appropriate sessions of the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, and the American Society of International Law at the annual meetings of these societies.

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law: Selected Essays. ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY 605

Blitzer, An Immortal Commonwealth. The Political Thought of James Harrington. JUDITH N. SHKLAR 606

Andersen, ed., Studies in Legal Philosophy. ARNOLD BRECHT 607

Aptheker, The World of C. Wright Mills. WILLIAM PETERSEN 610

Freund, Germany Between Two Worlds. ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER 611

Brace, Ordeal in Algeria; *Gillespie*, Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution; *Hahn*, North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood. DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD 613

Goals for Americans, Comprising the Report of the President's Commission on National Goals and Chapters Submitted for the Consideration of the Commission. MARIAN D. IRISH 614

Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization. JOHN F. DUE 616

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Political Theory, History of Political Thought, and Methodology 618

American Government and Politics 642

Foreign and Comparative Government 652

International Politics, Law and Organization 671

Other Books Received 688

BOOK REVIEWS

Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law: Selected Essays. By HERBERT WECHSLER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. xvi, 171. $4.25.)

Publishers these days are increasingly prone to ornament books with titles more cosmic than their contents. The economic reasons for such hyperbole are obvious enough, and one who has himself acquiesced in the practice lacks standing to inveigh against it. But it does oblige a conscientious reviewer to expend a portion of his word-budget notifying readers that the label rather mis-describes the article.

This book is not, as the title might suggest, a comprehensive treatise on the great problems of political philosophy, but a collection of four essays related only in their idiom and their good sense. I would like to focus primarily on the one that has caused something of a flutter in academic dovecotes—"Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law." But the others are also interesting and rewarding, and deserve more than the following brief descriptive comments. "The Political Safeguards of Federalism" argues compellingly that the perils of centralization, such as they may be, are adequately thwarted by the built-in political strength of the states, and that the Supreme Court should not augment this centrifugal tendency by inventing rules to cramp national power. Perhaps the pre-1937 Court needed this advice more than the present Court does, but the essay is the best justification I have seen of the modern judicial attitude towards this question, and our constitutional jurisprudence of today badly wants such reasoned vindication. "Mr. Justice Stone and the Constitution" is a short history of constitutional doctrine from 1925 to 1946 with special reference, of course, to Stone's contribution. The upshot, if I understand it, is that Stone's decisions reflect his concern to "preserve the essentials of freedom without impairing the power to govern." Not a very startling conclusion perhaps, but the analysis does suggest that Stone was more successful than some of his present-day heirs in finding a tolerable mean between these two great values. "The Issues of the Nuremberg Trial" is an able defense of that experiment in international penology, but I can only say in the space allotted that I find it ultimately unconvincing.

Now for the essay on "neutral principles." It consists of two parts: the first, an argument that the prerogative of judicial review is explicitly granted by the Constitution; and the second, a plea that this just power be exercized on the basis of generally applicable principles, rather than the *ad hoc* whimsies of this moment or that. It is rather a pity, I think, that the "explicit provision" controversy should be wakened from its long and deserved repose. Professor Wechsler was obviously provoked to arouse it by the recent pronouncements of Professor Crosskey and Judge Hand, who have purported (in varying degree) to squeeze a *negative* inference from the language. Wechsler finds an affirmative inference in Articles III and VI, but here too some squeezing is required. The trouble with his contention, however, is not that it is logically faulty. The Framers *could* have based judicial review on the syllogism Wechsler draws from Articles III and VI, and I certainly agree, as against Crosskey, that the power is not precluded by the language. But it seems most implausible that the Framers thought of these slender phrases as performing such heavy work unaided: that they foresaw Wechsler's reasoning and thought it so inevitable that no clarifying sentence was needed. Is it not far more likely, as most scholars have now long agreed, that the Framers believed judicial review was naturally deducible from the nature of the Constitution, a "principle" as Marshall said, infusing the document rather than lurking in the implications of two scattered phrases? The Court's title to wield such authority is not less secure on this hypothesis, which is indeed backed by the leading contemporary advocates of judicial review; and it avoids what might be called the Crosskey-fallacy of imputing to the Framers (not to mention the ratifying conventions) all the syllogisms their ingenious posterity might devise.

But the argument for an explicit base in Articles III and VI is not in any event essential to Professor Wechsler's second main theme. So long as we agree that judicial review is a legitimate duty of our courts, we can accompany him to the point where he says that this duty should not be shirked and that "neutral principles" should govern its performance. There are those who profess difficulty in understanding what he means by a "neutral principle," but at least one of his meanings is plain enough: he wants the courts to use criteria "that can be framed and tested as an exercize of reason"—"reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved."

Now most of us would agree that this standard is one that courts, and especially the Supreme Court, should keep always in mind. The idea that our constitutional law should rest on reason is a glorious one, and the judiciary has a special obligation to honor it. Professor Wechsler's restatement of the aspiration is both timely and admirable, and I mean no disrespect when I say that the essay stops at the point where the major difficulties begin. Nevertheless such is the case. The first of these difficulties is simply this: that a perfectly-reasoned and fully-rounded system of jurisprudence is impossible, and thus *some* element of the *ad hoc* will always inhere in the judicial process. A judge who deceives himself on this point will enunciate principles prematurely before experience and the famous process of inclusion and exclusion have given his judgment time to ripen, and will find later that his court or his government is bound by fetters that cannot be tolerated. Yet as soon as this is conceded—that the *ad hoc* must play some part—the question arises of what that part should be, the horns of a dilemma emerge. If Wechsler is saying that the dilemma does not or should not exist, this, I believe, is wrong. If he is merely saying, as I suspect, that the judge should always strive to develop viable principles and that the modern Supreme Court has striven too little, has been too much given to the *ad hoc* answer, one's instinct is to agree, but to wonder how we can know that this much is too much (by what neutral principle can this judgment be made?).

The second difficulty is a related one, and it is perhaps sufficiently indicated by noting that Wechsler himself propounds no neutral principles to supply the need he describes. The point is of course that they are desperately hard to fabricate well. They tend to be either broadly permissive, like the present doctrine as to the scope of the commerce power, or unrealistically restrictive, like the doctrine of "indirect effects" in *Carter Coal*. It is easy to devise such neutral principles as these, but another matter to produce doctrines that will preserve the concept of constitutional limit on the one hand and take account of the world we live in on the other.

I do not mean to chide Professor Wechsler for failing to resolve these difficulties in the space of a single essay. But I do suggest that they confront anyone who aspires to continue the task of criticism and construction which he has so impressively begun.

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An Immortal Commonwealth. The Political Thought of James Harrington. By Charles Blitzer. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1960. Pp. xv, 344. $6.00.)

James Harrington is one of those political theorists who, though not of the first rank, have always a few enthusiastic admirers. This is particularly true at present, as he has become a central figure in the debate about the proper interpretation of the English Civil War. And, as Mr. Blitzer so rightly notes, the ideas that emerged during that period form one of the decisive episodes in the development of political theory. Since the last book on Harrington appeared almost fifty years ago, a thorough, new study relying on the considerable additions of more recent scholarship was badly needed, and Mr. Blitzer has, fortunately, given us an excellent one. For those who will never read Harrington this book will serve as a more than adequate substitute, while those familiar with his writings will gain renewed interest in him through this enlightening study.

Mr. Blitzer's chosen approach is that of the strict historian. He finds that the two most important questions to be posed to a political writer are, first: what light does he throw upon his age, and second: what has he contributed to the development of political theory? Now this method has its advantages and its weakness. Nowhere is its strength more evident than in Mr. Blitzer's account of the fortunes of the Harrington family, the life of his hero, and the circumstances under which *Oceana* was written. Thanks to his labors there is now no room left for uninformed disputes about these matters. Again, Mr. Blitzer deftly unscrambles the arguments and counter-arguments that Harrington exchanged with his contemporary detractors. However, Mr. Blitzer's refusal to speculate even in a modest way, or to go beyond Harrington's own terms of reference has its disadvantages. In discussing Harrington's attitude to Hobbes he brings up only those points that Harrington himself chose to raise. Yet a general comparison would have been very valuable in this case. Again, Mr. Blitzer's otherwise sound, if bare, listing of Harrington's sources deals only with authors whom Harrington named, even though it is made clear that he was not reliable in these matters, as shown in his use of Plato's *Laws*. Nevertheless, Mr. Blitzer never even mentions the most overwhelmingly important precursor, Polybius, whom Harrington certainly knew, either directly or through Machiavelli's *Discourses* which contain long passages virtually lifted from Polybius. In any case, no ancient author is more relevant to Harrington's notions on history or mixed government. It is not that Mr. Blitzer is not capable of analytical comparisons.

When he indulges in them he is invariably acute and apt, as in his remarks on Harrington's relations to the Puritans or to Burke, and in pointing to the medieval origin of Harrington's distinction between "empire" and "authority." It is simply regrettable that he does not display his evident skill more often. Moreover, if there is a lack of generalization, there may be an excess of detail, especially in the review of Harrington's institutional schemes. These were, to be sure, fascinating to Harrington's contemporaries, but are they to us? Since Mr. Blitzer thinks that Harrington's main contribution is to the theory of constitutional government, he is probably justified in his efforts. And he does succeed in making Harrington's devices more comprehensible than their inventor ever did.

However, it may well be that Harrington's general social theory alone remains relevant. While Mr. Blitzer's interpretations here are always very well reasoned, they inevitably remain open to discussion. Although he does not reduce Harrington to a junior Marx, he is clearly partial to Tawney's views. That is, he takes Harrington's use of the word, "necessary," to mean "historically inevitable." Consequently, he imputes to Harrington a conscious inner conflict between an economic determinism and a demand for political leadership and rational theory. If, however, as seems perfectly plausible, Harrington's "necessity" simply covers all the conditions essential for the establishment of a stable and enduring commonwealth, then these odd difficulties disappear. He simply believed that the economic situation was ripe for his republic, that the people of England inarticulately wanted it, and that it was supremely desirable. Only leadership and theory were required, and the latter he tried to supply. In fact, Mr. Blitzer notes Harrington's deep concern for stability, but he does not make anything of it. Another arguable point is whether Harrington's devotion to Harvey qualifies him for the role of a political scientist. After all, the fact is that Harvey described and explained, while Harrington's "political architecture" was designed to prescribe and persuade.

These remarks are not meant to belittle Mr. Blitzer's meticulous and able work, but rather to point to its very real and general interest. Happily, too, Mr. Blitzer's muse, unlike poor Harrington's, is not "rough," and he writes with clarity, wit and grace.

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Studies in Legal Philosophy. Edited by William R. Andersen. (Special issue of *Vanderbilt Law Review,* vol. 14, December 1960, No. 1. Pp. 450. $2.00.)

This symposium of lawyers and philosophers presents fifteen essays on leading figures and recent movements in the history of legal philosophy in a somewhat haphazard, though not meaningless, selection. It attempts to pass beyond a merely historical type of reviewing by putting the individual exegeses in the perspective of contemporary significance. While the job of drawing conclusions for the present time is actually, in good part, left to the reader, the volume offers many stimulating suggestions apt to influence further writing in the field.

The debate opens with a chapter on the functions of legal theory reprinted from Roscoe Pound's *Introduction to the Philosophy of Law* (rev. ed., 1954). After a quick journey through the history of legal philosophy Pound avers that we are in a "new stage of transition" and that we must "build rather than merely improve, . . . create rather than merely order"; for the jurist of tomorrow will stand in need of some "new philosophical theory of law," some "new philosophical conception of the end of law," some "new steadying philosophical conception to safeguard the general security, in order to make the law which we hand down to him achieve justice in his time and place."

Thus the sights are set very high. Too high, perhaps. At any rate, the answers given in the symposium do not fill that ambitious bill. They move around the theme of natural law, critically tearing down some claims pro and other claims contra, rejecting newly offered solutions, or pointing to neglected contributors to either side of the debate. But they hardly offer, nor indeed claim to offer, a new philosophical theory of law or a new philosophical conception of the ends of law.

Plato has customarily been referred to as a protagonist of natural-law teaching. Hans Kelsen, in a meticular polemic against recent publications by John Wild and J. P. Maguire, demonstrates convincingly that what Plato offers as natural law refers not to empirical nature but either to "ideal" nature or to divine law. This is a significant contribution to the interpretation of Plato seasoned with a number of telling quotations; but, of course, it does not follow that the divinity, if there is one, never expresses its moral will through nature.

Do we fare better in referring to Thomas Aquinas? Professor Thomas E. Davitt, S.J., presents Thomas' thoughts on natural law in a clear and sober manner. He celebrates their greatness but is equally honest in regretting that Thomas never got around to showing how reason can draw the right inferences from the observation of natural drives. If "the accent is put on 'reason' this can be wrongly interpreted and 'natural law' can come to mean what is common among 'reasonable' (or even civilized) people." He joins this reviewer's call for more candid and critical attempts to ascertain what the universal judgments of natural law actually are.

While these two papers warn against naive reliance on classical authorities in present-day natural-law teaching, others, contrariwise, attempt to show that neither can we rely on eminent positivistic authors for the *denial* of higher law, since their writings frequently reveal elements of natural-law thinking. John Austin presumably had only contempt for the natural-law school and saw the essence of law exclusively in the "command" of the superior; but, as Professor Samuel E. Stumpf rightly states, he always took moral factors for granted and indeed said explicitly the sovereign or judge should be guided by moral views. Stumpf believes he has thus proved Austin's doctrine to be false, because it failed to reflect Austin's own views correctly. This argument is not conclusive, however. Austin wanted to draw a sharp line between the two questions of what laws exist and what laws are good or bad. To make that distinction the way he did is logically possible; whether it is preferable, instead, to include the moral elements in the definition of law cannot be decided by reference to the fact that those who accept Austin's division want moral views heeded by the legislators, as Austin did. I would concede, however, that occasionally Austin's formulations are indeed not quite consistent—as where, for example, he affirms that law rests on what is "bottomed in the common nature of man." This is in conflict with his doctrine that any command of the sovereign is law regardless of its respect for the common nature of man.

The great German jurist, Rudolf von Jhering, also has often been described as a precursor of positivism and relativism on account of his break-through from a merely conceptual jurisprudence to the recognition of the fact that law always serves some "purpose." Professor Iredell Jenkins wants us to re-examine Jhering's work closely for its great merits as well as its limitations. The limitations he sees in the fact that Jhering, although he put so much emphasis on the purpose of the law, never came to grips with the decisive questions of what are those purposes, how are they determinable midst their relative and subjective elements, what are the purposes to which the laws "properly" are to be directed. Therefore Jhering's treatment remained "provincial," Jenkins says. However, his "convictions and intentions on these points were sound, and law will not rest on a secure and fruitful theoretical base until it returns to Jhering's questions and deals with them seriously." Thus Jhering too is remodeled from a precursor of positivism to a path blazer for natural law.

So it goes with Justice Holmes. Professor John C. H. Wu sees in Holmes the embodiment of the deepest spirit of the common law, which reflects some of the most salient features of the Anglo-Saxon mind: the predilection for the concrete, the aversion to speculation, the practical sense of the useful, the reliance on experience, the view of law as an integral part of life, instinctive response to new values and novel situations. Yet Wu complains that Holmes failed—did he?—to see the importance of Christianity in his own thinking. Holmes' arguments were deeply permeated with the Christian spirit, especially with the Golden Rule; indeed, Wu insists that Holmes fundamentally thought in the spirit of Thomas and the modern Encyclicae. So we are left with the inference, although not literally drawn by Wu himself, that after all this great opponent of natural law too was in fact its apostle.

How about Dewey? It should not have been too difficult to point out that he too harbored unexpressed moral postulates along with his optimistic belief in progress, intelligence, and the perfectability of man. But Professor Jay Wesley Murphy did not choose to pursue this line. He concentrates his well documented presentation on Dewey's doctrine that morals and values are to be judged not from abstractions but from the concrete situation and from the consequences of probable alternatives of action. Murphy rightly emphasizes the strong points in Dewey's position; but he seems to overlook, as did Dewey himself, its limitations. After listing all the consequences of alternative procedures the moral question, which consequences are preferable, still remains.

While the symposium is quite effective in revealing elements of a latent belief in higher law in some of its presumptive opponents, it is not equally successful in presenting *overt* natural-law doctrines. The chief characteristic of American thought, writes Huntington Cairns, is its "antimetaphysical bias." Morris R. Cohen was one of the few who did not share that bias. He rather called himself an idealist "in the Platonic sense, according to which ideas, ideals, or abstract universals are the conditions of real existence, and not mere fictions of the human mind." He even boasted of having "no respect for experience, induction, the dynamic, evolution, behaviorism, and psychoanalysis." But he had a profound faith in philosophy. Cairns calls him "the chief critical philosopher the United States has known," and the foremost representative of the classical view that general principles operate in nature. Cairns thinks it remarkable that, nevertheless, Cohen shares with his antagonist Dewey the distinction of being "the most popularly influential of contemporary thinkers." Were the two really so very different regarding their views on moral questions? Cohen's belief that moral principles can be tested by their consequences is, in principle, pretty close to Dewey's teachings. Like Dewey and most others who hold that view Cohen presupposes the validity of some unverified standard—either hedonistic or social—by which the test proceeds. Cohen's own standard was the "good life." Cairns says that Cohen's views may seem to both idealists and empiricists an "unduly naive treatment of a vastly difficult problem," but he praises it as a "serious effort to meet the concrete requirements of the legal order" for, although not a lawyer, Cohen contributed to legal theory through his philosophy and logic.

More outspoken on the metaphysical side was the late Elija Jordan. Professor Andrew J. Rock speaks of him as "one of the most original social and legal philosophers in the history of American thought" (p. 263) but, relying chiefly on literal quotations, he has not been quite successful in translating Jordan's basic philosophical concepts into a more generally comprehensible and acceptable language. Jordan's theory of the corporate nature of man and of his salvation through the corporate mind or the "institutionalized mind moralized" seems to me—but I may be wrong— caught between the Scylla of triviality and the Charybdis of a vague mysticism. Jordan was certainly original among American philosophers also in his critical attitude toward political democracy, which he accused of the "false assumption that the 'people' can think speculatively or delegate this capacity to others"; he adopted the Platonic proposal of the philosopher-king and of legislation by an intellectual elite. The sensible American objection is that we first want to know how we can be sure to get the right type of elite or philosophic Czar and how we can get rid of the wrong ones.

Thus the harvest of the symposium in overt metaphysics is not exactly rich and convincing. But neither is the outcome conclusive on the side of overt positivistic and realtivistic ideas. There is a short but clear presentation of Kelsen's pure theory of law by Professor Reginald Parker. He defends the pure theory against the two most frequent attacks that it is devoid of real life and that it fosters amorality by treating all legal systems on the same level. Parker's answers are good as far as they go, restoring respect for the subjective motives of the pure theorists and the objective meaning of their teaching. But he fails to discuss the crucial problem—legal validity of outrageous legislation not controlled by written constitutions.

"American Legal Realism in Retrospect" is reviewed by Professor Hessel E. Yntema, who retraces its origin and development, appraises its considerable merits, and analyzes its limitations. Treating law as a practical art rather than a science, and concentrating on place and time of the individual process, Legal Realism lost the faculty of distinguishing trivia from aspects of more general import; it disregarded the common elements in the judicial process, the historical perspective, comparison with other countries, and with all this the humanistic aspects of law, for whose understanding, however, it prepared the way. Yntema thinks the scene is brightening because of current endeavors in American law schools to extend research and interest in international and foreign law.

Julius Stone and G. Tarello (Genoa) examine the interrelation between "Justice, Language and Communication." After a short if pointed analysis of the various meanings of justice in ordinary language, the chief part of their article turns on a devastating critique of Professor Chaim Perelman's writings, especially *De la Justice* (1945). Perelman looks for the common elements in all ideas of justice and thinks that he finds them in the postulate that all cases which belong to the same class should be treated equally. Drs. Stone and Torello show correctly that this leaves out all the *substantive* essentials in the various concepts of justice. This critique is valid. But it gets stuck in the pure negative. Neither Perelman himself nor his critics pursue the basic question to the point of examining whether, perhaps, in all ideas of justice there also are some substantive universals, such as postulates of truth or veracity, respect for the necessities of nature, and absence of arbitrariness in its various forms. I have elsewhere tried to show the importance of this type of research.

The most provocative contribution is by Professor Thomas A. Cowan on Nietzsche, the most heartwarming—and also one of the best balanced—by Professor Wolfgang Friedmann on Radbruch. Cowan wants us to open our minds to Nietzsche, because he has a great deal to say on the interrelation of science and morals and is "both absolutely honest and also highly talented" (p. 166). Calling the law of nature a "phrase of superstition" Nietzsche wanted to apply the method of science to morality, and in order to do so thoroughly, to *experiment* with morality, with ends and with goals. The criminal who is "worthy of his crime" is to Nietzsche a moral experimenter under the most appalling odds. Spicing his analysis with fascinating quotations from Nietzsche's various works and referring to the fathers of the U. S. Constitution as criminals that became the beloved heroes of their country, Cowan asks, "can we permit, nay insist upon moral experimentation by the individual? . . . Can we envisage a legal system so advanced that it can find a place for moral experiments in *action*?" He evades a clear yes or no, nor does he—in the fashion of John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*—examine the limits that must be set to moral experimentation. But he is outspoken in his request that we "must investigate, question and test even our most fundamental beliefs." The legal community, he guesses, will be the least likely to be shocked if moral experimentation be permitted, because the legal process has long become more intellectualized than science. Cowan also discusses Nietzsche's "will to power," which, he says, was merely meant as a description of nature, not as a moral recommendation, and therefore puts Nietzsche close to the psychologies of Alfred Adler and C. G. Jung—a "psychoanalyst before psychoanalysis."

Gustav Radbruch's importance for legal philosophy has become clearer to American students during the last several years. Professor Friedmann's beautifully written sketch of Radbruch's life and personality emphasizes the manifold tensions that characterized his development: between bourgeois and humanitarian dedication; between contemplation and action; between his artistic and his intellectual temperament; between skepticism and faith. Friedmann outlines Radbruch's relativism—which he rightly states was merely scientific in character—and likewise Radbruch's gropings, after Hitler's ascendancy, for limitations of relativity, which led him "some way toward the acceptance of a 'higher law' doctrine of the kind he had rejected all life." Thus Radbruch's work "ends with a question mark." But his work is always alive. "Every page links thought and life, generalizations and concrete illustrations. Art, poetry, history and philosophy all are linked with legal ideas in a style whose lucid simplicity is probably unmatched in the history of legal philosophy." No other book in legal history has "as poignantly and as beautifully translated the inevitable antinomies of life into legal values as Radbruch's *Rechtsphilosophie*." Fortunately Dr. Friedmann did not know my broadly parallel if slightly more critical analysis of Radbruch, which had just appeared when the present symposium got under way; otherwise he might have been drawn into a triangular polemic and we then would not now have this well-rounded nonpolemical appraisal of the great jurist from his hand. I do not consider the defeatist note necessary on which Friedmann concludes, regarding Radbruch's final conversion to natural law. A clear distinction between scienctific and juridical validity could help us, I believe. Scientifically the earlier Radbruch was right, juridically, the later.

The symposium of *Vanderbilt Law Review* is an indispensable document for any serious study of the present stage of legal and political philosophy.

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The World of C. Wright Mills. BY HERBERT APTHEKER. (New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1960. Pp. 128. paper-bound. $1.65.)

The "world" of Mills as circumscribed by Aptheker consists of only three of his ten published books—*The Power Elite, The Causes of World War Three,* and *The Sociological Imagination.* Dr. Aptheker passes over the earlier, more professional works, and he was not able, unfortunately, to appraise *Listen, Yankee,* which had not yet appeared. As one could predict of an outstanding Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist theoretician like Dr. Aptheker, he is critical of Mills's "bourgeois" shortcomings. "Above all, Mills will have to master Lenin"; and, in another context, the omission of Lenin is "fatal to both diagnosis and suggested treatment." On another level, Aptheker is distressed by Mills's "certain excessiveness of expression that goes beyond the permissible bounds of even heated debate"; his "deliberately shocking prose" that, strictly speaking, "is not true"; his "bold and courageous and on the whole salutary" but "somewhat undifferentiated" animadversions; his verbal victories "scored somewhat too easily," at the cost of accuracy and fairness. Mills's bludgeoning style has been criticized before; some professional colleagues have termed him the hit-and-run driver of American sociology. But to have a Communist caution him against his tendency to exaggerate is still a novelty—and for the reader, if not for Mills, a delightful one.

On the whole, however, Dr. Aptheker approves of Professor Mills. He likes his "splendid dedication to humanism"! He agrees with the pronouncement that Mills is "the most imaginative and brilliant of all the sociologists writing from American universities." Indeed, Mills has advanced far enough on his own to be able to aspire to membership in the Leninist elite. "One can argue about the best methods and forms and programs for political action," Aptheker suggests, "and I am urging Professor Mills to join in this effort." How is it that Mills, who for all his acerbic radicalism was once unequivocally anti-Communist, must now suffer the indignity of this invitation? He has earned it, as one can see by tracing his development through the three books that Aptheker has chosen to discuss.

The main theme of *The Power Elite* is that democracy in the United States is a sham. All really significant decisions are made by an interlocking "elite" of business, political, and military leaders; or, more precisely, many events happen without being willed, but "insofar as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them." This conception is reminiscent of the Sorelian tradition, but it derives more, I believe, from the old populist outcry against Wall Street and Washington. Mills is Texas-bred, and he has repeatedly expressed a nostalgic admiration for the muckrakers, who attacked social evils with trenchant prose and simplistic theories. Aptheker offers two criticisms of the thesis of *The Power Elite*, both of which I find telling. The Marxist theory of the class struggle, for all its inadequacy as a tool with which to analyze present-day American society, is still better than Mills's elastically defined elite. And Aptheker does not agree that the mass of the American people is powerless, or that in a typical election the voting public sees "no issues at all." This is, in his opinion, a "grossly excessive and substantively wrong estimate." Aptheker's approbation of the book, that is to say, is based less on the acuity of its analysis than on its political effect: those who accept the doctrine that democracy is fraudulent are by that fact more likely to accept the guidance of a totalitarian party.

The decisions that Mills uses to exemplify the elite's power are almost all in foreign policy, which is, one must remember, the legitimate province of the President and his advisers. The theme is continued in *The Causes of World War Three*, which matches the American elite with one in the Soviet Union. Understandably, Aptheker objects to this equating of the two societies, and he is able to use Mills's words to argue the point. "All private profit," Mills wrote, "must be taken out of the preparation of war in the U. S. economy"; but if this is an important cause of war, then the Soviet Union is blameless. As Irving Howe pointed out in the independent socialist journal *Dissent* (Spring and Summer 1959), the book never specifies the "causes" of world conflict, whether capitalist profits, or nationalism, or expansionist Communism, or whatever. Mills's analysis, again, echoes old-fashioned populist sentiments; and its main value to Communists, once again, is that this total denigration of democratic institutions, of democratic leaders, softens up the public for the positive support of totalitarianism.

By "the sociological imagination" Mills means the ability to relate personal troubles to the structure of the specific society in which they occur. In his view neither the "grand theorists" (exemplified by Talcott Parsons) nor the "abstracted empiricists" (such as Paul Lazarsfeld) are concerned with social issues: they merely reflect, and thus help to validate, the values of capitalist America. Aptheker finds his denunciation too sweeping, and points to himself, Victor Perlo, Paul Baran, and similar types as exceptions to it. Don't you see, he asks Mills in effect, that we Communists and near-Communists and fellow-travelers have been doing what you demand of the whole sociological profession? We analyze everything from the Congo crisis to juvenile delinquency as the effect of "the larger historical scene." If that is what you deem to be necessary and good, why not join us?

By any reasonable definition of the term, Mills is one of the power elite he has tried to delineate. Though somewhat isolated from his colleagues, he is still a professor at Columbia, which in sociology is one of the leading institutions in the country; he publishes incessantly in a wide variety of important periodicals (in particular, the editor of the *Sunday Times* book review section apparently knows of no other sociologist); through book clubs and general sales, he speaks to a wide audience both in this country and abroad. What a tragedy that a man with genuine gifts and such opportunities should find no better use for them than to attack his society, his profession, really himself, so intransigently as to give support, first implicit but in the last years increasingly direct, to the prime horror of our world.

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Germany Between Two Worlds, BY GERALD FREUND. (New York: Harcourt, Brace. 1961. Pp. xx., 296. $5.75.)

Gerald Freund, formerly an assistant to George Kennan and known for his study of German-Russian relations in the inter-war period, here relates the internal dynamics of West German politics to foreign policy alternatives, with special emphasis on the implications of the nuclear arming of the *Bundeswehr* for the problem of reunification. His book differs from earlier studies like those by Speier and Davison and Deutsch and Edinger in that it subordinates methodology and "objectivity" so as to allow the author to bring out certain trends which he believes to be implicit in the course of recent events. His evaluation is shaped by seeing the present situation in historical perspective and also by his belief that the "national interest" will in the end be the prevailing factor shaping West German policy.

While his survey of the contemporary West German scene (and the way it is perceived from abroad) covers much well-trodden ground, Freund makes some provocative contributions. Thus, in the preface, he presents a short essay on the influence of emigrants, publicists and "old Bonn hands" on the reshaping of the American image of Germany which could serve as a point of departure for a fascinating thesis. Later he makes some challenging points on the subject of the Germans' "unbewaeltigte Vergangenheit," his position being that the prevailing desire to repress and forget is not necessarily unhealthy. This reviewer would go along with him only part way on this theme, and other evaluations are similarly subject to argument. Thus one can disagree with Freund's description of the German press and with his presentation of some aspects of the political party picture and intra-party relationships.

For many American readers the most fascinating part of Freund's book may lie in the picture he gives of the behind-the-scenes eye-gouging which goes on among Bonn's bureaucrats and restive politicians. His presentation apparently rests heavily on information derived from officials and ex-officials of the *Auswaertige Amt* who are very critical of the "Adenauer line." Like these "outsiders," as much out of favor in the Adenauer-anointed upper reaches of their own ministry as in the Defense Ministry and other key points of power, Freund denounces the futility of attempts to "bundle the Federal Republic into an integrated West European community" and bemoans the failure of the Dulles-Adenauer diplomacy to alleviate the "continuing anguish of partition."

In good part thanks to his historical perspective, Freund succeeds in tearing himself away from the prevailing inability to calculate beyond the Adenauer period. His projection is not optimistic. Viewing NATO encouragement to German rearmament with great disfavor (indications of this include repeated "Freudian slips" through which German military expenditures are given in millions of *Deutschmark* when they clearly should read billions), the author anticipates with alarm the political consequences of a nuclear-armed German military machine. He fears that Franz Josef Strauss, building on his control of a dynamic military establishment, his encouragement of a powerful German armaments industry, and an alliance with industrialists, expellee groups and other advocates of an "active Eastern policy," will not only bully his way to the Chancellorship but initiate a revisionist policy once he consolidates his power.

Questioning as he does the durability of West German ties to the Atlantic alliance, Freund believes that "once they become a viable nuclear power the Germans cannot, no matter how often they profess loyalty to their allies, subordinate their interests to those of others." He sees Bonn's refusal to recognize the Oder-Neisse line and to establish relations with Poland as a means of holding out for a future bilateral German-Russian settlement in which the Germans would purchase unity from the Soviets at the expense of the East European nations, while leaving NATO to shift for itself. He argues for a policy of disengagement which would reduce the likelihood of such a development. The U. S. should thus reconcile itself to West German withdrawal from NATO, agree to a reciprocal withdrawal of NATO and Soviet troops from Central Europe, and encourage an arms and troop level freeze in both German states. For the West Germans he recommends recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, closer relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the overcoming of inhibitions toward establishing closer cultural, economic and even political relations with East Germany.

Freund's devotion to the national interest theory leads him to forego discussion of such trends as that which has led to the SPD's change of front toward NATO, and to discount the present German state of mind which was well brought out in a recent poll of university students. It showed that while 79% of the students thought that there was *some* cause or ideal worth dying for, only 6% believed that the German *Vaterland* fitted the bill. Such attitudes might indeed be changed if a new leadership were to reverse the rudder. But while fuelling our distrust of the ambiguous figure of Strauss and of the political ambitions of the power elite emerging from German rearmament, Freund does not really back up his conjectures with sufficient amounts of concrete evidence. However, even those who will not go along with his proposals for reciprocal disengagement will perhaps be swayed to accept the view that both Western and German interests warrant de-emphasizing the nuclear arming of West German troops.

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Ordeal in Algeria. BY RICHARD AND JOAN BRACE. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. 1960. Pp. xi, 453. $6.75.)

Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution. BY JOAN GILLESPIE. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1960. Pp. xiv, 208. $6.75.)

North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood. BY LORNA HAHN. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. Pp. x, 264. $6.00.)

These books fill important gaps in the available literature on North Africa, but they are also testimony to the large amount of research that remains to be done. Until recently scholarly inquiry in the Maghrib was dominated by French scholars, who were discouraged from probing too deeply into political questions, and a few Arab scholars, whose efforts were disrupted by the turbulent events of the area. American scholars, rather like diplomats, seem to have neglected a region where all appeared to be going smoothly. Our negligence is curious for two reasons. Historically the Maghrib has had a profound impact on European culture, comparable perhaps to the much more carefully studied impact of the Ottoman Empire. Politically the Maghrib has become, and unfortunately remains, one of the major points of violent conflict in the modern world. It is perhaps fitting that the first books on the region in English should be largely concerned with the Algerian war, even though wars are notorious for their inability to resolve human problems and their tendency to distort human judgment.

Despite the fact that these books have serious shortcomings, each makes a particular kind of contribution to our understanding of North Africa, demonstrating a particular approach to particular problems in the analysis of Maghribi politics. Richard and Joan Brace have underscored the close relation of Algerian and French politics. Few problems of political development in new nations can be meaningfully studied apart from the European impact, and the Brace volume provides a detailed account of how the Algerian war preoccupied French politicians even before the crises associated with the de Gaulle regime. An account of the efforts of Mollet, Gaillard and Bourges-Maurnoury helps put France's plight into historical perspective. The Braces' familiarity with French sources is reflected in their footnotes, and also in their notation of the importance of the Indochinese adventure to both Algerians and French. They are the only authors of the group to suggest Mao's psychological imprint on both revolutionary and paratrooper. Nevertheless, given the Braces' intentions, it is disappointing to see so much space, nearly half the book, devoted to a highly chronological account of the Fifth Republic's grappling with the problem. The history of the Algerian war must have deeper roots and will certainly need much more investigation, although the Braces have done a very good job of bringing together available information.

The Gillespie volume approaches the Algerian war with more discipline by focusing on the revolutionary (or in French terms, rebellious) organization. The late Joan Gillespie faced many of the same limitations of acquiring reliable data and verifying French accounts that the other authors undoubtedly faced, but she was much more successful because she dealt with a single problem. In her book, the phases of the war are clearly delimited in terms of the F.L.N.'s own organizational development, which has had to respond to changes in French politics and its own growing sphere of activity. Careful attention is given to the differences among Algerian leaders and to the structure of their organization. The strategy of the war is traced largely in reference to the combat itself, which seems to be the most successful method of inquiry so long as the charges and countercharges cannot be examined in the light of documentary evidence. There are some shortcomings, for example the failure to examine why the Algerian leaders remained so confused in the late 1940's when other North African leaders were busily, if not always effectively, preparing for the struggle for independence. Of the three books, however, Miss Gillespie's has given us the best organized account of the war as a revolution, and it is to be regretted that her premature death denies us future benefit from her insight into the revolutionary situation.

Lorna Hahn's approach is certainly the most ambitious, for she proceeds to trace the development of all three independence movements in North Africa. (It should perhaps be noted that most Lybians also consider themselves North Africans as opposed to Middle Easterners, and will probably participate in any future North African confederation.) She is less concerned with the relation of French politics to Maghribi events and with the development of the F.L.N. organization. Although the Gillespie volume touches on analytical points in discussing the Algerian revolution, Mrs. Hahn confronts herself with a more complex problem. By doing so she is in need of a more highly developed framework of analysis, a need which she fills most frequently by comparing leaders and the irremovable factors of their environment. Although it would have been difficult to trace all the events her book encompasses and also seek more satisfying explanations, one is reluctant to accept leadership analyses as sufficient for the solution of some of the more complex problems raised in the book, especially in those chapters dealing with post-revolutionary events. However, Mrs. Hahn has very profitably used her more intimate knowledge of Tunisian affairs to enlarge our knowledge of personal differences in that country, especially on the roles played by Mongi Slim and Bahi Ladgham. There are some points, such as the Bey's appeal for French support in early 1956, which need documentation. Even so, the Hahn volume is the most balanced account of recent politics in the area as a whole.

The surprising thing about all these volumes is how little material they give the reader for more general evaluations of North African problems. Mrs. Hahn has only three short (10 pages or less) background chapters. Miss Gillespie has a short, but quite good, chapter on circumstances in Algeria, and Mr. and Mrs. Brace give only a section of the first chapter to social conditions in Algeria. Since the framework of analysis does little to highlight more general social and economic factors in other contexts, the volumes sometimes risk becoming a chronology, and, moreover, ones that are heavily dependent on French sources. Questions might also be raised about the authors' care with the details of the books. Miss Gillespie has the best bibliography, and some very useful maps of how the F.L.N.'s *wilaya* have grown. The Braces provide a glossary, and a rough table of *wilaya* commanders in 1954, which is unfortunately not carried through to 1960. Mrs. Hahn has only a very short bibliography, but gives the reader some very welcome biographical sketches. In an area that has only recently come to the attention of American scholars, there is particular need for more basic data and for more care in preparing the way for supplementary, more detailed investigations. These books are helpful as introductory works, and as such it is to be hoped that they will lead more scholars to the area and stimulate more reflection on the problems of political change found in the Maghrib.

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Goals for Americans, Comprising The Report of the President's Commission on National Goals and Chapters Submitted for the Consideration of the Commission. Administered by The American Assembly, Columbia University. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: A Spectrum Book, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1960. Pp. xi, 372. $1.00.)

The President's Commission on National Goals made its Report to President Eisenhower, November 16, 1960. The Commission had been conceived as a non-partisan, non-governmental body, appointed "to develop a broad outline of coordinated national policies and programs" and to "set up a series of goals in various areas of national activity." The eleven distinguished citizens who participated in this high-level assignment were: Henry M. Wriston, Chairman; Frank Pace, Jr.; Erwin D. Canham; James B. Conant; Colgate W. Darden, Jr.; Crawford H. Greenewalt; Alfred Gruenther; Learned Hand; Clark Kerr; James R. Killian, Jr.; and George Meany. The American Assembly, Columbia University, administered the project and arranged for its private support through several foundations.

Though the members of the Committee represented very different sectors of the national life and held quite various points of view, all of them were highly qualified publicists skilled in group-think. Commissioned to produce "Goals for Americans," they asked the counsel of approximately 100 experts, and out of this plural background they arrived at an impressive consensus. The Report itself is relatively brief, 23 pages, with additional statements by individual members, adding to a total of 31 pages. Part I deals with "Goals at Home"; Part II with "Goals Abroad"; and Part III with "A Financial Accounting."

"Goals at Home" offers something for everyone: primary concern for the individual; equal rights for all without regard to race, religion, or sex; education strengthened at every level; arts and sciences advanced on every front; maximum economic growth, full employment, improved climate for new investment; technological changes to up-grade our defense preparations; government help for farmers including price supports; better living conditions, slum clearance, urban renewal programs and government-assisted housing; more hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes; more doctors and nurses, and extension of medical insurance through private and public agencies.

As to "Goals Abroad"—"The basic foreign policy of the United States should be the preservation of its own independence and free institutions." We should cooperate with the rest of the world that shares our ideals and interests and we should join in aiding the underdeveloped countries of the world. We must beware of the dangers of militant communism and maintain whatever deterrent force is necessary to protect us from surprise attack or even limited aggression. At the same time, we should try to reduce tensions in the world, stand ready to negotiate, and be willing to disarm, with safeguards. As to "A Financial Accounting"—"a substantial reform of the tax system is essential, whether public expenditures must be increased or can be reduced." The Committee hazards no figures on the expenditures that may be necessary but concludes that "the levels of public spending we would need to realize the recommendations of this Report are attainable."

Though the Report did not appear until after the election of President Kenndey, it is not a lame-duck document. It summons every American "to extraordinary personal responsibility, sustained effort, and sacrifice." It is imbued with the conventional wisdom, yet too well written to sound platitudinous. It speaks out boldly and hedges carefully. It prefers free enterprise but encourages government participation and supports government regulation. The economy should grow at a rate to meet our needs for defense, for education, for a rising standard of living, and for foreign aid, but "there is no merit in a statistical race with the Communist nations." Individualism is underscored but government services must be extended. The federal government must take on many new obligations, in education, housing, transportation, etc., but federalism must develop in the pattern of shared powers with the States and local governments. The controversy within the Committee is plain to read between the lines.

The *Report* reached consensus only in terms of aspirations. Seven members of the Committee felt impelled to make additional statements in which they expressed dissent or views omitted from the over-all statement. On the goal of "Equality," Colgate Darden, former Governor of Virginia, was disturbed by the suggestion that the federal government might deny funds to universities, hospitals, airports and federal housing programs which practice racial discrimination. Crawford H. Greenewalt, President of E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, was alarmed by the projected unprecedented increases in government expenditures over the next decade and was generally dissatisfied with the sections on economic growth, foreign trade, and tax policies. Clark Kerr, President of the University of California, felt that the Committee should have been more explicit in setting a timetable for ending discrimination in education by 1970. George Meany, President AFL-CIO, complained that the Report "speaks firmly and positively on goals . . . only timidly on methods for attaining them."

As a basis for working out the general statements of the Report, the Committee asked fourteen men and women of acknowledged competence to write essays on pertinent topics. These essays vary in professional interest and in literary quality. The most eloquent is the first essay in the collection, by Henry M. Wriston, Chairman of the Commission, who celebrates the role of The Individual with a paraphrase in prose of Walt Whitman's poem, "I swear nothing is good to me now that ignores individuals."

Clinton Rossiter's essay on "The Democratic Process," as one might expect, is seeded in the Jeffersonian tradition—"civilized discussion" and "the techniques of reason." His approach becomes increasingly hortatory as he develops "the imperative of responsibility," not only in the public government but in private governments, in trade and professional associations, churches, unions, community projects "and perhaps even in corporations and universities." As he sees it, the solution to most problems in American democracy is personal rather than institutional. But, if American democracy in the twentieth century is to "act for all mankind," we shall have to offer a more positive program of human rights than Rossiter here envisages.

From the professional point of view, Morton Grodzins' essay on "The Federal System" is especially noteworthy. This essay, developed out of research carried out in the Federalism workshop of the University of Chicago, develops the thesis of "shared functions." Grodzins observes that the American federal system has never been a system of separated governmental activities. The chaos of party process has permitted state and local governments and private interest groups to impinge heavily upon the national government, in legislation and in administration. To balance the centrifugal forces of domestic politics he urges the centripetal force of strong presidential leadership.

Herbert Stein and Edward F. Dennis present an analytical essay on "Economic Growth," setting out various alternatives. They refuse to go along with their colleagues in elevating their topic to a "national goal." "There is a limit to the number of goals that the American people or any people can pursue, the number of crusades they can engage in. . . . We need not feel guilty of negativism or passivity if we decide that accelerating growth is not one of our most critical needs."

Both the Report and the Essays were designed for public discussion and for this purpose they are reasonably adequate. If, however, we compare the Report to the Preamble of the Constitution and the Essays to *The Federalist*, the Founding Fathers seem to us more succinct in their statement of goals, more profound in their rationale, and withal more enduringly persuasive.

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Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization. BY THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. xiv, 512. $10.00.)

This volume is the most significant symposium which has ever appeared in the field of public finance. The papers, which, with a few exceptions, reach a very high level of performance, were presented at a conference sponsored by the Universities—National Bureau Committee for Economic Research in Charlottesville in 1959. Three of the eleven papers are largely empirical in character, while the others are primarily analytical, stressing the decision making process in the determination of the scope of the governmental sector of the economy, as a step toward bridging the gap between formal theory of governmental decision making and day to day determination of government policy. The papers are followed by commentaries by the discussants.

The first two papers by G. Colm-M. Helzner and D. Netzer attempt to predict government expenditure levels in 1970. The former paper stresses the relatively greater state-local expansion and the inadequacy of state-local revenues, relative to the Federal position. Netzer, however, with predictions that state-local expenditures will roughly double between 1957 and 1970, concludes that the revenues of these units will be adequate, with moderate tax increases, and believes that the Federal government will be more hard pressed because of rising defense spending. His predictions are regarded as too conservative by the discussants, who stress the pressures leading to greater state-local activities.

The next four papers, which cover over 200 pages, are all related to inter-governmental fiscal questions. C. M. Tiebout discusses decentralization of government functions in terms of the criterion of economic efficiency, with little attention to political aspects. He stresses his previous thesis, that attainment of optimum levels of local government activities is facilitated by movement of persons to those localities whose policies they prefer. There are interesting comments on how high-income-tax "colonies" seek to keep out lower income families. R. A. Musgrave discusses alternative approaches to the problem of equalization of fiscal capacities of the states in a Federal system, stressing the conflict between equalization and state incentives. His basic philosophy is the desirability of placing the various states in a more or less equal fiscal position without destroying their incentive or their autonomy. The Ecker-Racz—Labowitz paper is a long review of federal-state-local fiscal relations, with a detailed discussion of state tax systems, relative to federal; state-local borrowing; the grant programs; and limited suggestions for improvement of the relative state-local position. The prime usefulness of the paper is in providing a thorough current summary of the situation. The final paper in this group, by J. Margolis, resumes the analytical approach, providing a very penetrating and path-breaking discussion of the problems and solutions of metropolitan area finance. The difficulties in obtaining agreement are stressed, and the thesis developed that with conflicting interests, "package deals" can more easily win popular approval than additional expenditures on particular functions. Thus the development of special one-function districts and the existence of numerous separate municipal governments in metropolitan areas are seen as major aggravators of the problem. The greater recognition of self-interest aspects at the local level is a further obstacle; national activities thus are overexpanded relative to local. The inherent problem is not an inadequacy of local tax resources but an inability to mobilize them in support of functions best performed locally.

The last five papers are centered specifically on the question of decision making in government. The important Lindblom contribution diverges sharply from the traditional philosophy of optimum budgeting principles. He argues that no over-all deliberate coordination of budget policy is possible because of complexities and the limitation of the human mind. Instead, he argues, satisfactory budgeting can be obtained by "partisan mutual adjustment"; that is, through the impact of conflicting pressure groups. Thus fractionalization of budget making is preferable to a unified single budget decision.

The McKean paper stresses the need for presentation of budget data by function rather than object, and Burkhead in his commentary reviews the progress which has been made in this direction. A. Enthoven and H. S. Rowan present a very extensive paper on defense budgeting, stressing the desirability of decentralization, of non-unification of the armed forces in the interest of experimentation, and the need to get away from the usual "absolute need" and "as much as we can afford" approaches to defense budgeting. They likewise note the advantage of bargaining of diverse interests in budgeting, but point out biases and other difficulties. And, like McKean, they stress the need for budgeting in terms of outputs and objectives, rather than inputs.

The Eckstein paper is a detailed review of the question of decision making, primarily with reference to water resources, at a high level of abstraction. He reviews current economic welfare theory, the determination of the objective in resource planning, the constraints, and the significance of risk and uncertainty for decision making. Emphasis is placed on the role of the interest rate, and the need for use of a social preference rate lower than the market rate. Recent work in the field of project evaluation is reviewed in some detail.

One other paper, that by O. H. Brownlee, is concerned with the choice between taxes and user charges. He favors some increase in the latter, particularly to finance higher education, which he assumes to have no benefits other than to the recipients.

Various sections of this volume will appeal to persons with different interests, but in general the volume as a whole is indispensable reading for the economist and political scientist interested in the problem of decision making in government, and some sections should leave a permanent imprint on the development of the science of public finance.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

The Foundations of Jacques Maritain's Political Philosophy. By Hwa Yol Jung. (Gainesville: University of Florida Monographs, Social Sciences, Number 7, Summer 1960. p. 65. $2.00.)

This is a commendable effort to understand the political philosophy of Jacques Maritain, but one needs a wealth of philosophical background to attempt such a task. Properly enough, Mr. Jung begins with one of Maritain's most difficult and profound works, *Degrees of Knowledge.* In the chapter on the "Speculative Order," Mr. Jung quotes liberally from Maritain's work, but the reader is not altogether impressed with the author's comprehension of Maritain's philosophy. One would have to have a firm grasp of all of Maritain's work to substantiate a statement such as "one begins to doubt that Thomism alone can establish a union of metaphysics and science in the modern world. It appears that the very history of modern science and of philosophy shows some evidence to the contrary." We are left to guess the rest—what evidence, how much evidence, and whose evidence. Maritain himself would indeed be surprised by the following: "Although in metaphysics Maritain establishes a unity of the speculative order of knowledge, his philosophical system terminates in theology. It is in this respect that he is a theologian rather than a philosopher." In other words, any author who brings theology into his work or touches upon this field or terminates his speculation there is a theologian. Not a few philosophers become theologians with this measure of their work—Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, etc., etc.

Wherever Mr. Jung finds a special speculative conclusion difficult of application, he is evidently willing to throw away the conclusion. So, "there is an unbridgeable gap between an abstract theoretical system and practical, concrete problems as they occur in human affairs." How useless has been the work of all the political philosophers throughout the ages! Later on, Mr. Jung modifies this hopeless view, and we find that the "lacuna between reason and experience, theory and practice, thought and action, and the abstract and the concrete is a problem in the entire area of human knowledge and action." More correctly, then, the "gap" is not "unbridgeable" but a "problem."

The term common good is not easy of complete understanding, and there are differences among philosophers who use it, but it has been left for Mr. Jung to conclude that it means tyranny and absolutism. "However one may attempt to understand the common good as a moral term, it is certainly a type of moral absolutism." He continues, therefore: "Whether absolutism is political or moral, any type of absolutism or dogmatism endangers not only the philosophical foundation but also the working formula of a democratic society." In support of this, Mr. Jung summons the testimony of Frankel, Kelsen, Dewey, Hook, and Barzun. Now the ordinary interpretation of the term common good is that in many ways people are the same in their needs and capacities. The common good, the end or purpose of the political order and its agent the government means that these needs and capacities must be the guide for the action of the state. The state, in other words, must serve men's needs and the serving of these needs for all is of a higher order than the care of the immediate needs of one or a few. This does not appear to be a terrible "absolutism." If Mr. Jung wishes to substitute general welfare for common good, all well and good. Then, however, let him contemplate the danger of that term as used in the United States Constitution. Mr. Jung's fear of "any type of absolutism or dogmatism" leaves him without any foundation for his own democratic beliefs. Is he willing to accept a pure relativism, which leaves no sound basis for democracy itself? Like Mussolini, he might claim that democracy was good for the nineteenth century but that we have walked over its "putrid corpse." Would it not be dangerous to be dogmatic about any absolute value in democracy itself? Or may one claim any imperatives (dogmas) for man even in the protection of his life and freedom? Mr. Jung should be aware of the sheer intellectual anarchy of such a point of view.

As to Maritain's views on church and state, we find that once again Mr. Jung fears a theory because of the difficulty of its application. He contends that "it would be difficult to determine what belongs to the spiritual and what belongs to the temporal spheres in a complex political society of men." Do we then abandon all general constitutional safeguards—due process, separation of church and state, freedom of speech, etc.—because of the difficulty of applying them to existential situations? Mr. Jung may reject Maritain's assertion of the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal because of Maritain's belief that in an ideal situation the Catholic Church would be the spiritual guide, but is he willing to deny the general Hebraic-Christian teaching that unless the spiritual is above the temporal, no order rules the temporal and the state is supreme?

It is to be hoped that Mr. Jung will continue his study of the philosophy of Jacques Maritain and that he may come to a fuller understanding and appreciation of neo-Thomism.—JEROME G. KERWIN, *The University of Chicago.*

Research for Public Policy. BY PENDLETON HERRING, PHILIP E. MOSELY, CHARLES J. HITCH. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1961. Pp. lx, 126.)

In November, 1960, the Brookings Institution dedicated its new Center for Advanced Study. To honor the occasion, three leading scholar-administrators—Pendleton Herring, Philip E. Mosely and Charles J. Hitch—were invited to present papers taking stock of the state of policy research in their own particular fields of interest. *Research for Public Policy* is the compilation of those papers and the comments made upon them at the time by a number of this country's leading social science researchers.

The speakers and discussants are generally agreed that the primary task of the policy researcher is the determination of alternatives. It is his function to elucidate choice, to indicate what alternatives exist and then to attempt to estimate the consequences of following the various possible lines of action. In this way the researcher in public policy is concerned with prediction. And it is the "predictive capacity" that many of the participants in the panel state is at the very core of policy research.

However, there is the repeatedly expressed caveat that the policy researcher is not conducting experiments under the ideal laboratory conditions of the natural sciences. Rather he is dealing with human affairs, and thus always with possibilities and probabilities, not certainties. Research in public policy cannot produce infallibility, but it can help remove cant, prejudice and irrationality, so that the decision process can be carried out as scientifically as possible. The panelists generally regret that many scholars shy away from the area of public policy because it deals with "messy" problems for which there is no single, precise, all-encompassing answer, devoid of "spillover."

There is also agreement among the speakers that while posing alternatives is the function of the scholar, the ultimate decision as to which alternative will be adopted rests elsewhere—with the politician-statesman. At some point along the way the investigative art must give way and the political art takes over. The aim of the research scholar should be to strive to reduce the area in which intuition—and prejudice—are obliged to operate.

But what of the researcher who becomes convinced of the towering desirability of one alternative? Here a wide diversity of opinion seems to exist among the panelists. They agree that if all policy-planners aspired to become policy-makers, an untenable situation would result. But some would defend the ivory-tower isolation of the scholar under almost any condition, while others envisage the researcher in the role of the "initiator," who not only poses alternatives, but makes recommendations, and then strives to have his recommendations adopted.

The panelists stress the need for the interdisciplinary approach. There is appreciation that problems are seldom to be seen purely in terms of politics or economics or engineering. Multiple tools must be brought into use to solve multifaceted problems. But there is no consensus as to whether the tools should be united in the thinking of a single individual or whether the team approach is to be preferred. It is suggested that perhaps some problems require the former treatment, others the latter.

Research for Public Policy is in the happy position of being a first-rate introduction for those who are only vaguely aware of the developments that have occurred over the past decade in public policy research, yet of also having value for the specialist. The invitation extended by the Brookings Institution to the panelists to take stock in their own fields, called not only for description, but for criticism and suggested improvement, as well. And the participants have come forth with more than a few provocative and valuable ideas. Robert R. Bowie, for example, states that "as far as I could see when I was in government, of the ideas which were welcomed as bright new ideas from the outside only a few hadn't been discussed in the government at least a year or so before. The difficulty is that when the ideas were first discussed, the relevance of many of them was simply not seen, because of the way the environment was envisaged, and therefore they often died aborning." Professor Mosely suggests the need for professional "kibitzers" to be placed at key points in the governmental process with the role of asking just prior to the final act of decision making, "Well, what are the other ways in which this thing could be done?" Mosely elsewhere calls for a mixed board of academic and government representatives to consider and encourage proposals for government-sponsored research. The addresses and comments are rich in suggestions for research that is particularly needed at the moment.—DAN N. JACOBS, *Miami University, Oxford, Ohio.*

The Research Function of University Bureaus and Institutes for Government-Related Research, EDITED BY DWIGHT WALDO. (Berkeley: University of California, Bureau of Public Administration. 1960. Pp. ix., 222.)

University bureaus of governmental research and similar agencies known by various titles stand decidedly in need of greater amounts of publicity concerning their organizational structure, and their purposes and functions. Any true blue bureau staffer should attest to this, especially if he has suffered through the maddening question (and who hasn't?) of, "Well, if you don't *teach* full-time at the university, then what *do* you do?" If only for assistance in explaining at least a portion of their activites bureau personnel should welcome the appearance of Dwight Waldo's expertly edited book. But, of course, it possesses far greater value than that.

This work grew out of a conference on the research role of bureaus, conducted in 1959 at the University of California in Berkeley. It is essentially a compilation of papers presented at the conference, each paper treating one of seven definite research areas about which bureaus generally hold concern. They are public administration, politics, comparative studies, metropolitan affairs, community decisions, public policy and methodology. Fortunately for the reader each paper is balanced by an accompanying comment prepared by persons who, with the exception of one, did not attend the conference. This work, then, boasts also of a series of built-in "reviews," most of which assume extended form.

Contributors of topical papers express varying shades of concern over the central issue of what should be the proper and most fruitful type of research for a university oriented government research bureau. In a fascinating essay on research in politics Peter Odegard points up vividly what has taken place in this area and which gaps need to be closed. Only by implication does he suggest that any of his 23 proposed topics are germane to a bureau research program. The invitation is sufficiently broad, nevertheless, and there appears to be room for all in the field of political research. Who says a bureau cannot profitably investigate voting habits of American women, ethics in government, or pressure group politics?

Vincent Ostrom, in his essay on public policy studies, holds that there need be no basic contradiction between practical and theoretical research, both classes of which have a proper place in bureau research programs. Gilbert Steiner, Charles Adrian and other essay contributors tend to concur with this point of view. Adrian, for instance, writing on comparative studies, sees "no reason why 'pure' research cannot be undertaken simultaneously with 'applied' research within the same institution, even by the same individuals." He then goes on to make a plea for increased emphasis on basic research which will help provide explanations of the political process. It is comforting to note also his plea for sufficient allocation of staff time to permit engaging in basic research.

Indeed, a feeling seems to permeate most of the essays and comments in this book that more attention should be devoted in bureaus to basic research, and to those broader problems which relate to political science as a discipline, and which look hopefully to the ultimate development of a systematic theory of politics. Let the garbage disposal studies and the wage surveys be compiled by a graduate student in spare moments. There are deeper furrows to plow. This argument is reiterated in a summary statement unanimously approved by the Berkeley conferees and reproduced in this work. While recognizing the service orientation of most bureaus, the conferees emphasized that "bureaus exist in an academic environment" and therefore their activities should be consistent with "university traditions of scholarship." In other words, let's get in step with the intellectual pace of the university and carry out the more pedestrian missions of the bureau when possible.

This reviewer would find no fault with such noble expressions of purpose. All too often, perhaps, bureau staffers fail to strike an adequate balance between research and service on one hand, and between basic and applied research on the other. Let it be kept in mind, however, that just as some theoretical research conducted in a vacuum is worthless, in like manner is a bureau program, unrealistically developed, without value. Service demands and limits on time press in on a bureau staff. Precious few hours are available for either quiet research or study and reflection. In a bureau strongly committed and loyal to active relations with municipal and state officials this controlling atmosphere cannot help but prevail. Service to the community is destined to come first.

Ostrom alludes to such a situation in discussing bureau scales of values. In the standard pattern of bureau organization public service will normally come first; research, second; and teaching, third. Yet the same bureau will quite likely be judged by its own academic community on the basis of a completely opposite scale of values, i.e., teaching, first; research, second; and public service, third.

It remained for a bureau director to raise a lonely voice in defense of primary emphasis on empirical, pragmatic research in a bureau program. Commenting on Frank Pinner's essay on research methodology, Ethan Allen argues that historical conditions have had far more to do with framing bureau programs than has systematic theory. Moreover, it is the burden of any tax supported bureau or institute to give its public the benefit of its unique and special competence. Allen emphasizes that this must of necessity be a bureau's prime concern because time cannot wait for the perfection of a systematic theory.

If the heterogeneity of arguments presented in these essays points up any one factor in particular, it is that uniformity of purposes and direction among bureaus is unlikely to materialize. There are bureaus and bureaus. Each has an orientation toward its respective state and local governments, molded by conditions surrounding its creation. No one will deny the value of working toward common, ideally stated goals; the attainment of such goals, however, in view of present-day staff, budget and *time* limitations is another matter.

It is fortunate that these papers have been assembled under one cover, not only for the sake of those curious about bureaus, but also—and this should be more important—for the immediate or ultimate benefit of bureau directors and staff members who constitute the heart of the bureau movement. No one directly engaged in bureau activity should forego the opportunity to reflect upon the discriminating essays presented in this volume. With the passage of time this book should increase in stature as a valuable reference work.—Edwin A. Gere, Jr., *University of Massachusetts.*

Comparative Studies in Administration. By James D. Thompson et al. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1960. Pp. xiv, 224. $6.00.)

This is an excellent and useful collection of nine journal articles published in the five years prior to the appearance of the volume, and three papers specifically prepared for the volume by one or more of its editors. The collection is excellent for two reasons. (1) It sustains a broad comparative view of administration by including studies of non-American administrative organizations, "administration" in a non-industrial society (Fox Indians), and administration in non-industrial settings (military, hospital, governmental, academic, and marine organizations). (2) It emphasizes the challenge of future research because the articles selected for inclusion tend to be on the frontiers of expanding knowledge rather than embedded in the mundane corpus of accepted conclusions about organizations.

Given these two purposes the book should be a useful addition to the library of any student of administration. He will find adequate protection here from making the glib assumption that administration is an art. The heavy emphasis on empirical studies and the significance of the theoretical problems illuminated by them should finally succeed in laying that ghost. The reader will also be impressed by the fact that human organization can be viewed analytically without benefit of the appealing but severely limited "human relations" approach that launched the rebirth of interest in the study of administration, and has produced so little of enduring consequence.

The substantive contributions of the twelve papers center on three general topics: power, authority, and decision-making. No claim is made that these subjects are exhaustively treated, or that their analysis exhausts the significant content of administration. Any student who deals with these topics will find useful material here. Of special note are Thompson's study of power and authority in identical organizations (one of the few studies that treat power in behavioral rather than reputational terms); Miller's fascinating analysis of authority in Fox Indians society; the paper by Dill dealing with the limiting influences of environment on behavioral choices among managers; and Hammond's discussion of indirection in communication as it affects power and authority relations.—Robert Dubin, *University of Oregon.*

Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. By Ralf Dahrendorf. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959. Pp. xvi, 336. $6.50.)

Ralf Dahrendorf's major objective in *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society,* which he has translated and revised from his original German edition, is to advance a theory of social conflict relevant to modern industrial societies. Initially, however, refutation of alternative conflict theories is in order, and sociologist Dahrendorf begins with an assessment of Marxian doctrine. Examining various post-Marxian trends—the "decomposition" of labor and capital, the emergence of the "new middle class," the growth of social mobility and social equality, the institutionalization of class conflict—he concludes that Marxian theory is inapplicable to contemporary "postcapitalist" society. Nor do the more recent students of industrial society—among those writers briefly considered are Renner, Djilas, Schumpeter, Burnham, Mayo, and Drucker—provide what Dahrendorf regards as satisfactory explanations of social conflict.

The author's own approach derives from his assertion that any conflict theory must start from "an image of society that permits the explanation of conflict in terms of structural, not individual, conditions." Maintaining that "social structures as distinct from other structures are capable of producing within themselves the elements of their supersession and change", he proceeds on this basis to formulate a sociological theory of conflict. One of the concepts he develops is that the intensity and violence of class conflict depend to a considerable extent upon whether conflict is dispersed among many groups, or whether it is "superimposed" within a society "so that the multitude of possible conflict fronts is reduced to a few dominant conflicts."

In his final two chapters Dahrendorf demonstrates the empirical relevance of his theoretical framework by applying it to an analysis of two areas of conflict, the industrial and the political. One of his conclusions is that free societies are founded upon diversity, divergence, and a pluralism which recognizes and accepts social conflict; "totalitarian monism," on the other hand, requires "a homogeneous and uniform social and political order." But while he emphasizes that conflict plays a necessary role in the social process, Dahrendorf nevertheless notes that a conflict theory, valid or otherwise, cannot be exclusive; every society has "two faces," and both the "coercion" and "integration" models of society must be employed to account for social phenomena.

Whether theoretically-inclined or not, whether behaviorally- or institutionally-oriented, political scientists can derive significant insights from Dahrendorf's noteworthy contribution to the literature on social conflict.—MARTIN MEADOWS, *University of Maryland.*

The Moulding of Communists: The Training of the Communist Cadre. BY FRANK S. MEYER. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1961. Pp. 214. $5.00.)

The Moulding of Communists is the latest volume in the Fund for the Republic Series on Communism in American Life. It "is an attempt to depict as objectively as possible the process whereby the Communist man is created." The author, Frank S. Meyer, (an editor of the *National Review*) nevertheless admits that the book is "in a certain sense subjective" since "it represents the conclusions of a large sector of a lifetime spent in acceptance, rejection, and examination of Communism." He analyzes "the theory of Communist training" and describes "the practice" with reference both to published works of scholars and ex-party members and to his own personal experience.

The theory of Communist training is based on the transformation of the personality into the "mould" of the Communist ideal type. This ideal type is marked by a complete devotion to the Party and to the role of the Party as the dominant force of History. It is this identification with History which permits members of the cadre to accept, as tactical maneuvering, aspects of Party behavior they might otherwise reject as contradictions. The process of transforming the personality into this mould is completely wound up in the experience of the Party. Formal instruction in the inner schools of the Party plays a part in the transformation. But the real job of indoctrination depends on the continual exposure of the personality to doctrinal and organizational pressures in the course of working for the Party.

The Moulding of Communists is largely based on the assumption that communism is consistent and unchanging however variant the circumstances and conditions of its development. The author analyzes the variety of social and psychological factors which initially bring the individual into the orbit of the Party. From the moment the Party takes hold, however, the entire process, continual and unrelenting, is described as being thoroughly rational, deliberate, and similar in every historical setting. Any such system needs a central control point more tangible than the abstract concept of "the Party." "The Party" thus is "in actuality the creature of the rulers of the Soviet Union" and devotion to the Party "is, in grim literalness, devotion to their interests. . . . "

There are unusual insights in this book into the transformation of individuals by the Communists. The problems of inner conflict, of acceptance and rejection, of pressures and strains, are discussed with both clarity and sensitivity. These positive contributions are, however, marred by the tendency to view communism as a single, solid system and to accept the concept of THE COMMUNIST. The idea of a Communist monolith does not help us understand Titoism, the Polish unrest, the strains in Sino-Soviet relations, the deterioration of the French Communist elite after the Hungarian crisis, and the identity of Communists with legitimate forces of nationalism in the developing areas. In confronting the Communist threat, it would be as disastrous to ignore the complexities of the movement as to minimize the strength of Moscow's influence.—GENE M. LYONS, *Dartmouth College.*

Contemporary Political Ideologies. EDITED BY JOSEPH S. ROUCEK. (New York: Philosophical Library. Pp. 470. $10.00.)

The jacket describes this book as a "symposium of original studies by 21 leading American specialists." Perhaps it could be better described as a group of 21 essays, each by a different author, and each, with the exception of the introductory essay, dealing with a particular country or area. The editorial plan, which is not followed uniformly by the various authors, is to sketch historical developments of recent decades in each country or area as a background for, and partial explanation of, the prevailing ideological pattern of that country or area, and then to describe or explain the political and social doctrines to which the rulers of that country or area adhere. For the most part, this is done with reasonable objectivity, though a few of the authors inject their personal views.

The editor, Joseph S. Roucek, contributes only a brief preface stressing the importance of ideologies in the life of a people, but his achievement as an editor is manifest in the fact that he holds all of his authors to a common plan, so that the total of the essays gives a well rounded picture of today's world with its widely varied and often conflicting government viewpoints. There is little indication that profound research went into the preparation of any of the essays, but they do bring together a considerable amount of information and analysis that will provide most readers with a much clearer conception of what is involved in many of our world problems.

The introductory essay, entitled "'Ideological Movements and Social Change," by Carle C. Zimmerman of Harvard, stresses the close interrelation of social change and accepted doctrine. To some extent the social changes, a term which he uses broadly to include such things as shifts in territory and the conquest of distance, produce the ideologies. However, it works both ways, and ideologies sometimes produce social changes. To cope with the baffling world problems that grow out of this situation, we have only amateur, untrained leadership. To provide the guidance this leadership needs, Dr. Zimmerman proposes a new social science, more dynamic than sociology, based on a study of social change and human values, and having an ethical and moral content. He apparently considers this book to be a first step in launching such a social science.

The other essays run the whole gamut of contemporary ideologies, starting with an essay on "Sovietism." Others look at the variations in the communist pattern in China, the Soviet satellites, and Tito's Yugoslavia. A section of two essays on "Remnants of Socialism" pictures the decline of socialist doctrine, though not of Socialist Parties, in continental Europe and Britain's dabbling in socialism. A five-essay section deals with peripheral areas. "Colonialism at the Crossroads" pictures the decline and forecasts the end of colonialism, except for the Soviet variety. "Zionism" tells the story of the State of Israel and the cross currents at work there. One essay explains without condoning the various aspects of "apartheid" in South Africa. "Pan-Asiatic and Pan-African Movements" is enlightening on the pressure of these movements on world relations. Finally, in this section, an essay on "Latin America" depicts the forces and pressures that dominate the politics and foreign relations of that part of the world.

An essay each is devoted to "France's Fifth Republic," "Germany's Reconstruction," "Rejuvenated Italy," "Austria's Survival," "Japan's Reforms," and "India's Gandhism." The book closes with an essay on "The American Welfare State" which argues that the New Deal was neither an ideology nor a utopia, but was the natural working out of long standing American trends.

While, as is inevitable with twenty-one authors, there is some unevenness in quality, the book on the whole is readable and informative. All the parts fit together to provide an overview of the ideological differences and tensions that characterize today's world. One detail that will annoy serious students is that footnotes are relegated to the end to the volume, but this arrangement was probably dictated by the publisher rather than by the editor.—SAMUEL A. JOHNSON, *Harris Teachers College.*

Crime in America: Controversial Issues in Twentieth Century Criminology. EDITED BY HERBERT A. BLOCH. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1961. Pp. 355. $6.00.)

Sociology of Crime. EDITED BY JOSEPH S. ROUCEK. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1961. Pp. 551. $10.00.)

Pioneers in Criminology. EDITED BY HERMANN MANNHEIM. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1960. Pp. xi, 402. $7.50.)

The volume edited by Bloch, a sociologist, contains twenty-three papers, most of which were presented at annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology. Each paper is preceded by a one- or two-page commentary by the editor. Among the contributors are representatives of sociology, law enforcement, crime detection, psychology, psychiatry, correctional administration, correctional teaching, and politics (one senator)—not to mention an expert on "psychographology."

There are disquisitions on training for correctional work, prison discipline, prison labor, military offenders, probation and parole, drunken driving and highway accidents, gambling, "the child murderer" (by which is meant "homicide committed by children under sixteen"), the high financial cost of defending oneself against criminal charges, legal insanity, the nature-nurture controversy, the arguments against capital punishment, and a proposal that persons under death sentence be allowed to volunteer to submit themselves to medical experimentation.

What ties these widely disparate topics together? The editor claims that the "unifying theme . . . is the belief in the efficacy of the scientific method and a conviction that the use of science is itself an ennobling practice." This is a clear invitation that the book be judged for its merits as science. Indeed, the editor thinks it is not "inconceivable" that within the present century there will occur a scientific "breakthrough" in the understanding and treatment of offenders.

If the book under review is meant as a herald of such a consummation of science, then, in the reviewer's opinion, this happy eventuality lies far, far beyond the present century—which is another way of saying that the reviewer's conception of science must be very much at odds with the editor's.

Take, for example, the paper on "psychographology," the easiest paper in the book on which to practice one's scientific acumen. Instead of the editor's admonition to social scientists for being inhospitable to graphology and his high praise for the author's "true scientist's concern for objectivity," this reviewer would have severely condemned the article for its arrant nonsense, rejected its claim that graphology has established its validity, ridiculed its assertion that "a potential killer" was detected from the "ferocious, even violent, gestures in the lower parts of the Capital *S*", and challenged its contentions that graphology can classify the mentally ill into various diagnostic categories, separate offenders by the type of offenses they commit, and make a "complete" personality study of an individual.

For the rest of the book, violation of scientific canons is far more frequent than adherence to them. Only space forbids detailing dozens of examples.

Sociology of Crime is another edited work. It contains twenty-one chapters. Although not as much of a hodgepodge as the preceding work, still it covers a wide diversity of topics, done with —to use the inevitable but correct cliché—widely varying competence. Subjects covered include the relation of crime to such variables as immigration, mental condition, geographic factors, mass communication, and social and religious ideologies. There are chapters on penology, juvenile delinquency, and sociology and crime.

In addition, there are two chapters in the section on "The Sociology of the Police" to which the author calls special attention as a neglected phase of criminology. It is true that this is a neglected area, but the two chapters here are a negligible start on this topic. Jeffery's chapter on "The Sociology of the Police" is a good, brief statement on the history, operations, and legal aspects of law enforcement at the police level, but there is little sociology in it. The other chapter is on police training and contains even less sociology than does its companion piece.

To political scientists, the most useful chapters would doubtlessly be Newman's on "Legal Norms and Criminological Definitions" and Roucek's five chapters on crime and law in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries.

Newman gives a very sophisticated theoretical analysis of the issues in the relations between social and legal definitions of crime. He shows the distinctions between the social scientist's and the lawyer's orientation and indicates the possibilities and directions for fruitful "rapprochement." He raises some intriguing problems presented by the so-called "ideological crimes" (treason, sedition, crimes growing out of commitment to religious beliefs, and so on). Here certainly is a domain where the political scientist, the sociological criminologist, and the lawyer can join forces.

Roucek's chapters (totaling 100 pages) on crime and justice in the Soviet Union and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe are heavily documented with both primary and secondary sources. Roucek presents abundant evidence that crime, delinquency, prostitution, and alcoholism have not disappeared with the coming of socialism. They are, in fact, problems of large dimension. The "rock and roll" and jazz craze has also been a source of dismay for the Communist regimes. After surveying the extent of the problem, Roucek turns to a detailed analysis of the past and present political, legal, and informal attempts to control these "survivals of bourgeois influences" (to use the Communists', not Roucek's, label). There is a detailed analysis of the 1958 revision of Soviet criminal law and judicial procedures. Finally, there are chapters on the Soviet and satellite police and penal systems.

Mannheim brings together, at the invitation of the editor of the *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, eighteen papers originally published in a series there. He adds an Introduction of thirty-five pages. Each of the papers, except one that deals with a general historical survey of criminology, discusses the contributions to criminology, penology, and law of one of the past notables.

Here pass in review Beccaria, Bentham, Maconochie, Haviland, Ray, Doe, Maudsley, Lombroso, Tarde, Gross, Garofalo, Ferri, Durkheim, Montero, Aschaffenburg, Goring, and Bonger.

In his Introduction, Mannheim provides a stimulating essay. He anticipates and disposes of some of the disputations such a project invariably invites—who should have been included or excluded, what are the criteria of significant contributions, and so on. He undertakes a scholarly exposition of the relations between some of the very disparate figures and is brave enough to attempt to paint the picture whole, to depict trends, and to discern future possibilities.—MICHAEL HAKEEM, *University of Wisconsin.*

Under Orders: The Churches and Public Affairs. By Roswell P. Barnes. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961, pp. 138. $2.95.)

Under Orders might be described as a test-demonstration project. In its 138 pages the author seeks to show how *The Bible* and the Christian church contribute to an understanding of many social, economic, and political issues; e.g., corruption in government, communism, automation, poverty. His objective in these exercises is to provide a rationale for church interest in such subjects and, more important, to demonstrate the distinctively useful approach of the church to the problems faced by society.

The author isolates two elements of the church's concern with social issues as unique. First, the church is holistic in its attention to man's problems. It does not view man as solely a consumer or a producer or a voter, but is concerned with all aspects of man's needs and unites them in terms of his relationship to his creator. Secondly, and related to the first, all Christian churches and church members are "Under Orders." The meaning here is that *The Bible* serves as a common reference point defining ends and means. Thus it unifies and gives direction, in a way that is impossible for any other institution.

The question that remains is how well did the author perform his self-appointed task? For the lay reader the book represents, primarily, a series of individual reactions to issues. Some of the essays are interesting, contributing new insights into possible approaches to solving problems. In the main, however, there is little to interest the social scientist.

However, the book should be useful to the minister who wishes to preach the social gospel. The single thread that runs through the book is the application of *The Bible* and the Christian frame of reference derived from *The Bible* to social problems. Thus any minister should find *Under Orders* useful in preparing sermons as well as in providing a guide to action.—John H. Fenton, *University of Massachusetts.*

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METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Law and Social Process in United States History. By JAMES WILLARD HURST. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Law School, 1960. Pp. 361. $5.00.)

Because of the profession's diminished interest in law, and its indifference toward history, it is unlikely that many political scientists will read this book, the Ninth Series of the distinguished Thomas M. Cooley Lectures of the University of Michigan Law School. This is to be regretted, because the high attainments of the author and the magnificent range and depth of his themes make it a stimulating work brimming with fruitful insights about the role of law in American society.

To characterize James Willard Hurst as a legal historian hardly suggests the importance of his work and that of other scholars who have been stimulated by him to undertake studies in the largely neglected field of American legal-economic history. Hurst's *The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers*[1] is generally recognized as an outstanding, invaluable study of American legal institutions. His *Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States*,[2] which received the James Barr Ames prize of the Harvard Law School, displayed more fully his unusual ability to portray law as a constant force in the shaping of economic, political, and social behavior. In recent years a number of studies using Wisconsin materials have been published as the result of his initiative,[3] and it is now possible to envisage within another decade the existence of a substantial body of legal-economic-social materials reflecting the life of an American state from the end of the Civil War to the present.

It is difficult to suggest briefly the quality and range of Hurst's analysis in the present book. He is not concerned with a multiplicity of cases or the tracing of legal doctrine from origin to present application. In fact, he deliberately avoids emphasis on the more dramatic incidents of our legal system. By the use of a few undramatic cases and a survey of a vast number of Wisconsin statutes, he is able to suggest the way law structures our economy, guards, enhances or restrains the activities of a variety of private groups, and provides the guide rules for a political system.

The titles of the major sections perhaps best indicate the level of his analysis. After pointing out that the distinctive features of our legal order have been its emphasis on the legitimate monopoly of violence, constitutionalism, procedure, and resource allocation, he turns to the main burden of his argument. In "Drift and Direction" he contrasts the great influence of drift and the lesser role of conscious decision making and conflict. Social inheritance and context, rather than deliberated decision, largely shape our legal order. Factors outside the law produced the impetus to change in the nineteenth century, yet, as Hurst observes, " . . . to say that the law's actual or potential contribution in a given sector was typically marginal does not mean its contribution was unimportant."

In a section titled "Initiative and Response" Hurst uses a brief survey of the history of legal regulation of the milk industry in Wisconsin to show the at first tentative, and then more confident way that law was used to achieve desirable social and economic purposes. He rightly emphasizes the promotional rather than the restrictive role of law. Through law the cooperative and associational activities of farmers in their efforts to enlarge their markets were aided through legally imposed quality and sanitary standards. But it is also true that a powerful strain of what Hurst terms "bastard pragmatism," an overregard for meeting immediate problems and situations without concern for long-range considerations, prevented the intelligent use of law to meet a variety of urgent problems cast up by a changing, industrialized society. The pluralistic nature of the American social system probably made this inevitable. But Hurst quite properly points to the continuation of this anti-intellectual, anti-conscious planning bias in Twentieth Century America, when the persistence of this attitude may prove fatal.

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[1] Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1950.

[2] Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1956.

[3] Robert S. Hunt, *Law and Locomotives.* Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1958; George J. Kuehnl, *The Wisconsin Business Corporation.* Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959; Francis W. Laurent, *The Business of a Trial Court.* Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959; Spencer L. Kimball, *Insurance and Public Policy.* Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1960.

In "Leverage and Support" he compares the more frequent use of law to maintain or modify the ongoing institutions by supporting orderly market processes, maintaining the security of the family, or improving the administration of justice. The "leverage" function of the law is illustrated in tort rules forcing an injured person to maintain the burden of showing why he should be compensated, and in new laws governing the incorporation of businesses. The leverage function has been resorted to far less frequently than the support function. The endless complaints about the mass of new state and national legislation overlooks this fact that most laws are of a "support" rather than "leverage" character.

Finally, in a section titled "Force and Fruition," Hurst describes our excessive readiness to use the criminal law to resolve important problems, rather than seeking more fundamental solutions. But on the whole, our legal order has been rather effective in maintaining conditions under which most citizens could live peaceful lives and carry on productive work. The desire to allow virtually all groups to pursue ends not clearly inimical to society helped create a fair degree of tolerance through law. He concludes on a note of warning with respect to four of the safeguards built into our formal legal process—civil control of the military, limits on political disqualification, protection against compulsion of ideas, and the accountability of civil authority—implying clearly that changed conditions have endangered these rules of our constitutional system. It is typical of Hurst's whole method that the experience of history is made to illumine the problems of present day America. In this way the reason or irrationality of the past can help direct us toward more intelligent solutions of the great issues of this and future eras.—WILLIAM M. BEANEY, *Princeton University.*

The Presidency and Individual Liberties. BY RICHARD P. LONGAKER. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961. Pp. xii, 239. $4.50.)

Presidents have two historic responsibilities, "international leadership . . . and the guardianship over national prosperity," says the author, and a third that has been added in this century—"the constitutional obligation of the chief executive to protect individual liberties." The purpose of the present monograph is "to delineate the nature of this obligation, to describe the available instruments for presidential action, and to suggest the price of presidential indifference."

A reader who survives the first two chapters, which lack something both in organization and definition, will discover some new material drawn from the libraries at Hyde Park and Independence, Mo., and from interviews that shed light on the President's role in promoting or endangering individual liberties. Chapters III, "Affirmation and Restraint," and V, "Public Opinion and Persuasion," are outstanding. The former deals with executive agencies and the use of administrative discretion and, as in the latter chapter, most successfully demonstrates presidential power and responsibility unencumbered by Congressional and judicial complications.

Longaker identifies himself with the "constitutionalists" as though that term described a definitive attitude. Those who more commonly lean on such labels, such as the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government, will find they have little support in this book. In fact, at many points the constitutional mandates discovered by Longaker appear to be more moral than legal. He asserts that *recent events* have made inaction by the President a positive rather than a contingent agent with regard to injustice and loss of liberty. Far from "constitutionalism," this reasoning appears to have more in common with Scott Buchanan's modern concept of original (political) sin ("Tragedy and the New Politics"). If true, was it not always true? The "constitutional" argument would seem to be stronger if it were not tied to the shifting sands of current events.

If "constitutionalism" means anything, it must refer to the embodiment of national values in a fairly stable concept of laws and institutions. After telling us how dangerous was Lincoln's course during the Civil War, Mr. Longaker arrives at the Little Rock crisis of 1957 and says: "Lack of statutory authorization cannot bend the President from his constitutional course. Taking precedence over the statutes are the constitutional command to the President to see to the faithful execution of the laws and his oath 'to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution'." The issue here is not one of legal correctness, but of political realism. We have been judging the presidential view of constitutionality since Jefferson bought Louisiana in terms of the ultimate consequences of the action to the system as a whole. When the risks, as in Lincoln's case, appear in retrospect to have been unwarranted, we have exhorted the incumbents and their successors to greater self-restraint. Even those of us who view favorably the President's intent at Little Rock may gag on the prospect of having Longaker's standard applied by some future President with a Goldwater or Byrd view of the constitution. What useful purpose can be served by elevating political expediency to the level of "constitutionalism" when we may, under different circumstances, under the same rubric wish to constrain a President by statute?

In the wealth of illustration Longaker presents to demonstrate the power and opportunities of a president to contribute helpfully or destructively to the protection of individual liberties, one practical consideration fails clearly to emerge. Presidents, like courts and most legislators, rarely take the initiative either to enforce or change the law. It only appears to be so as they respond to the actions and pressures of the publics on which they fancy their power depends. Ultimately it is the electorate rather than the constitution that determines what the "obligations" of the president will be for the subsequent four years. Prompted and assisted, perhaps, by scholars and civil-liberty organizations he can be made to assume the "place of moral leadership" that will better assure constitutionalism and individual liberty.—James A. Riedel, *Union College, Schenectady.*

The Supreme Court: Views from Inside. By Alan F. Westin. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1961. Pp. iv, 192. $1.50.)

Nine Justices of the Supreme Court, six of whom are currently on the bench, present their views of the Court's function, its work, and its problems in a most worthwhile collection of essays ably edited and assembled by Professor Westin. With one exception the commentaries are responsible and reasonable attempts to shed light on various aspects of the most difficult of tasks, that of adjudicating the tough disputes in public law. The exception is the piece by former Associate Justice James F. Byrnes which condemns the Court for its desegregation ruling. This is little more than an angry polemic, contributing nothing to understanding unless it be to show how utterly vacuous the arguments are which purport to defend states' rights in general and segregation in particular.

The collection as a whole, while emphasizing the differences in viewpoint among the Justices, most certainly warrants some generalizations about their similarities. Without question each Justice recognizes his awe-inspiring responsibility; each impresses the reader with a sincerity of purpose; each conveys an honest desire for objectivity in judicial interpretation; and each appears to be in a continuous state of soul searching because he has some doubts, be they ever so slight, about his own convictions. Moreover, most of the Justices herein represented bring a vigorous intellect to bear on the issues at hand, and the disinterested reader must make concessions even to those with whom he disagrees. The essays are really of two generic types: those of Jackson, Frankfurter, Black and Douglas which are concerned with the proper function of the Supreme Court in the American governmental system as well as with the appropriate role of the individual Justice, and those by Clark, Brennan, Harlan and Roberts which are more specifically informational and less abstract.

The latter group does much to counteract the misinformation that is so prevalent in the United States today. Justice Clark describes the "unremitting toil" and the "painstaking research and care" that go into resolving the cases at hand, emphasizing that judging is not delegated to committees or panels but that the entire process is a highly individualized effort. In one essay Justice Brennan stresses how infinitesimally small is that class of cases in which the state courts must bow to the will of the Supreme Court, and in another, he defends the use of the social sciences as aids to resolving legal questions, suggesting that "legal scholarship must . . . be nourished by all the disciplines that comprehend the totality of human experience." Justice Harlan advises the advocate that it is a serious mistake to neglect oral argument before the Supreme Court, and he enumerates the most important factors in making oral argument effective—selectivity of issues, simplicity of presentation, candor and resiliency.

The sharpest and most searching analyses of the Supreme Court come from the minds of men who were a part of the intellectual ferment of the Roosevelt revolution—Jackson, Frankfurter, Black and Douglas. Through them we participate in a sophisticated discussion of judicial self-restraint and libertarian activism, the intellectual agony of choice in deciding cases, the use of *stare decisis* in constitutional law, the question of absolutes in the Bill of Rights, the necessity of judicial objectivity, the value of dissenting opinions, and the problem of meaning in statutory interpretation. These Justices are the old professionals; they are what might be called "Court men." Despite their doctrinal quarrels they are concerned with preserving the integrity of an institution which has played a vital role in making America the kind of nation it is. For Jackson, the Court "is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, narrow processes, and small capacity for handling mass litigation" and "can never quite escape consciousness of its own infirmities," but at the same time he holds it indispensable to government under a written constitution.

Just before his death in 1954 Justice Jackson wrote that "any court which undertakes by its legal processes to enforce civil liberties needs the support of an enlightened and vigorous public opinion. . . . I do not think the American public is enlightened on this subject." In 1960 Justice Black, disregarding public opinion, answers that the Bill of Rights comprises absolute, unqualified prohibitions on the other branches of government and that the Court cannot escape its "sacred trust" of enforcing these prohibitions. Justice Douglas tempers his activism with responsibility, declaring that the judge who "writes his own predilections into the law in disregard of constitutional principles . . . is not worthy of the great traditions of the bench." Nevertheless, says Douglas, a judge who "quavers or retreats before an impending crisis of the day and finds haven in dialectics or weasel words or surrenders his own conviction for a passing expediency is likewise not born for the woolsack." But perhaps the concept of judgeship is most eloquently expressed by Justice Frankfurter. "A judge . . . should be compounded of the faculties that are demanded of the historian and the philosopher and the prophet. The last demand upon him—to make some forecast of the consequences of his action—is perhaps the heaviest. To pierce the curtain of the future, to give shape and visage to mysteries still in the womb of time, is the gift of imagination. It requires poetic sensibilities. . . . These judges . . . must have something of the creative artist in them; they must have antennae registering feeling and judgment beyond logical, let alone quantitative, proof."—ROBERT J. STEAMER, *Louisiana State University.*

The Right of Assembly and Association. BY GLENN ABERNATHY. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1961. Pp. vi, 263. $6.25.)

The purpose of this book is to outline what public officials have declared to be the extent of and the limitations on the right of assembly and its cognate, freedom of association. The method of analysis is thus mainly legal and consists of an examination of legislation, administrative action, and, most of all, court decisions. Abernathy frankly concedes that there is often a wide gap between law and practice and admits that full understanding of the real limitations on First Amendment freedoms cannot be obtained without intense investigation of the more subtle social pressures which a community may bring to bear against dissidents. But within the bounds he has set for himself, the author does an excellent job. He has brought together into a coherent pattern a mass of decisions from the U. S. Supreme Court, American state tribunals, and from British courts as well. Although not so closely related to political theory as Robert Horn's *Groups and the Constitution* or as historically oriented as Leonard Levy's *Legacy of Suppression,* Abernathy's book is a literate and informative presentation of the gradual recognition and development in American law of two fundamental constitutional rights.

Abernathy's viewpoint is that of a moderate civil libertarian. On the one hand, he rejects the absolutist approach. He does not believe that any set of constitutional values can be automatically placed above all others irrespective of the particular situation. On the other hand, he insists on the "firstness of the First Amendment." "The danger," he points out, "is that an excess of restraint on the special rights [of speech, assembly, and petition] may start an irreversible reaction away from the democratic form. The dangers of too little restraint . . . lie largely in added inconvenience or irritations to the general public. Corrective measures normally may be applied if we move too far in the directing of *removing* restraints on the citizen's exercise of those rights, but there may be no institutions available for corrective measures to be applied if we impose *too many* restraints on their exercise."

Abernathy also offers some practical ways in which freedom of assembly and association can be made more meaningful. First, since meeting space in cities is expensive and therefore usually more available to established groups than to newer, less orthodox, and less solvent groups, he suggests that each city make public forums available. As a corollary, Abernathy urges that judges and administrators stop treating street meetings and meetings in public parks as if they raised the same sort of police problems. Parks, he believes, are proper places for public discussions—though he by no means favors the use of all parts of all parks for these purposes. Second, recognizing that how the policeman applies the law is as important as what the Supreme Court says the law is, Abernathy wants enforcement officials properly instructed on their duty not only to preserve order but their equally imperative duty to protect the exercise of such basic constitutional rights as speech, association, and assembly. Third, he proposes that the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers foster a movement to bring local ordinances in line with Supreme Court decisions.

Just as does any book on the First Amendment, this one raises doubts about matters of emphasis and interpretation. For instance, while conceding that Justices Black and Douglas have not always been either clear or consistent, one still might dispute Abernathy's statement that all members of the Court endorse Frankfurter's "balancing of interests" approach to First Amendment problems. One might also question his statement that when one American political party "wins a substantial [electoral] victory, virtually all public authority passes into its hands," Abernathy views the long term history of assembly and association as one of increasing freedom; and he appears reasonably hopeful about the future. Perhaps this guarded optimism might have been shaken by recent decisions of the Supreme Court. Neither the *Times Film Corp. Case*, which validated censorship and permit requirements for movies despite the historic ban against prior restraints, nor the *Wilkinson Case*, which upheld a contempt of Congress conviction of a man whose real crime seems to have been to try to organize a movement to abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee, augur well for the immediate future of First Amendment rights. Yet, what on first reading seemed to this reviewer to be the major weakness of the book—its failure to place specific episodes in a more general social context—may turn out to be its great strength. By not becoming bogged down in another discussion of the temper of the times of the Great Red Scare or the McCarthy Era, Abernathy may have obtained a perspective far superior to that available to those who are preoccupied with current defeats.—WALTER F. MURPHY, *Princeton University.*

Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century. BY PAUL Y. HAMMOND. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. xi, 403. $8.50.)

Paul Y. Hammond has helped fill a significant gap in the study by political scientists of American government. His book is a comprehensive analysis of the factors affecting the development of the organization and control of the armed services since America became a world power at the turn of the century. It points out the complications involved in attempting to maintain a balance between Congress and the executive, on the one hand, and between the civilian administrators and the military experts on the other. As a new Administration prepares to reorganize the Department of Defense to meet the rising military challenges, this study is most timely, in putting proposed changes in proper perspective through an examination of the evolution of the American defense system over the past sixty years.

In addition to using the numerous executive and Congressional documents on military organization throughout the years, and the diaries and biographies of many of the leading figures involved, the author, now in the Department of Political Science at Yale, conducted several hundred interviews with governmental officials, past and present. The result is a well-organized, thoughtfully written, and authoritative study of the vital problem of defense administration in the American political setting.

The important formative periods for the critical 1940's and 1950's, Hammond points out, were the first and second decades of the century. Although the early period saw enforced administrative decentralization, the concept of unification was already developing. Beginning with the Army Reorganization Act of 1903 (guided by the influential Secretary of War, Elihu Root) and the Navy reorganizations between 1900 and 1912, Hammond then traces the effect of the two World Wars in leading toward the National Security Act of 1947. The first quarter of the book covers the period before World War II; the second quarter, the experience of World War II; and the last half, the unification controversy preceding the 1947 law, the main reorganizations (1949, 1953, and 1958), and an evaluation of the current and proposed organization of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the National Security Council.

Recent trends are thoroughly analyzed. Admiral Arthur W. Radford showed how powerful the Chairman of the JCS could become (1953–1957), when supported by the Secretary of Defense. The tripling of Assistant Secretaries of Defense in 1953 led to a steady strengthening of the central control of "business" operations. The 1958 reorganization established six Unified Commands (by geographical areas) and two Specified Commands (including the Strategic Air Command); placed a command post inside the Joint Staff, supervised by the Chairman and responsible to the Secretary of Defense; and established a single Director of Research and Engineering.

In looking toward the future, Hammond considers the limited potential of the JCS, and explores the proposals for concentrating authority in the Chairman or in a single Chief of Staff for the Department of Defense (as suggested by General Maxwell Taylor, the Symington committee in December 1960, and others). The author argues from the analogy with the historical development of the Army Chief of Staff and his close relations with the Secretary of War, that the risk of losing civilian control is considerably less than is commonly feared. He believes further that the influence of Congress, the President, and the public would normally prevent the one-sided development of any single strategic theory. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is the key; the Secretary needs a small staff entirely his own, and only he can be responsible for "a coherent departmental program which has come to terms with both political possibilities and the needs of the operating officials."

The National Security Council plays a significant role, although it can only be as important as the President wishes it to be. The only genuine alternative is a Presidential staff in the Executive Office, but its plans would lack "the sense of political and administrative reality and the prestige which comes with responsibility."

There is little to criticize in the book. It does not presume to deal with America's strategic policies (as does General Taylor in *The Uncertain Trumpet*) or to give full accounts of episodes in the work of the JCS or the National Security Council (as does Walter Millis in *Arms and the State*). The book concentrates on defense organization, and on the principles and political factors involved. In some instances, material on major acts or reorganizations is scattered over several pages, when it would be more helpful to the ordinary reader to have it concentrated. The general format of the book is excellent, and the style of writing is distinguished.—FRANK L. KLINGBERG, *Southern Illinois University*.

Virginia's Massive Resistance. BY BENJAMIN MUSE. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961, Pp. 184. $3.95.)

Virginia's Massive Resistance is an unpretentious, well-written, and useful vignette of political reactions to desegregation in Virginia in the half dozen years subsequent to the 1954 decision. The author benefits from intimate and close experience derived in a political career that included a race for governor of Virginia on the Republican ticket. To this he adds ten years of journalism and a genuine instinct for uncovering the underlying causes of political affairs. The result is a brisk work, competent in analysis and in style, that brings into focus a myriad of events all in the brief scope of less than 200 pages.

Currently Director of the Southern Leadership Project of the Southern Regional Council, Mr. Muse is obviously hopeful of ending discrimination in the South. He believes that Virginia certainly, and probably vast portions of the South, would have accepted the decision in 1954 if leadership had been exerted in that direction. Implicitly, unmistakably, and yet not completely forthrightly, he indicts Harry Byrd for inspiring and fomenting opposition to the decision. He sees Byrd's reaction as partly genuine disagreement with the social values involved and partly the result of pique with any attempt to alter social behavior in Virginia, a State Byrd had come to regard as his own domain.

Once the resources of Byrd and his machine had been committed to opposition, Muse suggests, Lindsey Almond's role was inevitably circumscribed. To a large extent, therefore, Almond is the subject of the study and to the same extent it is an investigation of Almond's effort to burst the bonds set upon him. The author seems to have difficulty in making a final assessment of that complex character, and there is considerable blurring of images in his treatment of the governor. Muse condemns Almond's fiery resistance speech which was delivered after the Virginia Supreme Court and the Federal District Court had legally doomed massive resistance. He assumes it was a momentary aberration, and rejects out of hand any idea of its being a tactical ruse. Yet he suggests that the suit in the Virginia court was probably filed with Almond's expectations of an adverse ruling. (Obviously there was political advantage in the doom of the program coming at the hands of the State court rather than the expected villain, the Federal courts.) It would seem, though, that Almond was either moving in a predetermined direction or he was not; Muse prefers an obviously excluded middle ground. The musings of the author as to individual motives are stimulating, but they are often as uncoordinated as this.

Again he is less than fair to Almond during his term as Attorney General. While quite properly emphasizing both his zealousness and the bitterness of his language in public meetings and the courts, Muse relegates to a colorless parenthetical phrase Almond's courageous and abrupt legal dismissal of the nonsense of interposition as a legal doctrine. One must recognize, too, as Muse does not, that a distinction between the binding force of Supreme Court decisions and acceptance of such decisions as legally proper is much more than hair-splitting—and that such a distinction bears the imprimatur of some of our greatest political figures.

The strength of the book is in its clearly disciplined narrative. A great service is performed in rescuing many arresting events from the fate of ephemera. Among these is the story of the "Grammer school" (sic) sign over a makeshift "non-public" school—an educational adventure designed to evade the Court decision. Notable, too, is the deft handling of such incidents as Almond's separate but equal "two-flagpole" policy to prevent overtures of Federal Supremacy.

On the other hand, the indecision in interpretation of individual motivation extends to Muse's framework; basically the volume is not informed by an underlying and consistent approach to political phenomena. At times the author speaks the language of determinism; but that is often followed by assertions and even preachings on individual responsibility and influence. No attempt is made to justify the brief cryptic categories of analysis or the apodictic judgments on political tides.

In short, while it rises to a very high level of journalism indeed, *Virginia's Massive Resistance* remains basically an arresting chronology of a particularly critical aspect of a most vital development in our history. But skill, discipline, candor, and compassion make Muse's volume a massive challenge to social scientists—a challenge to add new dimensions of understanding to this type of high-level journalistic analysis.—SAMUEL KRISLOV, *Michigan State University*.

Robert Livingston (1654–1728) and the Politics of Colonial New York. BY LAWRENCE H. LEDER (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961. Pp. xii, 306. $6.00.)

The Livingstons have had a good year, what with Dangerfield's biography of the Chancellor and this new life of the Chancellor's great-grandfather. The great-grandson appears mild and indolent when compared with the singleminded and determined man who successfully made his way in colonial New York politics and trade.

The son of a dissenting Scottish minister, Livingston had been brought up in Holland where he had early tasted independence as a merchant and, as important, had become bilingual. When only twenty, he crossed the Atlantic and soon moved on to Albany. Here he started in a small way as merchant and holder of minor public offices.

Livingston's marriage in 1679 to the young widow of Nicholas Van Rensselaer was the big step forward. He gained a wife of capabilities approaching his own. Further, admission into this important family gave him an entree into larger affairs, the most significant of which was that of contracting to provision the British troops stationed in the colony. This required a taste for politics, since payment depended, at the very least, upon the closest relations with the governor of the colony. Despite a remarkable skill in gaining official confidence, Livingston's lifelong problem was that of getting paid.

One's first impression of the book is that it is devoted to an enumeration of Livingston's accounts and claims. These turn out to be the central theme upon which all else hangs.

Livingston did or did not get paid for a number of reasons. First, there wasn't enough specie in the colonies to settle all transactions in cash. Further, the small colonial revenues were not enough for all the needs of the government. Moreover, few New York governors ever gained sufficient influence with the Assembly to secure increased taxes. But we can be assured that a man as grasping as Livingston would get what money there was, so there must be additional reasons for his continuing troubles. And they are easily found in the prevailing political conditions.

In the colonial New York of Livingston's time factions were the units of political power. Their principle of action was revenge first and then rewards. For example, Livingston became a special target of the Leislerians, although Professor Leder does not clearly explain why this was so. The self-centered Livingston could not really be claimed by any faction. He was in prudent exile in Connecticut when Leisler was sentenced to be hanged in 1691. Leder further suggests that Governor Sloughter had arrived in the colony with fixed ideas about the rebel leader. But when Governor Bellomont died in 1701 and the Leislerians came into power, Livingston was in real trouble. He not only couldn't get payment on his claims, he even had his estates confiscated.

The arrival of the rapacious Cornbury as successor to Bellomont brought little relief and Livingston had to turn to London. This trip to England, the second of two that he had to make to get his claims settled, took three years to achieve satisfaction.

In view of the necessity of such a procedure, it must be admitted that Livingston's career and continued success appear incredible. Admitting that obstacles only spurred him on to greater efforts, the truth must be that, in colonial New York, Livingston was indispensable. He not only charmed each one of a succession of governors, but he became the right arm of each one of them. He knew the Indians and they trusted him. He could get credit and supplies as apparently no other man could. And, of course, in the end he was usually paid and so stayed on.

The narrative sticks so closely to Livingston that it is difficult to get a perspective on the wider problems of imperial management. The policy-making in London lies wholly outside this story. But the worm's eye view here given leaves the impression that this was no way to run an empire.—STANLEY D. ROSE, Department of Justice, *Washington, D. C.*

American Indians. BY WILLIAM T. HAGAN. (The Chicago History of American Civilization.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Pp viii, 190. $4.50.)

From the earliest Colonial days to the present, White and Indian have associated in America, often sporadically and unpleasantly. The consistent and harrowing retreat of the Indian and the destruction of his property, his culture, and, in many cases, his identity form one of the more unpleasant segments of our history. Professor Hagan has compressed this chronicle of conflict into a brief volume in which there are no wasted words, no literary detours. As an outline of Indian-White relations, most of which have been associated with government, the book offers a valuable reference tool to the political scientist.

The author begins his narrative in the English Colonial period, in which much of the pattern of intercultural strife originated. Few White names emerge from this or from later periods with any claim to understanding and fair dealing. Subsequent removals of tribes across the Mississippi were to be accomplished, often with severe hardship and loss of life. The experiences of the Creeks and particularly of the Cherokees in this removal are fairly well known; the author adds in some detail the story of the Winnebagos, who, in less than forty years, were forced to cede land in seven different negotiations, involving six possible changes of residence. That any tribal organization could survive in the face of such dislocations is remarkable.

Yet tribal organization did remain, through the abortive search for an Indian messiah, through the futile attempts to convert the tribes to sedentary farming, and even through the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 which attempted to divide tribal collective ownership of land into individual holdings. The author sees a new concern for the Indian with the publication of the Meriam Report of 1928, in the Hoover administration, and particularly under Roosevelt when John Collier served as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. World War II, with its conscription of Indians and with its opportunities for off-reservation employment, did much to bring the Indian more closely into American life. Since that time the relations between the two groups have been marked by national pressure, now relaxing to some extent, to bring about the termination of tribal existence.

In addition to his recital of facts the author weaves several threads of interpretation. American Indians were and to some extent still are a diverse people with differing values and levels of acculturation. To regard all Indians as "typical" is an oversimplification in White thinking. In spite of great differences between the tribes most Indian groups practiced a democratic individualism (some would say anarchism) which made discipline in war difficult and inter-tribal unity in peace impossible. In repeated instances Mr. Hagan shows that, even in the face of the greatest danger, Indians could not confederate for any appreciable length of time. All leaders who undertook the role of inter-tribal commanders failed. As the Whites pressed westward, this lack of Indian unity hastened the defeat of the tribes.

Following the War of 1812, except for the brief interlude of the Civil War, the Indians ceased to be a major problem for the United States. Individual settlers and frontier areas might be made miserable, but there was no doubt as to which civilization would prevail. Earlier, with French, Spanish, and British allies theoretically and often practically available, the Indian position in war and at the conference table had been much stronger. The author offers no evidence that this clash of Indian and White could have been avoided, although he implies that amelioration would have been possible.

The title of the book is unfortunate. The work does not describe American Indians, but rather their relationship with the Whites. In spite of the careful use and economy of words much is left unsaid in the 171 pages of descriptive text. Inevitably, because of the intricacy of the subject, a large number of Indian tribes pass across the pages, often identified only by name and by such fragments of incidents as to be confusing to those not learned in Indian history. In this compression there is a tendency to allocate space equally among many tribes. From reading this volume one would never realize that today almost one reservation Indian in four is a Navajo and that the area, wealth, and unity of this tribe constitute a basis for separate status among Indians. Also, for the political scientist, the last eleven pages of the book, those dealing with the present-day problems of termination, are probably the most meaningful and could have been expanded with profit. The volume contains a good bibliography, largely of secondary sources.—WARREN WESTON, *University of Denver*.

County Government in Illinois. BY CLYDE F. SNIDER AND IRVING HOWARDS. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1960. Pp. x, 171.)

A monograph written almost twenty years ago by one of that remarkable succession of scholars of county government at the University of Illinois—Fairlie, Kneier, and Snider—now reappears in revised form under joint authorship. Clyde F. Snider, the original author, and Irving Howards, of Southern Illinois University, did not need to do a great deal of revision from the original document which was printed among the annual reports of the Illinois Tax Commission. They are able still to characterize Illinois county government as "a vast array of officers, boards, and commissions, together with their respective employees." At least for rural areas, the authors probably would not dissent from the judgment of the late John A. Fairlie, uttered nearly fifty years ago, that Illinois county government "has proved entirely inadequate to the complex social and industrial problems of today."

After an interesting historical chapter, this little book presents essentially a statutory study, with occasional legal references to court decisions. Illinois county government in recent decades has experienced a growth in services, an increase in state supervision, some shuffling of offices, some increase in the number of authorized tax rates, a limited dipping into the till of the sales tax. Archaic and unused statutory provisions remain. One office, anyway, has disappeared during the twenty years, that of county surveyor. A multi-county metropolitan planning commission of northeastern Illinois, including Cook County, has come into existence as a notable innovation.

Cook County, containing Chicago, with more than one-half of the population of the state, merits separate consideration from the remaining one hundred and one counties. The authors do not note that at the same time that a Cook County purchasing agent was authorized, a department of maintenance and operation was also authorized. This department is responsible for more than one hundred buildings, including a large county hospital. The position of superintendent of public service, still in the statutes, no longer is filled. The authors do not mention a curious constitutional provision affecting elective offices in Cook County. Each year the circuit judges of the county must approve the number of employees, on the recommendation of a "committee of help" of their own number. The county board then fixes their salaries. Statutes provide for a civil service commission for Cook County, exempting, however, employees in elective offices and some others. About one-fifth of county employees are exempted, and temporary service serves to undermine further a merit service. The authors do not discuss these realities. Also, although they point out that the president of the Cook County board can operate to some extent as a county executive, they do not indicate that the county clerk likewise can develop a power position. It was from this post that the present mayor of Chicago emerged.

A short chapter on special districts has disappeared from the original study. In Cook County especially, a forest preserve district is strikingly important, being headed by the county board ex officio.

This little book has the limitations inherent in its scope. It represents solid spade-work, nevertheless, and should be welcomed back into print. —Dale Pontius, *Roosevelt University*.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Franklin L. Burdette
University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

The French Radical Party From Herriot to Mendès-France. By Francis de Tarr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xx, 264. $5.60.)

In discussing the politics of the Fourth Republic nothing comes easier than a tone of *de mortuis nihil nisi malum.* And no party lends itself more readily to caustic survey than the Radicals, those tireless practitioners of the misunderstood arts of compromise and mediation. Even many who allow that the narrow *esprit d'église* of other parties and the precarious balance of political forces made an 'accommodating' *parti de gouvernement* indispensable find it hard to forgive the Radicals for making the essential so personally profitable. Watching the portfolio-grubbing, they reflect with Jefferson that when a man has cast a longing eye on office a rottenness begins in his conduct. One thinks of the Corsican deputy Arrighi, driven to sedition and the invasion of his native isle in 1958 by the humiliation of being *radical sans être ancien ministre.*

Francis de Tarr reminds us of the Radicals' astonishing success (which was largely the consequence of the frighteningly slender margin by which the Republic clung to life). This dying party, unable to win even a tenth of the popular vote, nevertheless supplied Prime Ministers for ten Fourth Republic governments and had its men in all but one (the fleeting Blum ministry of 1946). Its motto might might well seem to be Webster Flanagan's timeless cry of "What are we here for, except the offices?"

But Mr. de Tarr presents us with another face of radicalism. He shows us that the party was always something more than a syndicate of *ministrables* or an opportunist electoral machine. Even in this most flexible of parties passions ran deep and men cared for doctrines as well as for fleeting alliances.

This scholarly, readable account is both entertaining and depressing. Entertaining because the author has a keen eye for the absurd and a delicate touch of irony. Depressing because he documents the oratorical extravagances of party congresses and the stage armies battling for control of the machine with phantom legions of 'members' created by fraudulent purchases of party cards. But through this *opêra buffon* atmosphere one is aware that all the while the Republic was dying of just such contradictions and indecision. Without straying from his subject Mr. de Tarr has succeeded remarkably in illuminating the downfall of the entire regime.

Essentially the author traces the Party's convulsive struggle for survival from its renaissance at the Liberation to its disruption in the last months of the Republic. He first attempts the difficult and inherently inconclusive task of defining Radicalism. He finds that themes like respect for the Revolution and the rights of private property, republicanism and the defense of *laïcité* were common to all Radicals. But all had been devalued or appropriated by other parties. Indeed one wonders whether a *parti de gouvernement* is, by definition, capable of maintaining a corpus of distinctive doctrine. The Radicals were living on their doctrinal capital. The Classical Radicals, one of six strands in the party analyzed in detail, wanted nothing better than to live comfortably with the slogans of 1910. Mr. de Tarr shows them, marked by Alain's provincialism and incipient anarchism, attempting to hold tight the brake on progress in a rapidly changing world.

Elsewhere new ideas were stirring. Mr. de Tarr continues with a careful survey of the Radicals' response to these fresh political currents and doctrines. At the Liberation, when the political fashion was to be leftist, the Left Radicals came into prominence, urging the *union des gauches*, a traditional Radical cry, and calling for the adoption of left-wing programmes. As the pendulum swung, the Gaullist Radicals came to the fore and vanished in turn. In both instances we see the party carried for a time by the new current, until the tide turns and the opportunists change orthodoxy, the leadership cracks down, and the 'extremists,' whether Gaullist or Leftist, withdraw or are expelled.

As the cold war developed, those voices urging the party to abandon the tradition of 'no enemies on the Left' were inevitably more influential. The foremost advocates of alliances with the Right were the neo-Radicals. Men such as René Mayer and Jean-Paul David, coming mainly from the urban *milieux d'affaires*, combined a nuanced position on *laïcité* with unyielding colonial policies, 'Europeanism,' and a concern with economic development which, though it was new to radicalism, they shared with the *mendésistes*.

During the neo-Radical heyday in the early fifties new strains emerged, leading indirectly to poujadism and neo-gaullism elsewhere, which found their Radical expression in *mendésisme.* Mr. de Tarr shows that while Mendès-France brought into the party the only significant infusion of the new blood it so desperately needed, his attempt to force it back into the forgotten paths of Clemenceau was a disastrous failure, perhaps inevitably so. The head-on battle with neo-Radicals and *radicaux de gestion* over the form that modern Radicalism should take ended in schism and defeat.

Such a summary is unfair, for the value of Mr. de Tarr's work lies in its close-knit detail. But some of his themes are recurrent. He shows us that men whose reputations are tarnished could act honorably, that if there were always opportunists every cause had its genuine supporters. He reminds us that Radicals could avocate unpopular policies, take political risks and even (rarely) go out into the wilderness. And we see that despite the party's reputation for tolerance, resignations and expulsions were legion—no small cause of its decline. The case for the *parti de gouvernement* is forceful and convincing.

Yet, while Mr. de Tarr is not uncritical I find him systematically over-indulgent. Three points must suffice. Not a few Radicals' doctrinal position was fortified, to put it delicately, by the funds of the *patronat*, the Comité Mascuraud or the North African lobby, but such influences are only lightly touched on. Mr. de Tarr twice insists that the Radicals 'came closer to representing France' than other parties, as if this somehow excused them. Granted, French politicians had perilously little room for maneuver, yet they need not on that account have been reduced merely to reflecting their society; their duty was to strive constantly to broaden their field of autonomous decision—to lead and inform. The author even contends that 'the party's leaders were remarkably proficient in presenting basic issues to the French public.' Yet when the fog of unreality about public issues spread over France in the fifties how many Radical leaders fought for enlightenment? These courageous few cannot justify so complaisant a generalisation about a party whose spokesmen also numbered men like Morice, Martinaud-Déplat and Bourgès-Maunoury.

In May 1958 Sirius rightly wrote of the "folly of those politicians who thought they could indefinitely confound the art of governing with that of evasion, cheating and lying"; many of these were Radicals. The Radicals can neither be made scapegoats nor acquitted. I suspect that Mr. de Tarr would agree; if he emphasizes the case for the defense it may be because the prosecution's *réquisitoire* is so well known (Perhaps the book should be read together with Michel Debré's *Ces princes qui nous gouvernent*—worth re-reading anyway with compassion and a sense of historical irony.) But if charity is carried to a fault, the book is nevertheless a most valuable and stimulating addition to French studies. One wishes that other French parties, so sparsely represented in monographs, would find as able an exponent.—MARTIN HARRISON. *Nuffield College, Oxford.*

Britain's Search for Health. BY PAUL F. GEMMILL. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961. Pp. 171. $5.00.)

Professor Gemmill's little book on the National Health Service is obviously a labor of love He spent much time on it over a period of four years, including a seven-month "on the spot" survey in Britain (which he proudly proclaims to have been wholly unsponsored); he read most of what there is to read on the subject, talked to most of the knowledgeable people, and, best of all, took the trouble to canvass a large number of NHS patients and practitioners. The resulting book is carefully put together, unpretentious, and clear. Not least, it is eminently fair; what advocacy it contains emerges from the data rather than from any special pleading on Gemmill's part. And it successfully conveys something of the atmosphere of the National Health Service, of its day-to-day operations, vexations and benefits. All this is to the good.

The trouble is that the book does not really make good its claims. Professor Gemmill says that the intent of his work is to tell the reader "how the Health Service came into being, what it is like today, and how the British people feel about it." I do not think that it really does any of these things.

The story of how the Health Service came into being is a fascinating chapter in British decision-making; it can provide much insight into the forces underlying the contemporary British welfare state, and it holds a great many lessons for Americans who are concerned about the condition of their medical services. But Gemmill's chapter on the subject is so brief and oversimplified as to be almost useless. It contains little or nothing about the forces of opinion leading toward the service, the condition of medicine in Britain prior to the NHS, the various shades of opinion on it in the medical profession, or the very complicated negotiations which led to its creation.

In regard to "what the NHS is like today," we are told something, but very little. No one can get any idea out of this book of how the service is organized, planned, or operated, how its parts are coordinated, how terms of contract are enforced, or what role medical advice plays in its operation—to mention only a few important matters on which even the general reader might like some information. Above all, the book presents little information on the hospital and specialist part of the service, and this part of the tripartite NHS provided, after all, its principal *raison d'etre* and consumes the largest amount of the resources, human and non-human, devoted to it. Nor does the book contain much about local authority services—though in this case, admittedly, there is not too much to say. It is essentially a book about general practice, and only certain aspects of that.

On "how the British people feel about the NHS," more information is provided; indeed, the chief utility of the book lies in the findings of Professor Gemmill's "on the spot" survey of British doctors' and patients' attitudes toward the NHS. But these findings are to some extent impugned by the nature of his survey. There is no need to go into the technical reasons for this here, for Gemmill himself admits that his findings do not necessarily reflect accurately British public or medical opinions. They do, however, confirm the personal impressions of practically everyone who has had a close look at such attitudes, and provide for such impressions some rather shaky, though not wholly unserviceable, quantitative underpinnings.

The picture that emerges is that the British, doctors and patients, like the Service—like it very much, and apparently like it better now than when they first got it. For example, 87 per cent of Professor Gemmill's respondents thought they were now getting better medical services (or the same standard of services) than before 1948 (37 per cent better, 50 per cent the same), and 91 per cent thought the various kinds of services provided under NHS were "satisfactory." Among persons who had been seriously ill since 1948, 76 per cent reported that they had received excellent care and only 2.2 per cent reported poor treatment. The vast majority of general practitioners (87 per cent) thought that the medical needs of the country were now better met than before the NHS, and only 3 per cent said they were less well met. While general practitioners were two to one against the Service in 1944 (on the BMA's "Questionary" on the National Government's White Paper), those in Gemmill's sample were two to one in favor of it if given the choice to go back and start over again.

While some doctors and some patients can be found to criticize practically every part of the Service, a majority is in favor not only of its general principles and structure, but every particular aspect of it on which questions were asked—except only for two: a majority of doctors thought they should be paid more (hardly surprising) and a majority of them also thought that private patients should be entitled to receive drugs on the same terms as NHS patients (also not surprising). All the American bugaboos about socialized medicine—that it leads to demanding patients, malingering in hospitals, doctors unwilling or unable to provide good services, long queues at doctors' offices, and so on—turn out to be pathetically unfounded in fact; the wonder is that people can keep on believing this kind of nonsense in the face of every conceivable kind of evidence.

The comments by patients which Professor Gemmill has collected are touching evidence of the enormous good a system like the NHS can do, even when it falls short of its founders' visions. Professor Gemmill, in his conclusion, quotes (apparently in agreement) what an American journalist wrote some years ago in *Harper's Magazine:* "The National Health Service has become a source of genuine national pride. . . . Britons know that there may be more spectacular examples of medical skill or research or treatment in the United States or elsewhere. But in their country more of the population get better medical care than in any other major country on earth."—HARRY ECKSTEIN, *Princeton University.*

Must Labour Lose? BY MARK ABRAMS AND RICHARD ROSE. (Baltimore: Penguin Books Ltd., 1960. Pp. 127. $0.85.)

Two of Britain's best practitioners of the suspect art, "political sociology," tackle the question which obviously arises when a major party loses three successive elections, each by a larger margin than the former. The book also contains a soul-searching commentary by the well-known editor of *Socialist Commentary,* Rita Hinden. The whole package is a fascinating attempt to delve into the wellsprings of British political behavior.

The answers will not dispel the gloom that must surround Transport House. Before making out a more optimistic case for forthcoming elections, Miss Hinden summarizes the answer, "Yes, it must—at least in the near future." Since this specific should surprise no one, the reader will probably be more interested in the knowledge he can gain of British contemporary opinions and in Richard Rose's attempts to formulate from them a kind of theory of British voting behavior.

Abrams and Rose constructed a questionnaire for depth interviewing of a very small sample drawn from random constituencies throughout Britain. It is impossible to evaluate their techniques, as these are stated in no detail. They apologize for the small size of the sample, but this should be no real problem if their techniques were adequate. One could think of numerous additional items for their schedule—and we could indeed wish this sort of probing could be done through time. Would that the British had the financial resources available to their wealthier American counterparts!

The survey was deliberately aimed at the question in the work's title with the consequence that this is not a full survey, by any means, of British electoral behavior. Perhaps, in view of the Greenwich and Bristol studies, it does not need to be; but I for one wish it could have been. It was certainly not designed to lead to generalized or comparative knowledge.

With these deliberate reservations, the survey provides some interesting material for speculation. Not many should be surprised to know that the image of the Labour Party is one of "working class," the "party favoring the welfare state," and the "protector of the underdog." Perhaps more interesting is the degree to which all groups—including Labour supporters—rate these as less important attributes of a party than those characteristics they assign either to the Tories or to both parties equally. Of particular interest are the responses of the respondents in the age group eighteen to twenty-four. This category was deliberately overweighted in the total to give an adequate sample. The changes in British class structure and social mobility and the changes in the working class are readily apparent here. And clearly the Conservatives are winning the battle of images, if these data are an indication.

One area of the survey attempted to appraise reactions to Labour Party programs of nationalizing industry and working toward greater economic and social equality. Interestingly, voters of all groups and supporters of all parties appear to react in similar fashion, judging the nationalized areas pragmatically and industry by industry and desiring no more of either nationalization or equalization. The fundamentalist socialists will receive little comfort from this portion of the survey. Indeed, the tumult raised in the Labour Party when these answers were written up in *Socialist Commentary* a year ago indicated that one must put one's head in the sand to have much immediate hope for the "Victory for Socialism" brand of purism. No light is shed upon the cleavages of the 1960 Conference on neutralism, except to show that world peace and prevention of nuclear war are primary concerns of an overwhelming majority and that neither party seems to gain in this area. No specific questions on foreign policy were included in the questionnaire.

Rose ably dispenses with much nonsense about British voting, particularly relationships between class and partisanship; but his efforts to construct his own framework are less successful. Perhaps they will aid the Labour Party in its electioneering, though this reader doubts it. His categories are largely descriptive and on a superficial level. They cannot lend themselves to generalized knowledge and are far too culture bound (admittedly, this was his purpose) to submit to comparative analysis. Miss Hinden's speculations about the Labour Party's future will certainly add fuel to internal party battles; to an American they make sense. What sense they will make to their intended audience, only the next few years will tell.—JOHN H. MILLETT, *University of Wichita.*

The Glory of Parliament. BY HARRY BOARDMAN. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1961. Pp. xv, 208. $3.95.)

Harry Boardman was a journalist on the Liberal *Manchester Guardian.* In 1929 he was appointed the London political correspondent of the paper, and from 1939 until his death in 1958 he was the Parliamentary correspondent, reporting parliamentary developments from the vantage-point of a seat in the Press Gallery. This book reproduces just over fifty contributions Boardman wrote for the *Guardian* during these years; because of their nature they are fairly brief, with an average length of about 1,500 words.

Many of the pieces selected by the editor, Francis Boyd, describe the scene in the Commons on the occasion of major debates. We can re-live *inter alia* the 1940 debate that led to the fall of the Chamberlain government, the parliamentary scenes on D-Day and on victory in Europe, how Mr. Bevan introduced the National Health Service Bill and how the usually placid Attlee was stung to anger by Churchillian criticism of the Labour government's India policy. A section of the book is devoted to the political situation at the time of Suez. Another group of essays assesses the stature of individual political leaders: there are pieces on Ramsey MacDonald, Samuel, Baldwin, Simon, Attlee, Gaitskell and, of course, Winston Churchill. There is also a lot about Boardman's special hero, Lloyd George.

It is a stern test to place between hard covers material on current events written for the press, and written, moreover, often under pressure of time. Boardman emerges from the test with much credit. His prose remains crisp and compelling. The pen-pictures of the men and moods of Parliament are drawn with firm but sensitive strokes. In nearly every page one can sense deep attachment to parliamentary institutions, and Boardman is unhappy when the Commons seem to him to fall below the requirements of the hour. This is not sensational journalism: there are no 'inside' stories: there are no tales of plots and plotters: there are no villains. And if Winston Churchill is a hero, at least some of his faults are seen.

The Glory of Parliament is in no sense an academic contribution to the study of politics. The evaluations of leading statesmen will not influence the verdict of history. I doubt if Lloyd George's memories (in 1940) of Marshal Foch are of significance. Probably the main value of this book is that it will give readers outside Britain a balanced impression of the House of Commons and the atmosphere in which it works. Even so, there can be no real substitute—as Boardman would have been the first to agree—for going to Westminster and seeing the Commons in the flesh.—PETER G. RICHARDS, *University of Southampton.*

The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development. BY FRANK H. GOLAY. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961. Pp. 455. $6.75.)

Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn. BY LEON WOLFF. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961. Pp. 383. $4.95.)

The economic and political development of the Republic of the Philippines is of special interest to Americans because it represents the major United States experience in colonial rule. These two books cover two aspects of that relationship: the process of acquiring and occupying the Islands and the accomplishments of Filipinos after independence.

Leon Wolff has written a popular historical account of the beginning of American-Filipino relations from George Dewey's initial mission to destroy the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in May 1898 to the capture of the Filipino insurgent leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, in early 1901. Wolff describes the blundering of American military men as they tried to carry out the vague and uninformed policies prescribed by President McKinley and his cabinet. Not until the arrival of the first Commissioner, William Howard Taft, in September 1900 did civilian authority attempt to sort out the responsibilities undertaken during that feverish period of jingoism and nationalism. Military men had committed the United States to destroy the Filipino Revolutionary government and pacify the population by force. Policy makers were either unable or unwilling to find an alternative to the policy adopted by military men on the scene although, as Wolff points out, alternatives to complete subjugation existed. Filipino leaders were willing to compromise for less than complete independence.

Wolff bases his narrative on the assumption that the insurgents had overwhelming popular support and thus he ignores the arguments of other American historians that the Revolution was essentially a Tagalog uprising confined to Central Luzon. Wolff himself writes that the populace supported Aguinaldo because they feared his forces and reports that Tagalog insurgents were sent to resist American landings in the Visayan areas as far away as Cebu and Panay. Although these facts do not belie his assumption of widespread popular support, they do call for some explanation. Wolff casts no new light on other matters of controversy among historians such as the extent to which the American consuls in Singapore and Hong Kong committed the United States to the insurgent aims. However, in spite of the shortcomings as historical analysis, *Little Brown Brother* is a fascinating account of a subject many Americans choose to forget.

Dr. Golay's book is an appraisal of the aims and consequences of policies adopted by the government of the Republic of the Philippines in the recent postwar period. "National income in the eight years following 1950 increased by 56 per cent while per capita income is estimated to have increased by one-third." The economy grew even though Filipinos lack the will to economize and the contribution of Filipino savings to capital investment is small. The government has not enforced tax laws, raised revenues or made use of the windfalls resulting from import and exchange controls. Social changes in attitudes and values brought on by urbanization, public education and the dislocations of war spur growth despite the government's haphazard and uncoordinated activities. Government failure to regulate and enforce exchange and import controls allows energetic entrepreneurs to make huge profits. The failure to enforce tax laws encourages investment. The political popularity of economic nationalism, aimed mainly at a large and prosperous Chinese minority, has further encouraged Filipino entrepreneurs. Golay concludes that the chronic foreign exchange crisis can be alleviated by devaluation of the peso and increased production of export goods.

Golay has dealt with a wide range of policies and problems and has analysed them thoroughly. But his analysis of each separate aspect of the economy leaves the reader with a fragmented picture of the total situation. One wishes he had placed his analysis in the framework of the political process wherein policy decisions are made.

The picture of the political process which results from this analysis is that of an industrialized elite competing successfully with landed agrarian interests for political power. Income and wealth are still highly correlated with political power; and the rural mass, with a per capita income Golay estimates to be not more than one-fourth of the national per capita income, remains impoverished and politically alienated. This is not, however, the whole story. The Filipino rural citizen participates actively in politics and he does so with a clear expectation of a *quid pro quo* in the form of welfare services, jobs or money. The particularistic character of Filipino political demands is an outgrowth of the social structure and behavior patterns which emphasize the power character of inter-personal relations and provide well understood reciprocal relations for landlord-tenant, politician-voter. This situation presents serious difficulties in the formation of pluralistic associations which would articulate group demands in the political process. Filipino individualism shows itself in Golay's analysis of the economy as basically an entrepreneurial and enterprise type of development which is committed to capitalism to a unique extent.

The Western reader cannot help being critical, as Golay is, of the "harshness of economic development" which seems to make the rich richer and the poor poorer, just as the political scientist cannot help being critical of political development which seems to put an unconscionable amount of power in the hands of the wealthy. Nevertheless the emphasis on person-to-person relations and on open manipulation of persons does give the rural masses a bargaining weight that enables them to participate directly in the distribution of national resources. Open bargaining has allowed for stable economic and political development and the gradual inclusion of the masses into the new society. Community development, increased local autonomy and social welfare measures have been initiated in response to articulate rural demands. These demands will increase as more concessions are made and greater economic aspirations created.

Golay's analysis provides a solid foundation for an understanding of the Philippine achievement and as such is an important contribution to the field of economic and political development.—THELMA JEAN GROSSHOLTZ, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry, The Agrarian Impact on Philippine Politics, 1953–1956. BY FRANCES LUCILLE STARNER. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 294. $6.00.)

Planning For Progress, The Administration of Economic Planning in the Philippines. BY R. S. MILNE. (Manila: Institute of Public Administration and Institute of Economic Development and Research, University of the Philippines. 1960. Pp. xiii, 238. No price.)

Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry, The Agrarian Impact on Philippine Politics, 1953–1956 by Frances Lucille Starner is a lucid and valuable account of politics and agrarian reform in the Philippines concentrating on the years since World War II and culminating in the Land Reform Bill of 1955. On the whole the story is not one to inspire confidence in the capacities of the democratic process to effect fundamental land reform in a developing agricultural country, particularly when one realizes that in such matters as education, lack of population pressure on available land and the institutions of political democracy the Philippines are in an enviable position in Southeast Asia. The problems of the agrarian system have their origins in previous centuries but as Miss Starner indicates, the present problems of increasing tenancy, size of holdings, credit and the like are essentially those of the twentieth century. Initial American efforts to effect reform in 1903 bore little fruit and in succeeding years further attempts unsupported by Filipino politicians failed to make much headway. President Manuel Quezon eloquently urged social justice for the common *tao,* but it was justice meted out by Quezon, not demanded by the peasantry. "What distinguished the Magsaysay program was its emphasis upon the common people, and especially the peasantry, as a major source of political power. If the peasantry, who constituted the bulk of the lower economic class in the Philippines, could achieve effective political authority, reform would no longer depend on the paternalistic impulses of an elitist government, or alternatively upon pressures from abroad. Rather it would derive from the needs and desires of the common *tao,* as expressed through regular political channels." It is Miss Starner's thesis that the Magsaysay movement was an important, possibly a permanent step in the direction of this desideratum, though without Magsaysay the effectiveness of the Philippine peasantry to achieve its aims "through regular political channels" is further attenuated. Her careful and systematic use of 1949 and 1953 election statistics in conjunction with data on population, land-holding and local political peculiarities is revealing and is a healthy antidote to facile generalizations about the peasantry and politics. Generalizations about peasant attitudes and political behavior can be made with less confidence because of the limited nature of the survey undertaken and of previous surveys, although the conclusions do accord with other studies. The impressiveness of the Magsaysay victory in 1953 was in no small part occasioned by the increase in voter participation by the peasantry, despite the fact that Magsaysay's policies were vague. The problem of translating election victory to policy performance was difficult. Enactment of the Land Reform Bill of 1955 was a remarkable legislative achievement in itself, although again in the Philippines the distance between legislative enactment and administrative execution is vast, to say the least. Even before enactment the powerful forces opposing reform managed to amend the bill in such a fashion as to make it almost impossible to execute. In addition the appropriation process, the courts, and the administrators themselves constitute further inhibitions to implementation. All these factors serve to lessen the significance of the statute as a standard for actual reform, though the statute is now on the books and it is a political milestone. Miss Starner recognizes these lights and shadows with proper objectivity and concludes on a realistic note of uncertainty.

The second volume, *Planning For Progress, The Administration of Economic Planning,* edited by R. S. Milne, is related to the first in that it too deals with public policy formation. Whereas Miss Starner is concerned with politics, pressure groups, the Presidency and Congress in the formulation of agrarian reform measures, Mr. Milne is concerned with policy formation and implementation essentially in the executive branch but also with the involvement of Congress and private groups. *Planning For Progress* is basically concerned with the role of the National Economic Council in the Philippines. The book grew out of a series of lectures given at the University of the Philippines by high government officials and informed Filipino businessmen. In addition many of these persons participated in succeeding seminar discussions. The result is a frank and healthy discussion and conflict of views. Background material is provided on the economic setting and Mr. Milne has concluded with a thoughtful and penetrating analysis. In the nature of the case there is unevenness of presentation and some material is included which only tangentially deals with the role of the National Economic Council, but the impact of the whole is an open confrontation of a significant issue. To state it simply, the lot of the Council has not been a happy one. Mr. Filemon C. Rodriguez, a former chairman of the Council, stated: "From the standpoint of concrete results, such as the formal adoption and faithful implementation of plans and policies formulated by it, however, it (the Council) did not have a single explicit national plan, recognized and accepted, much less implemented, by the Government and the people as a whole. It can thus be truthfully said that the plans the Council has produced could not have influenced significantly the course and speed of our economic development." In 1956 the Council was reorganized to include four members from Congress and additional staff was provided. It is, none the less, a staff aid to the President and Presidents to date have on the whole ignored its advice. The Central Bank by determining monetary policy and the Budget Commission by establishing fiscal policy have all but pre-empted the Council's planning function. Indeed, Mr. Milne holds that "It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, effectively, the Budget Commission has taken over the major share of the economic planning functions in the Philippines." Proposals for reform involve decisions of politics and economic policies of the highest level and significantly none of the lecturers anticipated that the Council's role would be substantially enhanced in the near future despite the awkwardness of the present arrangement. Mr. Rodriguez believed that the basic difficulty was that "We (Filipinos) as a people, including many of our leaders, are not yet conditioned to accept in our minds the necessity and urgency of country programming in the Philippines."

Both of these volumes are perceptive and tough-minded additions to a growing body of literature on politics and economics in the Philippines. Each in its own way supports the contention that in a country like the Philippines struggling to achieve economic take-off it is the bold scholar indeed who will predict even qualified success whether it is land reform or economic planning.—GEORGE A. PEEK, JR., *University of Michigan.*

Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century. BY KUNG-CHUAN HSIAO. (Seattle: University of Washington Publications on Asia, sponsored by the Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington Press, 1960. Pp. xiii, 783. $9.75.)

The organization of rural communes in mainland China, and the currently publicized difficulties of the Communist regime in sustaining rural morale, give a very special meaning and a highly contemporary importance to Professor Hsiao's analysis of a vital aspect of Imperial government in China. However, such bonus values are hardly needed to place this volume on the "must read" lists of students of politics, social organization, anthropology and Asian affairs. It is a minutely documented account of the techniques and results of Oriental Despotism (to use the classical terminology so aptly revived by K. A. Wittfogel) bearing down upon the countryside. The relationship of organized power to simple, relatively isolated villages has been a problem of central importance in modern theories of socio-political development, expecially those springing from the literature of Marxism, neo-Marxism and anti-Marxism. That a subject so white-hot could be treated in a calm, restrained manner which brings forth more light than heat, is a testament to the breadth, tolerance, and gently humorous wisdom of Professor Hsiao. He lets his carefully accumulated evidence for the most part speak for itself, and makes a successful effort to present a well-balanced, comprehensive picture of a rural society caught up in a process of decay and tortured stagnation. It is to the credit of our large centers of Asian studies, such as those at Harvard and the University of Washington, that they embarked on their series of 19th century studies even before the great changes in modern China became matters of daily headlines and urgent public policy. It is impossible to whip up useful "background studies" on short notice, and the past fifteen years of painstaking research carried on in the above projects now bear very full fruit.

The difficulties of carrying forward satisfactory study on peasant societies of the past are manifest. For although in primarily agrarian societies everyone talked about the peasants, nobody did anything about them—and this includes the recording of their lives. Thus while we know a great deal about the rulers and the ten percent who served them as officials, members of the rural gentry, or urban merchants and artisans, we know practically nothing about the ninety percent who made China what it was, who fought her wars, toppled her emperors, and produced the raw material from which was wrought one of the most splendid civilizations the world has seen. Overcoming his understandable trepidations, the author has attempted to set down a systematic account of exactly how the peasant was ruled and controlled. Following the Confucian admonition "cheng ming" ("set names aright"), he has traced the overlapping administrative systems and social institutions, massive and minute, which trapped the peasant and privileged subject alike in a web of conformity. This descriptive material provides a substantial basis for future comparative studies. Relying on a mass of local materials as well as official documents and Western travellers' accounts, Dr. Hsiao reconstitutes a living picture of the various elements of rural society, their group activities, their educational facilities, their heroes, oppressors and, most evasive of all, their "common" men. Unavoidably the materials used are uneven, but the author in every instance attempts to evaluate his evidence and to provide balancing views. While concentrating on the 19th century, he traces developments over three centuries, and sometimes as far back as the origins of the Empire itself. What emerges is a vivid tracing of the "great leaps forward" of the Chinese peasantry from one purgatory to the next. The confusion and inefficiency which, coupled with the inherent failure of productivity in a well populated agrarian society, brought the peasant periodically to the edge of starvation and beyond, was the product of the political calculus of a cynical government. Docility, indifference and compliance were stressed at the expense of initiative and resourcefulness. An acute natural disaster was all that was required for social interests to coalesce in violent rejection of the regime. Hsiao stresses repeatedly the essential role of the "intellectuals" in giving direction to peasant outbreaks.

In a postscript the author makes several comparisons between the Manchu regime and the Communists, noting several obvious similarities. These appear to be thin and forced against the weight of his principal subject. For Imperial China wished to preserve agrarian China unchanged, and sought to avoid upsetting its normally placid peasants. The Communists, on the other hand, are making every effort to transform the society, envisioning themselves as the rulers of an industrial giant, whose peasants, in large number, must eventually become a proletariat bound to machines. Professor Hsiao, having stimulated the reader, does not engage in speculation, but is content to leave us with a rare insight into the nature of the rulers and the ruled.—Stanley Spector, *Washington University* (St. Louis).

Italy: School for Awakening Countries By Maurice F. Neufeld (Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1961. Pp. viii, 589, $9.00.)

Maurice Neufeld, a labor economist and historian by training, has few peers among students of the Italian labor movement. He is the author of a first-rate study of grievance committees in Italian industrial plants and has spent a great deal of time in Italy during and since the Second World War.

With this book he fills an important need for an English language history of Italian industrial relations. As a backdrop to the chronicle of labor developments since 1800 Neufeld offers in separate sections a history of Italian politics and a recounting of social and economic developments for the same period. These are comprehensive, though the political history offers little that is new. The author declares in his introduction that his separate treatment of labor history is a deliberate effort to avoid what he regards as the mistake committed by his predecessors in this field: the assumption that labor matters are incidental to the Marxist movement rather than significant in their own right. Both in industrial relations and in political science the emphasis in recent years has been upon rigorous examination of social, economic, and political developments in terms of each other: as integral transactions or as alternative group or individual strategies. Neufeld hews to an older scholarly tradition. His study gains in value as an archival source while losing something in explanatory power.

The author's choice of organization and method is consistent with his normative theory of the role of labor organizations. He believes strongly that the healthy union is one that avoids permanent ties with political parties (especially missionary type parties) while emphasizing collective bargaining with employers, preferably at the local level. American unions would seem to be the model and Selig Perlman their prophet (though Perlman is not cited in the index or bibliography). For an historian with this outlook Italian industrial history in the last century and a half offers boundless opportunities for discouragement, frustration, and viewing with alarm; and a considerable portion of the text is devoted to denouncing Socialist and other political currents as sirens luring Italian workers to treacherous shores.

It does not necessarily follow, as the author often implies or asserts, that more conservative, bread-and-butter oriented unions would do better. In a poverty-ridden land with a meagre national product, collective bargaining is also likely to be a strategy of frustration, and Neufeld sorrowfully recognizes this in his introduction. In the circumstances one wishes there were rather more systematic analysis of the reasons for the courses pursued and rather less regret for what was evidently not feasible. In one respect the author does most astutely explain the hold of doctrinaire parties on Italian workers: he recognizes lofty rhetoric and millenial promises as substitutes in some sense for the material benefits almost always denied. But the reader comes away not at all clear whether the substitution has been inevitable or an avoidable and tragic obstacle to progress. The answer will be found, if at all, only in a systematic social science, not in normative declarations, nor even in a chronicle, however admirable and useful the chronicle is in other respects.

In its subtitle and in occasional other references the book is presented as a guide in some sense to the problems of underdeveloped areas now undergoing rapid industrialization. In my judgment this claim is quite justified even though there is relatively little explicit comparative data or analysis. In the period here covered part of Italy went through the industrial revolution, part of it remained an underdeveloped area, and the peninsula experienced in full measure all the problems we associate with industrialization: nationalism, imperialism, labor exploitation, absentee political and economic control, the politics of pragmatic logrolling, dictatorship, circuses in place of bread, war, and a potent Communist threat.

Neufeld recounts these episodes and their incidents in comprehensive detail. He further provides an appendix of 42 tables showing economic and demographic data trends. Other appendices compare the chief Italian labor confederations in respect to structure, dues collections, and other pertinent information. Still another describes Italian industrial development, by regions, before 1860.

Whether or not he shares the author's values and implicit theory of social process, the reader will find in this book a rich and invaluable archive of information on the economic, social and political events attendant upon the industrialization of Italy. As such it is a major contribution.—MURRAY EDELMAN, *University of Illinois.*

The Idea of the Jewish State. BY BEN HALPERN. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. xiv, 492. $10.00.)

The drama surrounding the establishment of the "Third Jewish Commonwealth" in 1948 has been much exploited in recent motion picture extravaganzas, best-selling novels, and celebrated judicial proceedings, so that the rudimentary nature of Israel's search for statehood is now widely known. Not until the appearance of this study, however, could a discriminating general reader find a first-rate introduction to the richness of history and intellectual ferment accompanying Israel's rebirth.

A distinguished student of Jewish affairs, onetime editor of *The Jewish Frontier*, and now Research Associate in Israelian Studies at Harvard University, Halpern here demonstrates a masterful comprehension of a complex social movement operating on a world-wide scale. Where most of his predecessors have undertaken specialized studies, Halpern's aim is more ambitious. This volume is the first of a projected two-volume study in systematic historical explanation. The focus is on the idea of Jewish national sovereignty, its pursuit by ideological and political Zionism, "the exercise of sovereignty by representative [Zionist] national institutions" and, in the second volume, once the elementary goal of statehood has been achieved, development of the new state's social structure and domestic character.

Aside from introductory chapters describing the historical setting and ideological varieties of Zionism, the book is organized into two major divisions: "Zionism and World Jewry" and "Zionism and the International Community." The international relations-oriented part, concerned with such dimensions as Zionist-Ottoman relations, Sykes-Picot agreement, Balfour Declaration, British Mandate for Palestine, the clash of Arab-Jewish aspirations, the Palestine question in the United Nations, etc., has been well-treated in less comprehensive works by Jacob Robinson, Joseph Zasloff, and especially J. C. Hurewitz (*Palestine and the United Nations, Great Britain and Palestine, The Struggle for Palestine*, respectively). But it is the reviewer's judgment that the most noteworthy and definitive aspect of Halpern's work is his probing of the successive reformulations of Zionist ideology as a means of mobilizing support within the widely-scattered Jewish communities of the world.

Drawing upon often unjustly neglected works in half a dozen languages, Halpern provides the sense of symmetry and color hitherto lacking in studies of the Zionist movement. More important, he averts the facile tendency to treat world Jewry as a cohesive pressure group exerting claims upon the great powers and international bodies concerned with Palestine. Instead, we are given entrance, as it were, to the private salons, conference tables and hotel corridors where Zionism met with tumultuous reactions from Jewish communists and socialists, from religious orthodoxy and the assimilation-minded, from the intelligentsia and the rank-and-file of many countries. One only regrets that Halpern's research into these internal Jewish struggles on the road to statehood did not direct greater attention to these fascinating clashes of opinion as they occurred on the American scene.

Readers who insist upon the primacy of a theoretical basis underlying every work will not find the author's efforts "mere journalism," for Halpern is at home in contemporary sociology. In an important appendix, "Assumptions, Methods and Terms," he outlines the rigorous theoretical organization underlying the presentation of his materials. For example, following Karl Mannheim's essay on the sociology of generations, his work coherently traces the impact of traumatic historical events upon various Jewish groups and classes, seeking out the special sensitivities of groups which come to champion ideas radically detached from the traditional thought of their culture.

In sum, where numerous scholarly predecessors—and a host of organizational polemicists—have fallen short of filling a void of understanding, *The Idea of the Jewish State* is excellent social and intellectual history.—SAMUEL HALPERIN, *U. S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.*

Farm Labor in Germany, 1810–1945. BY FRIEDA WUNDERLICH. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. xv, 390. $8.50.)

Few scholars on this side of the Atlantic can claim to have contributed as much as has Professor Wunderlich to our understanding of the nature and development of German labor relations. Her latest effort here under review demonstrates once again that she knows her subject.

The dates contained in the title suggest that the author has undertaken a much broader treatment of German farm labor policy than is actually the case. Except for a brief introductory sketch of the pre-1918 history of German farm labor policy, this book deals exclusively with the farm labor policies of the Weimar and Nazi periods. Utilizing extensive statistical data, public documents and statutes, and reliable secondary sources, and drawing upon her professional experience of the pre-Nazi days with German social and labor policies, she surveys in detail the policies of the Weimar and Nazi governments toward such matters affecting farm labor as wages and wage controls, working conditions, land reform and resettlement, social welfare benefits, employer-employee relations, arbitration procedures, collective bargaining rights and procedures, the representation of farm interests before public agencies, and the organization movement among both farmers and farm employees. Although handicapped in many instances by the lack of meaningful data, Professor Wunderlich attempts not only to describe the content of such policies but also to analyze the impact of the policies on the economic status of the several categories of farm workers. Special attention is given to the innovations in farm labor policy attempted by the Nazi government, particularly in the pre-war period, and the later difficulties encountered by the Nazis in trying to adjust these innovations to the demands of a war economy.

The intensive treatment accorded the diverse farm labor policies of the Weimar and Nazi years does not easily permit a brief summary of the author's findings. Essentially, Professor Wunderlich concludes that during the Weimar period (1) considerable gains were realized by farm labor in obtaining legal sanction for such rights as collective bargaining, adjudication of grievances, and "self-government" or representation before public agencies concerned with the administration of farm labor and welfare programs; (2) farm labor, with certain exceptions, was granted equal status with industrial labor in workers' compensation and unemployment insurance programs; (3) in spite of the usual difficulties involved in organizing farm labor as well as the particularly strong resistance which the German landed aristocracy was able to present, the unionization of farm workers made significant progress; and (4) while the real wages of farm labor did not reach parity with the real wages of industrial labor, the differentials were, at least during the inflationary periods, partly ameliorated by payments in kind to farm workers. Allowing for difficulties in measuring the real income of the farm population, due to inadequate statistical data and the virtual impossibility of converting payments in kind to monetary values, this study seems to confirm the generally held impression that farm laborers were particularly hard hit by the depression of the early 1930's. Permeating her account of the farm labor policies of the Nazi government is an attempt to single out the successes and failures of its threefold agricultural policy of de-urbanization, the preservation and "purification" of the peasantry, and the attainment of self-sufficiency in producing foodstuffs. In spite of some initial efforts by the Nazis to implement the first two objectives, the increasing pressures of the war effort elevated the third objective, self-sufficiency, to decisive importance. Professor Wunderlich acknowledges that the peasantry did achieve, at least temporarily, a more prestigious position during the Nazi regime than it had previously had in modern Germany, but she rather convincingly demonstrates that the economic position of the farm laboring classes, as compared with that of the industrial workers, showed no improvement during the Third Reich. Moreover, both the farm worker and the peasant lost whatever mobility and right of "self-government" they had enjoyed during the Weimar era.

Observers of modern totalitarianism sometimes note a high degree of both susceptibility of the peasantry to totalitarian ideology and resistance of the peasantry to changes attempted by the totalitarians in the value system to which the European peasants have traditionally subscribed. The reviewer is disappointed that Professor Wunderlich makes little attempt to deal with these generalizations as they apply to the German peasantry prior to and during Nazism.—Ronald F. Bunn, *University of Texas.*

Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution, 1919–1936. By John W. F. Dulles. (Austin: University of Texas Press. 1961. Pp. xiv, 805. $8.50.)

This strangely perplexing book does not belong to the genre of political science; in fact, I am not sure that *Yesterday in Mexico* really could be classed as history either. It is a chronological narrative of the political events occurring during the period of domination of the "Triumverate of Agua Prieta"—De la Huerta, Obregón, and Calles—an extremely detailed account that covers all of the major Mexican political figures and most of the minor ones from Carranza to Cárdenas.

Mr. Dulles, son of the former Secretary of State and a businessman with long experience in Mexico and other Latin American countries, has given us, in the tradition of the gentlemen historians, a lucid and well written account of a period in Mexican history that caught his fancy.

But it is a disappointingly shallow account, one which makes little or no effort to establish the environmental setting in which the characters operate and, worse still, one which presents all of the characters on the same undifferentiated plane. Perhaps because of a sense of awareness that the firms for which he has worked or may work must be able to continue to do business in Mexico, Mr. Dulles avoids evaluations of persons or political events and studiously skips presentation of some of the insights into the revolutionary political process he *must* have developed while preparing this book.

I am not suggesting that the author necessarily should have presented a rigorously analytical study in the behavioral pattern but even the most chronologically-oriented historian recognizes that he does owe his reader some assistance in understanding why certain types of event can happen at one time and not at another. For example, why should it have been possible for General Cárdenas to throw off the yoke of General Calles when neither General Ortiz Rubio or General Rodríguez could do so? It matters little whether Mr. Dulles ties his explanation to the personality of Cárdenas, to the evolution of the Revolutionary Party, to Calles' ill health, or to a combination of all three reasons (or some other), but to leave the reader with the impression that such major political upsets occur in a vacuum is not very helpful.

In the same light, the trained historian would not fall into the trap of relying too heavily upon what obviously are highly partisan sources without cross-checking them, as Mr. Dulles appears to have done. In several places materials are taken from biased and to my knowledge inaccurate sources without making any effort either in the text or the citation to indicate the possible slant of the original writer. As just one example of the sort of historiography found here, chapter 73 deals with the struggle against Tomás Garrido Canabal, boss of the state of Tabasco; "most of this chapter is based on" a memorandum prepared by Rodulfo Brito Foucher, one of the principal opponents of Garrido in the battle. This is hardly objective history.

All this is not to imply that *Yesterday in Mexico* does not provide a great deal of interesting material. Being reasonably well acquainted with the period covered, I found the book a useful compilation in English of a time-sequence of events, though a little less "untapped" than the blurb on the dust jacket indicates; it was rather like reading a tremendously detailed expansion of a digested novel where one already knows the plot and doesn't care much about character development. I fear, however, that for the person who is not already quite deeply immersed in the period *Yesterday in Mexico* might prove both confusing and misleading for the reasons mentioned above.

In his preface, Mr. Dulles points out that he has attempted consciously to offer an objective rather than an interpretive account. He seems to forget that in selecting and ordering materials for his objective account a certain degree of interpretation is both necessary and inevitable. In defense of not taking the next step to tacit interpretation, the author quotes a distinguished writer on Mexico who in commenting on this book says, "You have certainly taken much time and trouble to get at the facts. I still think Mexico is too complicated to understand." This reviewer believes that if Mexico is too complicated to understand, those individuals purporting to write about the country have a duty to offer whatever insights they may have gained, no matter how limited or specialized, so that we may at least move toward a better understanding of the whole picture.—Robert E. Scott, *University of Illinois.*

The Conseil d'Etat in Modern France. By Charles E. Freedeman. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 205. $5.00.)

The Conseil d'Etat, along with the Inspection of Finances and the Court of Accounts, is one of the "great corps" which, as every articulate Frenchman will attest, run the nation. In spite of the popular belief in the occult power of these relatively anonymous bodies, there has been little serious analysis of their role in the political process. Dr. Freedeman's book has the merit of presenting a great deal of information about the Conseil d'Etat which may not be readily available to the foreign observer. This body combines two functions kept rigidly separated in the common law countries: it adjudicates conflicts arising out of the operation of the administration, and it provides legal and technical counsel to the government, particularly in the drafting of bills and decrees. The author devotes much space to details concerning structure and procedure, of interest primarily to French law students.

Dr. Freedeman contends that the Conseil d'Etat has not usurped the prerogatives of other branches of government, but has dedicated itself entirely to protecting French citizens from illegal administrative action, and furnishing technical advice to the government. Its success on both counts, according to the author, has given the Conseil "unequalled prestige among French institutions." But are these optimistic conclusions justified? On several occasions the Conseil has refused to invalidate flagrantly dishonest elections in Algeria, and since the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954 has been unable or unwilling to safeguard civil liberties in that "group of departments" of the French Republic. It may be suspected that the

Conseil d'Etat "follows the election returns" in its own way. "Criticism of the Conseil's jurisdiction, which was common during most of the nineteenth century, has disappeared," concludes the author. "Today it would be difficult to find an advocate of destroying the administrative jurisdiction." Perhaps so, but the political scientist would like to know more about the role of the Conseil in protecting minority rights, its importance in the actual drafting of laws, and more generally its political significance.—BERNARD E. BROWN, *Vanderbilt University.*

The Negro in France, BY SHELBY T. MCCLOY. (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 278. $7.00.)

Professor McCloy, University of Kentucky historian, has presented "a history of the Negro who has come to France, the reasons for his coming, the record of his stay, and the reactions of the French to his presence" (p. v). Handicapped by a poverty of sources and a self-imposed though not strictly adhered to determination to restrict himself to Metropolitan France, he has written a survey of people of color in France.

Diligent work in French archives has enabled the author to trace the arrival and departure of Negroes before the Revolution and to present considerable information as to their number and status. As most of them were slaves from the French colonies and slavery was forbidden in France, their legal status was often unclear. Many gained their freedom, through manumission by their masters or by French courts, and settled in France where they melted into the population. The Revolution freed the colonial slaves, at least temporarily, and they responded to it enthusiastically. Several individuals of Negro ancestry attained the rank of general in the revolutionary armies and those of Napoleon.

The author's task became more difficult in dealing with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for governmental records seldom made reference to race. This made it much more difficult to trace the flow of Negroes in and out of France and almost impossible to generalize about their situation within France. The latter part of the book therefore of necessity concentrates on individual accomplishments in politics, literature, entertainment, sports, and the military. Personalities such as the three Dumas, Félix Eboué, Miss Nigeria, René Maran, Richard Wright, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Sugar Ray Robinson, Josephine Baker, Paul Robeson, and Gaston Monnerville are briefly and somewhat indiscriminately noted. The attraction of Paris for Negroes as for others is emphasized, as is the significance of the large number of African students now studying in Metropolitan France. The racial tolerance of the French is rightfully stressed, although with insufficient analysis. So is the contribution of the Negro to the defense of France in two world wars as in earlier ones. One wonders why a few particularly sensational crimes involving Negroes are similarly stressed.

The book is useful as a general survey of the Negro in France. Its value to political scientists is more questionable. While an author should not be criticized for not writing the kind of book one would have preferred, political scientists will find this book rather thin for their purposes. One gains few insights, for example, into the reasons for racial toleration in France. It may be due to indifference or to a genuine commitment to equality. Or to the small number of Negroes in the total population. Nor does the book analyze in any depth the current socio-economic status of the Negro in France and its relation to his treatment. For political scientists, perhaps the most fascinating subject touched upon in the book is the role of Negro politicians in French politics, especially during the Fourth Republic. But except for accounts of such obvious figures as Houphouet-Boigny, Monnerville, and Senghor, little attention is devoted to them. Virtually no attempt is made to analyse their career patterns and to relate them to the larger context of French politics. The book is particularly weak in political analysis. But, of course, the author has written a different kind of book. While it can be hoped that the book will focus attention on this highly researchable topic, the political scientist will find *The Negro in France* marginal to his interests.—SAMUEL H. BARNES, *The University of Michigan.*

New Zealand Becomes A Pacific Power. BY BERNARD K. GORDON. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1960. Pp. 283. $6.50.)

In this analysis of New Zealand's role in the Pacific major attention is devoted to the development of the country's concern about military security. Along with this development, according to the author, came the growth of nationalism. However, in the opinion of this reviewer, without extensive consideration of all phases of New Zealand's role in the Pacific, and without an explicit definition of nationalism, conclusions about such developments are not well substantiated.

Extensive and useful source references appear throughout the book. Yet further documentation in a few passages would have been of assistance. Of most value would have been the author's direct analyses of such primary sources as parliamentary debates (obtainable in both New Zealand and the United States), instead of his appraisals of quotes and interpretations included in commentaries about such sources. Some of these commentaries have already been used in the preparation of some volumes in the official history of New Zealand in the Second World War series, such as F. L. W. Wood's *The New Zealand People at War*.

A few of the author's characterizations of the country are debatable, and some interpretations are not clear because of organizational and stylistic defects. In the historical discussion of the period before 1935 there appear a few questionable statements, such as mention of the extreme British character of the country, and the observation about the country's "almost total preoccupation" with domestic affairs until just before World War II. Some conclusions concerning New Zealand's awareness of its security problems are unclear because various contributors to the country's views—the press, the people, the leaders, and the government—are at times used separately, implicitly, or interchangeably as the basis for overall interpretations. Other materials, including party documents before and after 1935, could also have added beneficially to the presentation. In reference to some views of labor leaders there seems to be an implicit, yet unsubstantiated, criticism.

Despite such omissions and generalizations, this book has made information about New Zealand's security policies to 1947 more accessible. Although other works are appearing in this general area, this presentation is recommended as a useful source for the insight of a non-New Zealander. A number of the author's interpretations, while not demonstrated conclusively, nevertheless have some basis.—JOSEPHINE F. MILBURN, *Simmons College*.

Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study of the Decade of Mass Terror (1929–39). BY HRYHORY KOSTIUK. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1960. Pp. xiv, 162.)

"It still remains to be seen whether Khrushchev can afford to sit quietly on the volcano of the Soviet nationality problem while promising a better standard of living to all the peoples." The author, an Ukrainian scholar—an "alumnus" of Vorkuta—believes that Stalin and his trusted lieutenants with Khrushchev as the last one, could liquidate men but not the idea of Ukrainian independence. His work is exciting reading; careful documentation with every indication of laborious research does not detract from its drama.

The significance of this decade of mass terror reaches beyond Ukraine, second in importance of the Soviet Republics. For, in addition to collectivization, Stalin's objective was to destroy those who stood for an independent culture "even though they were devoted Communists." The Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, the CP(b)U, has had "twin roots," the national element and the traditionally centralist Russian element. By 1933 a radical change occurred in Soviet nationality policy. Replacing the Leninist tenet of the "right to self-determination," Stalin set the new centralist course, using an obscure Russian party official, Pavel Petrovich Postyshev, to eradicate deviationist, bourgeois nationalism from the Ukrainian communist leadership and intelligentsia. In four years, the "purgers had to be purged." For failing to hold the resurgence of the nationalistic forces, notwithstanding the extensive liquidations, Postyshev and the new leaders of CP(b)U fell into Stalin's disfavor in 1937. "As if struck by sudden plague, the top administrators and leaders . . . were wiped out." But "Titoism" was not the only first in the tragic history of the Ukraine under Stalin. There were "trials," years before the Moscow trials, occupying "a special place in the history of Soviet falsification." It is the author's conviction that—in the form in which they were "uncovered"—the nationalist underground organizations were purely mythical. However, the arrests of the Ukrainian Communists in 1937 were carried out in connection with the fictitious National Fascist Organization.

Thus Stalin dispatched a new executor of his master plan: Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Once more began forcible Russification. Tactical changes in the years after the Second World War, and more recently the Khrushchevian attempt to blame all crimes on Stalin's "evil" character, have left the Ukrainian problem—and the nationality problem of the USSR—largely unsolved.—TIBOR PAYZS, *University of Detroit*.

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Field Administration in the United Nations System. BY WALTER R. SHARP. (London: Stevens & Sons Limited. 1961, Pp. ix, 555. $12.00.)

In a single year the United Nations and seven specialized agencies with the UN Children's Fund now make budgetary allocations of about 180 million dollars. Almost half of that amount is allocated for economic, social, and technical work performed in field activities away from UN and agency headquarters. Of the 14,000 internationally and locally recruited staff that now man the steadily growing UN system, about half are employed in field assignments.

Professor Sharp has analyzed in this remarkable book the emergence of field activities within the United Nations framework, their organization and staffing patterns, their problems of headquarters control and decentralization, and the complexity of program planning, coordination, and execution at the regional and country level. This is a pioneering work in international administration, brilliantly organized, carefully written, and based on the author's first hand experience as a staff member in international agencies as well as hundreds of personal interviews. It is destined to be a landmark for all students of the administration of international organizations and a starting point for further research into personnel selection and training, headquarters-field relationships, and methods of programming international economic assistance, social welfare, and technical cooperation.

With admirable patience, studded with useful tables, Dr. Sharp traces the mixture and uses of regional areas for administration by the United Nations agencies. There is a rich fund of information on everything from the hierarchical pattern of all field offices to such details as the number of organizations owning their own office premises. An important chapter of fifty-eight pages deals with the "human element": tenure, recruitment, rotation, morale, and other problems of international personnel administration. In Part II of the work the whole headquarters-field nexus is treated, with an invaluable section on communication and logistics. About a third of the book is concerned with the formulation of field programs, their coordination with the UN family of agencies, their implementation, and their relationships with other international programs sponsored by single governments or private agencies.

Yet the rich detail and earnest articulation of the volume does not miss the forest for the trees. Professor Sharp is peering into the future as well as describing the past. He has caught the vibrancy of international administration poised on the realization that, through the United Nations, nations have come to accept international responsibility for conditions everywhere. With scholarly courage nicely tempered by political experience, he urges the gradual integration of the Technical Assistance Board and the Special Fund secretariat. This would then lead to a single program director responsible to a single UN body, probably composed of more developed and less developed states.

At the country level, moreover, Professor Sharp hopes for a gradual elevation of the role of the Resident Technical Assistance Representative (under another title). His office should more and more tend to be the local point of contact for governments on all program matters and should serve all staffs for administrative support, including briefing on local conditions while bearing the symbol of the UN system's world welfare mission.

One can dip into this book at almost any point of its 555 pages and find food for research and application in international administration. It is a genuine *tour de force* in its discipline, enunciating with modesty the achievements of the UN system in field administration and confidently assessing a bright future for the burgeoning government of the world by international collaboration.—GERARD J. MANGONE, *Syracuse University.*

Progress of the Non-Self-Governing Territories under the Charter. Vol. 5. *Territorial Surveys* (New York: United Nations, 1960. Pp. 476. $5.50.)

This is the last volume of a series of five reporting on the progress of the non-self-governing territories under the provisions of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. Its contents are based exclusively on the reports submitted by the Administering Members in accordance with Article 73(e) of the Charter. Essentially, the period covered is from 1946 to 1957, with some slight deviations from this pattern. Unlike the previous volumes of the series, this one presents information by territories. Under each territory, it is subdivided into three functional sections: economic, social, and educational conditions.

As a source of information on non-self-governing territories, this study is worthwhile, as far as it goes. However, constitutional weaknesses of the United Nations imposed distinct limitations on the United Nations Secretariat in presenting a thorough survey of the subject matter. For example, there is an absence of uniform information on political progress of the territories. Article 73 (e) of the United Nations Charter provided no specific requirement that political information be submitted and the General Assembly considered submission of such information as optional. Accordingly, no consistent practice in this area exists: some states chose not to transmit any political information at all, while others reported political progress for only some of their territories. Wherever such information had been submitted, it was compiled in an additional section under each territory entitled "Government." Another limitation of the volume is that it does not cover all the non-self-governing territories presently in existence; only those which are officially considered as such by the United Nations were included. If a colonial Power had originally chosen to insist that its territories do not fall into this category, the United Nations General Assembly simply accepted this claim, regardless of its merits. Thus, the African possessions of Portugal, comprising an area equal to that of Western Europe, are conspicuous by their absence from the volume.

These limitations notwithstanding, *Territorial Surveys* is a conveniently compiled reference book that will be useful for researchers dealing with the areas covered. An absence of a separate index for this volume (a cumulative index for the entire series has been promised) is not a serious handicap considering the way the material is organized. A cursory reading of the volume favorably impresses the reader with the progress that has taken place. In this sense, the book may be considered a tribute to the work of the United Nations. However, the question as to how much of this progress is due to the proddings of the General Assembly and how much of it would have been achieved anyway probably will never be answered.—VICTOR BASIUK, *Washington University* (St. Louis).

The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice. BY SYDNEY D. BAILEY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1960. Pp. xx, 337. $5.00.)

This study of the manner in which the General Assembly conducts its business fills a very real need in the literature of international organization. Sydney Bailey, an experienced observer of the United Nations, has made judicious use of his knowledge of British parliamentary practice and of League of Nations precedents in developing his analysis and appraisal of the functioning of this peculiar and fascinating institution, with its blend of parliamentary and diplomatic characteristics. While he surveys the development of the Assembly over more than a decade of activity, he gives particular attention to its operation during its Fourteenth Session and adds a detailed study of its treatment of one issue, the Tibetan question, in 1950 and 1959. The author presents a knowledgeable and insightful account of such matters as the preparation of the agenda, the conduct of debates in committees and plenary meetings, the mechanics of voting and of the Assembly's electoral process, and the handling of budgetary matters. Equally important, he gets behind formal committees to look at informal groupings of states, and behind official rules of procedure to examine the development of usages and the working out of deals. Bailey has obviously taken a careful look at what goes on "behind the Speaker's Chair" as well as in the public chambers.

There are perils in writing a book on the mechanics and procedures of the General Assembly. The first of these is the danger of being dull and pedantically fussy about detail. Bailey is guilty of being repetitious on occasion, and of including excessive detail at various points. But he seems constitutionally incapable of being dull; his wit and wisdom, his unpretentious good humor, shine through the clouds of paltry facts.

A second danger is that of exaggerating the significance of procedural and structural detail. Happily, Bailey is well aware that what goes on in the Assembly is not the most important activity in the field of international relations, and that procedural matters are not the most important aspect of the Assembly's business. He sees procedure in its relationship to policy, and, while he abstains from deviating far from his procedural focus, he leaves no doubt that he conceives his study as contributing to an understanding of the Assembly as a political institution.

On certain political matters, he expresses explicit judgments. He deplores the tendency of states to succumb to what might be called "resolutionitis," with its stress on achieving formal voting victories that may or may not contribute to the solution of disputes and the alleviation of tensions. "A resolution . . . may be much less important than the fact that an issue has been publicly debated; and the public debate may have been much less important than the fact that the issue was privately discussed . . . public debate is no substitute for negotiation and is sometimes a bad prelude to it." He wishes that the Assembly might more often sponsor discussions, private and public, without the intent of pushing a resolution to the vote; after all, the United Nations has a higher mission than to serve as "just a place where differences are recorded."

The author presents well-tempered observations on the role of blocs in the Assembly, the influence which particular individuals achieve by virtue of their personal competence and integrity, and the development of a sort of elite group of states which contribute significantly more to the work of the organization than their objective importance as "powers" would indicate.

Beyond this, the book contains a rich body of information, much of it helpfully assembled in tables, from which the reader can draw political implications for himself. Bailey manages both to inform and to stimulate—which is quite enough for one man to achieve in one book.—INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., *The University of Michigan.*

Japan Subdued. The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific. BY HERBERT FEIS (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. vi, 199, $4.00.)

There is always drama in the capitulation of the vanquished at the end of a great and protracted war. But a variety of issues invest the Japanese surrender with a peculiarly tragic interest. Foremost is the ethical question raised by the use of the atomic bomb, a question that still haunts the American conscience. Was the bombing of Hiroshima and of Nagasaki justified? Was it essential? Apart from this problem, other questions as to the wisdom or expediency of American policy in the final months of the war against Japan remain unresolved. Could an earlier termination of hostilities have been secured by modification of "Unconditional Surrender," and by promise of the preservation of the Monarchy? Was it wisdom to press for Russia's entrance into the war? Could the United States have checked that power's aggressive purposes in the Far East?

These are not simply the questions raised by historical hindsight. These are the questions that troubled the minds of the men—the military, the scientists, the officials of the State Department, the President—charged with the determination of American policy in the months following the surrender of the German forces. It is of these questions, of the answers given and of the resulting events that Mr. Feis treats in *Japan Subdued.* Covering the same span of time as that embraced in the author's *Between War and Peace, the Potsdam Conference,* it complements that volume and rounds out Mr. Feis' distinguished series on American diplomacy and policy before and during World War II. The same meticulous scholarship and integrity of judgment mark this current study.

As Mr. Feis sees it, various courses toward Japan were open to the United States. First, there was the plan formed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for massive assault culminating in invasion of the Japanese homeland. An integral feature of this project was the intent of securing Russia's early entrance into the war. Secondly, there were proposals for inducing an early Japanese surrender by offering preservation of the Emperor and the Monarchy and holding out hope of national survival while warning of ultimate ruin should the war be continued. ("How far and how thoroughly do we want to beat Japan?" queried Secretary of the Navy Forrestal.) The sole fruit of this plan was the ambiguous Potsdam Declaration. Thirdly (but known to few) there was the possibility of shocking Japan into surrender by use of the as yet untested atomic bomb. Here the views of scientists and the military as to *how* to employ the new weapon diverged sharply—by demonstration, or by surprise attack.

In the end, immediate military objectives triumphed. Before the convening of the Potsdam Conference in mid-July, American decisions had crystallized. So far as the Far East was concerned the Conference did little save set the seal of Allied approval (or acquiescence) on American policies. The day-by-day record set forth by Mr. Feis reveals little of diplomatic negotiation as to post-victory conditions, much of preoccupation with military planning and the disposition of Allied forces in the projected campaign.

No pressure was exerted by President Truman or by Secretary of State Byrnes to check Stalin's distortions of the Yalta agreements or to shore up the position of the beset Chiang Kai-shek. Neither information as to Japan's urgent belated overtures for Russian mediation nor knowledge of the terrifying success of the atom bomb explosion in New Mexico affected American calculations. Warning was given the Japanese, it is true, but the Potsdam Proclamation left ambiguous the future of the Imperial Throne and was silent as to the atom bomb. President Truman's purpose of speeding Russia's entrance into the Japanese war remained unshaken. Deplorably, in the reviewer's opinion, it was officers of the State Department who provided a sophistical legal gloss to justify Russia's dishonoring of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.

The remainder of Mr. Feis' volume details the execution of American policy in the weeks following Potsdam. It is an absorbing narrative, colored with a sombre sense of the post-war problems that emerged in the days before formal Japanese surrender to MacArthur. In general, the author expresses a hesitant agreement, posited on military considerations, with American decisions. In his opinion, the unyielding *kamikaze* mood of the Japanese military leaders would have rendered nugatory any policy of bidding for an earlier surrender by a relaxation of terms. The use of the atomic bomb he regards to have been justified, but not essential for victory. His sole criticism of American policy in this respect is the failure to inform the Japanese of the horrifying power of this weapon. In addition, the author has reservations as to the wisdom of the final terms of surrender—the restriction of Japan to the home islands (a legacy of the Cairo Conference), the ban on re-armament, the over-emphasis on democratic control in the Constitution.

The tone of Mr. Feis' volume is impartial, convincing, yet grave questions are left unresolved. How explain our leaders' blindness to any objective beyond the immediate purpose of military victory? How, in the light of the post-Yalta record, justify their bland trust in Stalin's assurances to Nationalist China? By greater restraint or wisdom in the use of the atomic bomb, could a better postwar world have been secured?—DOROTHY BURNE GOEBEL, *Hunter College*.

The United States and the Southwest Pacific. BY C. HARTLEY GRATTAN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 273. $5.00.)

C. Hartley Grattan's book *The United States and the Southwest Pacific* summarizes American activities from the late eighteenth century onward, in the Southwest Pacific area. He writes concisely of New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, and gives considerable space to Antarctica. Because this seventh continent (or is it an archipelago?) is now looming larger in the affairs of men than ever before, his interest is commendable. But it is mainly historical. And the one paragraph on the present treaty regime in Antarctica is inadequate. This is an international settlement of issues which might well provide internationalists with a model for a regime for space. Its success may also provide arguments for such a regime which ambitious states would be hard pressed to turn aside.

Grattan's comparative study, contrasting traditional American interest in the North Pacific with the possibilities of a developing interest in the Southwest Pacific has, of all his themes, the greatest freshness of thought and holds the reader's interest best. He writes how the past has revealed the flimsiness and the frustrations of the American money-making, missionary, and political dreams for the North. He cogently argues for greatly extending and developing the solid strategic and commercial advantages which have already been gained in the Southwest Pacific. It is not only because of his personal interest in that country, but also because he sees it as pivotal, that Grattan's emphasis is on Australia and Australian-American relations.

The book is urbane, civilized and well informed. But in writing of Australia and New Zealand Grattan does not come to grips with the interesting problems. This may well be due to the fact that he has set himself a thankless task. As in his earlier books, he is not so much interested in presenting Australia and New Zealand to the American public, as in vouching for them. This he does in terms loaded with items calculated to appeal to American readers. The credentials he establishes for these countries to such a public are in terms of their being Like Us, and into the bargain Dependable Allies. Indeed Michener has characterized the book as being about "Our Friends Down Under." But in justice it must also be pointed out that Grattan rejects writing as if his were a quest for love; nor does he, like Werner Levi in "American-Australian Relations," or Michener in his review, give voice to the irrelevant but popular American myth to the effect that Australia and New Zealand are faced by a hard choice, since they cling emotionally to Britain but recognize that they need the wealth and power of the United States. This notion of a dilemma may be self-flattering, but it is also mythical, because it envisions these countries confronted by a choice which is not posed in reality. Whilst Anglo-American relations continue as they are, there is no more need for Australia and New Zealand to be viewed as poised at the moment of choice, than Britain need be called upon to choose between herself and the United States.

There are a number of good books about Australia ranging from D. H. Lawrence's "Kangaroo" to Pringle's "Australian Accent." They have points for the political scientist; but they are written from an English standpoint. Turning from the insights and realism of these books, the feeling is unavoidable that Grattan writes of the famous Labour Party split in 1954, for example, as if it were caused by a peripheral issue, a sort of Sunday School rivalry. But Orangeism, Communism, and the temporal ambitions of some Bishops cannot be so sweetly encapsulated.

By contrast, Lawrence infused "Kangaroo" with a sense of Sorelian politics, mystique, and violence. These may be hidden, but they lie close to the heart of the Australian style. Lawrence saw them as stemming from resentments which have been diluted or channelled harmlessly away in the United States, but which are part of the Australians' sense of integrity or violation. In that community each individual maintains a reticence, for nobody may expose the whole of himself. This reticence belongs to the rejection of dependency, it is coupled with the refusal to chance a betrayal, or the violation of that part which is "kept out of account." Even the trade unions and the governments bow to this fiercely protected indifference But equally they claim an unswerving solidarity in the context of those activities where they are expected to be effective. People's jobs may be to implement and to administer, but nobody may rule; nobody even may get sufficiently above himself to set a fashion or a taste. All such are suspect Silence, both of the bush and in human relations, provided Lawrence with insight. He understood how it gives foreigners the false impression that Australians are extremely permissive, and yet how it imposes judgment. For he became aware of, and resented, an invisible and inaudible communication of goals, moralities, and demands to each person. This spirit stems from the origins of Australia and especially of Sydney. For no city was ever born under so cruel and unforgotten a star. The small grim fort which is a yachtsmen's mark is still called Pinchgut.

It is the harshness of the climate, of the light, of the style of living, and of the mode of judgment that these people employ towards others and themselves that Grattan has failed to give weight and authenticity to. It is not for an American to impose on Australia, as a verity, either the model of a visiting card-exchanging suburbia, or that of a pleasure-loving and innocent Pacific Island people—let alone both. Better it would be to take to heart what an Australian poet wrote of his countrymen:

> "They are in me and its triumphs are my own,
> Hard-won in the thin and bitter years without pretence."

—L. F. E. Goldie, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Russia, America, and the World. By Louis Fischer. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1960. Pp. 244. $4.50.)

If perspective, insight, and breadth of matter-of-fact knowledge are required to write on world affairs, Louis Fischer's credentials should be beyond question. Mr. Fischer, of course, is a longtime roving reporter, an essayist and historian of parts, and an accomplished world traveller. The prospective reader of *Russia, America, and the World* is therefore entitled to take seriously those publisher's lines on the dust jacket which promise "a clarification of the fundamental factors influencing international politics today." Unfortunately, the book itself falls short of fulfilling that promise.

It is difficult to know just where to begin a review of *Russia, America, and the World,* for Fischer's discussion is as discursive as his scope is comprehensive. One will look in vain for a single, unifying thesis or a logical structure of argument. The first five chapters of the book deal in the main, although not exclusively, with Soviet foreign policy. The following six chapters traverse, in bewildering succession, Western Europe, India and Pakistan, Africa, and much other ground. The last two chapters, presumably by way of summary and conclusion, purport to assess "the Future of Communism" and to prescribe "a Foreign Policy for America."

Many faults can be found with this rambling and disorganized treatment of contemporary international politics. Among the most serious, certainly, is the predominance of sweeping generalizations in the absence of corroborative analysis. That the book is not meant for an academic audience is clear. Yet the very fact that Fischer's presentation may strike an uninformed reader as persuasive does not help matters either. On the contrary, his reduction of the complexities of world politics to a set of rather pat solutions is the more to be regretted. Consider a random selection of his most important policy precepts: Western Europe must unite; colonial powers ought to divest themselves of their remaining colonial possessions; Africans should avoid black apartheid; India and Pakistan ought to join in a common military and political association. What is one to say against such appealing propositions? Only this: that without a realistic assessment of possibilities or a critical analysis of alternatives, all such proposals are bound to ring rather hollow.

Mr. Fischer's treatment of Soviet foreign policy and the prospects for Communism is scarcely more satisfactory. Is it very helpful or, in fact, at all adequate to assert, as Fischer does, that "nations behave like nations" and to conclude on that basis that "Russia, like China, wants what nations have wanted in centuries past: to hold what she has and to get more?" To discount entirely the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology is no service to sophisticated analysis. Among other things, such an oversight undermines Fischer's own useful although abbreviated discussion of recent Sino-Soviet tensions. As far as the future of Communism is concerned, Fischer is downright exasperating. Having suggested a reciprocal relationship between the persistence of the Soviet dictatorship at home and the regime's commitments abroad, he then discards that insight in a final fit of unexamined optimism. "Evolution never stops. Communism will evolve and destroy itself." The thought may be comforting but it is far from convincing.

To lecture Louis Fischer on the requirements for a proper study of contemporary world affairs would indeed be presumptuous, for he is aware of the need to understand a multiplicity of problems and procedures, interests and ideologies, each in its national, regional, and international setting. It is highly unlikely that he would dismiss the oft repeated warning against "the simple solution" and "the easy answer" as merely a counsel of crusty pedantry rather than an imperative of political prudence. International politics remains an enormously complex subject. That observation is by now quite trite, but, alas, it is also still true—*Russia, America, and the World* notwithstanding.—Melvin Croan, *Harvard University.*

The United States and Latin America. By Dexter Perkins. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1961. Pp. xii, 124. $3.00.)

This excellent yet brief review of the major features of United States relations with Latin

America comes to us at a time when a new administration in Washington, one avowedly determined to improve and strengthen our Latin American ties, finds tensions increasing and threats of outside intervention growing more and more serious. Here the whole tapestry of our Latin American policy is set forth for us clearly, concisely, and in a very readable manner. Both the layman and the scholar will find much here to help him understand and interpret events that are occurring almost at his doorstep. The three essays which comprise the book are based on a series of lectures delivered by the author at Tulane University under the auspices of the Davis Washington Mitchell Fund.

The first of the three essays addresses itself to the problem of "Latin America and National Security." Essentially a review of the history of the Monroe Doctrine, the essay attempts to place the Doctrine in proper perspective. As in earlier, more voluminous, studies of this subject, Professor Perkins seeks to lay to rest the many shibboleths and superstitions that have developed around the Monroe Doctrine. Citing examples to support his thesis, he denies that the Doctrine was effective in protecting the Latin American nations from reconquest by Spain. No such threat really existed. Nor does he believe that Hitlerism ever constituted a serious physical threat to the hemisphere. As to the Communist threat, it is the "penetration of the alien and vicious ideas that emanate from the Kremlin," rather than an actual invasion, that is to be feared. The hypothesis underlying all of these arguments is that from the standpoint of our own national security, in terms of direct physical peril, the Latin American area is of less importance to us than Europe, and, perhaps, even other parts of the world. This view the Latin American is not likely to accept graciously, correct as it may be.

In a sense the second essay, "Latin American Political Relations with the United States," gets to the very heart of the matter. Here the main trends and patterns of our relations with the Latin American countries are described and the thoughtful reader will find much to help him understand current difficulties in Cuba and elsewhere in the hemisphere. Special attention, of course, is given United States interventionist policies in the early decades of the twentieth century, "the decades of Northern American imperialism," as Perkins calls them. Describing in some detail our active intervention in certain parts of the Caribbean, he goes on to illustrate the intensity of the psychological impact of these policies on the rest of Latin America. Despite the fact that the United States had long since abjured interventionism (at Montevideo in 1933 and at Buenos Aires in 1936), the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Dr. Rodriguez Lareta, found little support in 1945 for his suggestion that collective intervention might be brought to bear against dictatorial régimes which threatened the basic rights of men and, therefore, the principles of democratic government. To the Latin American there seemed to be little to differentiate collective intervention from United States intervention. Suggestions for collective action against Fidel Castro find a cool reception for much the same reason. The ghost of the Platt Amendment is still a very lively one.

Although Professor Perkins' view that our policy toward Mexico in the second and third decades of the twentieth century was relatively free of interventionist taint seems overly benevolent, we can agree with him that the high degree of progress and stability achieved by Mexico has been the result of internal forces, rather than the result of outside pressures. In fact, one might go a step further to point out that the internal forces did not fully come into play until after the external pressures had been relieved.

The final essay is entitled "Latin American Economic Relations with the United States." After pointing out that public capital has largely replaced private capital as a means of promoting economic development in retarded countries, Perkins discusses the banana industry, the sugar industry, and the oil industry in Latin America to demonstrate that, despite much criticism to the contrary, these operations have not been without benefit to the host nations. Granting that past mistakes have discouraged private investments, the author feels that there is hope for the future. He is confident that as more and more of these nations learn to manage their economies to greater advantage (cf. Argentina, Colombia, and others), they will achieve greater political stability, and this, in turn, will improve the economic climate and make it more attractive to private investors.
—Louis G. Kahle, *University of Missouri.*

The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939–1940. By Max Jakobson. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. 281. $5.75.)

The fundamental fact of Finnish politics has been the relationship with Russia. The most dramatic expression of this relationship was the Winter War. Westerners who know nothing else of Finland have heard of the Mannerheim Line. Few wars have seemed so exciting to spectators as the partially successful attempt of Finland to defend itself against its huge neighbor in the incredibly cold winter of 1939–40. To almost every impartial observer, this war appeared a clear-cut case of might against right.

The military aspects of the Winter War have faded in significance in a nuclear age. The diplomacy of this war, however, remains of lasting interest. There would have been no Winter War had there been no Russo-German agreement on spheres of influence in August, 1939. It was Finland's misfortune to be included in one of the slices (Soviet) of the East European pie. The political aspects—both international and domestic—of this misfortune are well treated by Jakobson in this distinguished study. Given the present lack of firsthand evidence on Soviet motivations, it is likely that this will remain the standard analysis of the politics of the Winter War.

Even though the author is a Finn, he never loses sight of the international significance of the Winter War. As Jakobson puts it, it was an incident that almost unhinged the power alignments of the Second World War. The Soviet Union became involved in an extremely unpopular war at a time when its foreign policy aimed at avoiding involvement in war. Germany drew the wrong conclusions about Soviet military might. Disguised as humanitarians interested only in aiding Finland, the United Kingdom and France almost got involved in a war against the Soviet Union. The United States was drawn further away from isolation by the brutal Soviet aggression against a small nation with a good press in America. As Jakobson points out, everywhere—both in the Axis camp and in the West—the Winter War created conflicts between public opinion and government policy, between emotions and political calculations, between words and deeds.

Jakobson recognizes, nevertheless, that in the vast drama of the Second World War, the Winter War was ". . . merely an incident within an episode: a Soviet attempt to move by force a recalcitrant pawn into the square assigned to it in the deal between Stalin and Hitler." This recognition is perhaps, in a Finn, even more commendable. For the great powers, the Winter War, although noteworthy, was of secondary significance. For Finland, however, the Winter War was an immensely important political, as well as military, event. The war saw the attainment of national unity, the achievement of *Volksgemeinschaft*. The serious cleavages between bourgeoisie and Marxists, between Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking Finns, between democrats and totalitarians, seemed to disappear from sight in the dark night that was the Winter War. This development is clearly perceived by Jakobson. Furthermore, his analysis of domestic politics is fair as well as interesting. His explicit and implicit criticisms of Finnish foreign policy are perhaps somewhat surprising, coming from an official of the Finnish Foreign Service. It is impossible to disagree with Jakobson that Eljas Erkko, the Finnish Foreign Minister prior to the outbreak of the Winter War, was a naive optimist in evaluating Soviet motivations towards Finland. There are many other accurate characterizations of Finnish politicians. The picture of Erkko's successor, Väinö Tanner, as a persistent advocate of peace throughout the Winter War is, however, less acceptable. Furthermore, it is rather surprising to find no mention in the sources of J. K. Paasikivi's important memoirs dealing with the Winter War. This gap, as well as a few minor historical errors, mars Jakobson's account. The latter remains, nevertheless, outstanding in almost every respect. Not least of these respects is the high literary quality, appropriate for a work of permanent value.—Marvin Rintala, *Brown University*.

International Communism. Edited by David Footman. (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1960. Pp. 151. $3.75.)

As a subject, the international communist movement continues to elude exploration far more than do either Soviet politics or national Communist parties. The great value of this volume is that it brings together scholarly research on a number of key topics.

International Communism is the ninth in a series of St. Antony's Papers, each devoted to a particular subject. Three of these are issued annually by St. Antony's College, the Oxford graduate institution founded in 1950 for the study of international affairs. The present volume consists of half a dozen brief papers by different authors, most of them originally prepared for a St. Antony's faculty seminar on international communism. (The volume is dedicated to R. N. Carew Hunt, who headed the seminar until his recent death.)

Two authors contribute knowledgeable historical surveys: Jane Degras, of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, on "United Front Tactics in the Comintern, 1921–1928," and Guy Wint on "Communism in India." The volume presents R. N. Carew Hunt's inevitably spotty findings on the almost legendary Willi Muenzenberg, the Comintern's brilliant organizer of front groups. Among the more formally documented pieces is one by Wolfgang Leonhard, a Soviet-trained former East German official who is now a freelance writer in West Germany. Leonhard retraces the European interparty relations of the later 1950's in order to interpret the "Present Phase" of the movement. "Socialism in America" contains personal reflections by the former Communist leader, Earl Browder—a choice for this volume which I find rather puzzling.

The outstanding contribution to *International Communism* is twice as long as the others. It is "The Bolshevisation of the Spartacus League," by Richard Lowenthal, political writer and now professor at the free University of West Berlin.

With admirable documentation, the author simultaneously throws light on two very different problems of equal interest. One is the intricate internal history of the Spartacus League, the forerunner during World War I of the German Communist Party—a subject recently touched upon in extensive discussions by Soviet and East German scholars. The other problem is a broad theoretical one: What can this case study tell us about "Bolshevisation" in general? By "Bolshevisation" Lowenthal means the transformation, so widespread after World War I, of quite autonomous and non-Jacobin revolutionary groups into Lenin's uniquely centralized "party of a new type." The problem has of course been raised more than once in the West. But I do not believe any other writer has analyzed it quite so specifically and at the same time so broadly as is done in *International Communism*.

In his paper, Richard Lowenthal pays a good deal of attention to personalities and organizational techniques. But he rightly concludes that the over-all explanation for "Bolshevisation" lies elsewhere. Decisive in many ways was the dramatic contrast between the success of Bolshevism in Russia and the failure of every non-Bolshevik revolutionary movement in Europe. Above all, however, the author points to the same key dilemma of European left movements as did Rosa Luxemburg and her associates at the [illegible] this view, such movements faced on[illegible] two alternatives. They had to remain [illegible] and parcel of a united labor movemen[illegible]ether it was in the main revo[illegible] not. [illegible]r they could end up [illegible] the most desperate strata only and repelling the solid core, [which] would create an unbridgeable *social* gulf between the revolutionary minority and the main force of the working class." Therefore, Lowenthal sees social stratification as the crux of "Bolshevisation" and of Communist predilection for totalitarian-type "classless parties of the uprooted and disaffected."—GEORGE FISCHER, *Cornell University*.

Paul Cambon: Master Diplomatist. BY KEITH EUBANK. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960. Pp. xiv, 222. $4.00.)

No strong commitment to any precise emphasis in a philosophy of history would seem necessarily to result from a recognition that certain aspects of history are usefully illumined when seen as symbolized by the life of an active participant in important historical events. However that may be, a good case can undoubtedly be made for a biography of Paul Cambon that examines carefully and assesses judiciously the steps by which the Entente Cordiale, with its tremendous import for the history of the world, was created, was tested, was strengthened, and became virtually an alliance.

Paul Cambon's earlier career was by no means without intrinsic interest; but such associations of his as those with Tunisia, Spain, and Turkey seem primarily important as affording preliminary training for his twenty-two years as ambassador to the Court of St. James. In the course of this period, a change took place in relations between France and Great Britain, from a situation which seemed to offer no hope of friendship to one of genuine cooperation and understanding. Paul Cambon was of course at the center of this momentous development.

Professor Eubank, in what may well be the definitive biography in English of Paul Cambon, has written with genuine restraint of this diplomat of the old school. He recognizes, though without any undue deterministic emphasis, that certain deep-running historical and political currents must, in both their ultimate and their immediate bearings, be given considerable weight in their interconnection with the parts played by persons, Paul Cambon and others. He makes no extravagant claims respecting the accomplishments of one man, even of a "master diplomatist." He acknowledges that his hero made mistakes, that his actions were sometimes of doubtful value for France; but he leaves no doubt that great native ability, combined with a wisdom derived from rich experience, was devoted with true dedication [illegible] what was usually both the patriotic and the fundamentally right course. The fact that some of the documentary sources will be available only later—indeed some perhaps never—is invoked more than once as a basis for a caveat against over-confident judgment; and yet a preference for tentativeness over cocksureness would seem to result much more from a characteristic scholarly detachment.

Paul Cambon's long public life fell of course wholly within the period of the Third Republic. At the same time, an account of his career presents, from the nature of things, glances only in brief flashes at the functioning of that regime as such. Persons and events—and these naturally in foreign affairs for the most part—are seen flittingly as backdrops or in supporting roles. Boulanger comes and, almost immediately, goes; foreign ministers—even Delcassé, presidents and prime ministers—even Poincaré and Clemenceau, fellow diplomatists—even his brother Jules, and high permanent officials tend inevitably to appear in the background. Of ministerial crises, of relations between civil servants and ministers, of the influence of standing committees, and of elections and public opinion there is little more than a glimpse. The same thing is true, *mutatis mutandis*, as regards operation of the English parliamentary system. In fine, there is—again from the nature of things—only a small modicum of political science in what is after all essentially a biography.

Professor Eubank writes with striking forthrightness. His style is one of great ease and, with a bare minimum of lapses, of real elegance. His narrative is markedly simple. In it long series of short and unqualified statements neatly manage wholly to avoid dreariness and dogmatism. A subject of great importance is treated with genuine understanding and sympathy, with real delicacy and distinction.—R. K. GOOCH, *University of Virginia.*

A History of the Cold War, BY JOHN LUKACS. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1961, Pp. 288. $3.95.)

In the past few years many books on the present state and future prospects of Soviet-American rivalry have appeared. What we have lacked is a comprehensive chronological treatment of the development of the "cold war." Yet this period of international relations, sixteen years old, is almost as long as the interwar period or the rivalry between European alliances which preceded World War I. Obviously the contemporary period cannot now be treated definitively, but a careful historical reexamination may be very fruitful.

John Lukacs' massive *The Great Powers and Eastern Europe* was a systematic, if rather polemical, attempt to examine one facet of the emerging conflict between the Soviet Union and its wartime allies. *A History of the Cold War* does not claim to be so thorough. Essentially it is a protracted essay, almost completely undocumented, the reflections of a cultivated observer rather than a systematic guide to recent history.

Unfortunately, in this reviewer's opinion, the value of Lukacs' book is partially vitiated by the author's assumption that national characteristics are the principal element in the formation of foreign and domestic policies: "the history of a state is formed by its concept of national interest, which, in turn, reveals certain dominant elements in the character of the nation." In seeking to relate the pursuit of national interest to the "character" of nations and statesmen, Lukacs occasionally makes extreme, almost ludicrous, deductions. Criticizing John Foster Dulles' policies, for example, Lukacs argues that "from his racial background, this Dutch American, an early admirer of the Boers against England, unusually sympathetic toward Germany, brought with him an enduring small core of distrust toward England." Pointing out similarities between American and Russian national characters, Lukacs ascribes importance to "the often intangible influence, through blood and through the soil, of the Indian element on the early American and the Tatar on the Russian settlers."

Unlike theorists of biological determinism Lukacs, as a believing Christian, denies ultimate value to the racial or national group: "whereas the soul of a man is . . . immortal, the soul of a nation is not." Nevertheless, his stress on nationalism deeply colors the core of his treatment, the interpretation of Soviet and American policies. In Lukacs' opinion, Soviet leaders have been guided predominantly by Russian nationalist motives: "his [Stalin's] ambitions were expansive; but they were national rather than international, Russian, rather than revolutionary." Few students of Soviet policy would doubt that Russian nationalism has influenced it, but most would hardly agree with Lukacs' drastic oversimplification. Lukacs offers almost no evidence to substantiate his argument. At the same time he misstates or omits conflicting evidence. As an indication that Soviet and Tsarist policy have essentially similar bases, he asserts that Tsarist Russia "from the very beginning" promoted the dissolution of Austria-Hungary (in fact Petrograd did not permit the formation of a Czech corps until 1916). Lukacs may be right in a narrow sense in writing that "there is no sufficient evidence that Stalin in 1947–48 had planned to advance into France and Italy," but in a broader sense it is misleading to ignore the Soviet Communist Party's regret (in argument with Tito) that it had been militarily incapable of helping the French and Italian Communists gain power two years earlier. In attributing Stalin's imposition of the Berlin blockade to his defensive desire to eliminate an "island" of Western influence, Lukacs disregards Walter Bedell Smith's circumstantial argument that Stalin's principal purpose was to delay unified government in West Germany.

Perhaps Lukacs' one-sided presentation arises as much from his spotty acquaintance with the mass of critical material, scholarly and memoir, on postwar events as it does from his theoretical bias. Such gaps in information unrelated to his major thesis are suggested by his acceptance of the myth (disproved years ago by scholarly investigation) that "many thousands of Russians, Ukrainians, and Tatars moved spontaneously over to the Germans' side" during World War II, his vast depreciation of the Russian population losses in World War II, or his strange confusion of the Turkish-Syrian crisis of 1957 with the Lebanese crisis of 1958.

It is unfortunate that Lukacs' study has not assimilated the wealth of factual information available, for his insight into world problems, when not overly influenced by his theory of national characteristics, is often very keen. He cogently stresses the memory of World War II as a major deterrent to a new conflict. His stress on armed force as the decisive element in nearly all instances of the expansion of Soviet control, and his insistence on the priority of power rivalry over ideological differences in domestic Soviet politics are, at least in this reviewer's opinion, very well put. Most important, perhaps, students of American society, though they may dispute many of Lukacs' facts and interpretations concerning domestic American developments, will find his book very thought-provoking.—JOHN A. ARMSTRONG, *University of Wisconsin.*

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WILLIAM H. ROBERTS
Catholic University of America

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Saunders, Dero A. Editor. *The Autobiography of Edward Gibbon.* (New York: Meridian Books. 1961. Pp. 224. $1.35.)

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Talmon, J. L. *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. xi, 366. $2.25 in paper, $5.50 in cloth.)

Taylor, Robert J. Editor. *Massachusetts, Colony to Commonwealth.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg. 1961. Pp. xi, 166. $2.00.)

Truman, Tom. *Catholic Action and Politics.* Revised Edition. (Melbourne: Georgian House. 1960. Pp. xiv, 283. 19/6.)

Wilkins, Burleigh Taylor. *Carl Becker: A Biographical Study in American Intellectual History.* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press and Harvard University Press, jointly. 1961. Pp. ix, 246. $5.50.)

Wishy, Bernard. Editor. *The Western World in the Twentieth Century.* (New York: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. 517. $5.00.)

Young, William H. Editor. *Ogg and Ray's Essentials of American Government.* Eighth Edition. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1961. Pp. xii, 564. No price.)

Yuzuk, Ronald Paul. *The Assessment of Employee Morale.* (Columbus: Ohio State University Bureau of Business Research. 1960. Pp. ix, 67. $2.00.)

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN UNIVERSITIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA*

COMPILED BY WILLIAM C. SEYLER

Deputy Secretary, Department of Internal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

ADDITIONS, CHANGES, AND DELETIONS SINCE THE 1960 LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Additions

Adele B. Anderson, Effects of Existentialist Theology on Contemporary Political Theory. *Claremont.*

Jason Aronson, Shaftesbury's Political Thought and Its Philosophical Foundations. *Chicago.*

Eldon Bowman, The Political Philosophy of Patrick Henry. *Claremont.*

David E. Brown, The Political Ideas of Lewis Corey. *Ohio State.*

Ronald C. Cease, Sovereignty and Social Solidarity in the Thought of Leon Duguit. *Claremont.*

David E. Clarke, The Elimination of Irrational Aggressiveness. *Stanford.*

Jack S. Dennis, Theories of Decision-Making in Political Science. *Chicago.*

Edward B. Estes, Albert Camus' Philosophy of Limits as Applied to the American Approach to the Cold War. *Florida.*

Joseph P. Farry, A Comparison of the Political Thought of Orestes A. Brownson and Father Isaac T. Hecker: Two Approaches to American Democracy. *Fordham.*

Wayne L. Francis, Patterns of Legislative Interaction and Influence: A Quantitative Analysis within a Conceptual Framework. *Indiana.*

Robert S. Getz, Congressional Conflict of Interest: A Study in Legislative Policy. *Rutgers.*

Milton Hobbs, The Logic of Political Science. *Northwestern.*

Nathaniel L. Huggard, A Comparison of Contemporary Conservatism in Great Britain and the United States. *Southern California.*

Hwa Yol Jung, God, Man and Politics: The Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain. *Florida.*

Patrick J. Kennedy, A Study of the Charges of Inconsistency within the Political Philosophy of James Madison. *Fordham.*

Ronald McDonald, Ideology and Political Analysis: A Theory of Ideology for Analyzing Contemporary Belief Systems. *California* (Los Angeles).

Wilson C. McWilliams, Fraternity and Politics in America. *California* (Berkeley).

Roger D. Masters, Political Right and the Art of Politics in Rousseau's Thought. *Chicago.*

Martin Meadows, Political Philosophy of Peter F. Drucker. *Maryland*

Ralph W. Nary, Views of the United States Catholic Hierarchy on Church-State Relations, 1884–1899. *Georgetown.*

Dale Neuman, The Implications for Political Behavior of Varying Leisure Time and Activities. *Northwestern.*

James S. Nyman, Conservatism as a Basis for Action in International Politics with Special Reference to Burke, Metternich, and Churchill. *California* (Berkeley).

Mary S. Power, Vernon Louis Parrington and J. Allen Smith: An American Political Tradition. *Illinois.*

Herman J. Ruether, Concepts of Leadership in Indian Political Thought. *Claremont.*

Charles E. Schutz, The Development and Significance of the Political Thought of Walter Lippmann. *Chicago.*

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* Similar lists have been printed in the REVIEW annually since 1911, except for 1915–19, 1921 and 1923–24; full citations are given in the 1955 list, XLIX, 792.

Items which appeared in the September, 1960 list and which are still in preparation *without change* are *not* repeated in this listing. The present listing contains only additions, changes, and deletions. Additions are those items which were reported in preparation for the first time; changes are those items which have had a change in name, title, or classification; and deletions are those items which are no longer in preparation.

The lists printed in the REVIEW are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science; to avoid misunderstandings, entries are not accepted from individual candidates for degrees. The subject matter classification of an entry by the department concerned, if given, is followed. Each entry is listed under one classification only.

For a fuller note about coverage and subject matter classification, and for references to dissertation lists in cognate fields, see the 1960 list, LIV, 816.

For a chart which classifies, by subject category, the numbers of dissertations completed and in progress, 1951 through 1957, see this REVIEW, LII, 916.

Abstracts of some of the theses listed as completed may be found in "Dissertation Abstracts," published bi-monthly by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Ethel Sheffer, The Pluralist Response to Changes in American Society and Politics, 1900–1930. *Columbia.*

George E. Von der Muhll, Efficiency and Decentralization in Administrative Theory: The Case of Plymouth, Massachusetts. *Harvard.*

Changes

Tadeusz Cieplak, Sorel's Theory of Syndicalism. *McGill.*

Edward R. Wright, Jr., The Social and Political Thought of William Temple. *Duke.*

Deletions

William Eaton, The Politics of George Bernard Shaw. *California* (Berkeley).

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Additions

Curtis B. Akenson, Political Power in the Redevelopment of the Minneapolis Loop. *Minnesota.*

Douglas L. Bailey, The Constitution, Federalism and American Foreign Policy. *Fletcher School.*

Thomas J. Bennett, The National Executive and the Mass Information Media. *Illinois.*

John F. Bibby, Legislative Oversight of the Administration: A Case Study of a Congressional Committee. *Wisconsin.*

R. Lewis Bowman, Negro Political Organization and Leadership in Four Southern Counties. *North Carolina.*

John Bradley, Party Platforms and Party Performance: Health, Education and Welfare, 1920–1960. *Washington* (Seattle).

Margaret L. Callcott, The Negro and Maryland Politics, 1870–1912. *North Carolina.*

James W. David, The Presidential Primary, 1928–1960. *Minnesota.*

Roger H. Davidson, The Politics of American Business: The Case of Depressed Areas Legislation. *Columbia.*

Joan Davis, Decision Making in a Small Elective Group. *Yale.*

Douglas S. Gatlin, The Socio-Economic Bases of Party Systems. *North Carolina.*

Philip Green, An Analysis of the Concept of Military Deterrence. *Princeton.*

Margaret Hunt, Congressional Perceptions of Interest Group Activities. *North Carolina.*

Virginia M. Kemp, Congress and China: 1945–1960. *Pittsburgh.*

Earl R. Kruschke, Female Politicals and Apoliticals: Some Measurements and Comparisons. *Wisconsin.*

Willard Leavel, Eisenhower and his Congressional Opposition. *Washington* (Seattle).

Lewis Lipsitz, Mass Production and Political Attitudes. *Yale.*

Charles McCall, Organizational Group Memberships and Political Participation. *Yale.*

John K. Moriarty, Democratic Control of American Military Strategy: Role of Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Georgetown.*

William L. Morrow, Congress and the ICA: A Study in Executive-Legislative Relations. *Iowa.*

Stuart Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making. *Northwestern.*

Robert E. Newton, The Concept of Judicial Self-restraint in the Opinions of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter of the Supreme Court of the United States. *Catholic.*

Michael K. O'Leary, Consensus Formation in American Government: The Case of Aid to Underdeveloped Nations. *Princeton.*

Dale W. Olsen, The Minnesota Department of Business Development: An Administrative Study. *Minnesota.*

Herbert C. Phillips, The Role of Academic Elites in the Formulation of American Foreign Policy. *Pittsburgh.*

John C. Ries, The Politics of National Defense. *California* (Los Angeles).

Luther W. Smith, Politics in Self-Image of a Group of Urban New England Protestant Parish Clergy. *Yale.*

David J. Stern, Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions in the Field of Subversive Activities, 1956–1961. *Claremont.*

Donald A. Strickland, Governmental Interaction with Antinomian Groups. *Chicago.*

Harry Stumpf, Patterns of Congressional Response to Supreme Court Decisions. *Northwestern.*

David T. Wood, The National Farmers Organization in Transition. *Iowa.*

Changes

James R. Kerr, Congressional Committee Staff and Legislative Oversight of Administration with Emphasis on the Independent Regulatory Agencies. *Stanford.*

Robert L. Keighton, The Investigatory Power of Congress with Particular Reference to the Executive Branch and the Separation of Powers Principle. *Pennsylvania.*

Robert G. Leh, Compulsory Arbitration of Civil Actions in the United States, with Special Reference to Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania.*

Jack M. Schick, The Limits of War: Politics and the Polaris. *Chicago.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Additions

John Quincy Adams, A Study of the United States Courts of Appeals. *Texas*.

Dee Akers, Administrative Regulation in Kentucky. *Kentucky*.

Duncan Baird, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Minnesota: Analysis and Reform Proposals. *Minnesota*.

James Bolner, Chief Justice Vinson: A Study of His Politics and His Constitutional Law. *Virginia*.

Walter D. Burnham, Activism, Self-Restraint and the Warren Court: A Judicial Dilemma of Means and Ends. *Harvard*.

Richard C. Cortner, The Wagner Act Cases. *Wisconsin*.

Maria J. Falco, Accusatorial versus Inquisatorial Methods of Judicial Procedure. *Bryn Mawr*.

Joan Gotwals, Constitutional and Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power in American States. *Pennsylvania*.

Robert W. Heussler, Recruitment and Training of the British Colonial Administrative Service from the 1920's to the End of the Second World War. *Princeton*.

David Hughes, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Salmon P. Chase. *Princeton*.

Joseph Lesser, Constitutional Review of the Actions of the State of New York and its Agencies 1939–1960. *Columbia*.

Louis S. Loeb, Judicial Groups and Judicial Values: A Study of the Value Relationships Between Voting Groups on Selected U. S. Courts of Appeal and State Supreme Courts and the United States Supreme Court, 1957–60. *American*.

Sister M. Candida Lund, The Sunday Observance Laws and the Law. *Chicago*.

Ida May Martin, The Contribution of the State of Georgia to the Development of the Concept of Federalism. *Emory*.

Vernon L. Martin, United States Passport Policy and the Right to Travel since World War II. *Kentucky*.

Elijah W. Miles, A Study of the Origin of Judicial Review in Indiana. *Indiana*.

Eugene C. Price, Judicial Review of the Administrative Process. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert D. Slote, Freedom of Speech in Public Places—The Use of New York City Streets and Parks for Purposes of Public Speech and Assembly. *Columbia*.

Richard M. Yearwood, The Law and Administration of Subdivision Regulation: A Study in Land Use Control. *Florida*.

Changes

Edward M. Goldberg, Apportionment and Voting Powers Under the Constitution. *Pennsylvania*.

Leigh Hunt, Administrative Procedure Legislation in Minnesota. *Minnesota*.

Deletions

Martin M. Shapiro, Constitutional Concept of Morality. *Harvard*.

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

Shirley Chapman, The Dynamics of Federalism: An Analysis of Changing Relationships of National, State and Local Governments: 1950–1960 *Emory*.

Michael N. Danielson, The Politics of Commuter Transportation: A Study of the Political Role of the Metropolis in a Federal System. *Princeton*.

Bernice M. Deutrich, Southeastern Wisconsin's Four Largest Cities: Their Budget and Related Financial Practices. *American*.

Alfred E. Diamond, The Establishment of a State Governmental Structure for Civil Defense: A Problem in Intergovernmental Relations. *Ohio State*.

Thomas R. Dye, Certain Political Correlates of the Areal Differentiation and Stratification of Subpopulation in a Metropolitan Area. *Pennsylvania*.

Murray Frost, The Political Behavior of Union Members in Two Urban Areas. *Michigan State*.

Lawrence D. Greene, Reform of the Pennsylvania State Personnel System 1955–1959: A Study in the Politics of Personnel Administration. *Columbia*.

David H. Grubbs, City-County Consolidation in Tennessee. *Pensylvania*.

Harlan D. Hahn, One-partyism and State Politics: The Structure of Political Power in Iowa. *Harvard*.

Charles O. Hardy, Some Political Aspects of Budget-Making in the State of Indiana. *Indiana*.

Donald S. Hiller, The Commission Form of Government in Pennsylvania Cities of the Third Class. *Pennsylvania*.

James B. Hobbs, The Impact of Selected "Equal Protection" Decisions in Kansas City. *Missouri*.

Matthew Holden, Decision-making on a Metropolitan Government Proposition: The Case of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1958–59. *Northwestern*.

James Holderman, Decision-making in Conflict

Resolution: The Case of Winnetka, Illinois. *Northwestern.*

Kenneth E. Kerle, The League of Kansas Municipalities. *American.*

Emilia Longobardo, The Politics of Charter Revision in New York City since 1898. *Columbia.*

Robert T. Norman, The Politics of Urbanization. *Harvard.*

Kan Ori, Basic Ideas in Federal-State Relations: The Indiana Revolt of 1951. *Indiana.*

Stanley A. Pearl, Comparative Community Study of the Politics of Economic Development. *Oregon.*

Lois Pelekoudas, An Analysis of Attempts at Judicial Reform. *Illinois.*

Leonard Ruchelman, Career Patterns of New York Legislators. *Columbia.*

Alvin D. Sokolow, Social Structure and Political Conflict: The Politics of Two Illinois Counties. *Illinois.*

Donald S. Smith, Federal-Local Relations: Philadelphia's Approach to the Metropolitan Problem. *Pennsylvania.*

Hugh M. Thomason, The Legislative Process in Georgia. *Emory.*

Stephen Wasby, The Clean and the Unclean: Groups and the Politics of Obscenity. *Oregon.*

Lewis P. Welch, County Government Reorganization in Upstate New York: An Historical, Legal, and Political Study of Metropolitan Area Action. *Syracuse.*

James L. Wilcox, The Republican Party of Los Angeles County. *California* (Los Angeles).

Gary L. Wilhelm, A Scale Analysis of Several Recent Sessions of the Idaho Legislature. *Illinois.*

Darrell C. Wilson, Role Conflicts and Adjustment among Oregon State Legislators. *Oregon.*

Matthew Zuckerbraun, Factors Contributing to the Growth of a Suburban Minority Party: The Case of the Democratic Party in Westchester County. *Columbia.*

Paul Zehner, Some Religious Influences in the Politics of Metropolitan Chicago and in the United States. *Northwestern.*

Changes

Todd H. Bullard, The West Virginia Labor Federation and Legislative Politics in West Virginia, 1956–1961. *Pittsburgh.*

Thomas L. Rielly, An Analysis of the Shifting Focus of the Federal Urban Renewal Program. *Chicago.*

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

T. Goldberg, Health Benefits Through Collective Bargaining in Canadian Industries. *Toronto.*

W. D. Young, The C.C.F. Party in Canada. *Toronto.*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Additions

Amin Alimard, A Study of the University Bureaus of Public Administration. *Southern California.*

Thomas Ashley, Power, Politics and Community Planning: (A Study of Democratic Participation in the Policy-Making Process). *Claremont.*

Alireza Besharat, Political and Administrative Decentralization. *Southern California.*

Jack D. Brooks, Regulation by Negotiation: A Study of Non-adjudicative Processes. *Princeton.*

Il Suk Cha, Planning Administration in South Korea. *New York University.*

James P. Clark, Codes of Ethics in the Public Service. *New York University.*

Frank T. Colon, A Study of the Regulatory Commissions: The Hector Memorandum and the Landis Report. *Pittsburgh.*

Karim I. Darwish, Bureaucracy and Social Change in Modern Egypt. *New York University.*

Camille E. Decker, The Training of Government Employees: A Study of Training Operations under the Government Employees Training Act of 1958, with Special Reference to the Department of the Navy. *American.*

Warren Donnelly, Atomic Energy and Government in the United States, Great Britain and Canada. *New York University.*

Gerald E. Fitzgerald, Current Practices in Wage Administration and Position Classification Administration in Selected American Jurisdictions. *New York University.*

Theodore F. Gautschi, Administration of Research and Development. *Southern California.*

Abram F. Goldman, The County Board of Equalization in California: An Administrative Study of Its Action. *Southern California.*

Gerald R. Hasty, Description and Analysis of the Army Command Management System. *American.*

John M. Hess, The Concept of Staff: A Study in Administrative Theory. *California* (Berkeley).

Mel Huden, Factors Affecting the Mobility of Public Employees. *Southern California.*

Rose S. Jochnowitz, Administrative Aspects of Federal Aid to Distressed Areas. *New York University.*

Jacob M. Kleiman, Evaluation of the Management Appraisal Program of the U. S. Public Health Service Hospital System. *American.*

Opal V. Landrum, The Heraldic Program of the United States Department of the Army: An

Analysis, Evaluation and Interpretation. *American*.

Antonio E. Lapitan, The Decision of the United States to Establish a Wage and Position Classification System in the Philippines: A Study of the United States Technical Assistance in Public Administration. *Oregon*.

Arthur L. Levine, Research Independence in a Government Science Agency: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1951–1958. *Columbia*.

Leonard Lund, Forty Years of Failure: The Commuter Problem in the New York Area. *New York University*.

Conrad McBride, Federal State Relations in the Development of the Water Resources of the Upper Colorado River Basin. *California* (Los Angeles).

Omega R. McQuown, From National Agency to Regional Institution: A Study of T.V.A. in the Political Process. *Florida*.

Alexandre M. Mattos, Standards and Patterns of Administrative Reorganization in the U. S. 1945–55. *Southern California*.

Amir Houshang Mehrassa, Administrative Analysis in Modern Management with a Special Emphasis on Public Administration and Social Science Research. *Southern California*.

John E. Moore. Comparative Analysis of the Regulatory Process. *Princeton*.

Murray Nesbitt, Administration and Due Process in the National Labor Relations Act. *New York University*.

Chung Oh, Civil Service in Korea. *New York University*.

Margaret Oslund, Elements of Organized Behavior: A Study of Delegation. *Southern California*.

Vishvambher A. Pai-Panandiker, Personnel Administration in the Union Government of India. *Michigan*.

Chong Mo Pak, The Dynamics of Government Reorganization. *Southern California*.

Harold Pellish, Regulation of Insurance by the State of New York. *New York University*.

Donovan Perkins, Determination of Physicians' Attitudes Pertaining to Home Care Programs. *Southern California*.

Raymond L. Randall, An Analysis of Intensive Short-Term Executive Development Programs for Government Officials. *American*.

Chong Ik Rhee, Public Finances of Korea with Special Reference to Administrative Problems. *New York University*.

Irving Rosenthal, Administration of External Assistance with Special Reference to the Government of Turkey. *American*.

Winslow Rouse, The Problem of Adult Corrections: (A Case Study of State Penal Administration in California). *Claremont*.

William Sachau, Samuel Leask, Jr.: A Study in Administrative Behavior. *Southern California*.

Allen Schick, Program Budgeting: Attitudes, Expectations and Results. *Yale*.

Gilbert B. Siegel, An Analysis of Comparative Public Administration Models through the Study of Developing Countries. *Pittsburgh*.

Jairaj Solomon, Administrative Problems of State Enterprises in India. *New York University*.

Louis Sparar, Social Organization of Inter-Disciplinary Research. *Claremont*.

Bommireddi V. Subbiah, A National Planning Policy for India. *New York University*.

John Sullivan, The Effect of Electronic Data Processing on Organization in Public Administration. *Southern California*.

Kasem Suwanagul, The Civil Service of Thailand. *New York University*.

Leland Swanson, Real Time System for Law Enforcement in Los Angeles County. *Southern California*.

Robert Warren, The Anarchy of Incorporation. *California* (Los Angeles).

David Wellborn, The Administrative Process in Motor Carrier Regulation. *Texas*.

Troy R. Westmeyer, Administration of the New York University-Ankara Program. *New York University*.

Changes

Todd R. La Porte, Organization Goals: Their Impact on Administrative Operations and Executive Roles. *Stanford*.

Deletions

Warren C. White, The Role of Federal Examiners in the Administrative Process, with Special Reference to the Interstate Commerce Commission. *Maryland*.

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

Gil C. AlRoy, The Republican Elite and Problems of Organization in the Third Republic. *Princeton*.

John Ambler, French Civil-Military Relations. The Problem of Civilian Control. *California* (Berkeley).

John H. Badgley, The Theory of Progress: The Problem of its Adaptation in Burma. *California* (Berkeley).

Allen B. Ballard, Jr., The State Farm System of the U.S.S.R. *Harvard*.

John A. Ballard, Development of Political Parties in Former French Equatorial Africa. *Fletcher School.*

Joan R. Barth, History of the Albanian Communist Party. *Harvard* (Radcliffe).

Eunuel V. Berbano, Innovations in Philippine Public Administration, 1954–60. *American.*

Albert Boiter, Social Courts in the U.S.S.R. *Columbia.*

Peter J. Boyce, Australian Relations with the Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore, 1941–1961. *Duke.*

Wilfried Braje, The Presidency of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–59. *Clark University.*

Louis F. Brakeman, Jr., India's Constructive Policy of Non-Alignment: An Analytical Interpretation. *Fletcher School.*

Belmont Brice, Jr., The Development of Military Institutions in the Emerging States. *California* (Los Angeles).

Adam Bromke, Poland's Own Road to Socialism. *McGill.*

Barbara Budin, A Comparison of Soviet and French Communist Policies toward the French Colonial Problem, 1945–1960. *Harvard* (Radcliffe).

Willard C. Carpenter, Jr., The Kerala Communist Party. *Claremont.*

Sung Hwan Chang, Japanese Rule in China (1931–1945), a Study of Japanese-Sponsored Regimes in China. *Columbia.*

Robert H. Clarke, Agricultural Pressure Groups and French Politics. *Princeton.*

Orville G. Cope, Recent Political Party Alignment and Election Procedures in Chile. *Claremont.*

Joanne M. Coyle, French Educational Policy in Indochina. *Fletcher School.*

Frank Dinka, Church and State in Communist Poland: Political Conflict between the Catholic Church and the Communist Regime in Poland. *Washington* (St. Louis).

John C. Donnell, Personalism and Politics in Viet Nam. *California* (Berkeley).

William Eaton, Judicial Legislation: The Canadian Case. *California* (Berkeley).

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Constance M. Hicks, Central Banking in Under-developed Countries, with Special Emphasis on Three Economies: The Union of South Africa, the Central African Federation, and Nigeria. *Fletcher School.*

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Eli Kaminsky, An Anti-Subversive Program in the French Public Service: The Epuration Administrative 1944–1954. *Harvard.*

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Rene LeMarchand, Political Awakening in the Congo. *California* (Los Angeles).

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Ronald S. MacLean, British, Top-Level Personal Diplomacy in Two Wartime Coalitions: A Comparison. *Fletcher School.*

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Alvin Magid, Legislative Recruitment and Social Change in Kenya. *Michigan State.*

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Leila Meo, The Separation of Lebanon from Greater Syria: The Effort of a National, Territorial Authority to Assert Itself in a Heterogeneous Society. *Indiana.*

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Israel Ola, Regionalism and Federation in Two Emerging African States. *Northwestern.*

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Charles E. Patterson, Planning Politics and Administration: A Comparative Study of Great Britain and the United States. *Illinois.*

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Tran H. Phat, The Innovating Bureaucrat in a Developing Country. *Harvard.*

Jaroslaw A. Piekalkiewicz, Local Government in Poland-Rady Narodowe. *Indiana.*

Jorgen S. Rasmussen, Postwar Leadership of the British Liberal Party. *Wisconsin.*

James Scarritt, The Role of the African Legislatures of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland. *Northwestern.*

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Bhekh Thapa, Organization for Economic Development in Nepal. *Claremont.*

James R. Townsend, Mass Political Participation in Communist China. *California* (Berkeley).

Thomas Trombetas, The Problem of Political Change in Greece and Turkey, 1945–1960. *Washington* (Seattle).

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Takie Yasuda, The Power Structure and Value System in Modern Japan. *Pittsburgh.*

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Raymond G. Rocca, Italian Foreign Policy and the Mediterranean Problem, 1913–1939. *California* (Berkeley).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION POLITICS AND LAW

Additions

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Thomas W. Adams, Cyprus: A Possible Prototype for Terminating the Colonial Status of a Strategically Located Territory. *Oklahoma.*

John D. Alexander, A Case Study of Spanish Non-belligerency, 1940–1945. *Notre Dame.*

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Terrell W. Bailey, Russian-American Disarmament Negotiations since World War II. *Florida.*

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Rolet Chen, International Problems Relating to Inland Waterways. *Nebraska.*

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Suchati Chuthasmit, The Experiences of the United States and Its Allies in Controlling Trade with the Red Bloc. *Fletcher School.*

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David J. Finlay, A Theory of Totalism: A Study of Conflict and Integration. *Stanford.*

Robert Friedheim, The Politics of the Sea: A Study of Law-Making by Conference. *Washington* (Seattle).

William W. Fry, Communist United Front Strategy and Tactics: Origins and Some Recent Applications. *Georgetown.*

Hosney M. Gaber, The Development of International Law of the Islamic State during the Republican and Omayyad Periods, 632–750, A.D. *American.*

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James L. Govan, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Its Institutional Development and its Role in National Security Policy. *Columbia.*

George E. Gruen, Turkish-Israel Relations: 1948–1958. *Columbia.*

Philip Han, The Republic of Korea and the Unification Issue. *Michigan.*

Jonathan Harris, The Soviet Conception of the "National Bourgeoisie:" Its Impact on Communist Strategy in Asia and the Middle East. *Columbia.*

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Robert F. Herring, The Influence of the United States on the Development of Democratic Institutions in Latin America, 1900–1950. *Fletcher School.*

Janet E. Hill, An Analysis of the Interpretation Given by the Union of South Africa to Article II, Paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter. *Fletcher School.*

Olė R. Holsti, The Decision-Maker's Image of the "Enemy": John Foster Dulles and the Soviet Union. *Stanford.*

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Jaipaul, India's Policy Towards American Business and Industry in India. *Minnesota.*

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Niazul Hag Khan, The Alabama Arbitration. *Virginia.*

Dona King, The Crisis of Political Leadership by the Secretary General in the United Nations. *Northwestern.*

Stanley F. Knock, Jr., A Study of Selected Protestant Christian Missionary Radio Stations in Latin America. *American.*

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Unja Lee, Relations between the Soviet Union and China. *Claremont.*

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Richard Merritt, Symbols of American Nationalism, 1735–1775. *Yale.*

J. Mohan, The Suez Crisis and the Commonwealth. *Toronto.*

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Virgil Ney, Resistance Warfare—A Military Phenomenon. *Georgetown.*

Robert Noel, Theory and Procedure for the Simulation of International Relations. *Northwestern.*

Donald H. Norton, Karl Haushofer and his Influence on Nazi Ideology and Foreign Policy. *Clark University.*

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Chi Young Pak, The Political Role of the Secretary General of the United Nations. *New York University.*

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Walt A. Raitt, The Politics of Disarmament—An Exploratory Inquiry of the "Gamesmanship" of U. S.-Soviet Diplomacy, 1946–1960. *Claremont.*

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Young Y. Rew, A Study of the Government-General of Korea, 1919–1937. *American.*

Susan Rosenbaum, The British Withdrawal from Cyprus 1955–58. *Yale.*

Robert L. Rothstein, The Alliance Policy of Small States, 1919–1940. *Columbia.*

Bonifacio Salamanca, The Beginnings of Philippine-American Affinity, 1901–1907. *Yale.*

Joseph Salameh, Politics in the United Nations: A Case Study of the Politics of Lebanon in the United Nations on Major Substantive Issues, 1945–1960. *Georgetown.*

John C. Satra, Some Aspects of the European Coal and Steel Community: International Law and the Political Process. *Florida.*

Edith M. Schein, The International Commonwealth: Its Forces of Cohesion and Counterpoise. *California* (Berkeley).

Walter S. Schoenberger, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and Its Political and Moral Consequences. *Fletcher School.*

James P. Sewell, "Peace by Pieces" and World Politics: An Evaluation of the Functional Approach to International Organization, with Emphasis on Two UN Programs. *California* (Berkeley).

John E. Simon, The Political Exploitation of the Moscow Patriarchate by the Soviet Government. *American.*

Walter A. E. Skurnik, The Drive for Unity in Former French West Africa. *Pennsylvania.*

Zdenek Slouka, Some Aspects of the Growth of International Customary Rules. *Columbia.*

Barbara Stevens, Para-Military Groups and International Organization. *Yale.*

Harold D. Stevens, Communication and Control in Recent Disarmament Negotiations: An Analysis of Attempts to Resolve Disagreements and to Manipulate Negotiations. *Stanford.*

Kenneth Street, President Truman's Legislative Relations. *Texas.*

Usha Roy Sud, The United Nations and Non Self-Governing Territories: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation. *Michigan.*

Denis Sullivan, Toward an Inventory of Explanatory Propositions Concerning International Behavior. *Northwestern.*

Istan Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Integration Movement in the United States, Theory and Practice. *Columbia.*

George J. Vojta, Money and Finance in an Underdeveloped Country: A Case Study of India, 1950–60. *Yale.*

Pramod Vyas, United States Congressional Attitudes toward India. *American.*

Joan K. Wadlow, Procurement of Factual Data in the Settlement of International Disputes. *Nebraska.*

Stephen Weber, Communist Concepts of the Permanent Revolution in International Relations. *Columbia.*

Miner L. Weems, The Propaganda Struggle in the Middle East 1955–1958. A Comparative Study of the Role of Propaganda as a Legitimate Tool of Government in the Cold War. *Georgetown.*

Lawrence Whetten; The Relations of IAEA with Other International Organizations: A Study in Functional Approach to International Relations. *New York University.*

Herbert R. Winter, The Foreign Policy Position of the German Social Democratic Party. *Iowa.*

Sophia Yen, Taiwan in China's Foreign Affairs, 1858–1875. *Yale.*

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M. George Zaninovich, Transformations in World View and Images of the "Other Power" in Communist Foreign Policy. *Stanford.*

Ciro E. Zoppo, The Test Ban Conference: A Study in Arms Control Negotiation. *Columbia.*

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Frank W. Ryan, A Case Study of a Private International Organization: The Foster Parents' Plan, Inc., in Korea. *New York University.*

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James E. Boyce, The United States and the Integrity of China, 1898–1908. *Fletcher School.*

Jean E. Buckens, Land Tenure and Labor Conditions Among Indigenous Peoples. *Fletcher School.*

George A. Carroll, American Policy Concerning Control of American Energy. *Fletcher School.*

Jack Chia, The Secretary General of the United Nations: Office and Powers. *Fordham.*

Martin G. Cramer, TCA Program in India. *Fletcher School.*

Francois M. Dickman, The Economic Foreign Policy of the U. S. in Western Europe from 1945–1948. *Fletcher School.*

C. Dale Fuller, The Soviet Union's Concept of the League of Nations as an Instrumentality for the Maintenance of Peace, 1934–1939. *Columbia.*

Shirley M. Gifford, U. S. Relations with Morocco from 1778–1956. *Fletcher School.*

Doris W. Jones, The First Moroccan Crisis and the Foreign Policy of Theodore Roosevelt. *Fletcher School.*

William C. Mithoefer, International Legal Developments since 1915 Concerning Southwest Africa. *Duke.*

Charles W. Naas, The Development of a Constitution for Pakistan. *Fletcher School.*

James L. Weber, The Development of the Foreign Policy Objectives of the British Labor Party, 1919–1939. *Fletcher School.*

Harvey Yarosky, The Theory and Practice of Disarmament. *McGill.*

II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

William C. Baum; B.A., Kalamazoo College, 1955; M.A., *ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., Iowa, 1960. The Politics of Fright: The Radical Right in the United States. *Iowa.*

Charles S. Bednar; A.B., Rutgers, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Columbia, 1960. John Dewey's Rationale for a Democratic Society. *Columbia.*

Nathaniel Davis; A.B., Brown, 1944; M.A., Fletcher School, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. Religion under Communism. *Fletcher School.*

Paul M. Downing; A.B., Harvard, 1950; M.A., Catholic University, 1952; Ph.D., Columbia, 1960. A Comparison of the Doctrines of St. Thomas Aquinas and John Locke on the Right of Political Authority. *Columbia.*

Martin Fleisher; B.S., Duke, 1945; Ph.D., Columbia, 1960. Reason and Reform: The Transformation of Social and Political Theory during the English Revolution. *Columbia.*

Julian H. Franklin; B.A., Queens College, 1946; M.A., Columbia, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. Jean Bodin and the 16th Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law and History. *Columbia.*

William H. Hatcher, B.A., Arkansas, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., Duke, 1961. The Political and Legal Theories of Westel Woodbury Willoughby. *Duke.*

John A. Hobbs; A.B., Illinois, 1957; A.M., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., Princeton, 1961. The Rise of Scientific Value Relativism in American Political Science. *Princeton.*

Rev. Francis D. Johnson, S.J.; B.A., West Baden College, 1945; M.A., Loyola, 1951; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1961. Suarez on the Theory of Custom. *Georgetown.*

Arthur Kalleberg; B.A., Minnesota, 1952; M.A., *ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. An Analysis of the Nature and Validity of the Idea of a Science of Politics in Recent Political Theory. *Minnesota.*

David S. Keene; A.B., Bowdoin College, 1953; Ph.D., Princeton, 1961. The Political Thought of Edwin Lawrence Godkin. *Princeton.*

David Kettler; B.A., Columbia., 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson: An Intellectual and the Emergence of Modern Society. *Columbia.*

Erwin L. Levine; A.B., Brown, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Politics of Theodore Francis Green: The Early Years, 1906–1936. *Brown.*

Thomas McEnroe; B.A., California, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1960. The Political Theories of the Industrial Workers of the World. *Minnesota.*

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.; B.A., Harvard, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Party Government and Statemanship. *Harvard.*

Simon D. Perry; A.B., Berea College, 1954; M.A., Tennessee, 1955; Ph.D. Michigan, 1961. Conflict of Expectations and Roles in "Policy Science" Behavior. *Michigan.*

Hanna Pitkin; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1961. The Theory of Political Representation. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert J. Pranger; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Problem of Citizenship in the Action Theories of Modern Social Science and Existentialism. *California* (Berkeley).

Eugene Pyziur; D. Juris, Free University of the Ukraine, 1949; M.A., Columbia, 1954; Ph.D., Notre Dame, 1961. Constitutional Thought in Pre-Revolutionary Russia. *Notre Dame.*

Sister M. Christopher Querin, F.C.S.P.; B.S.S., San Francisco, 1950; Ph.D., St. Louis, 1960. The Political Theory of James Wilson. *St. Louis.*

Donald R. Reich; A.B., Wisconsin, 1952; Ph.D., Harvard, 1961. Federal Conflict in Maturing Federal Systems. *Harvard.*

John E. Rielly; B.A., St. John's University, 1954; Ph.D., Harvard, 1961. Contemporary Thought on Church and State: An Analysis of the Work of Jacques Maritain and John Courtney Murray. *Harvard.*

William A. Ritchie; A.B., Marshall College, 1950; A.M., Michigan, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. Henry Sidgwick and the Received Liberal-Utilitarian Tradition. *Michigan.*

Joseph Scottino; A.B., Gannon, 1950; M.A., Fordham, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. An Examination of the Concept of Liberty in the Political Thought of Lord Acton. *Fordham.*

Otto C. Stoetzer; LL.D., University of Freiburg; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1961. The Influence of European Political Thought in Spanish America: Scholasticism and the Period of Enlightenment, 1789–1825. *Georgetown.*

Thomas L. Thorson; A.B., Indiana, 1956; A.M., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., Princeton, 1960. An Examination of the Logic of Democracy. *Princeton.*

Morimichi Watanabe; M.A., Columbia, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Nicholas of Cusa. *Columbia.*

Edward D. Watt; B.S., Western Australia, 1954; A.M., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., Duke, 1961. Acton's Concept of Freedom. *Duke.*

Jean H. Wheeler; B.A., Radcliffe, 1948; Lic. Sci. Politiques (Inst. Univ. de Hautes Etudes Int.), 1949; M.A., Radcliffe, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Freedom and Education: A Study of the Interrelation in American Thought of Ideas of Freedom and Education. *Harvard.*

Fred H. Willhoite, Jr.; A.B., Oklahoma Baptist, 1957; A.M., Duke, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Consent of the Governed: An Analysis of Some Representative Thinkers. *Duke.*

Marvin Zetterbaum; A.B., St. John's College, 1950; A.M., Chicago, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. The Political Philosophy of Alexis de Tocqueville. *Chicago.*

Norman L. Zucker; A.B., Rutgers, 1954; M.A., *ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. The Political Philosophy of George W. Norris. *Rutgers.*

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Lee F. Anderson; B.A., Idaho, 1956; M.A., Illinois, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Volume and Stability of Intra-Party Consensus in the House of Representatives during Four Recent Congresses. *Illinois.*

Bruce R. Andrews; A.B., Syracuse, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Religious and Ethnic Influences on Voting Behavior: A Study of the Syracuse Electorate from 1918 to 1957. *Syracuse.*

Joseph Cooper; A.B., Harvard, 1955; A.M., *ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Congress and its Committees: A Historical and Theoretical Approach to the Proper Role of Committees in the Legislative Process. *Harvard.*

Bernard Cosman; A.B., Alabama, 1954; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. Republicanism in the Metropolitan South. *Alabama.*

Billy G. Crane; B.A., North Texas State College, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., Texas, 1960. Intergovernmental Relations in Relief in Texas. *Texas.*

John A. Crittenden; A.B., Wesleyan, 1950; M.A., North Carolina, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. The Relationship of Age to Political Party Identification. *North Carolina.*

Steven Ebbin; A.B., Syracuse, 1954; D.S.S., *ibid.*, 1960. Personality and Politics: A Qualitative Analysis of the Basic Factors of Political Success. *Syracuse.*

Robert C. Gibson; B.S., Ohio State, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Political Ideas of the American Businessman, 1930–1955: A Study of the Response to the Changing Social Milieu. *Ohio State.*

Edward M. Glick; B.A., Ohio State, 1943; M.A., Western Reserve, 1947; Ph.D., Ohio State, 1960. Propaganda Strategy and Tactics of the Party in Power during the 1958 Congressional Campaign. *Ohio State.*

Charles T. Goodsell; A.B., Kalamazoo College, 1954; M.P.A., Harvard, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Congressional Access to Executive Information: A Problem of Legislative Executive Relations in American National Government. *Harvard.*

Klaus Herrmann; B.A., Minnesota, 1954; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. The Politics of Administrative Reorganization in Minnesota State Government, 1949–59. *Minnesota.*

George C. Hoffmann; A.B., Swarthmore, 1952; A.M., Chicago, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Executive-Legislative Relations in the First Agricultural Adjustment Act. *Chicago.*

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Donato Pugliese; B.A., Pennsylvania, 1951; M.G.A., *ibid.*, 1953; D.P.A., Syracuse, 1960. Citizens Group Activity in the Delaware River Basin. *Syracuse.*

Norman F. Reber; A.B., Elizabethtown College, 1930; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1935; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. Main Factors that Influence the Editorial Content of Farm Magazines. *Pennsylvania.*

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Harold Nieburg; A.B., Chicago, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Atomic Secrecy and Foreign Policy. *Chicago.*

Don C. Piper; B.A., Maryland, 1954; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., Duke, 1961. International Law of the Great Lakes. *Duke.*

Bruce M. Russett; B.A., Williams, 1956; M.A., Yale, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Anglo-American Trade and Political Community. *Yale.*

Seymour Slessinger; A.B., Boston University, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Idea of Nationalism in Soviet Foreign Policy. *Boston University.*

Kusuma Snitwongse; A.B., Jackson, 1956; M.A., Fletcher School, 1957; M.A.L.D., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. United States Policy Toward China, 1921–1927. *Fletcher School.*

Mitchell P. Strohl; B.S., U. S. Naval Academy, 1942; M.A., Boston University, 1958; M.A., Fletcher School, 1959; M.A.L.D. *ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1960. The International Law of Bays. *Fletcher Sdhool.*

David W. Tarr; A.B., Massachusetts, 1953; A.M., Chicago, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. American Power and Diplomacy in the Middle East. *Chicago.*

John H. Woodruff; B.A., Pomona College, 1949; M.A. Fletcher School, 1952; Ph.D., Boston University, 1961. Relations between the Netherlands Government in Exile and Occupied Holland during World War II. *Boston University.*

[The title of George P. Jan's dissertation, listed in this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (September, 1960), p. 832, should read, "Nationality and the Treatment of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia."]

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Midwest Conference of Political Scientists held its nineteenth annual meeting May 11 to 13 at the University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri. General sessions of the Conference were addressed by Hon. Richard Bolling, Member of Congress, Fifth Congressional District of Missouri, on "The House Committee on Rules" and by President Emmette S. Redford of the American Political Science Association on "Perspectives for the Study of Regulation."

Panel sessions featured papers and discussions on the following topics: "The Effective Political Units of a Transitional Society," "Research on the Judicial Process: Some Comments on a Quantitative Approach," "Block Voting in State Appellate Courts," "Testing Relations between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision Making," "Pre-Primary Endorsement and Party Cohesion," "Political Theory, Fruitful or Fruitless," "The Impact of Africa on the Political Process of the United Nations," "New Patterns of Voting in 1960" "The International Law of Space," "Access and Representation in Metropolitan Reorganization," "The Opposition Party in Congress," "The Political Scientist in Africa: Community Research Needs and Opportunities," "Journalism, Political Theory and Foreign Affairs," and "The Growth and Effects of Political Identification." A special panel session was held on simulation (gaming) techniques in research and teaching in international relations.

President Lloyd M. Short chaired the business meeting of the Conference, which elected the following new officers: Richard C. Spencer, Coe College, president; Mona Fletcher, Kent State University, vice-president; and as members of the executive council, Daniel S. McHargue, University of Michigan, and John E. Stoner, Indiana University.

The 1962 annual meeting will be held at the University of Notre Dame on April 26 to 28.

The fifteenth annual meeting of the New York Political Science Association was held at Cornell University on April 21 and 22, 1961. Panel sessions were devoted to "Government and Resources Development" and "The Politics of Developing Areas." At the dinner session Laurin Henry of the Brookings Institution, discussed "Presidential Transition." Officers for 1960–61 are: president, William R. Willoughby, St. Lawrence University; vice-president, Channing Richardson, Hamilton College; secretary-treasurer, Frederick T. Bent, Cornell University; council members: Frederick Engelman, Alfred University; James A. Riedel, Union College, and Herbert Rosenbaum, Hofstra College. Retiring officers were president: Donald Bishop, Syracuse University; vice-president: William R. Willoughby, St. Lawrence University; secretary-treasurer: Frederick T. Bent, Cornell University; council members: Albert Gorvine, Brooklyn College, Alan K. Campbell of the State Controller's Office, and Walter Filley, Harpur College.

The eleventh annual meeting of the Oklahoma Political Science Association was held April 14–15, 1961 at the University of Oklahoma at Norman. Highlights of the program were a paper on "Causal Relationships in Studies of Municipal Politics," by Bertil Hanson, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, and a panel discussion on "Oklahoma State Finances," presided over by H. V. Thornton, University of Oklahoma, Norman.

The eleventh annual meeting of the Iowa Conference of Iowa Political Scientists was held on the campus of Cornell College, April 29, 1961. The morning meeting heard Professor Donald A. Boles of Iowa State University speak on "The Iowa Human Rights Commission—Unfinished Business." The main speaker was President Virgil M. Hancher of the State University of Iowa, who discussed his experiences as delegate to the United Nations. The afternoon session heard Professor Charles R. Foster of Cornell College (Iowa) speak on "Liberals and the Democratic Leadership in Congress."

Indiana University has received a grant of $2,300,000 from the Ford Foundation for support of graduate training and research in non-Western and other international studies. Of the total grant, $1,520,000 plus interest is for ten-year support partly for Russian and East European studies and partly for Asian Studies, including work on the Far East and Near East. The remaining $780,000 plus interest is for five-year support of graduate training and research in comparative studies, African studies, international business administration, and folklore studies. Professor Edward H. Buehrig, department of government, served as chairman of the committee that prepared the request for the grant.

The Government Section of the Southwestern Social Science Association voted at its business meeting held April 1, 1961 to become the Southwestern Political Science Association while retaining its connection with the Southwestern

Social Science Association. Elected as program chairman for the upcoming year was Keith S. Petersen of the University of Arkansas while August O. Spain of Texas Christian University was elected as section editor for the *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*.

The 1961–62 Officers of the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association elected at the 1961 meeting held at Whitman College are: president: Boyd Martin, University of Idaho; vice-president: Paul Castleberry, Washington State University; secretary-treasurer: Donald Balmer, Lewis and Clark College; executive committee: Jean Laponce, University of British Columbia; C. W. Cassinelli, University of Washington; Thomas Payne, Montana State University; Austin Walter, Oregon State University; John Vloyantes, Pacific University; Brock Dixon, Portland State College.

Chicago area political scientists met on the evening of March 24, 1961 at Roosevelt University. Professor George I. Blankstein, Northwestern University, spoke on "The Cuban Situation."

The Northern California Political Science Association held its 13th annual meeting at the University of San Francisco on May 13th. Panels discussed: "Power Structures and Urban Politics" and "Scope, Method and Status of Political Science: Assessment of Approaches." Professor Leo Strauss, University of Chicago, addressed the meeting on the topic, "What is the theme of political theory?" The Presidential Award Citation for teaching, service to the profession, community service, and research was given to Karl Buckman of Fresno State College. Officers elected for 1961–62 were: president, Benjamin G. Franklin, Chico State College; vice-president, John H. Bunzel, Stanford University; secretary-treasurer, John M. Selig, City College of San Francisco. The following were elected to the council: Victor Ferkiss, Saint Mary's College; Norman Jacobson, University of California; Ross Y. Koen, Humboldt State College; Jack F. Leach, Monterey Peninsula College; Alexander Smetana, University of San Francisco; Frederic A. Weed, San Jose State College; William W. Young, Fresno State College.

V. O. Key, professor of government at Harvard University, addressed the members of the Southern California Political Science Association who held their spring meeting on the campus of the University of Southern California. Professor Key's topic was "Public Opinion and the Decay of Democracy." Emmette S. Redford, professor of government at the University of Texas and president of the American Political Science Association, also spoke to the members regarding the activities of the national association.

The 1961 annual meeting of the New England Political Science Association was held on May 6 and 7 at the College of the Holy Cross. Norman Padelford of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was elected president for the coming year, and Sigmund Neumann of Wesleyan University will serve as vice-president. Gerald Grady of the University of Massachusetts was elected secretary-treasurer for the term 1961–1964. Louise Holborn of Connecticut College, Lawrence Howard of Brandeis University, and Donald Rothchild of Colby College were elected to the executive committee. The meeting opened with a Saturday afternoon panel on "The First One Hundred Days of the New Frontier: An Appraisal," chaired by Samuel Beer of Harvard University, and including Lawrence Fuchs of Brandeis University, Lucian Pye of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Frederick Schuman of Williams College. The Saturday evening dinner meeting featured an address on "The American Presidency" by Malcolm Moos of Johns Hopkins University, former special assistant to the president. The annual meeting closed with a Sunday morning panel on "Political Strategy for the Alienated Voter," at which Duane Lockard of Connecticut College served as chairman. Murray Levin of Boston University delivered a paper, and Elmer Cornwell of Brown University and Herbert Kaufman of Yale University served as discussants.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Merritt Abrash has been appointed assistant professor in the department of history, government and international relations at Clark University, 1961–62.

Samir N. Anabtawi has been promoted to assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College.

Jeremy Azrael of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

Benjamin Baker has been promoted to the rank of professor at Rutgers University.

Robert S. Babcock has been promoted to the rank of full professor at the University of Vermont.

William B. Ballis has been named director of the newly established center for Russian Studies at the University of Michigan. During the summer of 1961, Professor Ballis served as consultant with the institute for the study of the USSR in Munich, Germany.

Victor Basiuk, currently teaching at Washington University, has accepted an appointment at Columbia as lecturer in government and research associate in the institute of war and peace studies.

David H. Bayley, formerly of the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed assistant professor in the department of international relations, and the social science foundation, University of Denver.

Kenneth Beasley has been appointed associate professor of political science and public administration at the Pennsylvania State University effective August 1, 1961.

Arnold J. Bornfriend who is completing his work for the doctorate at Columbia University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Western Reserve University.

William L. Bradshaw retired from the deanship of the school of business and public administration of the University of Missouri in August 1961. He will continue to teach in the department of political science there.

George F. Brasington has been promoted from an assistant to an associate professor at Emory University.

Franklin M. Bridge formerly research associate in the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, has been appointed as assistant director for research projects in the bureau of governmental research and service and associate professor of political science in the department of political science at the University of Colorado, effective July 1961.

Arthur W. Bromage has been named chairman of the department of political science of the University of Michigan. He succeeds James K. Pollock who has resigned the chairmanship after serving for fourteen years. Professor Pollock remains James Orin Murfin professor of political science.

Rufus P. Browning has been appointed an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin.

Barbara Buckstein Green has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Wellesley College.

Walter Dean Burnham, Kenyon College, has been appointed to the faculty there to replace Richard P. Longaker, who has resigned in order to join U.C.L.A.

Allen K. Campbell has been appointed professor of political science in the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, where he will have charge of the new metropolitan studies program.

George W. Carey, Indiana University, has accepted an assistant professorship at Georgetown University.

Chong-Do Hah of Indiana University has accepted an instructorship at Lawrence College.

Martin J. Clancy has resigned from the department of political science, Marquette University, to join the staff of the Republican policy committee of the United States Senate.

George C. Codding, assistant professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania, has resigned to take a position at the University of Colorado.

George A. Condon has been appointed to an instructorship in political science for one year, beginning September 1961 at Washington State University.

Herbert Corkran, Jr., Indiana University, has accepted a position at Southern Methodist University.

Richard F. Crabbs, assistant professor of government has been promoted to associate coordinator of contract programs in public administration at Indiana University.

Michael R. Curtis formerly of the University of Massachusetts has been appointed associate professor at Rutgers University.

John T. Dorwey, Jr. has accepted an appointment at Vanderbilt, replacing J. Leiper Freeman who has gone to Alleghany College as professor of political science.

Rondal Downing has accepted the position of assistant professor of political science and assistant director for governmental studies in the newly established research center of the school of business and public administration of the University of Missouri.

Robert L. Drake, Indiana University, has been appointed assistant professor at the University of New Hampshire.

Henry W. Ehrmann has resigned as professor of political science at the University of Colorado to accept a professorship in the department of government at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.

William H. Flanigan, a candidate for the doctorate at Yale University, has been appointed to an assistant professorship at Minnesota.

Thomas A. Flinn has been promoted to an associate professorship at Oberlin.

Robert C. Fried has been appointed assistant professor of government at Bard College.

Stanley H. Friedelbaum has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Rutgers University.

Stanley T. Gabis has accepted an associate professorship at the University of Missouri, effective July 1961.

Arthur N. Gilbert, Ph.D. candidate, has been appointed instructor in the department of international relations and the social science foundation University of Denver.

John Gillespie, secretary of the University of Massachusetts, has accepted the position of director of the Massachusetts State College System. He will have under his supervision nine senior colleges and a college of art.

Robert G. Gilpin, Jr., will come to Columbia in 1961–62 as associate director of the Council for Atomic Age Studies and as lecturer in government.

Visiting professor Bertram Gross has been appointed a permanent member of the Maxwell faculty of political science at Syracuse University. He will spend the 1961–62 academic year at the Stanford center for advanced study.

Alexander Groth, currently instructor in political science at City College of New York, has been named assistant professor of political science at Harpur College, effective September 1.

Lyman J. Gould has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the University of Vermont.

Darrell Hammer, Columbia University, who has been studying for two years at the University of Leningrad has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University.

Charles O. Hardy, Indiana University, has accepted an instructorship at Albion College.

Philip S. Haring of Knox College has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

Murray C. Havens has resigned from Duke University to accept a position at the University of Texas where he served as visiting lecturer during the spring semester.

Harold Herman has become assistant professor at the institute of local and state government, Pennsylvania State University.

James Herndon was appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of North Dakota, beginning September, 1960.

Robert Heussler of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, succeeds Professor Stephen K. Bailey as director of the Ford Foundation-supported Africa-Asia Program, September 1.

Raul Hilberg has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the University of Vermont.

John A. Houston of Knox College has been appointed to the Philip S. Post distinguished professorship of political science.

Karel Hulicka has been promoted to associate professor of history and government at the University of Buffalo.

John Hunger, Indiana University, has accepted an assistant professorship at the University of North Dakota.

Charles S. Hyneman, president-elect of the Association, has been promoted to the rank of distinguished professor at Indiana University, the highest rank which the institution awards.

Harold K. Jacobson has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Kenneth F. Janda, Indiana University, has been appointed assistant professor at Northwestern University.

Charles O. Jones has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Wellesley College.

Melvin A. Kahn, Indiana University, has been appointed assistant professor at Indiana State College at Terre Haute.

Arthur L. Kalleberg, formerly at Mount Holyoke College, has accepted an assistant professorship at the University of Missouri, effective September 1961.

Harold Kaplan, who taught at the University of Rochester in 1960–61, has received an appointment at Columbia for the next academic year as instructor in government and assistant administrative officer, metropolitan region program.

James B. Kessler, Indiana University, has been promoted to assistant professor and re-appointed resident director of the Indiana Commission on State Tax and Financing Policy.

William R. Kintner has been appointed a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Kintner was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff, department of the Army, and was on a special project with the foreign policy research institute, University of Pennsylvania.

Otto Kirchheimer of the New School has been named professor of government at Columbia, and will divide his time next year between the two campuses.

Walter C. Klein a candidate for the doctorate at Northwestern University has been appointed to an assistant professorship at the University of Minnesota.

David C. Knapp, associate professor of government at the University of New Hampshire began his new duties on July 1st as the dean of the college of liberal arts.

Allan A. Kuusisto, retaining his professorship in government has added the office of the dean of the graduate school to his many activities at the University of New Hampshire.

Karl A. Lamb has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

J. Gus Liebenow who is on leave in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has been promoted to associate professor at Indiana University.

Neville Linton who has been a graduate student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, will become instructor in political science at Harpur College, September 1.

Charles H. McLaughlin has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Minnesota beginning 1961–62.

Wilson C. McWilliams of the University of California, Berkeley has been appointed to an instructorship at Oberlin.

Stephen R. Mitchell of Washington State has been promoted from an instructorship to an assistant professorship in political science, effective next September 16.

Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago has been elected a member of the American Philosophical Society. He has also been appointed professor of modern history as well as professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

Daniel M. Ogden, Jr. of Washington State has resigned his associate professorship here to accept appointment to the Technical Review Staff of the U. S. Department of Interior, effective on or about June 15.

Kan Ori has been appointed an assistant professor at Taylor University, Upland, Indiana.

Robert J. Osborn, currently completing his work for the doctorate in political science at Columbia has been appointed as instructor in political science at Swarthmore College for next year.

Richard L. Park has been named director of the newly established center for Southern Asian studies at the University of Michigan. The Center will be concerned with research and advanced training in the areas of both South and Southeast Asia.

Ivan W. Parkins has been promoted to the rank of professor of government and given tenure at Jacksonville University.

Robert L. Peabody, a post-doctoral research fellow at Brookings Institution, has been appointed an assistant professor in political science at the John Hopkins University, beginning September, 1961.

Philip M. Phibbs has been appointed instructor in political science at Wellesley College.

Thomas C. Pocklington, Indiana University, has been appointed assistant professor at the University of Alberta at Edmonton.

Paul F. Power has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati.

Henry J. Pratt has been appointed an instructor in political science at Wellesley College.

Harry Howe Ransom, associate director of the defense studies program at Harvard joins the Vanderbilt political science department in September, 1961. He replaces Denna F. Fleming who retired June 30 after 33 years during which he served as department chairman and research professor of international relations.

Donald Reich of Harvard has been appointed to an assistant professorship at Oberlin for the year 1961–62.

Reza Rezazadeh, Indiana University, was appointed associate professor at Wisconsin State College and Institute of Technology at Platteville, Wisconsin.

Leroy Rieselbach, Yale University, has been appointed instructor at Indiana University.

George K. Romoser has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of New Hampshire.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, University of Pennsylvania, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor. He will be on leave in 1961–62.

Dankwart A. Rustow has been appointed senior staff member of the Foreign Policy Studies program of the Brookings Institution.

Hale T. Shenefield, formerly advisor on international monetary and financial affairs for I.C.A. in Washington has been appointed to the staff of the Inter-American Development Bank in the Division of Technical Assistance.

George W. Shepherd, formerly of the University of Minnesota, has been appointed assistant professor in the department of international relations and the social science foundation, University of Denver.

Jay Sigler is joining the staff of the political science department of Kent State University in September 1961. He completed his work for the Ph.D. at Rutgers during the summer of 1961.

J. David Singer has joined the mental health research institute of the University of Michigan as associate research political scientist, as of February, 1961.

Reed Smith, University of Pennsylvania, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the Fels institute of local and state government.

Rhoten A. Smith, for the past three years director of the Citizenship Clearing House and professor of politics at New York University, has resigned to accept appointment as dean of the college of liberal arts at Temple University.

Glenn H. Snyder, University of Denver, has been promoted to associate professor of international relations.

Frank Sorauf, Jr. formerly at Pennsylvania State has been appointed to an assistant professorship at the University of Minnesota.

Frederick C. Spiegel has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Missouri.

James E. Springfield, Indiana University, has accepted a position in the United States Bureau of the Budget.

Frank M. Stewart, after 45 years in the teaching profession at the University of Texas and UCLA retired as of July 1, 1961 at UCLA. On May 26, a dinner was held in Professor Stewart's honor at UCLA by his colleagues and former students. Three of his former students—Professors V. O. Key, Jr. of Harvard, Emmette S. Redford of the University of Texas, and Foster Sherwood vice chancellor of UCLA gave seminars and addresses on this occasion.

Thor Swanson has been promoted from an assistant professorship to an associate professorship of public administration at Washington State, effective next September 16.

Henry Teune, Indiana University, has accepted an assistant professorship at the University of Pennsylvania.

M. Ladd Thomas, formerly of Indiana University, has been appointed assistant professor at Rutgers University.

G. W. Thumm of the political science department of the University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed professor of government and chairman of the division of social sciences at Bates College.

Henry J. Tomasek has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at the University of North Dakota.

Manoucher Vahdat, Indiana University, was appointed to the political science department at Southeast Missouri State College at Cape Girardeau, Missouri.

Eric Voegelin, Institut für Politische Wissenschaften, of the University of Munich, Germany, has accepted appointment to the Notre Dame faculty in political science. He will reside on campus, visiting from Munich, at frequent intervals during the coming years.

George A. Warp has been appointed director of the public administration center at the University of Minnesota beginning 1961–62.

Richard A. Watson has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Missouri.

Myron Weiner of the department of political science at the University of Chicago has received a Guggenheim Fellowship and a grant-in-aid from the Rockefeller Foundation to study in India. Upon his return he will join the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as an associate professor of political science and a staff member of the center for international studies.

Joe R. Wilkinson, University of Denver has been promoted to assistant professor of international relations.

Robert R. Wilson of Duke University has been appointed James B. Duke professor of political science.

Clyde Wingfield has become assistant professor of public administration at Pennsylvania State University.

Richard M. Yearwood, doctoral candidate at the University of Florida has been appointed assistant professor of history and political science at Millikin University.

Harmon Zeigler will join the department this fall as an assistant professor at Emory University.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Douglas E. Ashford assistant professor at Indiana University has been awarded a research grant by the Harvard Center of Middle Eastern Studies for the summer and will be on leave for the coming year under the sponsorship of the joint committee of the S.S.R.C.-A.C.L.S. He will be conducting a comparative study of local political development in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan.

Paul L. Beckett, chairman of the department of political science at Washington State University will be on sabbatical leave during 1961–62. H. Paul Castleberry will be acting chairman during Beckett's absence.

George Belknap has been appointed visiting associate professor of government at Dartmouth College.

Thomas C. Blaisdell, professor of political science University of California, Berkeley, will be on sabbatical leave in Europe during the 1961–62 academic year.

C. Paul Bradley has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Michigan, Flint College.

Cecil C. Brett assistant professor of government, has accepted reappointment as chief adviser and academic adviser on the Indiana University team assisting the institute of public administration at Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand.

Bernard E. Brown is lecturing during the academic year 1961–62 at the University of New Delhi, on overseas assignment from Vanderbilt under the Rockefeller Program of cooperative interchange with universities in the developing countries.

David S. Brown, director of public administration programs at George Washington University is currently on leave of absence in Pakistan where he is serving as deputy chief of the USC Party in public administration there. The Southern California group under contract to the ICA is providing advice to the government of Pakistan in areas of public administration, education, training, and research.

Lawrence H. Chamberlain will occupy the Ford rotating research professorship of governmental affairs at Columbia for the coming year.

Carl Q. Christol professor of international law and chairman of the department of political science at the University of Southern California has been elected president of the United Nations Association of Los Angeles for a two-year term. He has also been appointed the first chairman of the committee on international and comparative law of the Los Angeles County Bar Association.

Bernard C. Cohen associate professor at the University of Wisconsin will spend 1961–62 at the center for advanced study in the behavioral sciences at Stanford, California.

Joanne M. Coyle has received the Mary E. Wooley international fellowship for 1961–62 awarded by the international federation of university women. Miss Coyle has served during the past two years as instructor in political science at Mount Holyoke College.

Patricia E. Cunnea who has been teaching at Mills College has accepted an instructorship for one year effective September 16, at Washington State.

Alexander Dallin of Columbia has received a Guggenheim fellowship for the coming academic year and will be working on a study of international communism in the post-Stalin era.

Paul C. Davis will spend the year 1961–62 at Columbia as lecturer in government and research associate in the institute of war and peace studies.

Alona E. Evans professor of political science at Wellesley College will be on leave in 1961–62 and has been appointed a fellow in law and political science at Harvard Law School for the year.

David Fellman, professor at the University of Wisconsin, will spend 1961–62 as a senior research Fulbright scholar at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Edwin Fogelman of the department of government at the University of Oklahoma will be visiting associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota for the academic year 1961–62.

Robert Friedman formerly of Louisiana State University has been appointed visiting associate professor of political science and research associate in the institute of public administration at the University of Michigan.

John N. Hazard of the Russian Institute staff at Columbia will spend the year 1961–62 at the center for advanced study in the behavioral sciences.

Robert T. Holt of the University of Minnesota has accepted a fellowship at the center for advanced study in behavioral sciences at Stanford University, California for 1961–62.

J. Woodford Howard, assistant professor in the department of government and law at Lafayette College will be on leave during the academic year 1961–62 while he is attending the law school at Harvard University under a Ford Foundation post-doctoral grant.

Claudius O. Johnson who retired a year ago and who has been teaching this year at Chatham College at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on a John Hay Whitney Foundation visiting professorship, has been awarded a Fulbright lectureship in American civilization at the University of Athens, Greece, for the year 1961–62.

Herbert Kaufman of Yale will be visiting professor of government at Columbia during the coming academic year.

Hans Kohn has been appointed visiting professor in the department of political Science, University of Pennsylvania for the academic year 1961–62.

Stephen P. Koff has been appointed resident administrator of the Syracuse semester in Italy, an undergraduate program based in Florence.

W. W. Kulski of Syracuse University has received Fulbright and Guggenheim awards for study in France during the 1961–62 academic year.

John H. Leek, David Ross Boyd professor of government at the University of Oklahoma has been elected president of the Oklahoma Political Science Association.

Benjamin E. Lippincott will be on sabbatical leave in 1961–62. He plans to examine representative writings in the behavioral and traditional fields, with regard to their assumptions of scientific method, their techniques employed and an evaluation of their results. He also plans to initiate with Professor Harold Lasswell a series of studies on art and politics.

Robert D. Loevy has been re-appointed as a lecturer in political science at Goucher College for the academic year 1961–62.

Gerhard Loewenberg, assistant professor of political science at Mount Holyoke College, has received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation for a study of the legislative process in the Bundestag. He will be on sabbatical leave for the year 1961–62 conducting research in Germany.

Edwin B. McPheron, associate professor, Indiana University, has been appointed to the Indiana Commission of flood control and water resources.

Arthur W. Macmahon, professor emeritus of public administration at Columbia University, represented the United Nations' technical assistance division during April at a five-weeks conference of Irish administrators convened under the auspices of the Irish Institute of Public Administration on problems of planning and development.

Hubert Marshall is representing the department of political science, Stanford University, in a new interdepartmental program of research and instruction in engineering, economic planning, supported by a grant of approximately $700,000 from the Ford Foundation. The grant to the School of Engineering promotes cooperation between the faculties of that school and economics and political science, in an effort to understand better the factors that affect decision-making in the public works field. Primary attention will be focused on water resources, highway and urban transit projects.

Douglas H. Mendel, Jr. will be on leave from the University of California (Los Angeles) during the year 1961–62 as a Fulbright lecturer in political science in Taiwan.

Robert L. Morlan, professor of government at the University of Redlands, has been appointed as a member of the California State Scholarship Commission by Governor Edmund G. Brown.

Richard E. Neustadt on sabbatical leave from Columbia, will spend the next academic year at Nuffield College.

A. Gaylord Obern has been re-appointed as visiting associate professor of public administration at the University of Southern California with an assignment as consultant to the University of Rio Grande de Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Abramo F. Kenneth Organski has accepted an appointment as visiting associate professor of government at Columbia for 1961–62.

Robert Osgood, associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago, will be on leave from the University of Chicago during 1961–62 as research associate of the Washington center of foreign policy research and visiting lecturer at the school of advanced international studies.

Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania, the chairman of the international relations graduate program and a member of the South Asia regional studies program, will be on leave during the academic year 1961–62 engaged in research on major trends and developments in India and Pakistan and their implications for United States policy.

Mojmir Povolny, assistant professor of government at Lawrence College, will spend his 1961–62 leave of absence in France and in western and equatorial Africa.

Neal Riemer, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University has been awarded a Fulbright lectureship in American studies at the University of Innsbruck, Austria for 1961–62. He has been granted a sabbatical leave.

James N. Rosenau of Douglass College will be at Columbia in 1961–62 as visiting lecturer.

Eugene Rosi has accepted an appointment as instructor in Columbia College for next year.

Wallace S. Sayre of Columbia will spend the academic year 1961–62 in England.

Paul Seabury, associate professor of political science, University of California, Berkeley, will be on sabbatical leave during the fall semester.

Allen Schick of Yale University has become a member of the political science department of Tufts University for 1961–62.

Warner R. Schilling of Columbia will be on research leave next year on a Rockefeller grant made available to the department of public law.

Henry G. Schwarz, of the department of political science of the University of Wisconsin, has been awarded an inter-university fellowship for field training in Chinese. He will spend July and August at the Yale University Institute of Far Eastern Languages and then proceed to Taipei, Taiwan, where he will continue his training until July 1962.

Albert Somit, professor of public administration, graduate school of public administration at New York University, will be serving as the Chester W. Nimitz professor of social and political philosophy at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, during 1961–62.

Robert Strausz-Hupe, professor of political science and director of the foreign policy research institute of the University of Pennsylvania, was NATO professor of government at the University of Heidelberg from May to September 1961 by appointment of the secretary-general of NATO and with the consent of the German government.

John E. Turner of the University of Minnesota has been granted leave for the academic year 1961–62 in order to undertake a research project in Great Britain.

Vakur Versan of the University of Istanbul will be at Columbia as visiting professor during the coming year, giving a lecture course and seminar in the center of Turkish studies.

P. J. Vatikiotis, associate professor at Indiana University, was awarded a Guggenheim fellowship to study in the Near East and in England.

Ivan Volgyes has been appointed as lecturer in the Atlantic program of the University of Maryland commencing in September, 1961.

Benjamin Walter is spending the academic year 1961–62 at Vanderbilt teaching courses offered by Professor John C. Wahlke, who is co-director of the university's semester-in-France program at Aix-en-Provence.

Theodore P. Wright, Jr. assistant professor of government, Bates College, will be on leave of absence in 1961–62 to be a Carnegie Teaching Fellow in Indian civilization at the University of Chicago following a summer at Osmania University, Hyderabad, India.

J. K. Zawodny, research associate of the department of political science, Stanford University, has been appointed a fellow at the center for advanced study in the behavioral sciences for 1961–62.

IN MEMORIAM

Norman L. Stamps, associate professor of political science at Rutgers University, died suddenly on January 24, 1961, after a heart attack. His death cut short a very promising career. Professor Stamps was educated at the University of Kansas City where he received his B.A. and M.A. degrees. His graduate work was completed at Yale where he received his Ph.D.

Although only 42 years of age, Professor Stamps had made substantial contributions. He had written 16 major articles for professional journals. His book, *Why Democracies Fail*, added to our insight and understanding of the democratic process. At the time of his death, he had almost completed a major study in the field of comparative government.

Professor Stamps' teaching career which extended over a period of 14 years, began and ended at Rutgers. He was widely regarded as a brilliant teacher. In his command of subject and his method of presentation, Professor Stamps inspired the interest and devotion of his students. As a colleague, he gave unstintingly of both his time and effort to the work of the department. He will be sorely missed.

EDWARD McN. BURNS

John J. George, professor of political science at Rutgers university died suddenly on February 27, 1961, ending a long and vigorous academic career. Professor George received the A.B. degree from Washington and Lee in 1920, the A.M. degree from the University of Chicago in 1922, and the Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1928. He also attended Johns Hopkins University and the University of Wisconsin.

Professor George had a varied teaching career, beginning at Clemson College in 1919 and including periods of residence at Baylor University, Denison University, University of Wisconsin, University of Kentucky, University of Michigan, and Converse College. He came to Rutgers in 1929 as an assistant professor. He was appointed associate professor in 1939 and professor in 1946.

Professor George's special field of interest was motor carrier regulation, and many of his contributions to the scholarly journals were concerned with this topic. He also served frequently as expert consultant to governmental agencies concerned with the regulation of motor carriers. Professor George was the author of *Motor Carrier Regulation in the United States*, published in 1929 and long acknowledged as a standard work in the field. As a teacher, he dealt chiefly with American state and federal government, constitutional law, political parties, current politics, and allied subjects.

The scope of Professor George's activities extended well beyond the boundaries of the campus. He played an active part in a number of governmental agencies, including membership in the National War Labor Board for the New York Region, and the Alien Control Board. He was particularly active in local politics serving an elective term as member of the council of North Brunswick, New Jersey, and a term as mayor of the same municipality. An active member of the Democratic Party, Professor George was a candidate for Congress in 1946.

Professor George was possessed of enormous energy, which he expended without reserve in his teaching, writing, speaking, and political activities. His loss will be deeply felt by all those who knew him, whether as friend, colleague, or student.

EDWARD McN. BURNS

Clarence C. Ludwig, who retired in 1959 after twenty-four years of service as professor of political science, director of the Municipal Reference Bureau and executive secretary of the League of Minnesota Municipalities, died at his home in San Jose, California on February 10, 1961. He is survived by his wife, Virginia, and son, John.

Professor Ludwig was born in Arlington, Nebraska, in 1893. He graduated from Whitman College, Walla Walla, Washington, with honors and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. After serving with the Navy in World War I, he began his career in government research and administration in Rochester, New York. He served as executive secretary of the Multnomah County, Oregon, budget agency and was the first city manager of Albert Lea, Minnesota.

As a member of the political science faculty at Minnesota, he taught courses in municipal government, public administration, and planning. He participated in the establishment of the graduate training program in public administration in 1936 and the alumni of that program are especially appreciative of the practical emphasis which he brought to their study of public administration. In 1956, the University of Michigan sent him to Manila to serve as a local government consultant at the University of Philippines' Institute of Public Administration. In 1959, the Minnesota Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration selected him for its award for outstanding contributions to the art and science of public administration.

As director of the Municipal Reference Bureau and executive secretary of the League of Minnesota Municipalities, he personally exemplified the role of the University in service to the state, and his executive ability brought the League to top rank among similar organizations in the United States. His leadership in promoting metropolitan planning led to his appointment as the first chairman of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Planning Commission. He served as secretary of the Minnesota Highway Study Commission and was a member of advisory committees on Children and Youth, Suburban Problems, Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law, Anti-Recession Measures, the State Self-Survey, Water, Civil Defense, and Aeronautics. For a quarter of a century he worked for municipal progress in Minnesota. He was a staunch supporter of home rule and responsibility of local officials.

His national professional offices included the presidency of the American Municipal Association, the vice-presidency of the International City Managers Association, and membership on the National Committee of Municipal Accounting.

Integrity, firmness and persistence, leadership, and a kind and generous spirit were among his outstanding qualities. He leaves behind him a heritage of achievement—almost always through cooperation with others, for cooperation was woven into the fabric of his personal and professional life.

Asher Norman Christensen, professor of political science, died in Minneapolis on January 19, 1961. He is survived by his wife, Allison.

Professor Christensen was born in Little Falls, Minnesota, on July 11, 1903. He received his B.A. degree from the University of Minnesota in 1925 and served as assistant registrar from 1925 to 1930. His graduate work was done at the University of Chicago in 1930–31, at the University of Madrid in 1931–32 where he was a Carnegie Fellow in International Law, and at the University of Minnesota in 1933–35. He began his 26 years of service on the faculty of his alma mater as an instructor in political science in 1935. His major fields of interest were American government and politics, social legislation, and Latin-American governments and international relations. His large introductory lecture course in American Government brought him into contact with hundreds of undergraduate students each year. He was co-editor of a widely used book of readings on the American governmental system entitled, "The People, Politics, and the Politician" (1941). In the Latin American field he was one of the nation's leading and pioneering authorities. He edited a book of readings on *The Evolution of Latin American Governments* (1951) and contributed two chapters to a volume on *Government and Politics in Latin America* (1958). For ten years he edited the "Government" section of the *Handbook of Latin American Studies*. He gained a first-hand knowledge of Latin America through serving as a visiting professor at the Universidad Nacional del Litoral in Argentina in 1942, as cultural attache in the U. S. Embassy in Buenos Aires from 1942 to 1945, as visiting professor at the Universidad Central in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1947, and as a lecturer in other Central and South American universities. He was a frequent lecturer at American colleges and universities in this field. He was a professor at the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies in 1952, 1955, and 1957, and was Fulbright professor at the University College of Wales at Aberystwyth in 1954–55.

On the campus of the University of Minnesota, Professor Christensen probably will be best remembered for his outstanding capacity as a teacher and as a friend and counselor of students. He was awarded a citation during *SLA* Week in 1958 as a "distinguished teacher." He was also known, respected, and loved by a wide circle of colleagues and friends in both the academic and civil service staffs of the University and in the community.

On April 8, 1961, Walter Schaetzel, emeritus professor of constitutional and international law at the University of Bonn, died at Coblenz after a lingering illness.

Born on March 29, 1890 at Berlin, Schaetzel spent almost 50 years of his life as a judge, an official in the Prussian Justice Department, as a professor and an attorney admitted to various international courts of arbitration in the field of law—as a practitioner as well as a theorist. At Bonn where he began teaching after the end of World War II he organized the Institute of International Law which he managed until his retirement in 1958. Between the two world wars Schaetzel represented the Weimar Republic before the Paris Franco-German Court of Arbitration for more than six years, and since his retirement he worked restlessly at expert opinions, delivered lectures and prepared the final edition of his collected works—four volumes being published under the common heading *Internationales Recht* (Bonn: L. Rohrscheid publ.) The individual titles of the volumes are significant for the author's chief fields of interest and competence: Annexation in International Law; International Judicature; International Law and Citizenship; War and Customs (*Kriegsbrauch*).

In all his writings Schaetzel fought continuously against any *Zwang* (coercion) and denied the legality of any onesided annexation or bestowal of nationality (*Zwangseinburgerung*), views which brought him into conflict with the High

Command of the Nazi Wehrmacht in 1944. His thorough *Kommentar* to the German *Staatsangehorigkeitsrecht* (Berlin 1958: deGruyter publ.) is still the *magnum opus* in the field.

For many years—until his retirement—Schaetzel also carried the burden of a managing editor of the *Archiv des Volkerrechts*.

In the last years the very revered and popular teacher gave much time to the European refugees, their organizations and legal assistance, and to the Nansen-Institute at Vaduz, Liechtenstein, the roof organization of the homeless.

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

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

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

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